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1. Changes with respect to the DoA
N/A. 
2. Dissemination and uptake
Internally to the project, the deliverable provides useful background for the work under Work 
Packages (WPs) 2 and 3. Outside the project, the deliverable is appropriate for use by the broad 
community of experts and policymakers interested in the international governance of climate 
change. It provides a basis for identifying the challenges, barriers and opportunities that 
international climate governance faces from a sectoral system perspective, and thereby enables a 
more targeted approach to addressing the international decarbonisation challenge. 
3. Short Summary of results (<250 words)
Much mitigation-related governance activity is evident in a range of sectoral systems, and regarding 
particular governance functions. However, there is a tendency for this activity to relate to the easiest 
functions to address, such as ‘learning and knowledge building’, or to take place in somewhat limited 
‘niches’. Across all sectoral systems examined, the gap between identified governance needs and 
what is currently supplied is most serious in terms of the critical function of setting rules to facilitate 
collective action. A lack of ‘guidance and signal’ is also evident, particularly in the finance, extractive 
industries, energy-intensive industries, and buildings sectoral systems.  
Of the sectoral systems examined, the power sector appears the most advanced in covering the 
main international governance functions required of it. Nevertheless, it still falls short in achieving 
critical governance functions necessary for sufficient decarbonisation. Significantly, while the signal 
is strong and clear for the phase-in of renewable energy, it is either vague or absent when it comes 
to the phase-out of fossil fuel-generated electricity. The same lack of signal that certain high-carbon 
activities need actively to be phased out is also evident in financial, fossil-fuel extractive industry and 
transport-related sectors.  
More effective mitigation action will need greater co-ordination or orchestration effort, sometimes 
led by the UNFCCC, but also from the bodies such as the G20, as well as existing (or potentially new) 
sector-level institutions. The EU needs to re-consider what it means to provide climate leadership in 
an increasingly ‘polycentric’ governance landscape.  
4. Evidence of accomplishment
Several chapters are due be presented at the forthcoming Earth System Governance (ESG) 
conference, Utrecht (5th - 8th November 2018), where the authors successfully proposed a dedicated 
panel session on Assessing the Adequacy of the Global Climate Governance Complex après Paris. 
Otherwise, the results of the work are evident from the report enclosed.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The Task in Context 
Task 4.2 was designed to ‘address a series of related questions: What is the structure and 
composition of the existing international climate regime complex? How do its elements inter-relate? 
To what extent does the regime complex fulfil the governance functions identified in task 4.1 and 
how can existing gaps and overlaps be managed and addressed and overall effectiveness be 
improved? What is the current and future role of UNFCCC/Paris Agreement in the regime complex 
and important subsections of it?’ (COP21 RIPPLES, Description of Work, p17).  
As well as the role of the UNFCCC and the adequacy of the Paris Agreement (1), special attention 
was due to be paid to ‘(2) identifying implications and options for the EU to advance international 
climate governance arrangements under the UNFCCC’s Paris Agreement (and elsewhere, as 
appropriate), in particular with regard to core issues for the EU, such as transparency and 
accountability and the creation of an upward dynamic in ambition …’ and ‘(3) issue-specific sub-sets 
of the regime complex of particularly high relevance such as carbon pricing, subsidy reform, or urban 
development (Description of Work, p40). 
Deliverable 4.1 (Oberthür et al. 2017) laid much of the groundwork. Specifically, its sectoral 
differentiation provided a structure and guide for the process of mapping international and 
transnational institutions, and the assessment of their adequacy, in a novel way. It offered a guide to 
which governance functions are most important for individual sectoral systems. Deliverable 4.1’s 
analysis of the promise of international cooperation along sectoral system lines also provided ‘the 
point of reference for the assessment of related international cooperation, including the 
identification of scope for its further development’ (Oberthür et al. 2017). Task 4.2 sets out to 
‘analyse international governance as being advanced through various institutional arrangements, 
including international organisations, international regimes and transnational institutions and 
arrangements that interact with each other in specific ways. It follows that we … have to look at all 
institutions/ institutional arrangements that are relevant for a specific challenge/function in order to 
assess achievements and shortcomings (and to identify possible venues for enhancing governance)’ 
(Oberthür et al. 2017: 14).  
Deliverable 4.1 also confirmed the importance of private and ‘hybrid’ transnational initiatives, 
alongside more conventional inter-governmental institutions. In an increasingly ‘polycentric era’, any 
analysis of the governance landscape would otherwise be incomplete (Betsill et al. 2015, Jordan et 
al. 2018). Indeed, the Paris outcome itself offers strong indications that action outside the UNFCCC’s 
remit will play a key role, acknowledging and encouraging action by voluntary efforts, initiatives, and 
coalitions.1 In this project, the terms “institutional complexes” and “governance landscapes” are 
1 Decision 1/CP.21 (paragraphs 133-136), together with the Marrakech Partnership, take important first steps 
towards institutionalising the engagement with non-state and subnational actors and initiatives. 
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used interchangeably to denote this phenomenon (Oberthür et al. 2017). Research in other COP21 
RIPPLES tasks and work packages will focus on particular national-level governance arrangements, 
with potential to further enrich the project’s understanding of polycentricity in the future work. 
Deliverable 4.1 also offered a preliminary benchmark to define ‘adequacy’, to apply to the current 
governance landscape. This consists of two interlinked criteria: 
i) ‘international governance of the climate transition can be considered adequate if it
maximises the contribution of this governance level to climate mitigation, in line with
literature on the “problem-solving effectiveness” of international institutions … It is worth
noting, that in the context of the objectives of the Paris Agreement, problem-solving
effectiveness should not only cover the mitigation perspective (1.5/2°C goal), … but also
adaptation (Art. 2.1(b)) and financial flows consistent with low-GHG and climate-resilient
development (Art. 2.1(c))’.
ii) ‘Article 2.1 of the Paris Agreement posits that the global response to climate change has to
be strengthened “in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate
poverty”. It thereby highlights the second aspect of the adequacy of international
governance, namely that it be considered fair and socially acceptable. This requirement can
partially be justified on normative grounds, based on criteria of good governance. It can also
be derived from the effectiveness objective since governance arrangements that are not
considered fair and acceptable may not be stable and effective. […] (Oberthür et al. 2017:
12).
Despite acknowledging the importance of adaptation in the governance landscape, due to resource 
constraints it was have agreed to restrict analysis exclusively to mitigation-related aspects.  
1.2. Pointers from Existing Literature 
To date, the tendency has been for scholars to focus on either the multilateral (governmental) 
regime complex or more non-governmental, transnational spheres, without considering their 
interconnections. Most research has focused on multilateral institutions, for instance the linkages 
between the UN climate regime and the World Trade Organization (e.g. Bacchus 2017, Brewer 2003, 
van Asselt 2014). Michonski and Levi (2010: 1) identified over 16 international organisations in the 
UN system that are part of the ‘broader complex of multilateral institutions whose rules, decisions, 
and activities can be expected to have important consequences for international efforts to confront 
climate change’. Although such ‘regime complexity’ literature is useful, it has been liable to play 
down the role of non-state actors. Moreover, much of it emphasises the negative effects that actors 
can use to pick and choose according to their perceived interests: forum shopping, shifting, 
competition, and exploitation of legal ambiguities. Fewer works discuss the positive effects of 
complexity, such as innovation, experimentation, and the ability to avoid deadlock (Green 2013).  
This dichotomy between two supposed spheres is increasingly being abandoned in favour of 
recognition of a governance landscape that has characteristics of a complex system. Betsill et al. 
(2015: 2) note the possibility of the UNFCCC playing a coordinating role in the broader landscape, 
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based on the empirical observation that several initiatives (but not all) voluntarily define themselves 
in relation to the UNFCCC. This sense is captured in Figure 1.1 below. 
Figure 1.1: The landscape of agreements and institutions on climate change 
Lines connecting different types of agreements and institutions indicate different types of links. In 
some cases, lines represent a formal agreement of a division of labour (e. g. between the UNFCCC 
and ICAO concerning aviation emissions). In other cases, lines represent a simpler mutual 
recognition (e. g. the accreditation of C40 cities by the UNFCCC). In others still, lines represent a 
functional linkage without any formal relationship (e.g. the relation- ship between the CDM and the 
NGO certification of carbon offsets). This is a rapidly-changing landscape and not all links may be 
captured (Source: IPCC 2014, p.1013).  
Others are more sceptical of the UNFCCC’s potential as a co-ordinator of international cooperative 
initiatives, regarding it as potentially too restrictive, and preferring a lead role for UNEP (Bakhtiari 
2017).  
Interesting overlaps may be noted between our agenda – to identify governance functions, and then 
assess how well they are fulfilled - and the kind of research proposed by Betsill et al (2015: 3): 
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‘Notions of complex systems are useful for understanding the global climate governance 
landscape, and for enabling us to reconceptualize the UNFCCC less as an authority that 
attempts to govern climate change in its entirety and more as a coordinating node in a diverse 
landscape of initiatives. … Rather than expecting the UNFCCC to do all of the hard work, 
however, we might consider how it could facilitate governance innovations and activities 
beyond the treaty regime’. 
‘To ensure a more effective response to the climate problem, we argue that there is a need to 
think more critically about how different parts of the climate governance landscape are or 
could be connected. We contend it is useful to (1) consider the governance functions that need 
to be performed; (2) look across the governance landscape to think about where and how 
those functions can be performed; (3) and analyze how more effective divisions of labor [sic] 
could be facilitated by creating linkages between the UNFCCC and other types of governance 
arrangements. It is also important to consider types of linkage that may undermine the 
activities of individual governance initiatives, as well as the question of the power and 
authority relationships working across the landscape’.  
To a large extent our work picks up this agenda, but views it through a particular, sectoral system-
specific lens and with particular governance functions in mind. 
1.3. Methodology 
The task began with the construction of an extensive Excel database recording governance activity 
by relevant international institutions or transnational initiatives, reflecting the conceptual 
framework developed under Task 4.1. 2  As initially constructed, it contained over 150 entries, 
compiled in large measure by drawing on the following online databases:  
i) UNEP’s Climate Initiatives Platform, which tracks ‘international cooperative climate
initiatives’3;
ii) The International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database Project4;
iii) The UNFCCC’s International Cooperative Initiatives Database5;
iv) The UNFCCC’s ‘non-state actor zone for climate action’ (NAZCA) database.6
Following Widerberg et al. (2016), four criteria had to be met by an institution/initiative for it to be 
included in the database: 
2 Particular credit is due to Zoha Shawoo for setting up the database while at the University of East Anglia. 
3 http://climateinitiativesplatform.org 
4 https://iea.uoregon.edu/  
5 https://unfccc.int/topics/mitigation/resources/portal-on-cooperative-initiatives  
6 See http://climateaction.unfccc.int/. NAZCA captures the commitments to climate action by companies, cities, 
subnational, regions, investors, and civil society organisations. 
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i) it is international or transnational;
ii) it displays intentionality to steer the behaviour of its members;
iii) it explicitly mentions a common governance goal related to climate change mitigation;
iv) it has identifiable governance functions.
Criterion (iii) was interpreted flexibly in building the database, to allow inclusion of certain initiatives 
with significance for mitigation effort whose official documentation (as recorded on their websites) 
does not explicitly state a GHG reduction goal. This allowed the inclusion of several potentially 
important initiatives related to renewable energy, and to significant developments in the ozone 
regime (namely the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, by which hydrofluorocarbons, which have high global warming potentials, are included 
in the Protocol, and their use as substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons is therefore phased out). 
Similarly, ‘climate-relevant overarching institutions’ such as the G20 and World Trade Organisation 
were also included, although many initiatives focusing on sustainable development in general were 
considered ‘out of scope’. 
The database classifies the actors involved in terms of: 
• Public/ formal inter-governmental
• Private/firm
• State/non-state hybrid forms
• Civil society
The relationship to the UNFCCC is recorded. So too is the role of the EU in relation to each initiative, 
with a view to potential recommendations for how the EU could address gaps identified in the post-
Paris governance landscape. EU relevance has been recorded primarily in terms of the participants, 
funding and scope of each initiative. An effort was made to classify the entries in the database in 
terms of their potential contribution to fulfilling the governance functions outlined in Deliverable 
4.1.  
The first ‘cut’ produced the picture illustrated in Figure 1.2. The intention is that this will be updated 
in future publications. 
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Figure 1.2: Number of institutions/ initiatives per sectoral system: initial count. (NB. Some of the 152 initially 
collected span multiple sectors. Efforts to update/ specify this picture further are ongoing). 
Given limited resources, in conducting deeper analysis it was decided to concentrate on seven 
sectoral systems: power, energy intensives, extractive industries, finance, international transport, 
land-based transport and buildings. These were chosen in view of their: 
• High contribution to global emissions;
• Potential to be governed at inter-/transnational level;
• Prominent finance and technical issues;
• Potential relevance for EU, and to the ‘issue-specific sub-sets of the regime complex of
particularly high relevance’ highlighted by the Description of Work (carbon pricing, subsidy
reform and urban development).
Consideration was also given to avoiding overlap between systems, though this is inevitable to some 
extent. 
Following a common template, a more detailed set of assessments was then conducted for each 
sectoral system. These were designed to confirm the importance of individual governance functions 
for decarbonisation in each case (based on analysis conducted for Deliverable 4.1 (Oberthür et al. 
2017), identify the role of different institutions and initiatives in addressing them, highlight gaps in 
terms of fulfilment of the most critical functions, and thereby assess the adequacy of the overall 
picture. Scores of ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ were used to record judgments over the extent to which 
the governance demands identified are being fulfilled in each sectoral system. The assessment took 















0 10 20 30 40 50
Energy-intensive Industry
Products and Appliances
Waste and Resource Efficiency
Fluorinated GHGs











functions in the sectoral system. As a final step, scope for further development of identified 
potential for international cooperation was considered, including the possibility of establishing new 
institutions or initiatives, better co-ordinating or ‘orchestrating’ those that currently exist, and 
opportunities for the EU to offer leadership.7  
Following the framework for ‘adequacy’ set out in Oberthür et al. (2017), each sectoral analysis also 
considered fairness and social acceptability aspects. Concerning fairness, the question of whether all 
relevant actors are contributing to emission reduction effort, in particular those who have most 
responsibility for present and past emissions, and/or most capacity to act, was considered. Social 
acceptability was deemed to relate to the perceived legitimacy of relevant institutions and processes 
(including issues of balance of representation within them between developed and developing 
countries), and how far they meet with criticism and opposition. These aspects were considered in 
so far as they were judged likely to affect ultimate effectiveness of mitigation action.  
For each sectoral analysis, individuals with detailed sector knowledge were approached and either 
interviewed or asked to comment on draft assessments (or both). Where they have given their 
permission, these individuals are acknowledged in the relevant chapters. 
1.4. Future Plans 
This deliverable should be regarded as a staging post on the way to a (more readily digestible!) 
planned journal special issue or book project by the authors. Its findings will continue to be updated 
in the light of both emerging developments (such as in the international aviation sector, where 
decisions are imminent at the time of writing) and reviewer comments that time constraints have 
prevented from being acted upon fully. Several chapters are due be presented at the forthcoming 
Earth System Governance (ESG) conference, Utrecht (5th - 8th November 2018), where the authors 
successfully proposed a dedicated panel session on Assessing the Adequacy of the Global Climate 
Governance Complex après Paris.8  
1.5. Structure of the Report 
Before the seven sectoral system assessments are set out, chapter 2 examines the UNFCCC and Paris 
Agreement, and the extent to which they fulfil the governance functions that have provided the 
common reference point for our analysis. The deliverable then presents the series of sectoral 
assessments (chapters 3-9). In the interests of comprehensiveness and coherence, we have included 
significant extracts from the respective sectoral analyses presented in Deliverable 4.1. In doing so, 
we have also taken the opportunity to update our analysis in some respects. Combining the analyses 
in this way allows us to present the important characteristics of each sector, decarbonisation 
7 ‘Orchestration’ refers to activity whereby states or international organisations multiply their influence by 
initiating, guiding, broadening, and strengthening transnational governance by non-state and/or sub-state 
actors (Abbott 2018). 
8 http://www.earthsystemgovernance.net/utrecht2018/a-homepage-section/  
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pathways and options, barriers to change and potential for international cooperation to fulfil the 
most critical governance functions in each case, before mapping the current institutional landscape 
against these needs, identifying gaps, and then suggesting potential means to address them at 
sectoral level.  
In the concluding chapter, key findings from the assessments are reviewed and synthesised. The 
importance of the equity and social acceptability aspects of adequacy are also drawn together and 
highlighted. Conclusions related to the (potential) role of the EU in the different sectoral systems, 
and in terms of promoting progress within the framework of the UNFCCC - particularly regarding 
upward ‘ratcheting’ of ambition in the post-Paris climate regime – are also offered. 
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2. The UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement and Functions of International
Governance
Lukas Hermwille, Wolfgang Obergassel, Florian Mersmann and Tim Rayner 
2.1. Introduction 
In recent years international climate governance has become increasingly fragmented (van Asselt 
2014), or polycentric (Jordan et al., 2018). Since 2010, a wide range of governance initiatives have 
been mushrooming (Bulkeley et al., 2014; e.g. Widerberg and Stripple, 2016; Roger, Hale and 
Andonova, 2017) that are broadly intended to complement the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement 
(PA). The result is an increasingly complicated network of institutions and international organisations 
which have been described as a “regime complex” (Keohane and Victor, 2011; Abbott, 2012; Orsini, 
Morin and Young, 2013). 
The climate regime may be complex in the sense of being an arrangement of a wide range of 
fragmented institutions and organisations, but also in a further, systems-theoretical sense (Pattberg, 
2017). A feature of complex systems is that the interactions between their various elements produce 
emergent properties that cannot be explained by an analysis of the individual elements alone. This 
may also be true for the climate change regime complex. In other words: the climate change regime 
complex may be more than just the sum of its elements. 
When addressing the question of the adequacy of the climate change regime complex, this project 
adopts a sectoral systems perspective that helps to break down overall transformation challenges 
implied by the 1.5°C goal of the PA into more specific governance challenges which, in turn, can be 
addressed to varying degrees by international (rather than national or sub-national) governance. 
Despite growing ‘polycentricity’, the UNFCCC, and in particular the Paris Agreement, still assume a 
central role within the wider regime complex (see figure 1.1 in chapter 1). Arguably, three factors in 
particular lie behind this special role:  
(1) The PA defines and institutionalises the collective vision for global climate action in terms of
the 1.5/2°C long-term temperature limitation goal. When assessing the adequacy of the
wider regime complex, this long-term goal of the PA is the ultimate benchmark.
(2) Besides defining the goal of international climate policy, the UNFCCC and the PA are key
institutions that help achieve this goal. In particular, the UNFCCC and PA provide the
fundamental transparency/ accounting system for tracking individual and collective
progress; eventually, the results of all climate change mitigation actions will materialise in
the national GHG inventories that are mandated by the UNFCCC/PA. The UNFCCC and the PA
thus do not only provide the benchmark for global climate action but also the ultimate
measure for effectiveness in making progress against their goals.
(3) The PA’s 5-yearly ambition cycle and periodic global stocktakes of climate action create
political moments that can mobilise climate action across the entire regime complex and all
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governance levels. While the failed negotiations for a new global climate agreement in 
Copenhagen were a “diplomatic disaster” (Grubb, 2010), that summit was still a success in 
that the extraordinary public attention it created served as a catalyst for climate action in 
civil society and in many cases also at subnational and transnational levels. Paris and the 
preparatory process beforehand functioned similarly. The PA now makes sure that there will 
be similar moments of high political and public attention every five years (cf. Schüssler, 
Rüling and Wittneben, 2014). 
We therefore focus on the UNFCCC and PA as the central hub of the climate change regime complex. 
The PA will be assessed with respect to the five governance functions outlined in WP4.1: (1) 
guidance and signal function; (2) setting rules to facilitate collective action; (3) transparency and 
accountability (including compliance); (4) means of implementation (capacity building, technology 
and finance); and (5) knowledge diffusion and learning.  
2.2. Guidance and Signal Function 
Long before the adoption of the PA, the UNFCCC and the associated negotiation processes were 
instrumental in framing the climate change problem. Initially, climate change was framed in terms of 
a classical environmental problem (Vogler, 2016). The core components of the problem were the 
pollutants, and the proposed remedies focussed on the end-of-pipe curtailment of them. This 
paradigm was ultimately institutionalised in the Kyoto Protocol that not only defined emission caps 
(so-called Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Obligations – QELROs) for developed 
countries but also promoted the ‘basket’ approach in which all major greenhouse gases were 
included under a common metric.9 The global warming potential of CO2 (over a period of 100 years) 
has been used as a point of reference to calculate conversion factors for all other greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). In so doing, it was possible to come up with a common currency for all GHGs expressed in 
CO2 equivalents (CO2e).  
The concept of the 2°C goal, i.e. to prevent global mean temperature rise from exceeding 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels, was first introduced in the political discourse by Angela Merkel, then 
Environmental Minister of Germany and President of COP1 in Berlin in 1995 (Randalls, 2010). It 
follows from this logic of climate change as an environmental problem. A common approach for a 
wide range of environmental problems is to define environmental thresholds or safe limits. The 
below 2°C goal in its original form, although inadequate from today’s scientific point of view, can be 
read as such a threshold (Jaeger and Jaeger, 2011).10 
9 GHGs in addition to CO2 are methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
10 Note that recent research shows that 2°C should not be considered safe. As the final report of the 
Structured Expert Dialogue of the 2013-2015 review highlighted: “The ‘guardrail’ concept, in which up to 2 °C 
of warming is considered safe, is inadequate and would therefore be better seen as an upper limit, a defence 
line that needs to be stringently defended, while less warming would be preferable” (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 18).  
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With the failure of the US to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, geopolitical shifts and the growing share of 
developing countries in total GHG emissions and a new dimension was added to the framing of the 
problem. Climate change was increasingly seen as being linked to the issue of a development issue. 
China and in particular India rejected attempts to impose on them any formal mitigation obligations 
as a curtailment of their right to develop. The paradigm of climate change as a development issue, 
however, was never fully embraced by the UNFCCC negotiations. In fact, it has been argued that 
COP15 in Copenhagen ended in a diplomatic disaster precisely because of this lack of appreciation of 
the developmental implications of climate change (Moomaw and Papa, 2012; Hermwille et al., 2017). 
In recent years, the framing of climate change has seen yet another paradigm shift – or rather, 
another issue expansion. It is now increasingly seen as a transformation challenge (WBGU, 2011; 
Hermwille, 2016), requiring a fundamental transformation of global societies and economies. The 
question is whether this transformation can be governed towards sustainable, climate resilient and 
decarbonised economies in a timely enough fashion to avoid the kind of transformation that would 
occur through catastrophic impacts of unabated climate change. 
The PA can be read as an institutionalisation of this new paradigm. With its structuring element of 5-
yearly ambition cycles (see below) and the newly formulated strengthened long-term temperature 
goal expressed in Article 2 (and further operationalised in Article 4.1), it creates the framework and 
ambition signals required for achieving the former kind of transformation. At the same time, by 
elevating adaptation and in particular by establishing a separate article on “loss and damage” 
(Article 8), it provides a foundation to adapt to and deal with unavoidable effects of the latter kind of 
transformation. In reality, of course, both transformations will happen simultaneously. Adaptation 
and loss and damage should not be considered as only a backstop for insufficient mitigation. 
Mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage actions all have to happen in parallel. 
On the very aggregate level, the PA provides a collectively agreed vision for the global 
transformation. Not only is the temperature limit enshrined for the first time in an international 
treaty law, but it is also strengthened compared to the previous “below 2oC” formulation11: “Holding 
the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2oC above pre-industrial levels”, the 
agreement contains and "to pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels". This outcome reflected that recent climate science has more and more underlined 
that the below 2 °C limit cannot be taken to be a secure ‘guardrail’, but would in all likelihood mean 
severe damages from climate change (UNFCCC, 2015). Reflecting this new understanding, the PA 
11 Earlier language in the Cancun Agreements (1/CP.16 para 4) recognized the scientific consensus that “deep 
cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required (...) with a view to reducing global greenhouse gas 
emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C above pre- industrial levels, and 
that Parties should take urgent action to meet this long-term goal, consistent with science and on the basis of 
equity” (UNFCCC, 2011, para. 4). 
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reflects this new understanding in its 1.5°C goal. It changed the notion of the 2°C “goal” expressed 
already in Copenhagen and adopted in Cancún one year later into a hard well below 2°C “limit”; the 
new “goal” is 1.5°C.  
In terms of the signalling function of the PA, the most important achievement is arguably something 
else. Article 4.1 provides a new translation of the ultimate objective of the Convention: to prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. While the Copenhagen and 
consequently Cancún COPs operationalised this in terms of a temperature goal, Paris now provides 
the next step and translates its strengthened long-term temperature goal into a global call for 
decarbonisation. Parties agreed that, firstly, global greenhouse gas emissions need to peak “as soon 
as possible”, secondly, that rapid reductions thereafter are needed and, thirdly, that "a balance 
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases” is needed 
“in the second half of this century" (Art. 4.1). Given that it will probably not be possible to reduce 
emissions from agriculture and some industrial processes to zero, the available sink capacity will be 
needed to compensate for emissions from these sources, which means that all emissions that can be 
reduced to zero need to be reduced to zero. In fact, the majority of scenarios that are 
commensurate with the long-term goal of limiting global warming to 1.5/well below 2°C even 
foresee significant negative emissions, i.e. through increased sink capacities or technologies such as 
bioenergy in combination with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) or direct air capture of CO2 (van 
Vuuren et al., 2018). The long-term goal as formulated in the PA is thus synonymous with a call to 
global decarbonisation by the second half of the century, and much earlier even in developed 
countries. This is the main message from Paris: the age of fossil fuels is coming to an end. 
This signal provided by the PA can in turn offer strong legitimation for the growing civil society 
movements against coal power plants, mines, pipelines and other carbon-intensive infrastructure. 
Comparable to the Final Act of Helsinki that provided dissidents in the former Soviet Bloc with a 
crucial reference for their work, opponents of fossil infrastructures can now point to the goals of the 
PA to justify their activities. 
Nevertheless, the 1.5°C goal may also be a double edged sword. While the goal provides a strong 
mandate for climate change mitigation, the implications for adaptation may be challenging, because 
all optimism notwithstanding, the collective climate action seen to date and reflected in current 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) is far from sufficient to deliver an emissions trajectory 
consistent with achieving the 1.5°C goal. Implementing the initial commitments contained in 
intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) has been projected to put the world on course 
for a 2.7°C increase at best, with 3-4°C increasingly likely (UNFCCC, 2016a; UNEP, 2017). The promise 
of the 1.5/2°C target may, hence, send an insufficient signal for adaptation (Jordan et al., 2013; 
Sharma, 2017). Specifically, Article 7.1 of the PA states that Parties agree to “strengthening 
resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to [...] ensuring an adequate 
adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2” (UNFCCC, 2016b, 
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Art. 7.1).12 The inconsistency between the aggregate likely effect of current NDCs with the overall 
temperature goal has been highlighted explicitly in the decision adopting the Agreement, which 
“notes with concern” that the contributions “do not fall within least-cost 2°C scenarios but rather 
lead to a projected level of 55 gigatonnes in 2030” (UNFCCC, 2016c, para. 17).  
The UNFCCC for a long time has promoted a paradigm with accounting for emissions at its core. 
Owing to its history, in particular under the Kyoto Protocol, there is still a widespread sentiment that 
emission caps are the most adequate approach to address climate change (Sterk and Hermwille, 
2013; Hermwille et al., 2017). Limiting emissions in such a way creates a scarce resource around 
which a distributional conflict emerges (Moomaw and Papa, 2012; Hourcade and Shukla, 2013). 
Stiglitz opines that, “if emissions were appropriately restricted, the value of emission rights would be 
a couple trillion dollars a year – no wonder that there is a squabble over who should get them” 
(Stiglitz, 2010; see also Stiglitz 2006).  
The PA and in particular the bottom-up NDC cycle overcome this paradigm of a “zero-sum game”. 
Countries are required to develop their climate change policies in line with other national interests. 
While synergies between climate policy and for example development or industrial policies have 
been dubbed “co-benefits” in the UNFCCC negotiations in the past, in many countries these co-
benefits now take a much more prominent role in domestic climate policy debates. The NDCs have 
the potential to become a tool of collectively developing and institutionalising expectations and 
interests. This, in turn, is intended to reduce uncertainty and stimulate targeted innovation and 
investment across all sectoral systems. 
2.3. Setting Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
One way to overcome collective action problems13 may lie in strong legal contracts and rigid non-
compliance provisions that can effectively halt free riders (Fearon and Wendt, 2002; see also 
Oberthür et al., 2017). This section discusses the legal form of the PA and the extent to which it 
addresses climate change as a collective action problem. 
The PA has been criticised for the lack of legal ‘bindingness’ of its provisions, and in fact its legal 
character was a major bone of contention in the negotiations (Obergassel et al., 2015, 2016; 
Bodansky, 2016; Oberthür and Bodle, 2016). To a great extent, the legal form was designed to 
accommodate the political constraints of the US constitutional system (Oberthür and Bodle, 2016), 
where international treaties need to be ratified by the Senate by a two-thirds majority. Because in all 
12 Only in Art. 7.4 do Parties recognise “that the current need for adaptation is significant and that greater 
levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs 
can involve greater adaptation costs”. 
13 We define collective action problems here in economic terms: While it is collectively rational to act on 
climate change, but from an individual country perspective it is more economically attractive to “free ride” on 
the efforts of others. 
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likelihood this was almost impossible to achieve, given the increasing tribalism in domestic politics, 
the US delegation made sure that the PA did not contain any substantial legal obligations that would 
have triggered the need for it to be ratified by the US Senate (e.g. new obligations with respect to 
finance). Furthermore, the Agreement was adopted as a separate international treaty rather than as 
a formal protocol according to Article 17 of the Framework Convention. Instead Parties opted for a 
new form of international accord dependent on a larger convention treaty, creating a legal construct 
that is at the same time an international treaty and not: under the Vienna Convention, and therefore 
under international law, the PA clearly qualifies as an international treaty; and yet to accommodate 
US political circumstances and domestic ratification processes, under US law, the Agreement falls 
under a category of “international agreements other than treaties” and thus it could be ratified by 
executive order without a Senate vote (for a detailed discussion see Obergassel et al., 2015, p. 247f). 
Consequently, the PA contains relatively few mandatory legal requirements on Parties in terms of 
“obligations of results”. There are, however, a range of “obligations of conduct” (Oberthür and Bodle, 
2016): for example, procedural obligations, particularly with respect to the preparation, and 
communication and maintenance of successive Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) every 5-
years – Articles 4.2, 4.3, and 4.8, 4.9 – and accounting for NDCs as well as GHG inventory reporting 
and reporting information necessary to track progress in implementing and achieving NDCs – 
Articles 4.13 and 13.7 (Bodansky, 2016). Yet, the realisation by a Party of its NDC is not mandatory in 
itself, leading to the conclusion that “[d]eveloped country targets have been watered down from the 
legally binding, comparable commitments they had under the Kyoto Protocol, to softer, weaker, 
disparate pledges under the Paris Agreement“ (Depledge, 2016, p. 10). On the other hand, the PA 
includes a legally binding obligation on Parties to implement policies and measures towards 
achieving NDCs. As per Article 4.2 “Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim 
of achieving the objectives of such contributions“ (UNFCCC, 2016b, Art. 4.2 – emphasis added). 
Under the Trump administration in the US, the question has arisen as to whether a Party can re-draft 
its NDC in order to lower its ambition. While the EU appears willing to countenance such a 
development, as the price of keeping the US within the Agreement (Neslen 2017), others fear the 
example it would set to other states and consider that for this and other reasons, less harm would 
be done if the US withdraws completely (Kemp 2017; Ott et al. 2017). 
These problems notwithstanding, the UNFCCC and the PA have set rules to facilitate international 
collaboration in a number of different ways that can overcome collective action problems. For 
example, a precondition for international collaboration is a forum in which Parties can discuss in a 
spirit of mutual trust and cooperation. Arguably, the adoption of the PA saved the process of 
environmental multilateralism from falling into irrelevance (Obergassel et al., 2015, 2016). As the 
COP President Laurent Fabius declared in Paris: “if, today, we were so misfortunate as to fail, how 
could we rebuild hope? Confidence in the very ability of the concert of nations to make progress on 
climate issues would be forever shaken” (Fabius, 2015). 
While the PA did not create many substantive targets or commitments, it created a set of procedural 
rules that help to provide a collective picture of the increase in ambition required to be consistent 
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with the 1.5°C goal and to stimulate and synchronise climate policy processes on the national and 
international level that respond to this need. The 5-yearly cycle of communicating new and updated 
NDCs that present a progression beyond the status quo (the so-called ‘ratchet mechanism’), and 
taking stock of implementation of the Agreement to assess collective progress under periodic global 
stocktakes creates a “pacemaker” that establishes periodic moments of high-level political and 
public attention, and mandates periodic review of policy processes and ambition of climate action.  
With regard to the facilitation of collective action and avoidance of free riding, the lack of a common 
standard and/or information requirements for the NDCs must be considered a weak spot of the PA. 
In the run-up to COP21, Parties were unable to agree to a common set of information requirements 
for the NDCs (Ott et al., 2014). Consequently, NDCs are extremely diverse: some including Kyoto-
style economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets, others formulating commitments in terms 
of reductions of emission intensity or from a BAU scenario. Some countries even formulate non-GHG 
targets and instead focus for example on the restoration of forests or increased deployment of 
renewable energies. Last but not least, some countries did not make any result-based commitments 
but committed to specific behaviour by outlining specific policies and measures. Discussions on a 
more rigid framework of information requirements for the next round (updated) NDCs is still being 
negotiated as part of the “rulebook” for the PA that Parties have agreed to prepare for adoption at 
COP24 in 2018 (see section 2.3 below). 
Two other aspects in which the UNFCCC and the PA have contributed to a facilitation of collective 
action have already been mentioned above. The first refers to standardisation: the UNFCCC and in 
particular the Kyoto Protocol established a standard of accounting for GHGs in an aggregated way 
expressed in CO2 equivalents. On the one hand, this may have helped making commitments and 
achievements more comparable. It has also provided the basis for emission trading, a tool for 
countries and private actors to cooperate in mitigation activities. 14  Fungibility of mitigation 
outcomes is a key prerequisite for the establishment of carbon markets.  
The second aspect regards to the resolution of distributional conflicts. As discussed above, climate 
change for a long time was framed around “burden sharing” and the division of the remaining 
“environmental space”. A wide range of different approaches to operationalising equity principles 
have been proposed (see for example Vieweg et al., 2014). While the distributional conflict has not 
been resolved, by focusing on NDCs developed with national interests at their core, the PA has 
found a way to circumvent it such that it no longer stands in the way of a comprehensive agreement. 
Voigt and Ferreira argue that the PA addresses the issue of equity “in three complementary ways: 
firstly, on a principled basis, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (CBDR-RC), in the light of different national circumstances; secondly, in the content of its 
14 With its project-based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC has also catalysed the 
development of a large set of standardised methodologies and tools for measuring, reporting and verifying 
emission reductions at the project level in a wide range of different sectors (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012).  
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articles, in particular on mitigation, finance and transparency; and thirdly, on the basis of the 
principles of progression and highest possible ambition, which represent new and dynamic aspects 
of differentiation.” (Voigt and Ferreira, 2016, p. 285).  
2.4. Transparency and Accountability 
In this section we address the transparency and accountability function as a means to support 
collective action in line with the definition of the function in Oberthür et al (2017). The provisions of 
the PA’s enhanced transparency framework (Art. 13) are pertinent but not entirely congruent with 
this governance function.  
Article 13 among other things requires parties to account for their NDCs, report at least biennially 
their GHG inventories and include information necessary to track progress towards the respective 
country’s NDC. Moreover, this information is supposed to be subjected to international expert 
review and multilateral consideration of its progress (Mace, 2016). The purpose of the information 
generated from the enhanced transparency framework is to inform the global stocktakes (according 
to Art. 14) which in turn is supposed to assess the collective progress towards achieving the long-
term goals of the PA.  
Given the non-binding nature of NDCs (at least in terms of their realisation), the element of 
transparency is all the more important in the context of the PA. Essentially, the weak legal mandate 
is supposed to be offset by a mechanism of political accountability: a high degree of transparency 
paired with the 5-yearly cycle of global stocktakes that creates periodic moments of concentrated 
political and public attention. Although the key purpose of the Global Stocktake is to assess 
collective progress and to inform the next round of NDCs to be developed by Parties, the high profile 
of the event still places a political onus on policy makers to implement the NDCs and not to be 
identified as laggards. It thereby helps discipline national governments so as to avoid public shaming 
if they fail to deliver on their commitments (cf. Obergassel et al., 2015, 2016). The formula of the PA 
is therefore to complement accountability through a weak legal mandate with accountability 
through public scrutiny.
By making visible who is doing what, transparency is widely assumed to be vital to holding countries 
to account and building trust. Whether or not this formula will actually work crucially depends on 
the detailed modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) provisions under the transparency 
framework, which are being developed and negotiated as part of the “Paris rulebook”.  
At COP22 in Marrakech, Parties agreed to complete the PA Work Programme in time for it to be 
considered and adopted at COP24 in 2018 (Obergassel et al., 2017). In Paris, consensus on the 
transparency provisions under Article 13 issue was achieved only by finding a balance between 
developed and developing countries’ positions. Developed countries demanded more transparency 
and detailed information with respect to GHG emissions, mitigation activities and their effects from 
developing countries. Developing countries pushed developed counterparts to be more transparent 
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with respect to the means of implementation, in particular climate finance (Obergassel et al., 2015, 
2016).  
President Trump’s announced intention to withdraw the US from the PA could throw the 
negotiations on this issue out of balance.15 As stated above, the provisions for the transparency 
mechanism are still embryonic, yet parties have agreed that they become legally binding once 
agreed by the meeting of the PA’s parties (CMA). Whether or not the transparency mechanism 
framework works in the intended way will depend on parties agreeing to binding provisions inter 
alia on information requirements and procedures for subsequent NDCs (Art. 4.8 & 4.9), information 
on financial and technical support (Art. 9.7), and crucially information on GHG inventories and 
progress with implementation of NDCs (Art. 13.7). Whether the decisions that the CMA adopts 
pursuant to these articles are legally binding will depend on their phrasing in mandatory terms 
(Bodansky, 2016, p. 148).  
2.5. Means of Implementation: Capacity Building, Technology and Finance 
For developing countries to implement their NDCs effectively, industrialised countries will have to 
cooperate with developing countries in various forms. Some NDCs, such as India’s are explicit on this 
point. The basis for this obligation reaches back as far as the original text of the Convention (UNFCCC 
Art. 4). Support to developing countries in general should come in the form of finance, technology 
development and transfer, and capacity building.  
A large portion of the PA contains provisions for support to developing countries, albeit of varying 
strength: Article 9 deals with finance, Article 10 with technology development and transfer, Articles 
11 and 12 with capacity building and education (the “means of implementation” or MOI). The draft 
decision on the adoption of the PA contains a number of specifications to the articles mentioned 
above. 
Bearing in mind that especially finance and technology are "hard currency" not only in the climate 
realm, but have notable implications for country budgets, the history of climate diplomacy has seen 
fights over MOI at almost every COP. Perhaps more than anything else within these negotiations, 
MOI brings out the divisions and distributional conflicts between industrialised and developing 
countries.  
Climate change being one of the most malign governance problems of our time (Miles et al., 2002), 
distributional conflicts are not only common, but also highly asymmetrical. Developed countries 
have the most responsibility to act on climate change and provide support, but do not face 
immediately life-threatening consequences from a changing climate, whereas, many "receivers" do, 
but traditionally do not have the same bargaining weight. In cooperative terms, this creates an 
15 At the first negotiation rounds after President Trump’s announcement, the US delegation somewhat 
unexpectedly continued to play a constructive role in the transparency negotiations.  
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"upstream-downstream" problem (Mitchell, 2009) that is very hard to solve. However, many 
developing countries become considerable economic and political powerhouses in their own right. 
This also gives them a stronger bargaining position in climate negotiations, so there is a good chance 
that the cards for MOI are going to be reshuffled to have a more level playing field in coming 
negotiations.  
2.5.1. Finance 
In order to channel climate finance through UNFCCC channels, the Convention features a financial 
mechanism that serves both the Kyoto Protocol and the PA. It is operated by the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), and, since COP17, also the Green Climate fund (GCF). The financial mechanism and its 
operating entities are accountable to the COP, which decides on its policies, prioritisations and 
eligibility criteria for funding, assisted by the Standing Committee on Finance.  
The GCF is by far the largest funding mechanism under the UNFCCC. Countries, regional 
governments and the city of Paris have collectively pledged more than 10 billion USD so far (though 
cuts announced by the Trump administration will likely reduce that number by 2 billion) 
(Washington Post, 2017). 
Besides the GCF, two smaller funds exist under the convention, governed by the GEF: 
• the Special Climate Change Fund, designed to finance activities in developing countries in
relation to adaptation, technology transfer and capacity building, energy, transport, industry,
agriculture, forestry and waste management, and economic diversification;
• the Least Developed Countries Fund, which is mainly concerned with assisting LDCs in
formulating national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs).16
In addition, the Adaptation Fund (AF) was created under the Kyoto Protocol. Following a decision at 
COP22, it will also serve the PA. The AF is governed by its own board, and financed in part through a 
share of proceeds from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). While the amount of funding 
generated to date is not much, it is interesting for constituting an international levy that is 
independent of national states. In actual terms, the largest part of the AF's funding comes out of 
voluntary contributions by states. In recent years, it has been increasingly difficult for the AF to raise 
even its minimum amount of funding. 
Conflicts over provisions on finance within the international climate regime have always threatened 
to "break" the outcome of the negotiations as a whole, and Paris has been no different in this regard. 
Finance was among the last issues to be resolved before hammer-fall, and lost all qualifiers to the 
provision of climate finance in its first paragraph. It now only stipulates that "Developed country 
Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both 
mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention" 
16 The GCF and GEF are analysed further in chapter 3. 
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(UNFCCC, 2016b, Art. 9.1). The PA also encourages other Parties to "provide or continue to provide 
such support voluntarily" (UNFCCC, 2016b, Art. 9.2). This poses no additional binding obligation on 
developing countries, but recognises the growing level of South-South financial support. 
Some clearer language is retained in the decision text, where Parties have decided that "developed 
countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilisation goal through 2025 [...]; prior to 
2025 the [CMA] shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year..." 
(UNFCCC, 2016c, para. 54). With this, developed countries have committed themselves again to a 
(non-binding) finance goal. Moreover, with the second half of the paragraph, it is now clear that the 
promised 100 billion USD per year cannot be the ceiling of finance commitment, but rather a floor to 
scale up from before 2025. However, the paragraph may prove to be a double-edged sword for 
future negotiations, as the formulation of a "collective quantified goal" will once more open up 
fights over financing commitments by at least the economically stronger developing countries. 
The Agreement text itself does not contain any reference to the $100 billion mobilisation goal, or, in 
fact, any language that would imply an obligation to scale up climate finance from current levels. 
Financial obligations had been a clear red line for the US, as they would have required Congressional 
approval, in effect meaning that the US would have been unable to join the Agreement. With the US 
continuing to cut funding to already agreed funding mechanisms, it is still getting harder to ramp up 
much needed financial assistance for implementation. 
2.5.2. Technology Transfer 
A further crucial aspect to effective implementation of developing countries' NDCs is access to 
technologies that make a shift away from fossil fuel-based infrastructures possible. While always 
recognised, the issue of technology development and transfer had been out of the limelight of 
negotiations for some time, relegated to the work of the Convention’s Subsidiary Bodies.17 Thus, the 
further development of the Convention's Technology Mechanism, including the work of Technology 
Executive Committee (TEC), and the development and operationalisation of the Climate Technology 
Centre and Network (CTCN) had been of rather low profile. With the PA in place, there is now a 
renewed interest in strengthening this issue under the UNFCCC. 
Both the Technology Mechanism and the TEC/CTCN will serve the Agreement. As a result of 
developing country pressure, the PA establishes a technology framework (tabled initially by the 
African Group) in order to provide guidance to the Technology Mechanism. The technology 
framework also serves to pursue the long-term vision of all Parties set out in paragraph one of Art. 
17 The Article 9 and 10 of the UNFCCC respectively establish the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical 
Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). Both are permanent fora regularly meeting 
two times a year. The bodies are open to all Parties and are task to provide information and advice on 
scientific and technological matters (SBSTA), and assessment and review of the effective implementation of 
the Convention (SBI). 
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10, citing “the importance of fully realising technology development and transfer in order to 
improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (UNFCCC, 2016b, Art. 
10.1). 
Another key feature of the PA is the establishment of a clear link between technology and finance. 
As set out in paragraph five of Article 10, the acceleration, encouragement, and enablement of 
innovation is not only to be supported through the Technology Mechanism, but also through the 
Financial Mechanism of the Convention. (UNFCCC, 2016b, Art. 10.5).  
Predictably, Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) do not appear in the Agreement text. The mention of 
IPRs has always been a red line issue for many developed countries, and it cannot be expected that 
this will change in the foreseeable future. However, the link between technology and finance at least 
acknowledges that finance could be needed for the acquisition of copyrighted technologies. 
Whether this will be sufficient to close the chapter on IPRs again remains to be seen. 
2.5.3. Capacity Building 
Capacity building had in the past been another low-profile element of the UN climate regime's 
support structure. While industrialised countries had always recognised it as an essential element, 
especially for least-developed countries, developing countries had never managed to bring the issue 
to the top of the agenda. However, consistent progress in developing the architecture has been 
made over recent years, with the Durban Forum on Capacity-Building, a multi-stakeholder forum for 
sharing ideas and lessons learned, the most visible outcome in 2011. 
The PA recognises the importance of the issue, but the text is relatively weak and non-binding. 
However, the accompanying decision text contains a negotiation success for developing countries: 
the creation of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building, with an aim to "address gaps and needs, 
both current and emerging, in implementing capacity-building in developing country Parties and 
further enhancing capacity-building efforts, including with regard to coherence and coordination in 
capacity-building activities under the Convention” (UNFCCC, 2016c, para. 72). The Committee’s 
2016-2020 work plan contains a number of different issues related to the existing capacity-building 
framework under the Convention, as well as capacity gaps that should be addressed by Parties. Each 
year, the Committee focuses on a special topic, and holds annual in-session meetings where these 
areas can be addressed.  
Apart from these relatively limited contributions in supplying capacity building resources, the 
UNFCCC and in particular the development of (I)NDCs has created strong demand for capacities, a 
demand that was met in many developing countries by creating new national institutions and/or by 
mainstreaming climate policy into line ministries (Day et al., 2015). Whether this effect is best 
thought of as a contribution for capacity building or as an instance of institutional learning is an 
open question.  
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2.5.4. Knowledge and Learning 
The UNFCCC has fostered knowledge creation and learning in a number of ways, directly and 
indirectly. One central direct mechanism under the UNFCCC is the obligation on Parties to regularly 
submit GHG inventories, National Communications and biennial reports (developed countries) or 
biennial update reports. As noted above, the GHG metrics form the core of the UNFCCC’s common 
language and are the key benchmark for its effectiveness. National Communications provide a 
wealth of information about national circumstances and actions being taken. Information about 
national emission profiles is a key prerequisite for developing suitable mitigation strategies.  
However, while the process of developing national communications may have served as a motor of 
knowledge aggregation at the national level, the information contained in them has generally not 
been used to promote mutual learning at the international level. Country reporting on policies and 
measures, in particular, could have been a key basis for organising exchanges on lessons learned, but 
has so far remained largely untapped (Hilden et al 2014, Schoenefeld et al 2016).  
The situation has changed somewhat in recent years through the work under Workstream 2 of the 
Ad-hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP) and other subsequent initiatives. Workstream 
2 was tasked with elaborating ways to increase ambition before 2020. While the original idea was to 
get countries to increase their mitigation pledges, work has increasingly re-focused on identifying 
mitigation potential and best practices. Following the initiative of the AOSIS group of countries, a 
series of technical expert meetings (TEMs) have been convened, in order to create a space for non-
political and facilitative discussions. The first of these meetings was held at COP19 in Warsaw 2013 
as an in-session workshop on urbanisation and the role of sub-national governments in facilitating 
climate action in cities (Sterk et al., 2013). Building on this positive experience, parties agreed to 
continue this format also during the intersessional meetings in 2014 and at COP20 in Lima.  
However, in practice the results in terms of facilitating diffusion of knowledge were rather limited, in 
particular because a constructive discussion between delegates – usually senior staff of ministries of 
the environment or foreign affairs – and highly specialised issue experts was difficult to maintain. 
While the TEMs worked well in identifying best practice solutions they had very limited success in 
getting governments to actually adopt them (Hermwille, forthcoming). Consequently, the series of 
TEMs was complemented by high-level events of the so-called Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), 
which provided a stage to showcase particularly successful initiatives and announce new ones.  
Although the mandate of the ADP ended at COP21, Parties agreed to continue the series of TEMs, 
now dubbed “technical examination processes” (TEPs), under the joint auspices of the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA). Parties also encouraged the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to engage in the process, and to 
provide information with respect to its contribution to the implementation of policies and measures 
identified in the TEP. Building on the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, Parties have also agreed to convene 
high-level events in conjunction with each COP between 2016–2020, and to appoint two high-level 
champions to facilitate high-level engagement.   
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COP22 in Marrakech was accompanied for the first time by a parallel large-scale technological 
solutions conference hosted by the Government of Morocco and co-organized by the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), the UN Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network (SDSN) and the ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI). 
The UNFCCC has indirectly promoted learning through its function as ‘pacemaker’ for national 
discussions. In particular the landmark summits in Copenhagen and Paris confronted all countries 
with the question of what their contributions could be to the new agreements under negotiation. 
The UNFCCC thus galvanised national assessments and policy development, promoting better 
understanding of available options and mainstreaming of climate policy in governments (cf. Day et 
al., 2015).  
The UNFCCC has also promoted learning by requesting work from others such as the IPCC, e.g. the 
2018 report on the 1.5°C limit. Generally, the UNFCCC has repeatedly raised new research questions 
(such as the implications of the 1.5°C goal) and has created ample demand for all kinds of climate 
services from natural science of the climate system, to socio-economic implications of 
decarbonisation pathways up to research on specific climate policies. 
Last but not least, the UNFCCC has also indirectly promoted learning through its Kyoto Protocol 
instruments such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). By 
incentivising private actors to identify and mobilise mitigation potential, these instruments have 
contributed to putting climate mitigation on the agenda of many private companies and getting a 
better picture of mitigation options and costs. These instruments have also contributed to building 
capacity on how to quantify GHG emissions and reductions. In China and possibly also in other 
countries, the capacity built by the CDM arguably contributed to the establishment of national 
emissions trading (Ba, Thiers and Liu, 2018). 
2.6. Discussion and Conclusions 
With its new 1.5°C goal and operationalisation in Art. 4.1, the PA provides a strong overarching 
signal towards for the decarbonisation of all sectors. Yet, the signal still entails various ambiguities 
and, more importantly, needs to be broken down and translated into sectoral targets and 
trajectories. For example, one such ambiguity relates to the role of natural gas in the power sector. 
On the one hand, gas can contribute to short-term emission reductions by substituting coal and also 
help to provide flexibility to accommodate increasing shares of intermittent renewable energy; on 
the other, in the long-run natural gas, like all other fossil fuels, needs to be phased out. For other 
sectors such as energy-intensive industries, the ambiguity of the signal is even greater, given that 
the (technological) pathways towards decarbonisation to date remain much less visible.  
The PA’s focus on procedural rules and obligations of conduct does not sufficiently address direct 
and indirect competitiveness concerns of many sectors (as explored in various chapters of this 
report). Transparency is closely related to rule setting. UNFCCC provides transparency at the 
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aggregate level, but does not provide sufficient granularity to meaningfully inform sectoral 
transformations. Of course, the UNFCCC is no longer the “only game in town”. Other inter- and 
transnational institutions may already fill this gap to some extent (as explored in the chapters to 
follow). 
While the amount of finance and the lack of ‘bindingness’ of the financial commitment constitute a 
major weak spot of the PA, the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism with the Green Climate Fund (see 
chapter 3) still constitute a potentially powerful lever. To fully employ it, the UNFCCC must 
collaborate with other international institutions. Coordinating with multilateral development banks 
(MDBs) is already happening to the extent that the World Bank and other MDBs are accredited 
entities to the Green Climate Fund and help to disburse the available funding. Another candidate for 
closer coordination would be the Mission Innovation initiative, a global initiative of 22 countries 
committing to increase funding on research and innovation for clean energy.  
While the UNFCCC has historically contributed to knowledge creation and diffusion, it has done so 
mostly in an indirect or inadvertent way. The kind of knowledge and learning we have identified as 
required to facilitate sectoral transformations in the various sectors analysed below are not within 
the purview of the UNFCCC. Importantly, though, the UNFCCC has served as a centre of demand for 
related research. 
As stated above, the UNFCCC is no longer the only game in town. Instead, it is only one - albeit 
important - element within a wider international climate governance landscape (Pattberg and 
Widerberg, 2017). Given the deficiencies that we have identified above, this must be considered a 
good thing. The PA alone cannot meet the sector-specific governance needs. The question is, 
whether and to what extent other inter- and transnational institutions can fill in the gaps. The 
subsequent analyses of seven key sectoral systems will address this question in more detail. 
2.7. References 
Abbott, K. W. (2012) ‘The transnational regime complex for climate change’, Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy, 30(4), pp. 571 – 590. doi: 10.1068/c11127. 
Ba, F., Thiers, P. R. and Liu, Y. (2018) ‘The evolution of China’s emission trading mechanisms: From 
international offset market to domestic Emission Trading Scheme’, Environment and 
Planning C: Politics and Space, online first, pp. 1–20. doi: 10.1177/2399654417751928. 
Bodansky, D. (2016) ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’, Review of European, Comparative 
& International Environmental Law, 25(2), pp. 142–150. doi: 10.1111/reel.12154. 
Bulkeley, H. et al. (2014) Transnational Climate Change Governance. Cambridge University Press. 
CDM Policy Dialogue (2012) Climate Change, Carbon Markets and the CDM: A Call to Action. CDM 
Policy Dialogue. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
36 
Day, T. et al. (2015) Preparation of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) as a 
catalyst for national climate action. International Partnership on Mitigation and MRV. 
Available at: https://www.transparency-
partnership.net/sites/default/files/indc_as_catalyst.pdf (Accessed: 21 June 2017). 
Depledge, J. (2016) ‘The Paris Agreement: A Significant Landmark on the Road to a Climatically Safe 
World’, Chinese Journal of Urban and Environmental Studies, 04(01), p. 1650011. doi: 
10.1142/S2345748116500111. 
Fabius, L. (2015) ‘COP21 - Plenary session for the submission of the final draft text’. UNFCCC – COP21, 
Paris, 12 December. Available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-
policy/climate/events/article/cop21-plenary-session-for-the-submission-of-the-final-draft-
text-speech-by. 
Fearon, J. and Wendt, A. (2002) ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View’, in Handbook of 
International Relations. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 52–72. 
Grubb, M. (2010) ‘Copenhagen: back to the future’, Climate Policy, 10(2), pp. 127–130. 
Hermwille, L. (forthcoming) Making Initiatives Resonate: How Can Non-State Initiatives Advance 
National Contributions under the UNFCCC? mimeo. 
Hermwille, L. (2016) ‘Climate Change as a Transformation Challenge—A New Climate Policy 
Paradigm?’, GAIA  - Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society, 25(1), pp. 19–22. doi: 
10.14512/gaia.25.1.6. 
Hermwille, L. et al. (2017) ‘UNFCCC before and after Paris – what’s necessary for an effective climate 
regime?’, Climate Policy, 17(2), pp. 150–170. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2015.1115231. 
Hourcade, J.-C. and Shukla, P. (2013) ‘Triggering the low-carbon transition in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis’, Climate Policy, 13(sup01), pp. 22–35. doi: 
10.1080/14693062.2012.751687. 
Jaeger, C. C. and Jaeger, J. (2011) ‘Three views of two degrees’, Regional Environmental Change, 
11(1), pp. 15–26. 
Jordan, A. et al. (2013) ‘Going beyond two degrees? The risks and opportunities of alternative 
options’, Climate Policy, 13(6), pp. 751–769. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2013.835705. 
Jordan, A. et al. (2018) Governing Climate Change: Polycentricity in Action? Cambridge, United 
Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Kemp, R. (2017). A Systems Critique of the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate. In M. Hossain et al. 
(eds.), Pathways to a Sustainable Economy, Springer. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-67702-6_3. 
Keohane, R. O. and Victor, D. G. (2011) ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’, Perspectives on 
Politics, 9(01), pp. 7–23. doi: 10.1017/S1537592710004068. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
37 
Mace, M. (2016) ‘Mitigation Commitments Under the Paris Agreement and the Way Forward’, 
Climate Law, 6(1–2), pp. 21–39. doi: 10.1163/18786561-00601002. 
Miles, E. L. et al. (2002) Environmental regime effectiveness: confronting theory with evidence. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press (Global environmental accord). 
Mitchell, R. B. (2009) ‘The influence of international institutions: institutional design, compliance, 
effectiveness, and endogeneity’, in Milner, H. and Moravcsik, A. (eds) Power, 
Interdependence and Non-State Actors in World Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, pp. 66–83. 
Moomaw, W. and Papa, M. (2012) ‘Creating a mutual gains climate regime through universal clean 
energy services’, Climate Policy, 12(4), pp. 505–520. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2011.644072. 
Neslen, A., 2017. Anger at EU climate chief’s suggestion US can backtrack on Paris. Climate Change 
News. http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/09/25/anger-eu-climate-chiefs-
concession-trump-paris-agreement/ 
Obergassel, W. et al. (2015) ‘Phoenix from the ashes: an analysis of the Paris Agreement to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – Part I’, Environmental Law and 
Management, 27, pp. 243–262. 
Obergassel, W. et al. (2016) ‘Phoenix from the ashes: an analysis of the Paris Agreement to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – Part II’, Environmental Law and 
Management, 28, pp. 3–12. 
Obergassel, W. et al. (2017) Setting Sails for Troubled Waters: An Assessment of the Marrakech 
Climate Conference. Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie. Available at: 
http://wupperinst.org/fa/redaktion/downloads/publications/COP22-report.pdf (Accessed: 
16 March 2017). 
Oberthür, S. et al. (2017) Key concepts, core challenges and governance functions of international 
climate governance. Deliverable 4.1. Paris: COP21 RIPPLES Project (Horizon2020). Available 
at: https://www.cop21ripples.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Deliverable-4.1-Ripples-
Final2.pdf (Accessed: 23 October 2017). 
Oberthür, S. and Bodle, R. (2016) ‘Legal Form and Nature of the Paris Outcome’, Climate Law, 6(1–2), 
pp. 40–57. doi: 10.1163/18786561-00601003. 
Orsini, A., Morin, J.-F. and Young, O. (2013) ‘Regime complexes: A buzz, a boom, or a boost for global 
governance?’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International 
Organizations, 19(1), pp. 27–39. 
Ott, H. E. et al. (2014) ‘Climate Policy: Road Works and New Horizons – An Assessment of the 
UNFCCC Process from Lima to Paris and beyond’, Environmental Liability, 22(6), pp. 223–238. 
Pattberg, P. (2017) ‘Weltumweltpolitik im Anthropozän: kompliziert oder komplex?’ Umweltpolitik 
im Anthropozän, Konferenz des AK-Umwelt, Postdam, 7 April. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
38 
Pattberg, P. and Widerberg, O. (2017) ‘The Climate Change Regime’, in von Storch, H. (ed.) Oxford 
Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.013.46 (Accessed: 2 January 2018). 
Randalls, S. (2010) ‘History of the 2°C climate target’, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate 
Change, 1(4), pp. 598–605. 
Roger, C., Hale, T. and Andonova, L. (2017) ‘The Comparative Politics of Transnational Climate 
Governance’, International Interactions, 43(1), pp. 1–25. doi: 
10.1080/03050629.2017.1252248. 
Schüssler, E., Rüling, C.-C. and Wittneben, B. B. F. (2014) ‘On Melting Summits: The Limitations of 
Field-Configuring Events as Catalysts of Change in Transnational Climate Policy’, Academy of 
Management Journal, 57(1), pp. 140–171. doi: 10.5465/amj.2011.0812. 
Sharma, A. (2017) ‘Precaution and post-caution in the Paris Agreement: adaptation, loss and damage 
and finance’, Climate Policy, 17(1), pp. 33–47. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2016.1213697. 
Sterk, W. et al. (2013) Warsaw Groundhog Days. Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institute for Climate, 
Environment and Energy. Available at: http://wupperinst.org/a/wi/a/s/ad/2447/. 
Sterk, W. and Hermwille, L. (2013) ‘Does the Climate Regime Need New Types of Mitigation 
Commitments?’, Carbon and Climate Law Review, 7(4), pp. 270–282. 
UNEP (2017) The Emissions Gap Report 2017: A UN Environment Synthesis Report. Nairobi: United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available at: http://edepot.wur.nl/426310 
(Accessed: 28 May 2018). 
UNFCCC (2011) Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. Document 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. 
UNFCCC (2015) Report on the structured expert dialogue on the 2013-2015 review. 
FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at: 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2015/sb/eng/inf01.pdf (Accessed: 28 
May 2018). 
UNFCCC (2016a) Aggregate effect of the intended nationally determined contributions: an update. 
Document FCCC/CP/2016/2. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Available at: http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/9240.php (Accessed: 29 
February 2016). 
UNFCCC (2016b) Paris Agreement. Bonn: United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_
.pdf (Accessed: 3 March 2016). 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
39 
UNFCCC (2016c) Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris 
from 30 November to 13 December 2015. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. Paris: United Nations 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf (Accessed: 3 February 2016). 
Van Asselt, H. (2014). The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance: Consequences and 
Management of Regime Interactions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Vieweg, M. et al. (2014) Squaring the circle of mitigation adequacy and equity: options and 
perspectives. Climate Change 15/2014. Dessau-Roßlau: Umweltbundesamt. 
Vogler, J. (2016) Climate Change in World Politics. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Voigt, C. and Ferreira, F. (2016) ‘“Dynamic Differentiation”: The Principles of CBDR-RC, Progression 
and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement’, Transnational Environmental Law, 
5(2), pp. 285–303. doi: 10.1017/S2047102516000212. 
Van Vuuren, D. P. et al. (2018) ‘Alternative pathways to the 1.5 °C target reduce the need for 
negative emission technologies’, Nature Climate Change. doi: 10.1038/s41558-018-0119-8. 
Washington Post (2017) Trump will stop paying into the Green Climate Fund. He has no idea what it 
is. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/06/02/trump-
will-stop-paying-into-the-green-climate-fund-he-has-no-idea-what-it-
is/?utm_term=.80df2f0fbb00 (Accessed: 3 May 2018). 
WBGU (2011) World in Transition – A Social Contract for Sustainability. Berlin: German Advisory 
Council on Global Change. Available at: http://www.wbgu.de/en/flagship-reports/fr-2011-a-
social-contract/ (Accessed: 12 January 2015). 
Widerberg, O. and Stripple, J. (2016) ‘The expanding field of cooperative initiatives for 
decarbonization: a review of five databases: The expanding field of cooperative initiatives for 
decarbonization’, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change. doi: 10.1002/wcc.396. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
40 
3. Financial Sector
Bianka Kretschmer, Mahlet Melkie, Luis Zamarioli, Damon Jones 
3.1. Transformation Challenges and Governance Demands 
3.1.1. Current Status and Prospect 
In this analysis, we treat the financial sector as a complex sectoral system with challenges that are 
inherent to finance and its own structures, and other challenges that are directly linked to other 
sectors, such as energy, transport, analysed at length elsewhere in this report. The overarching 
challenge posed is how to finance the low-carbon transition while at the same time steering finance 
and investments away from current carbon-intensive trends, thus avoiding the lock-in of 
unsustainable development pathways. This has led to the new paradigm of what civil society 
organisations have termed “shifting the trillions” (of dollars) in the world’s economy. 
Technologies and new business practices that objectively boost the low-carbon transition need 
massive amounts of investments to survive the so-called “valley of death” and to diffuse, 
mainstream and supplant old carbon-intensive alternatives (Grubb, Hourcade and Neuhoff, 2014). 
In its last assessment report in 2014, the IPCC finds with high certainty that substantial emission 
reductions would require large changes in investment patterns by both the public and the private 
sector. For mitigation scenarios which stabilise concentrations in the range of 430 to 530 ppm CO2-
eq by 2100, annual investments in low carbon electricity supply and energy efficiency in key sectors 
(transport, industry and buildings) are projected to rise by several hundred billion dollars per year 
before 2030 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014).  
The Paris Agreement (PA)’s strengthened 1.5°C warming limit implies that an even greater scale and 
speed is necessary in shifting investments. Estimates of investment needs have been made available 
based on different methodologies, relative to different timeframes and sectors, making 
comparability difficult. Nevertheless, as a common trend, these estimates identify the order of 
magnitude for annual investments needs in climate action by 2020 to be well beyond USD 1 trillion 
(Mission 2020, 2017). The OECD, building on IEA and IRENA’s joint analysis of additional investment 
required in low-carbon technologies to achieve the 66% probability of 2°C scenario, estimated that 
the investment required to remain below 2°C will be USD 6.9 trillion per year over the next 15 years 
for new infrastructure, which represents merely a 10 per cent increase relative to the USD 6.3 trillion 
of annual infrastructure investment needs before taking into account climate issues (OECD, 2017). 
This number is to be compared with current infrastructure spending of around USD 3.4 to USD 4.4 
trillion. 
The long lifespan of infrastructure in sectors such as energy and transport means that investments 
must start to shift now towards an increased alignment with the goals of the PA, if we are avoid the 
risk of locking in future GHG emissions and fostering financial instability from large-scale ‘stranding’ 
of assets (OECD, 2017). While global investment in clean energy has been rising, volumes of finance 
for high carbon energy in all countries remain considerably higher (UNFCCC, 2016). Global climate 
finance flows have been growing from 97 billion USD in 2009/10 (Climate Policy Initiative, 2011) to 
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an annual average of 367 billion USD in 2013/2014, with the majority (93 per cent) of these funds 
going to efforts to reduce GHG emissions in three main areas: renewable energy generation, energy 
efficiency, and sustainable transport (Climate Policy Initiative, 2016). Similarly, public and private 
mobilised climate finance for developing countries has been growing over the past decade reaching 
an average of USD 57 billion per year for 2013/2014 (OECD/ CPI, 2015). This remains a small portion 
of government subsidies for fossil fuel consumption which reached around USD 513 billion a year 
globally in the same period (International Energy Agency, 2014). Public support by G20 governments 
in subsidies to fossil fuel production has been estimated at USD 444 billion a year (Bast et al., 2015). 
A global removal of fossil fuel production subsidies would result in estimated GHG emissions 
reductions of up to 37 GtCO2eq over the period 2017–2050 (Gerasimchuk et al., 2017). To put this in 
context, total global GHG emissions in 2014 were 51 GtCO2eq (Gütschow et al. 2017).18  
Including the private finance side, capital expenditure on fossil fuel supply has been increasing 
steadily between 2000 and 2014, tripling in real terms. The trend was only interrupted in 2009 by 
the financial crisis and more recently by the steep drop in global energy prices. More recent 
estimates of “brown” finance (i.e. high-carbon financing and investments) put global investments in 
oil, gas and coal supply in 2015 at USD 900 billion, representing a decline of 18% from the USD 1.1 
trillion in the peak year 2014 (OECD/IEA, 2016). It remains to be seen whether this is a lasting change 
in the investment flows. 
Hence, it is clear that global investments still fall significantly short of what is needed to achieve 
national climate targets and global goals and are not yet consistent with the necessary transition 
away from fossil fuel financing. The financial transformation challenge is best illustrated by putting 
climate finance numbers and annual infrastructure needs in the context of total assets under 
management (see Figure 3.1 below).  
These trillions of global assets are controlled by private entities, including the global banking sector, 
worth USD 140 trillion; institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, 
managing over USD 100 trillion; and capital markets including bonds and equities of over USD 100 
trillion and USD 73 trillion respectively (Climate Policy Initiative, 2016). On the other hand, public 
financing aimed at mitigating climate change remains key in its role of directly mobilising and 
leveraging private sector investment and indirectly creating scaled up and commercially sustainable 
markets for low-carbon technologies (Maclean et al., 2008).  
The PA recognises the financial challenge as one of its overarching goals: The Agreement “aims to 
strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable 
development […], including by […] making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (Article 2.1(c)). In doing so, the 
Agreement’s text highlights the role and potential of international cooperation in aligning the global 
financial system with the Sustainable Development Goals and this goal of the PA.  
18 More detail on the issue of fossil fuel production subsidies can be found in chapter 6 on extractive industries.  
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The financial system is key for permitting and boosting the low-carbon transition on several fronts. 
Firstly, it does so by supporting concrete climate mitigation actions and the appropriate enabling 
environments. It also ensures that financial assets and portfolios become climate-aligned by 
internalising the costs of emissions to assets and mainstreaming climate risks into financial decision-
making. Finally, decarbonisation efforts have to move from specific responsible investing niches 
towards reforming the financial system as a whole, so it can serve as a lever for a wide 
transformation permeating all other sectors of the real economy.  
Figure 3.1: Global climate finance in context (UNFCCC, 2016) 
3.1.2. Main Challenges and Barriers toward Decarbonisation 
As in other sectors, the financial low-carbon transition is already underway but needs to be 
accelerated from incrementalism towards transformation. While much focus has been put on 
curbing emissions from specific sectors and pushing actions to regulate carbon intensity on the firm 
level, the financial sector holds the power to allocate capital to (i) “brown” and “climate-misaligned” 
activities, hence slowing down the implementation of the PA goals, or to (ii) “climate-aligned” 
activities, which can be considered as the entirety of investments flowing within the financial sector 
that do not pose objective obstacles to the PA, such as investments towards all goals of the 
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Sustainable Development Goals. Finally, as a sub-section of climate-aligned activities, we can define 
the (iii) “green” or “climate-focused” activities that are not only climate-aligned, but also essential 
for decarbonisation goals, such as investments into technologies and business models that can effect 
a transformational transition, including in renewables, energy efficiency, electric vehicles etc.  
Decisions to invest in brown, climate-aligned or green activities are often carried out according to 
very short-term calculations of expected returns, creating a failure in financial markets to internalise 
medium to long-term risks and costs of climate change, potentially slowing down the transition if 
not properly addressed. Here, even when specific mechanisms are created to boost additional 
capital to green sectors, it’s still important to understand and trigger a broader transformation of 
the financial system (United Nations, 2018) to a direction that is consistent with decarbonisation 
pathways, in an effort to make all investments climate-aligned.  
The “corporate veil” that separates firms from shareholders means that investors are protected to 
the limit of their investments from corporate actions and any liability arising from them. This 
effectively shields the financial sector from the objective responsibility for actions on the ground, 
allowing for a quicker and freer movement of capital, at the same time reducing the incentives for 
effectively including climate risks more comprehensively in the sector’s decision-making 
(Richardson, 2008). This might indicate one of the reasons why the internalisation of mitigation costs 
and climate risks is still under-represented on the portfolio level, with institutional and private 
investors still largely failing to acknowledge any positive correlation between socio-environmental 
criteria and financial performance (Friede, Busch and Bassen, 2015). Simply put, the sector works 
under the underlying assumption that a climate-aligned portfolio will not necessarily outperform a 
mixed or a brown one, even if the latter creates additional and externalised costs to society.  
In order to correct this market failure, a growing number of initiatives have been put forward, such 
as those informing investors about the climate-alignment of assets through carbon content and 
climate-risk disclosure, policies to incentivise long-term investments over short-termism, capacity 
building to improve literacy regarding climate risks across investor classes. They seek to enable a 
holistic transition by internalising costs and risks into the financial decision-making. As an example, 
policy frameworks influencing investments in the energy sector may need to be reformed so that 
fossil fuel externalities are internalised into production and consumption practices. By setting strong 
carbon prices and eliminating distorting fossil fuel subsidies and other support to fossil fuels, 
governments can send a clear signal to the market about the increasing costs for running climate-
misaligned activities. Such clearer policy direction, when coupled with new climate-related 
information from carbon disclosure requirements, allows investors to assess better climate risks. The 
result is likely to be a mix of both climate-misaligned investments becoming increasingly more 
expensive, for example in the form of higher interest rates or shortened repayment horizons, and 
investors moving away altogether from these risky investments with time.   
This “moving away” can be translated into decreasing return expectations for the fossil fuel sector, 
stranding their assets over time. The reassessment of assets’ value as costs and opportunities forms 
a part of the transition risks of climate change (Carney, 2015), making it imperative that a transition 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
44 
begins early and follows a predictable path in order to avoid a domino effect followed by a financial 
crisis from bursting the carbon (-intensive) bubble. However, it’s important to underline that even 
with fears about the speed of this re-pricing process, or the “bursting of the carbon bubble”, climate 
risks from inaction and slow decarbonisation continue to mount at a fast pace, posing even greater 
risks for financial stability and future taxpayers (Kraemer, 2017), who are left with the burden and 
liabilities of today’s flawed regulations and irresponsible investment decisions into carbon-intensive 
sectors. 
In order to achieve a climate-aligned financial sector, as well as to develop climate-focused financial 
instruments and investment criteria to enable the decarbonisation, there are economic, political, 
institutional and knowledge challenges and barriers that need to be addressed: 
A. Inconsistent Policy Signals by Governments
Inconsistent policy signals by governments are significant barriers for a decisive and orderly low-
carbon transition. The PA has given a clear signal that strengthening the global response to the 
threat of climate change needs to make financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG 
emissions and climate-resilient development. Given the all-encompassing characteristic of the 
decarbonisation goal, it is essential that policies are created and managed with a bigger picture 
perspective in mind, seeking to correct inconsistencies across all sectors that might erode the 
pursuit of the ultimate target of net-zero carbon emissions in the second half of the century.  
According to OECD’s Secretary General Angel Gurría, “the sum effect of policy misalignments in an 
economy can significantly undermine the effectiveness of climate policy efforts” (OECD et al., 2015), 
making it of tantamount importance to identify and correct misalignments in policy domains such as 
investment, taxation, innovation and skills, trade, adaptation, and areas such as electricity, urban 
mobility and rural land use.  
As an example, governments’ ongoing backing and support to fossil fuel production creates market 
distortions by sending contrary signals to investors, which continue to make bad investment 
decisions and profit in the short-term from fossil fuels (Gerasimchuk et al., 2017) while externalising 
risks and leaving cost burdens for future generations. Clear long-term policies and sufficient 
regulatory frameworks are needed to send appropriate signals to markets and investors, and to 
incentivise the engagement of the private sector (OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017). While various efforts 
and initiatives such as carbon trading and fossil fuel subsidies reform have started to shift 
investments, these are generally at insufficient scale and still in early phases. G20 countries have not 
lived up to their commitment to phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, even though they 
account for 75% of global GHG emissions and about 82% of global energy-related CO2 emissions (see 
chapter 6). While these countries have decreased the energy and carbon intensity of their 
economies, they are still at the early stages of decarbonisation and their collective efforts are not yet 
sufficient to lead to an overall reduction in GHG emissions. While renewable energy in these 
countries is on the rise, fossil fuels still dominate the energy market with coal being the primary 
energy supply for most G20 countries (Climate Transparency, 2017). 
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Subsidies to fossil fuel production further distort energy markets by lowering costs of oil, coal and 
gas production, thereby signalling to the market about potentially higher economic rent and 
increased revenue per invested unit from these activities.  This is the case, including in comparison 
to other climate-aligned investments. This is one of the main reasons why energy efficiency and 
clean energy investments still remain less competitive in some markets (Gerasimchuk et al., 2017). 
Some studies have found that a barrier for removing fossil fuel consumer subsidies, particularly in 
developing countries, is the rising cost of energy which is usually transferred to household 
consumers, which are most sensitive to price rises (Roberts, 2016). However, there are other studies 
that indicate eliminating fossil fuel subsidies does not affect all households equally, with higher 
income groups usually benefitting most from these subsidies (Coady et al., 2015). 
Beyond eliminating subsidies for fossil fuel production and consumption and other market 
distortions that block the internalisation of the full economic, social and environmental costs of GHG 
emissions, other market-based mechanisms intended to price carbon such as emission trading 
schemes or carbon taxes can provide further incentives to shift investments away from fossil fuels. 
However, remaining barriers to the market penetration of such mechanisms include low prices of 
carbon and their insufficient coverage relative to global GHG emissions, and non-equilibrium 
markets where price signals might not be directly taken up by players, such as energy sectors 
predominantly controlled by State-owned enterprises.   
Carbon pricing, if well designed, could be a tool to lower GHG emissions and shift investments to 
low-carbon sources of energy. Various studies indicate that even where carbon-pricing schemes are 
in place, such as in G20 countries, prices remain too low to encourage a substantial shift to low 
carbon economies (Climate Transparency, 2017). According to Carbon Pricing Watch (2017), the 
number of carbon pricing initiatives implemented or scheduled has almost doubled over the past 
five years, including 40 national and 25 subnational jurisdictions, responsible for about a quarter of 
global GHG emissions. However, only about half of the total emissions from these jurisdictions are 
covered by the carbon-pricing initiatives, leading to a total coverage of only about 15 percent of 
global GHG emissions or about 8 GtCO2eq (World Bank & Ecofys, 2017). Currently 60% of CO2 
emissions are priced at zero and less than 10% of the emissions are priced at EUR 30 or more (OECD, 
2017). The High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices has stated that. a carbon price level that is 
consistent with holding global temperature increase below 2°C is at least USD 40-80 per tonne of 
CO2 by 2020 and USD 50–100 per tonne of CO2 by 2030, with a supportive policy environment in 
place (Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2017). Since the study used scenarios to limit warming 
below 2°C with a greater than 66% probability, holding global temperature increase to well below 
2°C and limiting this to 1.5°C would imply carbon prices at the high range or above these estimates. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
46 
B. Lack of Information and Knowledge
Lack of information and knowledge is another barrier that institutional investors and central banks 
face. Though the awareness and responsiveness to climate related risks of asset owners and 
investors has increased, most of them still lack in-house capacity and experience to develop an 
informed view about climate change scenarios and strategise accordingly. Moreover, many of these 
investors find it difficult to incorporate climate risks into their investment strategies (EY Financials 
Climate Change & Sustainability, 2016). A study even found that central banks do not consider as 
their responsibility to mainstream climate change into their operational decisions (Matikainen et al. 
2017), which might be explained within the aforementioned context of  “corporate veil” and the 
limited responsibility over public costs of climate change to financial markets. 
C. Short-Termism
Another major barrier is the fact that investors tend to prioritise financing to short-term liabilities, 
impacting negatively on green investments which often require high upfront investment costs (Bank 
of England, 2017). High perceived risks, limited financial viability and limited long-term capital were 
identified as barrier for the private sector to invest in capital intense renewable energy projects 
(Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, 2016). Green investments typically suffer higher risk 
perceptions due to the relative lack of maturity of technologies, markets, and industries, especially 
in developing countries, and to the need of clear and long-term public policies signalling a path of 
change (Climate Policy Initiative, 2013). Moreover, investors often fail to recognise that delayed 
action should have a significant impact on stranded assets (IRENA, 2017). An overarching challenge 
is therefore how to channel the financial capability to support the low-carbon transition in the real 
economy. While governments remain important investors in sectors such as energy, with 42% share 
of investments in 2016 against 47% from the private sector (IEA, 2017), public money is starting also 
to be leveraged strategically to attract increased private capital to critical sectors and technologies. 
This can be done through the different types of “blended finance”, in which public money is used in 
mechanisms such as risk mitigation instruments including risk pooling and transfer, public 
concessional financing and guarantees (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, 2016).  
D. Transparency and Accountability
While there is growing momentum for financial institutions to disclose climate risks in their 
investment portfolios to investors, the lack of coherent, comparable and standardised approach to 
assess and disclose risks remains the biggest barrier. In order to address this concern, the G20 in 
2015 requested the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to review how the financial sector can take 
account of climate related issues (TCFD, 2016). The Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures (TCFD), established by the FSB, designed a coherent but voluntary framework for 
disclosing clear, comparable and consistent information about the risks and opportunities of climate 
change. The Task Force recommended that climate-related financial disclosures should be 
mainstreamed into financial institutions’ public annual financial filings to inform investors and others 
on climate-related risks and opportunities (TCFD, 2017). The fact that it is voluntary continues to 
create challenges - with the exception of France, that became the first country to introduce 
mandatory climate change-related reporting for institutional investors in 2016 (Rust, 2016). 
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Disclosure and more transparent frameworks should produce better data, also important to 
advance climate-related criteria for financial markets, informing for example positive lists with 
investment priorities, qualitative conditions to determine projects that might receive funding, 
quantitative conditions with indicators and minimum thresholds for funding projects and negative 
lists with technologies, industries and sectors that might be excluded from financing (Höhne et al., 
2017). This is relevant for increasing consistent transparency and accountability.  
3.1.3. The Promise and Potential of International Cooperation (i.e. Governance Demand) 
Given the complexity of the financial sector, the overall demand for international governance for 
decarbonisation is very high, especially for the governance functions related to guidance and signal, 
setting rules to facilitate collective action, transparency and accountability, as well as knowledge and 
learning. The primary demands (summarised in Table 3.1) are as follows. 
The demand for guidance and signal in the form of consistent, credible and long-term climate 
policies is particularly high in order for investors and financial actors to align their decision-making 
with international climate objectives. A strong signalling effect is necessary to address the “tragedy 
of the horizons” (Carney 2015) and to bring long-term climate impacts and “social cost of carbon” 
(Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2017) into short-term financial decision-making. For example, 
investors and companies regularly call for a price signal that would correct policy and market 
failures, but this should be substituted with other regulatory measures whenever pricing is not 
effective (OECD et al., 2015). A cross-cutting signalling that goes beyond the energy sector must be 
carried out, such as in taxation, in innovation and skills and in international trade barriers. 
Fulfilling the setting rules function is crucial for developing and agreeing on international standards, 
benchmarks and metrics for 1.5 degree-compatible investments and carbon prices. This would 
provide clarity and consistency to public and private financial actors for how to align their portfolios 
and business models with the long-term temperature target. Ideally, international cooperation 
would facilitate collective mobilisation targets for climate-specific investments as well as targets for 
phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and high-carbon investments with clear timeframes and fair burden-
sharing approaches. Further, to track progress in redirecting global financial flows, common 
accounting and reporting rules are required that capture both high-carbon and low-carbon 
investments.  
Enhanced transparency and accountability regimes are essential for the decarbonisation targets set 
by the financial sector’s international governance. Within the financial sector, reforming investor 
duties and disclosure rules for investors and companies are a precondition to effect change in 
investment practices, as well as to hold financial institutions accountable to international finance’s 
targets. The need to fulfil this function is high, in order to address issues of free-riding, double-
counting, additionality of flows, as well as “green-washing” of continued high-carbon investment 
practices.  
International governance is required to facilitate the mobilisation of the means of implementation 
so developing countries can translate low-carbon and climate-resilient development strategies into 
climate investment plans ready for implementation. Further data on private financial flows and 
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carbon risks, which becomes possible with the increased transparency and accountability regimes, 
as well as institutional capacity-building, are necessary in both governments and financial 
institutions in order to build and implement international mainstreaming standards, performance 
metrics and disclosure rules. More advanced international financial institutions might acquire the 
role to provide capacity-building and to encourage other financial institutions such as national 
development banks in pursuing mainstreaming efforts.  
Exchange of knowledge and learning is critical to know which policies work best to mobilise climate 
finance and to shift financial flows away from climate-misaligned assets. International cooperation 
among financial institutions and investors is required to facilitate sharing of knowledge related to 
climate risk analysis and management in the financial sector.  
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Table 3.1: Synthesis of finance-related governance demands 
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3.2. Governance Supply 
There are a high number of existing intergovernmental and transnational initiatives and institutions 
relevant for international governance of climate finance specifically and the financial sector more 
broadly. While the UNFCCC and the PA in particular play an important role for setting targets for 
climate finance mobilisation, establishing specialised climate funds and sending policy signals to the 
private sector, several relevant investor- and industry-led initiatives have also emerged. Beyond the 
UNFCCC, a number of climate-relevant overarching institutions are also relevant for the finance 
sector, such as international development finance institutions.   
3.2.1. Finance in the UNFCCC 
As noted in chapter 2, under the UNFCCC, industrialised countries have an obligation to provide 
financial resources for the implementation of developing countries’ emission reduction and 
adaptation measures and have set collective mobilisation goals. Most notably, the 2009 Copenhagen 
conference of the parties produced the commitment by developed countries to jointly mobilise USD 
100 billion annually in public and private financing by 2020, with a portion of that flowing through 
the UNFCCC’s Financial Mechanism comprised of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GEF Trust Fund, established in 1992, is replenished with financial 
contributions every four years and administered by the World Bank. Besides the UNFCCC, it serves a 
number of other multilateral environmental agreements. Other trust funds under the GEF are the 
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). The Green 
Climate Fund was established in 2010 and capitalised with USD 10 billion as the largest dedicated 
climate fund with a clear mandate to contribute to the shift towards low-emission and climate-
resilient development pathways. Since 2010, the UNFCCC’s Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) 
has been mandated to assist with technical aspect of climate finance, with particular relevance for 
consistency in climate finance delivery and tracking of global climate finance flows to developing 
countries. Its authoritative reports (Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows) 
have pointed to methodological issues in accounting and reporting of climate finance and provided 
recommendations for improving consistency and comparability.  
The PA’s strongest signal for the decarbonisation of the financial sector lies in the first ever 
recognition of the role of financial flows for the achievement of the long-term temperature goal in 
international law. The aim to make all finance flows consistent with low-carbon development 
pathways is stipulated as one of the three overarching goals of the Agreement itself (Article 2.1(c) 
Paris Agreement). This includes both the alignment of overall flows away from carbon-intensive and 
misaligned activities and the scaling-up of available green finance for efforts and technologies 
enabling low-carbon transition. The Agreement also stipulates the need for scaled-up financial 
resources for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, with the accompanying decision 
establishing the existing target of USD 100 billion annually as a minimum level for the period of 2020 
to 2025, while postponing the formulation of a strengthened target to 2025 (UNFCCC, Decision 
1/CP.21, paragraphs 53 and 114). Finance is also part of the Agreement’s enhanced transparency 
framework and so-called 5-yearly periodic global stocktake (GST) ambition mechanism. The PA thus 
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constitutes the guiding framework for global climate finance governance through three main 
elements:  
i. Goal-setting: More broadly, the setting of the overarching vision that all public and private
global financial flows should be aligned with the long-term temperature goal; and
specifically the setting of collective public finance mobilisation targets to support the
transition in developing countries;
ii. Enhancing transparency and accountability: Developing internationally agreed rules and
methodologies for counting and reporting climate finance flows to developing countries;
iii. Facilitating tracking of collective progress: Every five years, as part of the Agreement’s
Global Stocktake, assessing progress towards achieving the finance goals of mobilising at
least 100 billion USD a year to developing countries and shifting financing away from fossil
fuels to low-carbon development.
Overall, the PA’s three overarching goals expressed in Article 2, in particular the strengthened long-
term temperature goal and the finance-related goal to make all finance flows consistent with low-
carbon development seem to partially satisfy the identified demand for guidance and signal. While 
it sends a strong signal to the private sector and financial actors, the PA lacks concrete provisions on 
how to achieve the finance goal.  Nevertheless the formal recognition of the role of global finance 
beyond North-South transfers for global decarbonisation signals that finance considerations need to 
form part of Parties’ mitigation contributions, reporting obligations and long-term low emissions 
development strategies.  
In the absence of an international price on carbon or an explicit commitment to phase out fossil fuel 
subsidies in the PA, Article 2.1(c) has a crucial role as a guiding framework and catalyst for related 
efforts outside of the UNFCCC, e.g. other fora such as G20 and financial institutions including MDBs. 
Hence its successful implementation will depend on other institutions of the climate regime 
complex. However, there is a high potential for the UNFCCC to play an important orchestration role 
in the assessment of collective progress towards achieving the PA’s goals through the 5-yearly 
periodic GST. If well-designed and coupled with the Agreement’s mandate to develop common 
financial accounting and reporting rules, the UNFCCC could serve as a framework for collective 
action and transparency/accountability for “shifting the trillions” by regularly assessing the 
alignment of global finance with the 1.5°C temperature limit. 
The three Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows reports from the SCF have 
started to develop metrics for putting climate finance figures in relation to global financial assets in 
the realm of trillions. In light of climate finance mobilisation targets that are well beyond identified 
investment needs under 1.5°C/ well below 2°C compatible scenarios and a lack of burden-sharing 
arrangements, the setting rules function is only partially satisfied. The potential for financial 
mobilisation is also somewhat limited under the UNFCCC as a bulk of necessary investment will have 
to come from the private sector.   
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3.2.2. Specialised Climate Funds Inside and Outside the UNFCCC 
As specialised funds, it is the mandate of climate funds to mobilise climate-specific financing. 
Mobilised public capital has been either invested directly in projects that fulfil the funds’ mandates, 
or increasingly seek means to attract additional commercial public and private capital through 
leveraging and “blended finance” in order to scale-up available financing. Climate funds are on their 
own a type of structure that can be used to mitigate financial risks and “crowd-in” additional private 
capital, channelling the mobilisation through instruments such as debt, equity and mezzanine 
instruments, guarantees and insurance, hedging, grants and technical assistance (OECD, 2018). 
i. The GCF, that initially mobilised US$ 10.3 billion in 2014, had at the time of writing a
portfolio of 76 approved projects with a committed fund of US$ 3.7 billion. Due to its
transformational mandate and business model of working with partner institutions including
national and international development finance institutions, civil society organisations and
those from the private sector, the GCF can encourage change within the partner institutions
towards low-carbon portfolios. This means that entities that are accredited under the GCF
must demonstrate a process towards aligning their investments with the goals set in the PA.
ii. The GEF, as the financial mechanism for numerous multilateral environmental agreements,
has adopted a strategy of supporting integrated solutions to environmental challenges such
as sustainable city development and deforestation, which have also great relevance for
lowering GHG emissions. The total climate funding available across the current GEF-6 and
previous GEF-5 replenishment periods amount to $3.03 billion (WRI 2017).
iii. G8 leaders recognised increased costs of climate change and set up the Climate Investment
Funds (CIFs) in 2008. Besides the UNFCCC climate funds, the USD 8.3 billion under the CIFs
have played a significant role in supporting 72 developing countries in their (adaptation and)
mitigation actions and mobilising financial resources through four funds: Clean Technology
Fund (CTF), Forest Investment Programme (FIP), Scaling Up Renewable Energy Programme
(SREP) and Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PRCR).
In the last decade, the three biggest climate funds (GEF, GCF and CIFs) have mobilised around $20 
billion in climate finance. However, the adequacy of the scale and delivery of resources can be 
questioned. In the context of the magnitude of the climate challenge and the goal to scale-up 
towards $100 billion annually by 2020 (including not only climate funds), $20 billion remains 
insufficient, and future pledges are uncertain. What is more, the World Bank-administered GEF and 
CIFs that channel resources largely through MDBs are not fully accepted by developing countries and 
civil society and have been criticised for a lack of country-ownership.  
This is one of the reasons why the GCF was set up and includes country ownership and direct access 
modalities in the core of its mandate. The direct access modality and readiness support programme 
indicate a stronger focus on capacity-building in developing countries. In addition to means of 
implementation, the GCF’s mandate to promote the paradigm shift and to jointly mobilise funding 
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at scale from public and private sectors satisfies well the demand for guidance and signal and 
setting rules to facilitate collective action.  
The GCF’s requirement for partner organisations to report on their progress towards decarbonising 
their overall financial portfolios also contributes to the signal and guidance, and transparency and 
accountability functions. Developing an international methodology to establish portfolio baselines 
for assessing progress also contributes to setting rules to facilitate collective action. 
The GCF is criticised by some civil society organisations and also faces issues with social acceptability 
and fairness due to accrediting international financial institutions and commercial banks with a track 
record in fossil fuel financing, which is seen as incompatible with the Fund’s mandate. Some civil 
society organisations have further criticised the GCF for not agreeing on an exclusion list of fossil fuel 
projects. Even though it has no explicit exclusion list of fossil fuel projects, the GCF’s objectives and 
Investment Criteria indirectly imply that only those projects that are aligned with the 1.5oC goal will 
be funded. The question is to what extent this tension is irreconcilable or can be used to effect 
change within the banks’ strategies and portfolios. Commercial banks’ continued lending to top 
companies responsible for the extraction, processing, and burning of fossil fuels impede efforts to 
make global finance flows consistent with low-carbon development pathways. Between 2014 and 
2017, the global banking sector provided and mobilised financing over USD 600 billion for the top 
120 coal plan developers – a clear contradiction to international governance efforts to provide 
guidance and signal, facilitation of collective action, and transparency and accountability for the low-
carbon transition (Bank Track, 2017).  
3.2.3. International, Bilateral and Regional Development Finance Institutions 
The World Bank Group (WBG) and other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), as international 
financial institutions providing financial assistance globally to support sustainable development and 
relief programmes, play a significant role in providing financing to the public and private sector for 
investments that promote the transition to a low-carbon economy.  
- National and sub-regional development banks also play an increasing role in supporting
global sustainable development and enabling countries to align with the PA. The
International Development Finance Club (IDFC) brings together like-minded international,
national and regional development banks with total assets of more than $2 trillion and
focuses on financing green infrastructure, improving its joint green finance tracking
methodology and developing international best practice standards.
- Through the Climate Action in Financial Institutions Initiative, members of the IDFC and
MDBs have committed to align their financial flows with the PA. The initiative has also been
joined by several commercial banks.
Development finance institutions as providers of public finance for mitigation projects in developing 
countries at a higher scale than multilateral climate funds satisfy well the means of implementation 
function.  For example, the world’s six largest MDBs have reported jointly on climate finance to 
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developing countries and emerging economies since 2011 and have collectively committed over 
$158 billion from 2011 to 2016 (AfDB et al., 2015). Between 2011 and 2016, the WBG alone 
committed on average more than $10 billion a year to more than 1000 climate-related projects, 
hence satisfying the means of implementation and knowledge and learning functions. MDBs have 
also committed to align their financial flows with the PA, for which they will have to develop 
transition strategies and self-assess their progress towards aligning their portfolio spending with the 
PA. For example, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has put a plan in place to assess its alignment 
with the PA as part of its mid-term review of its Climate Strategy 5 year Implementation (Wright et 
al., 2018). In addition, the WBG’s 2013 announcement to stop financing coal-fired generation 
projects, and its 2017 announcement to stop financing upstream oil and gas after 2019, partially 
satisfy the demand for guidance and signal, including to other MDBs and financial institutions. The 
WBG has also pledged to report annually its greenhouse gas emissions from the investment projects 
it finances particularly in the energy sector, starting from end of 2018.  
However, while in 2016 alone six major MDBs provided $27,441 million in mitigation finance (AfDB 
et al., 2015), some of the banks invested almost as much in fossil fuels as they do in energy-related 
climate finance. According to Oil Change International, the same MDBs continued to finance 
substantial amounts of new fossil fuel infrastructure through 2015 ($83 billion from 2008 to 2015) 
and by all indications into 2016 and 2017 (Doukas and Bast, 2017). An analysis by E3G shows a ratio 
by the World Bank of 1.2 units invested in energy-related climate finance for each 1 unit invested in 
fossil finance; 1.2 : 1 for the European Bank for Reconstruction & Development; 1 : 1 for the 
European Investment Bank; and 0.9 : 1 for the Asian Development Bank (Wright et al., 2018).  The 
World Bank’s 2016 mitigation finance of $8 billion is only 13 per cent of its total portfolio worth $61 
billion (World Bank, 2016). The fossil fuel divestment campaign challenges the social acceptability 
and fairness of the WBG by criticising its continued support for fossil fuel projects, as well as adverse 
social and environmental impacts of their activities for affected populations. The WBG has been 
accused of indirectly continuing its coal support through the IFC, its private sector lending arm. 
According to an NGO report, “IFC-supported financial institutions have funded at least 41 new coal 
projects […] since the World Bank announced its coal ban in 2013” (Inclusive Development 
International, 2016). While the WBG’s announcement (World Bank, 2017) to stop financing 
upstream oil and gas investment starting from 2019 is significant, it means that midstream and 
downstream gas and oil  investments will not be affected.   
The Climate Action in Financial Institutions Initiative, due to its support from several major 
development finance institutions and commercial banks, their commitment to mainstreaming of 
climate action throughout the financial community and their adoption of five voluntary 
mainstreaming principles satisfy the functions of guidance and signal, setting rules (partially), as 
well as knowledge and learning. The transparency and accountability function is partially fulfilled, 
as one of the principles concerns transparency and disclosure of climate information. IDFC members 
in 2016 jointly committed $153 billion in mitigation finance. Through their technical assistance and 
policy support to developing countries, they also score high on the knowledge and learning 
function.  
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
55 
3.2.4. Institutional Investor Initiatives 
Institutional investors are the largest group of private sector financiers and comprise a multitude of 
actors ranging from insurance companies, pension funds and sovereign wealth funds. Institutional 
investors are estimated to manage large portfolios of assets reaching around $93 trillion – hence a 
large portion of global finance flows that have to be redirected to be made compatible with 1.5°C 
compatible decarbonisation pathways. Climate-relevant institutions and initiatives that are led by or 
mobilise those investors to align their investment practices and reduce their portfolio carbon 
footprints therefore have a high potential for contributing to a low-carbon financial sector. Such 
initiatives include:  
- The Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change (GIC), a joint initiative of four regional
climate change investor groups, namely Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change
(IIGCC) for Europe, Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) for North America, Investor
Group on Climate Change (IGCC) for Australia and New Zealand, and Asia Investor Group on
Climate Change (AIGCC) for Asia. The GIC regional investor networks collaborate on joint
international projects focused on climate policy, corporate engagement and investment
practices, including investor statements on climate change.
- Portfolio Decarbonisation Coalition (PDC) and Montreal Carbon Pledge, a multi-
stakeholder initiative aiming at mobilising a critical mass of institutional investors committed
to gradually decarbonising their portfolios through disclosing information on the carbon
intensity of their capital and annually reporting their decarbonisation progress. The 2017
annual report includes 32 investors representing over $800 billion in decarbonisation
commitments. Signing the so-called Montréal Carbon Pledge allows investors (asset owners
and investment managers) to formalise their commitment to the goals of the PDC. The
Pledge is overseen by the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), an investor initiative
in partnership with UNEP Finance Initiative (FI) supporting its international network of
investors to integrate environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors in their
investment decisions.
- The UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), a global partnership between UNEP and the financial
sector, acts as a sort of interface between world governments including financial regulators
and over 200 banks, insurers, and investors to bring about systemic change in the financial
sector.
- The Climate Wise, which is the global insurance industry’s leadership group driving action on
climate change risk.
The above identified initiatives that involve institutional investors largely fulfil the guidance and 
signal function as well as knowledge and learning. Especially the GIC, as a global investor network 
connecting regional networks, fulfils the need for knowledge and learning, including through 
exchanging on best practices and standards. In addition, the PDC and Montreal Carbon Pledge at 
least partially satisfy the demand for collective action, as well as transparency and accountability, 
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as they focus on commitments to measure, disclose and reduce their portfolio carbon footprint. The 
UNEP FI also has an element of knowledge and learning through its capacity-building activities. It is 
relevant to note, however, that the decentralised character of these initiatives often create 
overlapping of efforts and results. In the case of guidance and signal, as well as for transparency and 
accountability, the consequence is that implementation loses legitimacy, with possibility of 
greenwashing claims when the process of creation is deemed as not participative enough or the 
criteria’s effectiveness is perceived as insufficient for its purpose. Also, the freedom by firms and 
investors to choose from a multitude of competing standard-setting sources can generate a “race-
to-the-bottom” process, in which less ambitious criteria might be more commonly adopted in 
detriment of more climate-aligned and stringent ones. 
3.2.5. Central Banks and Supervisors 
The role of central banks and financial supervisors in the transition to a low carbon economy, 
through monetary policy instruments and financial regulation (e.g. capital requirements, disclosure 
rules) influencing capital flows into different sectors, has been largely under-explored. Aligning the 
credit and monetary system with the low-carbon transition would provide strong guidance and 
signal as well as setting rules functions for greening the financial system. The enormous risk of 
climate change for financial stability and the need for “breaking the tragedy of the horizon” has 
been famously highlighted by the governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney. It led to the 
founding of the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System, 
which united central banks and supervisors of eight countries. Starting work in 2018, the network is 
aiming to speed up climate mainstreaming in financial supervision and refinancing of secondary 
markets (commercial banks) in order to promote orderly development of green finance. This 
Network partially satisfies the demands for guidance and signal and collective action functions and 
satisfies well the knowledge and learning function.  
3.2.6. Standards, Benchmarks and Metrics 
Especially important for the functions knowledge and learning and transparency and 
accountability, private sector and civil society initiatives that develop metrics and standards to 
prioritise climate compatible financial products and investments can provide international metrics 
to guide the low-carbon transition. These climate-related criteria can be targeted at specific 
institutions, sectors or technologies, creating positive lists, qualitative and quantitative conditions, 
and negative lists (Höhne et al., 2017) and have been developed by initiatives such as: 
- The Gold Standard;
- Climate Bond Initiative;
- 2 Degrees Investing Initiative; and
- Climate Change Reporting and Fiduciary Duty.
The absence of a more concerted setting of rules by a single institution or a group of institutions 
together means that different standards, benchmarks and metrics can end up competing among 
themselves. This creates uncertainty and increases risks for the market regarding what should be an 
aligned, a brown or a green investment, and what might constitute greenwashing, with the 
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respective reputational and financial risks.  In the meantime, initiatives such as The Gold Standard, 
Climate Bond Initiative, 2 Degrees Investing Initiative, Climate Change Reporting and Fiduciary Duty 
satisfy the demand for knowledge and learning by feeding the system with 1.5 °C compatible 
standards, benchmarks and metrics. While they cannot set rules themselves, they contribute to 
satisfying the demand for international rules-setting to facilitate collective action.  
3.2.7. Global Divestment Movements 
Especially important for the guidance and signal function, growing global civil society movements 
such as the Fossil Free campaign are highlighting the moral imperative of moving investments away 
from the fossil fuel industry. By 2018, 785 governments, pension funds, private companies, 
foundations, NGOs, educational and faith-based organisations have joined the Divest-Invest global 
network and pledged to shift their capital. The Big Shift Global campaign aims to mobilise public 
opinion for urging MDBs to shift their portfolios away from fossil fuels.  
These global divestment movements satisfy two governance functions, namely guidance and signal 
and by mobilising public awareness and changing social values also knowledge and learning.  
3.2.8. G20 Initiatives 
As a joint forum of industrialised nations and major emerging economies, collectively G20 countries 
account for about 80 per cent of global economic output. Traditionally a forum for economic and 
financial issues, since 2009 climate change has moved more and more on its agenda. Within the so-
called “finance track”, in which finance ministers and central bank governors meet, the G20 
established a study group on climate finance in 2012 and the Green Finance Study Group in 2016.  
While G20 decisions may not be legally binding, they have a strong political signalling effect for 
reforms on national and multinational levels. The most significant development for mainstreaming 
climate in the financial sector has been the G20 request to its Financial Stability Board to consider 
climate risk, which led to the establishment of an industry-led task force on developing climate-
related financial disclosures (TCFD) as a prerequisite for financial firms appropriately manage and 
price climate risks. Three countries (France, Sweden and the UK) and more than 200 businesses have 
pledged to support the implementation of the recommendations by the FSB.  
The G20’s reiterated yet unimplemented commitment to phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies 
(see chapter 6) and its establishment of the Green Finance Study Group are significant political 
signals, at least in light of the group’s major share in global financial assets and GHG emissions. 
However, the initiatives only fulfil little of the needed guidance and signal function due to the 
unimplemented and/or voluntary nature of its outputs. The work of the Green Finance Study Group 
partially satisfies the knowledge and learning function.   
G20 governments’ continued public support to high-carbon infrastructure directly impedes fulfilling 
the necessary governance functions of guidance and signal, setting rules, and transparency and 
accountability. G20 countries’ public finance institutions, such as national and international 
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development banks, majority state-owned banks and export credit agencies, spent over US$ 88 
billion on average annually on coal, oil and gas projects between 2013 and 2014 (Bast et al., 2015). 
Further, G20’s continued fossil fuel subsidies are in acute conflict with the PA’s low-carbon guidance 
and signal and rules for collective actions. In fact, as a negative carbon price, it has a negative 
signalling effect. Despite their repeated commitment since 2009 to phase out inefficient fossil fuel 
subsidies, G20 countries provided over USD 230 billion subsidies to coal, oil and gas in 2014 (Climate 
Transparency, 2017).  
The TCFD satisfies several functions, albeit partially since its recommendations remain voluntary to 
encourage broad participation: by recommending standardised and universally-applicable climate-
related financial disclosure, it scores on guidance and signal, rule-setting, transparency and 
accountability, and knowledge and learning. Especially the recommendation to provide climate-
related disclosure as part of mainstream public financial filings is relevant for transparency and 
could be a step to hold companies and financial institutions accountable. 
3.2.9. Carbon Pricing and Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform Initiatives 
An internationally agreed and adequate carbon price would in a way be the strongest and most 
credible policy signal to the financial sector and would facilitate transnational collective action. 
International cooperation on carbon pricing is required to ensure consistency across countries and 
to avoid possible carbon leakage and trade distortions. While the PA did not set an explicit price on 
carbon through a carbon tax or a cap and trade system, there is continued momentum for carbon 
pricing through existing and emerging carbon initiatives beyond the UNFCCC.  
- China’s national cap and trade carbon market is set to replace the EU Emission Trading
Scheme (EUETS) as the largest carbon market in the world, and the platform for cooperation
on “Carbon Pricing in the Americas (CPA) was created in 2017. However, coverage of GHG
emissions under these schemes remains limited.
- The so-called Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (CPLC), a voluntary partnership of
national and sub-national governments, businesses, and civil society organisations that was
launched in Paris, has adopted and is working towards the long-term objective of a carbon
price applied throughout the global economy that is in line with the PA objectives. CPLC is
complemented by a high-level political Carbon Pricing Panel that calls for the expansion of
carbon pricing coverage to 25 percent of global emissions by 2020 and 50 percent by 2030,
as well as a High Level Economic Commission that aims to identify Paris-compatible
corridors of carbon prices. Its influential 2017 high-level report on carbon prices (the so-
called Stern-Stieglitz report) (High-level Commission on Carbon Pricing 2017) finds that
explicit carbon-price levels consistent with achieving the Paris temperature limit would have
to significantly increase from current levels to at least US$40 – 80/tCO2 by 2020 and US$50
– 100/ tCO2 by 2030. It is significant that this high-level economic report also highlights the
currently underestimated “social cost of carbon”.
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- The Stern-Stiglitz report also mentions the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies as an essential
part of carbon pricing, as subsidies in effect constitute a negative price on carbon and hinder
the achievement of climate targets. Hence subsidies provide a negative guidance and signal
that are inconsistent with climate policy signals. Every year since 2009, the G20 has pledges
to phase out fossil fuel subsidies, however this pledge lacks a plan for implementation. In
2010, a group of non-G20 members formed the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform
(FFFSR) initiative to encourage the G20 to implement their commitment.
The Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition and the FFFSR initiative fulfil several functions: guidance 
and signal, support for setting rules and knowledge and learning by developing pathways for 
different carbon pricing policies and timelines, encouraging other countries to join the initiative and 
implement their commitments, and creating platforms for sharing experiences. 
3.2.10. Research Initiatives on Green Finance and Financial Sector Reform 
Various research initiatives on climate finance, renewable energy finance and green finance have 
emerged that are relevant in the context of international governance demands of knowledge and 
learning and transparency and accountability. They serve as international research collaboratives, 
networks and platforms that produce technical and policy knowledge on mobilising and tracking 
climate finance and standards for greening the financial sector, as well as best practice learning, 
often through a hybrid structure including governments, the finance sector and civil society.  These 
include:  
- UNEP FI & UNEP Inquiry Research on Sustainable Financial System
- OECD Centre on Green Finance and Investment & OECD Tracking Private Climate Finance
initiative
- Global Commission on the Economy and Climate
- Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance, and
- IRENA and IEA produce knowledge on international renewable energy finance.
These international research initiatives satisfy mainly the knowledge and learning function. In 
addition, the OECD’s initiatives of Tracking Private Climate Finance further contribute to the 
transparency and accountability function by working to promote a more transparent and 
comprehensive international measurement and reporting system for climate finance. 
3.3. Assessing the Governance Complex 
Due to the complexity of the financial sector and the impact of financial sector governance for 
different sectors in the real economy, the overall need for international governance has been 
identified as very high, especially for the governance functions related to guidance and signal, rule-
setting to facilitate collective action, transparency and accountability, and knowledge and learning. 
These are discussed in turn below. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
60 
However it has not been not feasible to include an overall ranking (low, medium, high) on the 
supply-side for each of the five governance functions considered, given the number of institutions 
and initiatives, and the broad diversity of their contributions towards governance supply functions, 
within the financial sector.  A more detailed methodological approach for how rankings could be 
calculated and applied would need to be developed before overall rankings could be applied in an 
objective, non-arbitrary way.  In view of this, the following analysis instead provides a brief overview 
of how institutions and initiatives deliver on the different governance functions. 
3.3.1. Guidance and Signal 
The PA’s article 2.1(c) and its Financial Mechanism comprised of the GCF and GEF, as well as other 
specialised climate funds such as the NAMA facility and CIFs, fulfil their role of guidance and signal 
function with their direct mandate to support the transformation towards low-carbon economies.  
There is some guidance and signal provided, at least indirectly, by many initiatives involving 
financial institutions including MDBs and institutional investors, who have started to adopt joint 
objectives for mainstreaming climate across portfolios. The World Bank’s recent announcement to 
no longer finance upstream oil and gas sends a strong signal in that regard. The role of MDBs in 
demonstrating how different innovative financing mechanisms work, as is the case with green bonds 
and de-risking activities, has provided the guidance for other actors to replicate leveraging strategies 
and attract private financing for climate-aligned and climate-focused projects on the local, national 
and regional levels. 
Other international fora such as the G20 Finance track, Green Finance Study Group, and in particular 
the TCFD overall respond to the guidance and signal function with increasing adoption of objectives 
related to managing the risk that climate poses to the global economy. 
3.3.2. Setting Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
The UNFCCC could serve as a framework to facilitate collective action in setting common accounting 
and reporting rules for 1.5 oC-compatible investments. Specialised climate funds could also fulfil the 
function of facilitating collective action by jointly mobilising climate finance.  
Initiatives such as the Gold Standard, Climate Bond Initiative, 2 Degrees Investing Initiative, Climate 
Change Reporting and Fiduciary Duty contribute to satisfying the demand for international rules-
setting and collective action. Other initiatives by institutional investors such as the PDC and 
Montreal Carbon Pledge with their commitments to measure and disclose their portfolio carbon 
footprint partially satisfy the collective action governance function. 
3.3.3. Transparency and Accountability 
The enhanced transparency framework established by the PA, and its rules being developed under 
the UNFCCC process, has the potential to agree on methodologies and rules that would allow 
assessing alignment of global finance with the 1.5oC goal set in the PA.  
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The finance sector has been pushed by the international community to advance on its transparency 
and accountability, in the form of financial climate costs and risk disclosure and accounting rules for 
assessing flows. With TCFD recommendations to provide climate-related disclosure as part of 
mainstream public financial filings being voluntary and the pledge by the G20 countries to phase out 
fossil fuel subsidies remaining unimplemented, the main gap relates to transparency and 
accountability with regards to successful shifts away from fossil fuel financing and not just 
increasing green financing.  
Investor initiatives such as the PDC and Montreal Carbon Pledge whose members are committed to 
measure and disclose their portfolio carbon footprint partially fulfil the transparency and 
accountability function. 
3.3.4. Means of Implementation 
Specialised funds such as the GCF, GEF and CIFs have a direct mandate to provide the means of 
implementation, which together with MDBs and sector-specific initiatives such as the ones 
conducted by institutional investors can turn finance into the means of implementation for all other 
sectors. Initiatives such as the IDFC and UNEP’s FI build the capacity of their members to track and 
report on their green finance flows and better understand the impacts of environmental and social 
considerations on financial performance. 
3.3.5. Knowledge and Learning 
The financial sector has been kick-starting many initiatives on its own, seeking to produce 
knowledge and learning. Going forward, international governance will need to help develop more 
knowledge and learning on common standards, metrics and benchmarks for the different types of 
flows counting or not as Paris compatible.  In this regard, initiatives such as sustainable finance 
research, carbon pricing and global divestment movements play significant roles in raising public 
awareness, expanding knowledge and lessons learned. 
A synthesis of how the main institutions and initiatives in the financial sector contribute to the five 
governance functions is provided in Table 3.2 below.  
3.4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
There is a need for a new governance regime for finance to transition to a world where all finance is 
aligned with climate goals.  
Given the financial sector’s global reach, going beyond the limitations of national borders, there is a 
very high demand for international governance. Existing inter- and transnational institutions offer a 
growing, yet mostly partial or indirect guidance and signal. Emerging voluntary collective action has 
sought to make climate-related financial costs and risks more transparent and committed to 
mainstreaming climate considerations into financial decision-making. The provision of public finance 
as means of implementation has been increasing, although amounts remain insufficient compared 
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to global investment needs. As public finance seeks to tap into the commercial markets’ potential 
through leveraging and de-risking activities, it must ensure that financial biases towards big 
infrastructure projects will not be detrimental to smaller and more localised types of 
decarbonisation interventions. A high number of institutions provide knowledge and learning on 
sustainable and green finance, but this remains a niche within the larger financial sector.  
There is untapped governance potential to send the sector-wide signals necessary to shift away from 
high carbon investment patterns. This should include the redefinition of climate-focused standards 
and rules for the financial sector itself, including more apt structures that enable feedbacks from 
decarbonisation efforts in specific sectors to be taken on board by financial metrics and integrated 
into broader investors’ decision-making. A more dynamic structure is required for a smooth 
transition, both to diminish risks of financial instability, and  also in order to allow the inclusion of 
evolving standards relating to carbon-intensity and carbon risk of sectors over time, cost-
optimisation alternatives linked to improved decarbonisation pathways, introduction of new 
climate-focused technologies and business practices, etc. 
In conclusion, there is a great potential for decarbonisation within the financial sector emerging 
from existing initiatives, which can be scaled up. However for this potential to be fulfilled and for 
financial flows to contribute effectively to decarbonisation efforts within other sectors in the real 
economy, the broader climate regime complex must overcome three main challenges: 
i. The role of finance in enhancing ambition
- Guidance and signal and rule-setting - How to effectively operationalise Article 2.1(c) of the
PA: consistency of global financial flows with the Agreement should become a key
consideration of the Paris architecture designed to enhance mitigation ambition over time,
covering public and private, development and commercial flows.
ii. Mainstreaming
- Guidance and signal and rule-setting - How to continue to mainstream climate
considerations into sectoral financial governance, where finance is not part of its original
mandate. “Green”, “sustainable” and climate-aligned finance have to advance from a niche
topic to the new norm with wide-spread participation from financial actors, while avoiding
“greenwashing” practices.
- Knowledge and learning – Co-developing, improving and sharing metrics and benchmarks
for operationalising mainstreaming goals in practice.
iii. Additionality
- Transparency and accountability - How to ensure that through transparency and
accountability under i) and ii) above, governance will achieve additionality in the
mobilisation of all types of finance for climate mitigation measures. This should be
maintained through ongoing measuring and verification of additional emissions impacts in
changing the climate and their links to investments.
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Based on the above three challenges, we identify potential engagement that should take place 
through the UNFCCC, other international institutions, and internally within the EU and its member 
states: 
3.4.1. Recommendations for Engagement with the UNFCCC 
The UNFCCC provides the framework for setting overarching goals and raising ambition on how to 
reduce emissions and make financial flows consistent with the PA. As such, it should send a clearer 
and stronger signal about divesting from carbon intensive investments and aligning all financial flows 
with climate goals, as set out in Article 2.1(c). 
• Potential opportunities to integrate the alignment of financial flows in the design of PA’s rule
book include:
- Guidance for Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – NDCs could include finance-
related commitments and policies to help reach mitigation targets such as reducing
fossil fuel subsidies, carbon pricing instruments, national legislation for mandatory
climate-related financial disclosure.
- Enhanced transparency framework – Relevant reporting rules under the PA should
include space to report on the implementation of actions not just to mobilise climate-
specific financing, but also in efforts to ensure broader finance flows consistent with
low-emissions and climate-resilient development pathways.
- Sources of inputs and modalities for the Global Stocktake – One of the main focuses of
the Global Stocktake should be assessing progress towards achieving the long-term goal
set out in Article 2.1(c). Information on financial flows that are relevant for this goal
should be identified as inputs to the GST, and recommendations and guidance to both
Parties and non-Party actors in relation to achieving the goal should be one of its main
outputs.
- The cooperative approaches and new market mechanism identified in Article 6 of the PA
should be designed to help shift financial flows to support increased mitigation action.
- The UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance’s Biennial Assessment and Overview of
Climate Finance Flows should include relevant data on both climate-specific flows and
flows that are inconsistent with low-carbon development pathways in order to
determine the benchmark for assessing progress on Article 2.1(c). This could constitute a
relevant source of information for the Global Stocktake.
- The Financial Mechanism of the Convention and the PA should take stronger measures
to translate the UNFCCC’s guidance into concrete targets, policies and benchmarks to
encourage partner institutions to commit to reducing their overall portfolio’s carbon
footprints. The Green Climate Fund in particular has potential for establishing a first
international methodology to establish baselines to measure decarbonisation of
financial portfolios.
- The international climate finance landscape is currently fragmented and complex with
partly overlapping mandates. The UNFCCC could provide direction and coordination to
improve the division of labour between different multilateral climate funds.
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• The UN and UNFCCC should work to build political momentum to mobilise greater finance and
capacity-building that can unlock increased mitigation ambition and measures to implement and
enhance NDCs. Specific moments include the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue, the 2019 Climate Summit
by the UN Secretary General (SG Summit), and the first Global Stocktake in 2023. The SG Summit
will focus on six key issues that will include investment in clean technology, carbon pricing, and
mobilising finance.
3.4.2. Recommendations for Engagement with Other International Institutions 
International institutions such as the G719, G2020 and OECD have a significant convening power for 
engaging financial actors and the private sector, for example in relevant initiatives, task forces, 
expert groups, and research collaboratives whose outputs are targeted at advancing 
decarbonisation efforts in the financial sector. G20 and G7 summits also have the potential to help 
coordinate governance functions, with OECD, IMF, WEF and other forums working towards functions 
of signal and guidance, setting the rules, transparency and accountability and knowledge and 
learning. 
• The G20, whose member countries represent 85% of global economic output, should play a role
in bolder goal-setting, along with implementation of previous commitments such as phasing out
of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. Their actions have impact beyond their membership, since
other countries look to them for guidance, and are likely to follow with similar commitments.
• Multilateral development banks can play a significant role in mainstreaming decarbonisation
efforts, including by ceasing finance for fossil fuel production and ramping up investments in
low-carbon infrastructure.
• Multilateral funds with specific climate mandates, such as the GCF and the CIFs (in case the CIFs
will continue to operate despite their sunset clause), can act as multipliers by establishing new
norms for working with their accredited MDB partner institutions, and by using their limited
financing to catalyse transformational action by other actors.
• Transnational institutional investor initiatives have potential to encourage more investors to
align their capital with climate goals.
• More advanced international financial institutions might acquire the role to provide capacity-
building to national and local financial institutions and to governments.
• The TCFD’s voluntary recommendations on climate-related financial disclosure have potential to
become the new international standard for financial institutions and private businesses to
disclose the climate risk their portfolios are exposed to, as well as their transition strategies.
19 The seven major advanced economies as reported by the International Monetary Fund - including the EU. 
20 Founded in 1999, the G20 aims to discuss policy pertaining to the promotion of international financial 
stability. It seeks to address issues that go beyond the responsibilities of any one organisation. G20 consumes 
95% of the world’s coal, more than 70% of its oil and gas, and is responsible for 85% of global investment in. It 
includes a mixture of wealthy and emerging economies (Goldthau 2017). 
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• The One Planet Summit in 2017 helped build political momentum for mobilising the financial
sector to implement the PA, by providing a platform for capturing existing and emerging
decarbonisation coalitions, including on carbon pricing and decarbonisation in financial
institutions. A One Planet Platform with annual Summits is under discussion, and could provide a
regular venue for making pledges, setting targets, and tracking progress. In particular, there is a
need for transparency and accountability of these announcements and initiatives that involve
financial actors. The One Planet Platform could be a mechanism for monitoring and assessing
progress.
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Guidance and Signal Setting Rules Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
Consistent, credible and long-
term climate policies for 
investors and financial actors 
to align their decision making 
with international climate 
objectives 
Developing and agreeing on 
international standards, 
benchmarks and metrics for 
1.5 degree-compatible 
investments and carbon 
prices 
Required to address issues of 
free-riding, double- counting, 
additionality of flows, as well 
as green-washing of 
continued high-carbon 
investment practices 
Required to translate low-
carbon and climate-resilient 
development strategies into 
climate investment plans 
ready for implementation 
To know which policies work 
best to mobilize climate 
finance and divest assets 
from fossil fuels. 
UNFCCC/Paris 
Agreement 
Article 2.1 (c) of the PA Could serve as a framework 
for Collective Action 
Enhanced transparency 
framework 
Orchestration role through 
the GST 
Assessing alignment of global 
finance with 1.5 oC 
Specialised CC 
Funds 
(GCF, GEF, CIFs) 
Support the transformation 
towards low-carbon 
economies. For example the 
GCF promotes paradigm shift. 
Facilitate collective action by 
jointly mobilising climate 
finance 
Provide finance, capacity 
building and technology 
development 
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MDBs Commitment to align their 
financial flows with the Paris 
Agreement 
Adoption of five voluntary 
mainstreaming principles  
Transparent tracking and 
reporting of climate finance 
flows and impacts 
Provide public finance and 
mobilise investments for 
climate actions 
Technical assistance and 
policy support 
IDFC-Development finance 
institutions’ commitment to 
mainstream climate action in 
their investments 
Build the capacity of IDFC 
members to track and report 
on their green finance flows 
WB’s 2017 announcement to 
stop financing upstream oil 






investors to gradually 
decarbonise their portfolios 
PDC and Montreal Carbon 
Pledge- commitments to 
measure and disclose their 
portfolio carbon footprint. 
PDC and Montreal Carbon 
Pledge- commitments to 
measure and disclose their 
portfolio carbon footprint. 
UNEP- FI- partnership to 
understand the impacts of 
environmental and social 
considerations on financial 
performance. 
GIC- connecting regional 
networks and exchanging on 
best practices and standards 
Global Divestment 
Movements 
Mobilising public awareness 
by calling on investors to 
build an equitable and clean 
future and freeze any new 
investment in fossil fuel 
companies 
Calling for transparency 
about impacts of investments 
in energy and the lives of 
people 
Mobilising public awareness 
and changing social values 
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G20 Initiatives Commitment to phasing out 





TCFD- provide climate-related 
disclosure as part of 
mainstream public financial 
filings 
Expand learning networks for 
capacity building and 
encourage and facilitate 
knowledge sharing on 
environmental and financial 
risk 
Establishment of the Green 
Finance Study Group 
Carbon Pricing 
initiatives 
(CPLC & FFFS 
reform) 
Developing pathways for 
different carbon pricing 
policies and timelines, 
encouraging other countries 
to join the initiative and 
implement their 
commitments 
Enhancing cooperation and 
creating platforms for sharing 
experiences 
and lessons learned on 





Initiatives of Tracking Private 
Climate Finance (OECD) 
works to promote a more 
transparent and 
comprehensive international 
measurement and reporting 
system for climate finance 
Publishing annual global 
reports 
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4. Power Sector
Lukas Hermwille and Friederike Asche 
4.1. Transformation Challenges and Governance Demands 
4.1.1.  Current Status and rospect 
The CO2 emissions from the energy sector contribute some 61 per cent of global GHG emissions. 
Within that sector, electricity generation is the single largest subsector accounting for some 38.2 per 
cent of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion (IEA, 2016a).21 With respect to the global transformation 
challenge, global power supply is a key sector for two reasons: (1) with maturing renewable energy 
(RE) technologies, solutions for zero-emissions electricity are already technically available and cost 
competitive, and (2) for many other sectors electrification of processes is the most promising 
mitigation strategy. This holds for example for transport and emission intensive basic materials such 
as steel and cement (Ahman et al., 2016). 
Despite the availability of low-carbon alternatives, global CO2 emissions from electricity generation 
have been rising at an average rate of around three per cent annually between 2000 and 2015. Only 
after 2011 has this trend started to level off somewhat. While growth in electricity demand (and 
hence electric output) remained largely stable, the emission intensity of global electricity has started 
to slightly decrease after 2011 (IEA, 2017a). Since the latest data is available only for 2015, it is at this 
point difficult to assess whether this trend is robust. However, the recent development of for all 
energy related emissions (more recent data is available for the aggregate energy related emissions) 
suggests that they have not yet peaked. Having remained constant for three years over 2014-2016, 
energy-related emissions reached a historic high of 32.5 GtCO2-e/yr in 2017 – 1.4% higher than in 
2016. According to the IEA, this was due to higher energy demand, and a slowing in energy efficiency 
improvements (IEA, 2018a).   
Historically, electricity has been supplied by five energy sources: coal (hard coal and lignite), natural 
gas, oil, (large) hydro, and nuclear. Only recently have other renewable energy sources (wind, solar, 
geothermal, tidal, and bioenergy) started to assume a more significant share of the global electricity 
mix. The technologies and measures needed for decarbonisation are already available, and the long-
term benefits of decarbonisation will vastly outweigh the near-term costs (IRENA, 2018). The ongoing
renewables revolution has fundamentally reshaped the global energy landscape – much more can be
done much faster than was thought was possible just a few years ago. And a lot more has to be done
to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement (PA) and to limit global warming to well below 2°C.
21 Differentiating CO2 emissions from heat and electricity generation is challenging, since data is not reported 
separately in the IEA’s CO2  emissions from fuel combustion data set. We have calculated CO2  emissions of 
electricity generation by multiplying the reported CO2  emission factors per electricity output [tonnes CO2 /kWh 
electricity generated] with reported global electricity output [TWh]. For 2014 this calculation yields a total of 
12360 Mt CO2 , i.e. some 9.3 per cent less than the 13,625 Mt reported jointly for electricity and heat. 
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To date, the stock of global electricity generation capacity is still heavily dominated by fossil fuel, 
nuclear and large hydro power plants. However, the lion’s share of new investments has shifted 
towards renewable energies in recent years, both in terms of dollars spent and capacities added 
(Frankfurt School/UNEP/Bloomberg, 2016). The following paragraphs synthesise key developments 
with respect to all of the above-mentioned technologies. 
Coal used to be the backbone of the majority of the world’s power systems. And coal still is both 
abundant as well as relatively cheap. For many developing countries therefore, investing in coal 
capacities was considered a viable way of fuelling their rapid economic growth. And to some extent 
this is still the case. In 2017 Global coal demand rose about 1%, reversing the declining trend seen 
over the last years. This growth was mainly driven by an increase in coal-fired electricity generation 
in Asia (IEA, 2018a). If existing capacities and only a fraction of generation capacities currently in the 
planning are utilised to their full technical life-time, the remaining global carbon budget will already 
be consumed entirely (Edenhofer, 2015; Pfeiffer et al., 2018). However, there are some signs that the 
coal boom may come to an end. In the US, coal consumption and production has plummeted in 
recent years, partly due to regulation under the Obama administration and partly by stiff 
competition from shale gas and renewable energies. In the wake of this downturn, Peabody Energy, 
the largest private coal mining enterprise, filed for bankruptcy in its domestic US market (Reuters, 
2016). The most dramatic turn has arguably been seen in the United Kingdom (UK), with 2017 
witnessing the first working day without coal power since the industrial revolution (Brown, 2017). 
Also China and India drastically cut their respective coal project pipelines and China even halted 
ongoing constructions on new coal power plants (Shearer et al., 2018). It is still important however to 
note that in 2017, coal power plants were the biggest contributor to global energy related CO2 
emissions. After a two year decline in 2015-2016, coal emissions rose by 1.4% over 2017 (IEA, 2018a).  
Ever since the IPCC’s Special Report on carbon capture and storage (CCS) in 2005, there has been 
hope that CCS would make a substantial contribution to reducing CO2 emissions from the power 
sector (IPCC, 2005). There was particular hope that CCS would help to bring about “clean coal”.22 CCS 
is a combination of mostly proven technologies. However, to date there are only two large-scale 
projects operational in the power sector that prove that the concept works not only as a technical 
theory but in terms of being technically, economically, and socially viable to be deployed at 
commercial scale (Global CCS Institute, 2018). To change this, the IEA had set a goal to establish 100 
CCS demonstration projects across the globe by 2009. However, in 2013 the IEA had to change this 
goal to only 30 projects in 2020. And given the current pipeline of CCS projects it may be even 
22 The issue of CCS is not restricted to emissions from fuel combustion but may also cover industrial emissions 
(see section 4.6). Furthermore, many scenario modelling exercises come to the conclusion that negative 
emissions will be necessary to attain the well below 2/1.5°C target. These negative emissions could be achieved 
by combining the combustion of bio-energy with CCS (BECCS). However, we do not consider BECCS as an 
integral part of the power sector’s transformation challenge and therefore do not cover this important issue 
here. 
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difficult to meet this much more humble target. Apart from the two projects mentioned above there 
are no other large-scale demonstration projects in construction or advanced stages of development 
(Global CCS Institute, 2018; also see James Gaede and Meadowcroft, 2016). 
Among fossil fuels, natural gas has the lowest specific emission factor at combustion. However, gas 
extraction and in particular hydraulic fracturing (fracking) can lead to inadvertent diffuse CH4 
emissions that necessitate a significant increase of the emission factor. The recent boom in natural 
gas production was driven primarily by this technology. Annual production rose from 21.23 million 
terajoules (TJ) in 2010 to 29.43 million TJ in 2015 in the US alone (IEA, 2016c). While increased 
consumption of natural gas may yield short-term emission reductions by replacing coal, it may also 
‘lock-in’ carbon emissions in the long run (Climate Action Tracker, 2017). With respect to global 
trade, another trend was observed in the recent decade: increasing investments in liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) technology and infrastructure. LNG terminals and supertankers unshackled natural gas 
from pipeline infrastructure and made natural gas a globalised commodity (IEA, 2016d; Elkind, 2017). 
The global share of nuclear power has been in decline over the last decade (EIA, 2017). While 60 
reactors are currently being built, mostly in developing countries and emerging economies, 
numerous reactors are rapidly approaching the end of their technological lifetime (IAEA, 2017). What 
is more, a number of countries have reversed their nuclear energy policy after the Fukushima 
catastrophe and committed to phase out (e.g. Germany) or reduce the reliance on (e.g. France) 
nuclear energy. A common thread among all nuclear reactors currently under construction, at least 
in industrialised countries, is heavy cost overruns. This holds for example for constructions in Finland, 
the US, and France (Gilbert, Sovacool, Johnstone, & Stirling, 2017). In the UK, the planned nuclear 
station in Britain, Hinckley Point C, could only attract investors after the government had guaranteed 
a hefty feed-in tariff. The rate is already now much higher than what is usually paid for wind power 
and will not decrease over time but automatically increase with inflation (UK Department of Energy 
and Climate Change, 2013). All things considered, the “nuclear renaissance” that was proclaimed 
repeatedly in the past is far from materialising.23  
Renewables represents the most dynamic part of the global power sector. Technology costs for solar 
and wind power have been falling sharply, with renewable energy and storage systems now the 
cheapest source of new supply in many parts of the world (IRENA, 2018; Tanti, 2018). For example, 
global average utility-scale levelised cost of electricity of solar photovoltaics (PV) fell by around 58 
per cent between 2010 and 2015 and the cost are projected to continue to fall (IRENA, 2016). When 
levelised costs of electricity are considered, renewable energies are already competitive in many 
markets. In particularly well-suited locations, renewable energies are providing some of the cheapest 
electricity ever produced. Examples include solar PV in United Arab Emirates that was recently 
contracted at 2.4 ct/kWh (USD) and wind power in Morocco at ~3 ct/kWh (USD) (Dipaola, 2016; 
23 Because of these developments we did not consider in detail institutions that primarily promote nuclear 
energy in our below analysis. Also, when speaking of a transformation of the power sector we are typically 
implying a transformation based on renewable energy. 
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Parkinson, 2016). In the wake of this development, there has been a strong uptake in investments in 
renewable energy, particularly in emerging economies. India and China are not only among the 
leading markets, but have considered the renewable energy industry a priority for industrial policy 
and hence have become leading suppliers for renewable energy technologies (REN21, 2016). Apart 
from hydro, wind and solar power, bioenergy plays an important role in the global power mix. This, 
however, brings a risk of severe side effects (e.g. for food supply and biodiversity), particularly if 
biomass is not sustainably sourced.  
Decarbonisation of power sector by focusing on the supply side transformation is one side of the 
coin. The remaining emissions budget under the 1.5°C limit, however, appears prohibitively small. 
Decarbonisation of power supply needs to be supplemented by efficiency improvements of the 
demand side as well as moving towards more integrated energy systems and electrification of heat, 
transport, and industry sectors. The most recent literature exploring 1.5°C-compatible pathways, 
while limiting/minimising the need for negative emission technologies, project steep reductions in 
energy demand to achieve the required deep emission reductions (Kriegler et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 
2018; Strefler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018). 
Beyond these technical challenges, there are a number of other developments with relevance to the 
power sector. One issue is the central role that electric power plays in human development. Basic 
access to electricity can be considered a necessary condition for the eradication of poverty (IPCC, 
2012). Still more than 1.2 billion people, predominantly in rural areas in Africa and Asia still do not 
have access to electrical energy (IEA, 2015). The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development reflects 
the priority of providing electricity to these people with a separate Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG 7). Also, many NDCs submitted under the PA make reference to the challenges of providing 
access to sustainable energy.  
Another issue of importance to the power sector is the global fossil-fuel divestment campaign that 
has scored some big successes and continues to build momentum in convincing (institutional) 
investors to remove shares in companies that generate a large part of their revenue from the fossil 
energy industry from their portfolios (see chapter 3 for more on the divestment campaign).   
Additional to these general trends, the sectoral transformation challenges are very diverse in 
different countries. Key characteristics that determine these differences include the following: 
• renewable energy potentials;
• existence of domestic fossil fuel reserves;
• structure and ownership of the power market;
• state of the power system (grid infrastructure, current power mix).
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4.1.2. Main Challenges and Barriers toward Decarbonisation 
The transformation of the global power sector is already well under way. Sustainable technologies 
are technologically and economically mature and competitive. Still, in order to achieve a complete 
decarbonisation of the power sector several challenges and barriers remain. 
The physical pre-conditions for renewable energy deployment differ greatly across countries. 
Correspondingly, the transformation challenges and barriers for renewable energy deployment 
differ across countries. Countries with a high share of hydro power, for example, have the advantage 
that hydro power can typically be dispatched flexibly and hence is particularly suitable for integration 
with variable power supply from intermittent renewable energy sources like wind and solar power. 
For countries without access to significant hydro resources other technical solutions will need to be 
developed. Another key difference with deep implications for the transformation of the power 
system is the type of power system that different countries have chosen – from completely 
liberalised power markets to integrated state-owned monopolies. 
With respect to technological aspects, the need for storage capacities is one of the key challenges. 
Two different types of storage will be necessary to ensure the stability of power systems with high 
shares of intermittent renewable energy, particularly wind and solar power:  
1. Short-term storage that can help with buffering variability in frequency and voltage in a
matter of split seconds up to a couple of minutes (ancillary services). In the shorter term, the
need for storage can be reduced by making electricity demand more responsive (Palensky &
Dietrich, 2011). Currently, power demand is largely inelastic and is not significantly impacted
by short-term price hikes. Smart grids (and smart appliances) are showing significant
potential in helping to manage demand in order to shift some of it from peak load hours to
hours with lower demand and/or more abundant renewable energy supply.
2. Long-term storage will be required to balance out seasonal variability in the availability of RE.
Energy storage is still dominated globally by pumped hydropower. Still, both research
spending as well as investments in battery storage have been skyrocketing in recent years. As
a matter of consequence, battery costs have plummeted at rates similar to those seen in the
cost reductions of Solar PV (IEA, 2016b).
Another key technical challenge that needs to be addressed is the update and re-build of existing 
grid infrastructures. In countries that historically relied on fossil fuelled power generation, power 
plants typically where built at locations that are close to the centres of electricity demand (i.e. major 
industrial centres). Contrastingly, renewable energy generation units ideally should be located 
wherever the potential of renewable resources are highest. This is often in rather rural areas without 
large amounts of demand. While in prototypical fossil fuelled power systems the role of distribution 
networks was mainly one of interconnecting industrial hubs and thus hedging against the risk of 
black outs, the task in a prototypical RE-based power system is one of connecting centres of supply 
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to the centres of demand. This may require fundamentally different grid layouts and enormous 
investments over the coming decades (IEA, 2016b). 
This leads us to economic barriers. In the economic realm, two broad challenges are standing in the 
way of a global transformation of the power sector: an investment challenge as well as a market-
design and dispatch challenge. The investment challenge directly relates to Art. 2.1(c) of the PA, 
“[m]aking finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient 
development.” Current investments in renewable energy in 2015 amounted to nearly USD 286 billion 
(REN21, 2016). Yet, in order to have a chance of limiting global warming well below 2°C additional 
investments in the trillions will be required to build up sustainable energy infrastructure (Ceres, 
2014; IRENA, 2018). At the same time, investments in fossil fuel infrastructure need to be phased 
down and out. 
The often cited issue of high costs for renewable energy technologies is no longer a central barrier to 
decarbonisation as technology costs have plummeted in recent years. In particular cost for solar PV 
and wind have come down and this cost decrease is likely to continue (IRENA, 2016). This is not to 
say, that costs have become a non-issue. Despite low cost for the hardware, renewable energy can 
become excessively expensive if an unfavourable general investment climate (high prime lending 
rates) drives up capital costs and if a lack of local expertise and skilled workers drives up the soft 
costs of installing and maintaining renewable energy systems. Also, cost distribution may be an issue, 
including regarding equity and fairness. 
The second challenge is one of market design. Since the early 1980s numerous countries have 
started to liberalise (and privatise) their respective power markets. Typically, these markets are 
organised with power spot markets at their core. Prices at the spot market are based primarily on 
marginal generation costs. Most forms of RE, however, do not feature marginal generation costs. 
Wind and solar energy is generated when the wind blows or the sun shines, irrespective of the 
wholesale price for electricity. In markets with particularly high shares of electricity with zero 
marginal costs, the market design approaches its limits. Prices are generally low and can even 
become negative. In consequence, the spot market loses to essential functions. Firstly, the spot 
market cannot ensure that investments – irrespective of whether in renewable energy or fossil fuel 
capacities – can be recouped over the project lifetime without other revenues streams. Secondly, the 
spot market loses its ability to organise the dispatch of power plants, i.e. signalling which plant 
should be generating power to satisfy the exact current level of demand and which plant should not 
be running. While renewable energy has become competitive in current market environments, a 
proved market design for systems with very high shares of intermittent renewable energy that 
ensures that (1) long-term investments can be recouped and that (2) efficiently organises dispatch is 
still not on the horizon. 
The challenges and barriers differ among countries also in the way the power sector is structured. 
While in some countries, the power sector is dominated by privately owned utilities, in many 
countries utilities are state-owned. In some countries, institutional linkages between government 
and utilities is particularly close and amount to what Unruh has called a “techno-industrial complex” 
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from which strong systemic change resistance must be expected (Unruh, 2000; Harich, 2010; Heyen, 
Hermwille and Wehnert, 2017). Increasing deployment of renewable energy can contribute to a 
diversification of the ownership structure in the power sector. For example, in Germany investments 
in renewable energy have been largely driven by municipal utilities, small energy cooperatives and 
even individuals (Schmid, Knopf, & Pechan, 2016). 
Lastly, human capital and social barriers are important to highlight. Implementing global energy 
transformation towards renewable energy requires a skilled workforce. In many developing countries 
technical capabilities and skilled workers are still a bottleneck for the scaled-up renewable energy 
deployment (Hirsch, 2015). Social barriers include issues such as energy poverty. Changes in the 
provision of electricity may result in shifting costs and payments. In the course of the transformation 
of global power sectors, particular attention needs to be paid to avoiding potential effects that 
policies may have on marginalised communities so as to avoid increased incidence of energy poverty 
(Cherian, 2015). 
4.1.3. The Promise and Potential of International Cooperation 
4.1.1.1 Guidance and Signal Function 
The signalling function of international governance is of particular relevance for the power sector. 
Investments in the sector are extremely long-lived. On the one hand, this means that investments in 
fossil fuel infrastructure today may literally cement a carbon-intensive pathway for the next decades. 
On the other hand, this long-term perspective requires investors to make investment decisions to a 
large extent on the basis of long-term expectations of the sector and the economy in general as 
opposed to the market conditions of the day. When countries credibly agree on long-term visions 
and goals for the sector, this may alter the investors’ expectations about the viability of their 
projected investments and hence their investment decisions of today. The more specific the vision is, 
the more impact it is likely to have on the investment decisions.  
One particular example relates to investments in CCS. One of the key barriers is that potential 
investors face split incentives. Investing in CCS may help to “future-proof” the sector, yet this may 
come at significant short-term financial risks (J.	Gaede	and	Meadowcroft,	2016;	see	also	Kern	et	al.,	
2016). Also, the countries that have the strongest interest in developing CCS are those that have 
vested interests and/or large fossil fuel reserves. Yet, this interest in CCS is contingent on ambitious 
climate policy. The private sector will only invest in CCS in the presence of strict and credible long-
term climate policies. In the past, many of those countries have rather focused on delaying 
aggressive climate action (de Coninck and Bäckstrand, 2011). A strong international signal could help 
shift the political economy so that interest and consequently investment in developing CCS increases. 
4.1.1.2 Setting Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
There are various ways in which the power sector transformation in one country interrelates with the 
sector transformation in other countries. The most direct interdependence relates to global trade 
and competition. Power systems are connected through markets for fossil fuels, as well as globalised 
technology markets for all types of energy technologies, including renewable energy technologies 
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and battery storage. Since electricity is an essential input to almost all industries, there may be 
indirect competition among countries: if in the course of a sector transformation a country 
experiences (temporary) electricity price increases, energy intensive industries may migrate to 
another country with lower electricity prices (De Cian et al., 2017). A power sector transformation 
can thus become an issue of industrial competitiveness for the country. Moreover, direct 
international interdependencies may exist in the form of multinational corporations that are active in 
more than one country and often have significant economic power. However, in the power sector 
this may be less of an issue than for example in the extractive industries sector. While some 
multinational utilities exist, the majority of national power sectors are dominated by nationally 
operating utilities. Last but not least, regional spill-overs exist where power systems are physically 
interconnected. As a decarbonisation of the power sector will also reshape the grid infrastructure 
(see above), the transformation in country A will have ripple effects on the power system in country 
B with which country A is interconnected. 
Corresponding to the analysis of international interdependencies between power sectors of different 
countries, there are two types of rules could facilitate the decarbonisation of the sector. The first 
regards concerns of industrial competitiveness. Coordinated target setting could address such 
concerns at least partially. This could take the form of harmonised RE targets and/or quotas or even 
collective cap and trade systems for carbon emissions. Moreover, possible approaches for 
international cooperation include joint research programmes, patent pooling and removing trade 
barriers.  
The second type of rules are pertinent where power grids are regionally interconnected. In these 
cases regional governance approaches may be conducive to the transformation. Inter alia, 
coordinated investments in the grid infrastructure could minimise the need for storage capacities as 
variability in renewable energy supply to some extent balances itself out over large geographic 
distances.  
4.1.1.3 Transparency and Accountability 
Transparent reporting and monitoring can support and help reinforce rules, targets and/or standards 
collectively agreed as outlined above. The specific needs what to monitor and by whom, of course, 
depend on the specific rules, targets or standards agreed. 
4.1.1.4 Means of Implementation 
Another leverage point for international governance is mobilising the means of implementation for 
the sector transformation (for a discussion of the different means of implementation see Oberthür et 
al., 2017). In particular, international cooperation relating to means of implementation could help 
address the investment challenges described above. For example, typically, renewable energy 
investments incur the lion’s share of their lifetime cost in the form of upfront investment costs while 
featuring low or even close to zero operating costs later on. For countries in which difficult 
investment conditions prevail, this becomes a critical barrier for renewable energy investment. Due 
to high prime lending rates and currency related risks, capital cost can render renewable energy 
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technologies, which would otherwise outcompete the alternatives, uneconomical. This argument 
also holds for any highly capital intensive component of the energy system including storage and grid 
infrastructure. At the same time, there is no lack of investors looking for opportunities to invest. If 
ways were found to enhance the attractiveness of investments in sustainable power systems, this 
could strongly expedite the transformation of power sectors across the globe. International 
governance may especially contribute through arrangements for sharing the increased financial risks 
for investments in developing countries. More specifically, by providing some form of guarantee or 
security, developed countries could help bring down lending rates in developing countries in order to 
make private investments in renewable energy more attractive. 
Means of implementation, in terms of international transfer of renewable energy and energy storage 
technologies as well as capacity building (administrative and technological), are both highly beneficial 
for a successful transformation of power systems.  
4.1.1.5 Knowledge and Learning 
Learning and knowledge diffusion can also make a significant positive contribution to expediting 
global power sector transformations. For example, a successful sector transformation in one country 
may demonstrate the feasibility of transformation. Ideally, more success would demonstrate that 
there are numerous configurations that work, encouraging other countries to pursue the 
transformation of their sectors and at the same time providing orientation. This includes for example 
governance learning: which policies work and which political processes are promising in order to 
forge alliances and align interests. It also pertains to learning of management and organisational 
practices including for example effective market designs for high RE-share power markets. 
Furthermore, if successful transformations take place in large enough markets, this can lead to de-
facto standard setting of technological parameters.  
These kinds of spill-overs could be supported inter alia by creating (international) fora in which 
experimentation and good practice sharing with respect to policies and political processes can be 
facilitated, e.g. with respect to market designs and long-term planning procedures.  
The key governance functions necessary for decarbonisation of the power sector are summarised in 
Table 4.1 below. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
81 
Table 4.1: Overview of key governance needs in the power sector 
Guidance and 
Signal 

















































4.2. Governance Supply 
Global energy governance is a relatively new but increasingly popular field of academic inquiry. 
However, the existing literature has focused almost exclusively on perspectives aligned with different 
sources of energy (Florini and Sovacool, 2009; Lesage, Van de Graaf and Westphal, 2010; Cherp, 
Jewell and Goldthau, 2011; Dubash and Florini, 2011; Sovacool and Florini, 2012; Van de Graaf, 2013, 
2017; Müller, 2015; Roehrkasten, 2015; Westphal, 2015; Van de Graaf and Colgan, 2016; Van de 
Graaf and Zelli, 2016). To some extent this can be explained by the historical focus of the existing 
international organisations that are the study object of global energy governance; whether they are 
OPEC and IEA that are tied to oil, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) focussing on natural gas, 
or IRENA with a specific focus on renewable energy.  
It is, however, striking that to date, no one seems to have approached the question of global energy 
governance from the point of view of the systemic transformation challenges of the power sector. 
The subsequent section targets this research gap. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
82 
We have identified several thematic clusters to spasswordtructure the various institutions24 that are 
relevant for the power sector. We start with two elements of the UN system, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), 
that provide goals and address thematic issues directly relevant to the power sector. We then 
proceed to key initiatives focusing explicitly on the power sector. Subsequently we highlight three 
rather narrow yet very ambitious institutions that play pioneering roles for the power sector. After 
that we discuss Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). The last three sections consist of initiatives 
that could be divided into those with a regional focus, those with a technological focus and private 
sector institutions.  
Note that the list of institutions referred to below is neither exhaustive nor exclusive but focuses on 
the most salient ones. Particularly in the transnational realm there is a plethora of institutions, a 
comprehensive account of which would exceed the scope of this chapter. We therefore provide 
example accounts of a subset of institutions that are illustrative of a wider range of similar 
institutions and initiatives. 
4.2.1. Overarching Institutions within the UN System and Beyond 
Various institutions provide overarching governance pertinent to the power sector. These include the 
UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement (PA), the SDGs as well as the UN Secretary General’s Sustainable 
Energy for All (SE4All) initiative as a key enabler of SDG7 on energy. 
The PA with its long-term temperature goal of holding global temperature increase to well below 2°C 
and pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C (Art. 2.1(a)) and the accompanying goals of peaking of 
greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, rapid reductions thereafter and achieving net zero 
emissions in the second half of the century (Art. 4.1) have been interpreted as a clear signal to phase 
out fossil fuel production and consumption (Hermwille, 2016) and the implications of this signal are 
relatively clear for the power sector. Kuramochi et al. (2018) conclude that current growth rates for 
renewable energy of 25-30% per annum need to be maintained at least until 2025 in order to limit 
global warming to 1.5°C. For coal they deem it necessary to issue an immediate worldwide 
moratorium on new coal power plants and emission reductions of the existing fleet of coal power 
plants by 30% by 2025. Making these implications explicit in terms of specific sectoral goals could 
further strengthen the signal.  
The PA does not only express collective long-term temperature and other goals. The Agreement also 
places obligations on its Parties to develop and communicate successive, progressively more 
ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs) every five years. While the actual attainment 
of the mitigation contributions in NDCs are not legally binding in terms of obligations of result, 
24 We define international institutions as negotiated, dynamic, sectoral normative systems consisting of rules 
and practices, including decision-making procedures, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and 
shape actor expectations (cf. Oberthür et al., 2017, p. 12).  
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Parties have agreed on a legally binding obligation of conduct to implement domestic mitigation 
measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of their NDCs (Oberthür and Bodle 2016).  
The first round of NDCs has demonstrated the important role of the power sector in reducing 
emissions.25 The vast majority of NDCs mention renewable energy as a key mitigation option: 108 
countries declare their intention to expand renewable energy further as part of their reduction 
strategies, and 75 of them have also quantified this intended expansion. Eight countries – the Cape 
Verde Islands, Cook Island, Costa Rica, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu – even 
intend to decarbonise their power systems completely by 2030 (see Stephan, Schurig, and Leidreiter 
2016). Countries are however much less explicit with respect to phasing out reliance on fossil fuels. 
Moreover, all Parties have obligations to report biennially (except for SIDS and LDCs, which have 
discretion) on their inventories of greenhouse gas emissions and progress made in implementing and 
achieving their NDCs. Under the PA, a new and enhanced transparency framework for action and 
support is established and its modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) to be applicable to all 
Parties are currently being negotiated as part of the “Paris Agreement Work Programme”, which will 
provide the detailed modalities and guidance that underpin implementation of the Agreement.  
The periodic elements of the PA – the NDCs, regular reporting and review, as well as the five-yearly 
Global Stocktake that will assess collective progress towards the goals of the PA (see chapter 2) – 
create a ‘pacemaker’ that provides not only a one-off signal, but a periodic signal that is renewed 
refined every five years. 
With its financial mechanism and corresponding operating entities, the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (for a more detailed discussion see chapter 3), the UNFCCC 
and PA serve as key enablers of financial support to developing countries.26 In total, developed 
countries have pledged to mobilise US-Dollar 100 billion per annum from 2020 through to 2025 and 
agreed to negotiate an increase of that number for the period after 2025. However, individual 
contributions are not legally binding (see Obergassel et al., 2015, 2016). Looking at the project 
portfolio of the GCF – by far the largest funding mechanism under the UN climate regime – reveals 
that renewable energy projects are one of the priority areas of the fund (Green Climate Fund, 2018).  
Technology transfer and capacity building are also within the purview of the UNFCCC and the PA. 
With respect to the former, the Convention’s Technology Mechanism will now be further developed 
and refined to serve the PA. Moreover, the PA establishes a Technology Framework in order to 
26 Long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies that parties are invited to prepare in 
accordance with Art. 4.19 of the Paris Agreement could potentially also play an important role in facilitating the 
decarbonization of the power sector. To date, however, only a hand full of countries have presented such 
strategies. 
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provide guidance to the Technology Mechanism. In practice, however, the provision of technological 
support and technology transfer has been limited. For example, the Technology Executive Committee 
of the UNFCCC has contributed via papers, thematic reports and dialogues (UNFCCC Technology 
Executive Committee, 2016, 2017). Another example includes the national Technology Needs 
Assessments that many developing countries have conducted. Still, what has been delivered is 
mostly paper based and does not meet the needs we have identified in our above analysis. 
Capacity building has been on the agenda for many years, but has not been a priority in recent years. 
While industrialised countries had always recognised it as an essential element, especially for least-
developed countries and small island development states, developing countries had never managed 
to bring the issue to the top of the agenda. The PA recognises the importance of capacity building, 
but the actual text of Article 11 that specifies the capacity building provisions of the PA is relatively 
weak and non-binding. Moreover, the capacity building provisions are rather generic in nature. As 
one should expect of an overarching institutions such as the UNFCCC, the provisions are not specific 
enough to address the needs of the power sector we have identified above. 
The UNFCCC has fostered knowledge creation and learning in a number of ways, directly and 
indirectly. One central direct mechanism is the obligation on Parties to regularly submit GHG 
inventories and National Communications. Its GHG metrics form the core of the UNFCCC’s common 
language and are the key benchmark for its effectiveness. National Communications provide a 
wealth of information about national circumstances and actions being taken. Information about 
national emission profiles is a key prerequisite for developing suitable mitigation strategies. 
However, while the process of developing national communications may have served as a motor of 
knowledge aggregation at the national level, the information contained in them has not been used to 
promote mutual learning at the international level. Especially country’s reporting on policies and 
measures could have been a key basis for organising exchanges on lessons learned, which has so far 
remained largely untapped (Hildén, Jordan and Rayner, 2014; Schoenefeld, Hildén and Jordan, 2018). 
The situation has changed somewhat in recent years. As described in chapter 2, a series of technical 
expert meetings (TEMs) have been convened, in order to create a space for non-political and 
facilitative discussions (Sterk et al., 2013; Hermwille, 2018). The promotion of renewable energy was 
repeatedly a thematic focus of the TEMs. The UNFCCC has also promoted learning through its 
function as ‘pacemaker’ for national discussions. It has also served to raise new research questions 
(such as the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C) and created demand for new research on climate 
policies and transformation pathways. A key contribution also is the official request to the IPCC for 
the upcoming Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on the impacts of 
global warming of 1.5°C which will directly inform the negotiations.  
Last but not least, the UNFCCC has also indirectly contributed to the creation of methodologies and 
administrative knowledge with respect to determining emission reductions through its market-based 
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instruments such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).27 By 
incentivising private actors to identify and mobilise mitigation potential, these instruments have 
contributed to putting climate mitigation on the agenda of many private companies and getting a 
better picture of mitigation options and costs.  
Alongside the UNFCCC, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is the second large overarching 
international institution that aims at governing the sectoral transformation of the power sector and 
addresses the same sectoral transformation challenges identified in our assessment of the 
governance demands (see also Hermwille, 2017; Obergassel, Mersmann and Wang-Helmreich, 2017). 
For power supply, especially relevant are targets 7.2 (by 2030, to substantially increase the share of 
renewable energy in the global energy mix) and the two implementation-oriented targets 7.a (to 
enhance international cooperation and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean 
energy technology) and 7.b (to expand and upgrade infrastructure in developing countries to enable 
supply of sustainable energy services). 
The SDGs provide an overarching framework which will be implemented with the help of a variety of 
international organisations/initiatives. Yet the primary responsibility for implementation rests with 
national governments which are free to prioritise according to their respective national 
circumstances. Moreover, the targets are not very precise. Specifically, it remains unclear what 
constitutes a “substantial increase” in the share of renewable energy.  
For SDG7, the Sustainable Energy 4 All Initiative (SE4All) is particularly important. SE4All is a non-
profit organisation co-chaired by the UN Secretary-General and the President of the World Bank. 
Although SE4All predates the SDGs, it has now become a key initiative to facilitate the 
implementation of SDG7. To do so, it works with government leaders, the private sector, and civil 
society. With its general objectives “(…)ensuring universal access to modern energy services”, 
“(…)doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix” and “(…)doubling the global 
rate of improvement in energy efficiency” (SE4All website, no date). Inter alia SE4All maintains a 
Global Tracking Framework to monitor progress and trends in relation to energy access, renewable 
energy and energy efficiency. It furthermore produces a series of reports inter alia on financial flows 
towards energy access and clean cooking (SE4All, 2017). It also functions as a coordinator and 
distributor of knowledge through various regional and thematic hubs.  
Finally, the G7 and G20 as well as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) merit brief mention. All three 
have to a limited extend sought to govern on global energy matters, but mostly on an ad hoc basis. 
Examples are the G7’s call for decarbonisation of global economies expressed in the 2015 Leaders’ 
Declaration (G7, 2015) and the G20’s call for the phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies dating 
back to the 2009 summit in Pittsburgh (Dubash and Florini, 2011). Various scholars have in the past 
called for a much stronger role of the G20 in global energy governance (Roehrkasten, Thielges and 
27 The CDM and JI are mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. Their continuation under the Paris Agreement is 
uncertain (CDM) or excluded (JI). 
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Quitzow, 2016; Goldthau, 2017). The WTO is particularly relevant with respect to the trade of 
renewable energy and other low carbon technologies. Preferential trade agreements could play a 
strong facilitative role in promoting the deployment of renewable energy and their potential is 
currently not being exploited according to some analysts (Lewis, 2014; Morin and Jinnah, 2018). In 
2014 a group of 14 countries including the United States, EU, China and Japan started to negotiate a 
so-called “Environmental Goods Agreement” to reduce tariffs and trade barriers on low-carbon 
technologies (Van de Graaf and Colgan, 2016). In the meantime, the number of countries has 
increased to 18 members representing a total of 46 countries, yet the negotiations are slow and 
seem to have lost some of the initial momentum (Meyer, 2016; WTO, 2017). 
4.2.2. Energy Specific IGOs 
Institutions that are highly relevant for the power sector include the International Energy Agency, the 
International Renewable Energy Agency, as well as the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st 
century.  
The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an autonomous intergovernmental organisation under the 
OECD (on the origins of the IEA see Van de Graaf, 2017). Its members are 30 of the 35 OECD 
countries (plus Chile which is in status of accession to full membership), as well as currently seven 
association countries which are not part of the OECD.  The OECD also has working relationships with 
a number of other non-OECD countries. Despite its limited membership, “the IEA is the closest we 
currently have to a World Energy Organization” (Van de Graaf, 2013, p. 107). Also, the IEA has in 
recent years made strategic efforts to increase its reach by opening its doors to associated countries 
(without a full OECD membership). This was successful to the extent that Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Morocco, Singapore, and Thailand are now association countries (see also Heubaum and 
Biermann, 2015). 
The overall objective of the IEA is to provide reliable, affordable and clean energy to its members and 
also beyond the member countries. Originally, the IEA was founded as a ‘buyers club’ to counter the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and to ensure securing of oil supplies (Dubash 
and Florini, 2011). But the IEA has widened its portfolio to include all energy sources (Heubaum and 
Biermann, 2015). Most recently, the IEA has launched an extensive “Clean Energy Transition 
Programme” that focuses on leveraging a global energy transition beyond the IEA member countries, 
particularly in major emerging economies (IEA, 2017b). Specifically relevant to the power sector is 
the fact that the IEA has announced 2018 as the Year of Electricity. Activities include a special focus 
on electricity in the annual World Energy Outlook and a “Status Report on Power System 
Transformation“ to be published in the course of the year (IEA, 2018b). The agency’s main purview 
has hence become to make available information on all types of energy markets and technologies. 
“This information function has become the hallmark of the IEA’s day-to-day functioning” (Van de 
Graaf, 2017, p. 595).  
Especially noteworthy in this context are the above mentioned World Energy Outlook (WEO), and the 
Energy Technology Perspectives reports, which provide energy-market analysis and projections that 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
87 
are so influential that they effectively function as a key benchmark for decision making in all sorts of 
organisations from public administrations to private enterprises. Yet the IEAs scenarios have been 
criticised for repeated skewed predictions and dramatically underestimating the uptake of 
renewable energy, in particular solar PV (Creutzig et al., 2017). Muttitt (2018) even accuses the IEA of 
distorting its projections in ways that systematically support investments in fossil fuels and high 
carbon infrastructures. But as highlighted by Heubaum and Biermann, “the IEA was hardly the only 
organization that got it wrong” (Heubaum and Biermann, 2015, p. 232). 
Complementary to its informational resources, the IEA maintains various Technology Collaboration 
Programmes (TCPs) which facilitate collaboration between experts in order to support governments 
and industries in the field of, among others, renewable energy and hydrogen.  
Unlike the IEA, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) exclusively focuses on 
renewable energy governance. It is an intergovernmental organisation with 154 members. IRENA 
was founded in 2009 and is a rare example for a newly established international organisation that 
partly overlaps with an existing international organisation, namely the IEA. In fact, Van de Graaf 
posits that “IRENA was part of an institutional hedging strategy (...) to counter the IEA’s allegedly 
supportive stance toward the fossil and nuclear energy industries” (Van de Graaf, 2013, p. 108). 
According to Müller, IRENA has attained a “leading role as a political entrepreneur in the field of 
renewable energy” (Müller, 2015, p. 252). It has achieved this by building a global knowledge base on 
renewable energy that it consequently employs as a means “to exert power over knowledge” 
(Müller, 2015, p. 252). Key contributions in this regard are the ‘Global Atlas for Solar And Wind’ as 
well as IRENA’s regular and comprehensive renewable energy statistics and regional and/or 
technology specific roadmaps. Another key means of governance are the so-called “renewable 
readiness assessments” in which IRENA orchestrates national entities (related ministries, regional 
entities, specialised agencies financial institutions as well as corporate and civil society stakeholders) 
and brings in transnational knowledge brokers to identify gaps in the existing technological and 
administrative environment and developing concrete action plans to overcome these gaps (Müller,	
2015). IRENA also plays a key role in several relevant regional initiatives: the Clean Energy Corridor 
for Central America (CECCA), the Africa Clean Energy Corridor (ACEC), the West Africa Clean Energy 
Corridor (WACEC) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Lighthouse Initiative. 
Although not strictly an intergovernmental organisation, the Renewable Energy Policy Network for 
the 21st century (REN21) is also worth highlighting here. Again, REN21 is an institution that does not 
cover the full range of energy sources. REN21 is a transnational institution with a diverse 
membership. Members include national governments, industry organisations, research 
organisations, civil society organisations as well as numerous intergovernmental organisations. Its 
key governance instrument is the annual Renewables Global Status Report, which has become a key 
resource that includes not only statistical data on renewable energy capacities, generation, and 
investments but also reviews the state of the industry as well as national RE policy frameworks 
(REN21, 2017).  
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Numerous other intergovernmental organisations may be mentioned in terms of wider energy 
governance. These include the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Gas 
Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Energy 
Agency, and the International Energy Charter, all of which are important but mostly focus on 
commodity trade. Moreover, they hardly contribute specifically to climate governance by means of 
the specific governance functions assessed here (Lesage et al., 2010; see Dubash and Florini, 2011). 
4.2.3. Multilateral Development Banks 
Basically, all relevant Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) focus on means of implementation due 
to their general function of providing financial assistance in the context of development projects 
(Lesage, Van de Graaf and Westphal, 2010) (for a more elaborate discussion see chapter 3). 
Especially noteworthy is the World Bank as the largest and most influential development bank, 
which funds energy projects focusing on “affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy supply needed 
to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity” (World Bank, 2018). This is clearly aligned 
with the Bank’s engagement in the SE4ALL initiative (see above) and SDG 7. The Bank also mobilises 
private sector participation and investment for funding clean energy and supports various strategic 
global partnerships and programs. Particularly noteworthy is the Bank’s announcement to stop 
financing upstream oil and gas investments as of 2019 (World Bank, 2017b). It is noteworthy, 
because the Bank was the first international ‘heavyweight’ that not only focused on the phase-out of 
coal – which is becoming more and more commonplace – but also included oil and gas related 
investments. Due to its significant clout, the World Bank indirectly has helped to reinforce and 
amplify the signal to initiate decarbonisation.  
Additionally, the World Bank maintains an extensive statistical database which constitutes an 
important information hub for all types of stakeholders. Important elements in this regard are the 
Global Tracking Framework for the SE4All initiative and other regular reports such as the Regulatory 
Indicators in Sustainable Energy Report (RISE) and the State of Energy Access Report (SEAR).  
Another relevant development bank for the power sector is the African Development Bank (AfDB). 
The AfDB’s engagement in the power sector is guided by two goals: “Support Regional Member 
Countries (RMCs) in their efforts to provide all of their populations and productive sectors with 
access to modern, affordable and reliable energy services [and] help RMCs develop their energy 
sector in a socially, economically and environmentally sustainable manner” (AfDB, 2012). 
Like the World Bank and the AfDB, all other MDBs are also relevant to the power sector 
transformation. These include the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the New 
Development Bank co-founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.  
Finally, the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) is worth mentioning. Funded and supported by national 
governments and MDBs (African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for 
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Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank Group), 
CIF provides financial means of implementation to low and middle income countries with a specific 
view to build up and help establish emerging and unproven markets. The total budget of the CIF 
accounts for 8.3 billion US-Dollars. Particularly relevant for the power sector are the CIF’s 5.6 billion 
US-Dollar Clean Technology Fund and the 780 US-Dollar million ‘Scaling Up Renewable Energy in Low 
Income Countries Program’. 
4.2.4. Informal Energy Alliances 
We would like to highlight three institutions with a more narrow scope and/or membership yet with 
rather high ambitions: the International Solar Alliance, the Powering Past Coal Alliance, the Clean 
Energy Ministerial, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, as well as Mission 
Innovation and the Breakthrough Energy Coalition. 
The International Solar Alliance (ISA) was launched at COP 21 in Paris in 2015. It is an 
intergovernmental organisation and consists of 121 countries with high solar energy potential. Its 
core objective is to implement solar energy in a streamlined fashion. To this end the ISA concentrates 
on establishing expert groups and partnerships; training programmes; sharing of experiences and 
analysis. Each member has to establish a National Focal Point to create a stable network within the 
member states. Beyond capacity building, the ISA is also cooperating with various MDBs including 
the European Investment Bank and the Asian Development Bank on risk sharing arrangements and 
implementing financial mechanisms to support solar energy in developing countries (International 
Solar Alliance, 2016, 2017).  
The Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) was recently launched at COP23 (2017). It is an international 
alliance of governments, businesses and organisations that collaborate to reach the complete phase-
out of coal. In general, all members are committed to introduce policies and investments that are 
supportive of clean power. At the same time they commit to decrease investments in traditional coal 
power without carbon capture and storage. Member states should phase out existing traditional coal 
in their jurisdiction and new traditional coal power stations should only be established if operational 
CCS is available within their jurisdiction. Though promising, it can be observed that all of the 
founding member countries already have very limited coal consumption and consequently have little 
“skin in the game” (Obergassel et al., 2018). The PPCA also invites non-governmental members which 
commit to abandon coal for their special energy needs.  
The Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) is an association of 24 countries and the EU that works towards 
a global clean energy economy. It organises regular meetings of energy ministers to discuss clean 
energy, delivers necessary information and tools to decision makers and collaborates with other line 
ministries, institutions and private-sector partners. In addition, it finances public research and 
development in the context of clean energy technologies and implements initiatives relating to 
energy supply, capacity building and policy expertise. 
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The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) is a multi-stakeholder partnership 
that was founded in the aftermath of the 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit (Roehrkasten, 2015; Van 
de Graaf and Zelli, 2016). REEEP is primarily a platform that serves to connect and to some extent 
orchestrate a wide range of actors. Its prime focus is to facilitate and foster investment in 
renewables and energy efficiency technologies in developing countries, whether that is through 
funding actual projects that are pioneering yet replicable at the large scale, or whether that is 
through supporting governments in developing favourable regulatory frameworks (see also Parthan 
et al., 2010). REEEP maintains an online knowledge hub (reegle.info) that collates all kinds of 
information including country profiles and statistics for potential investors (REEEP, 2018).  
Finally, there are international institutions with a technology neutral innovation-oriented purview. 
Salient examples are Mission Innovation and the Breakthrough Energy Coalition. Mission Innovation 
is a high-level political initiative that regularly unites energy and other related ministers from 22 
mostly industrialised countries and the EU. Member countries have committed to double public 
spending for energy R&D with a view to cumulatively reaching over 32 billion US-Dollars by 2020 
(Sanchez and Sivaram, 2017). The initiative is particularly important because the membership covers 
nearly all public R&D funding. Beyond the financial commitment, Mission Innovation has become a 
hub for information sharing (on energy R&D), identification of innovation gaps, coordination of R&D 
funding plans as well as attraction of private-public partnership engagement. The latter was in fact a 
key prerogative of Mission Innovation from the outset. Its official announcement at COP21 was 
accompanied by representatives of the Breakthrough Energy Coalition, which unites private 
investors, global corporations and financial institutions who have collectively pledged to invest 1 
billion US-Dollar in early-stage technology companies through the Coalition’s Breakthrough Energy 
Ventures Fund (Sanchez and Sivaram, 2017; Breakthrough Energy Coalition, 2018). 
4.2.5. Institutions with Regional and Local Focus 
As sketched out above, IRENA includes a number of regional initiatives reflecting the organisation’s 
global commitment on a regional level. In addition to IRENA’s regional initiatives, a range of other 
international institutions have a focus on specific regions. As an example, we focus on Africa as a 
regional cluster, but similar institutions exist for other world regions.28  
With respect to Africa, the most salient institutions are the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) 
and the regional interconnected power grids, the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP), the Western 
African Power Pool (WAPP) and Southern African Power Pool (SAPP).  
The AREI is led and owned by African institutions and was launched at COP 21 in Paris. The initiative’s 
goal is to ramp up renewable energy generation capacity to at least 10 GW by 2020 and 300 GW by 
28 Examples include the Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, Latin America Energy 
Organization (OLADE), the Association of Southeast Asian Nation Centre for Energy, and Baltic Sea Region 
Energy Cooperation. 
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2030 in order to support African countries to transform their energy systems, ensure energy access 
and increase economic and energy security. In order to provide the required financial support, 
several industrialised donor countries, including Canada, France, Germany, the USA, together with 
the EU for example had pledged an initial 10 billion US-Dollar. Additionally, AREI provides capacity 
building on strengthening regulatory frameworks, mobilisation of capacities for all stakeholders as 
well as support for project development. 
EAPP, WAPP and SAPP are grid networks that all seek improvements in the field of energy supply and 
efficiency for their respective area by interconnecting power grids of different African countries. This 
requires technical rules to adjust different power systems.  
A particularly peculiar regional initiative is the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). It is the only 
transnational emission trading scheme.29 The WCI established a regional greenhouse gas emissions 
trading scheme in the western United States and Canada which is mandatory within the member’s 
respective jurisdictions. To support this, the WCI has a compliance tracking system in place that 
enables tracking of allowances and offsets certificates. It manages allowance auctions and performs 
market monitoring of certificate trading. This initiative is, of course, not exclusively geared towards 
the power sector, but does directly affect power generation. 
Alongside these institutions with regional focus, there are numerous institutions that focus on the 
local level. One of the largest regional initiatives, the Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, 
should be highlighted here. It unites over 7000 local and regional authorities from 57 countries who 
have pledged to decarbonise their territories, adapt to climate change impacts, and provide “secure, 
sustainable and affordable energy” by 2050 (Energy Cities, 2018). Inter alia, the Covenant of Mayors 
has established a standardised format for so-called Sustainable Energy and Climate Plans (SECAP) 
that include baseline emission inventories as well as climate risks and vulnerability assessments. 
Member cities are obligated to regularly report their progress every two years on the 
implementation of their commitments.  
The 100% Renewable Energy Cities & Regions Network convened by Local Governments for 
Sustainability (ICLEI) comprises leading cities, towns and regions envisioning the transition towards a 
exclusively renewable energy supply. It is also part of the to the Global 100% Renewable Energy 
Campaign (Global 100% RE, see below). Members must pledge 100% renewable energy target in at 
least one sector. Additionally, the network facilitates capacity building inter alia through peer-
learning arrangements and guidance provided by the ICLEI Secretariat.  
Another example of an institution focussing on the local level is the Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance. 
Participating cities make commitments concerning energy supply and renewable energy, ranging 
29 Of course, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme also extends across borders, but given the supranational nature 
of the EU, it is still not comparable with the WCI which unites subnational entities of to different countries. 
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from voluntary actions and financial incentives to obligations, in order to contribute to reaching the 
Alliance’s general target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050.  
There is also a wide range of governance institutions such as “under2 coalition” and “C40 Cities” that 
have a general climate policy focus and hence cover power sector issues on the general level. 
However, they do not have an explicit power sector focus and were hence not included in the 
assessment in further detail. 
4.2.6. Institutions Geared toward the Private Sector 
A number of institutions provide power sector-related governance directly towards the private 
sector. RE100 is a project by the Climate Group. It provides a platform for its 116 member companies 
to pledge and register their commitment to exclusively use renewable electricity for their global 
activities. Members also subscribe to RE100’s credibility and transparency requirements. This 
includes, for example, annual reporting of the amount of renewable electricity procured and 
consumed. Global 100% RE is an initiative with partners from civil society, industry, science and 
policy. It envisions the introduction of 100% renewable energy and solely renewable energy-
investments in the context of energy financing. It strives for uniting and organising motivated actors 
worldwide to define a roadmap towards the common objective.   
4.3. Assessing the Governance Complex 
4.3.1. Guidance and Signal 
As identified above, strong signals for the power sector are especially important to influence 
investment decisions towards decarbonisation. The guidance and signal from existing inter- and 
transnational governance institutions is already relatively elaborated. Overarching institutions like 
the UNFCCC and the SDGs, particularly SDG7, collectively provide relatively clear ‘terms of reference’ 
for the global energy transformation regarding their respective goals and targets (Hermwille, 2017). 
The periodic elements of the PA – NDCs, transparency reporting and the Global Stocktake – ensure 
that the signal is not intermittent or time-limited, but continuous guidance is provided through 
periodically renewed and revised signals.  
While the 1.5°C warming limit, peaking of emissions as soon as possible and net zero emissions goals 
of the PA still fall short of an explicit call for the phase-out of fossil fuel extraction and consumption, 
its implications are relatively straightforward for the power sector. As noted above, Kuramochi et al. 
(2018) conclude that current growth rates for renewable energy of 25-30% per annum need to be 
maintained at least until 2025 in order to limit global warming to 1.5°C. For coal they deem it 
necessary to issue an immediate worldwide moratorium on new coal power plants and emission 
reductions of the existing fleet of coal power plants by 30% by 2025. Still, it needs to be noted that 
the signal could be strengthened if these implications were made explicit as specific goals, for 
example in terms of a global decarbonisation roadmap for the sector. 
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Moreover, it bears noting that the signal is less clear when it comes to oil- and particularly gas-
fuelled power. On the one hand gas can contribute to short-term emission reductions by substituting 
coal and also help to provide flexibility to accommodate increasing shares of intermittent renewable 
energy. Indeed, a significant share of the recent emission reductions in the United States can be 
attributed to gas replacing coal as a fuel for electricity generation (Mohlin et al., 2018). Yet in the 
long-run, gas like any other fossil fuel is clearly incompatible with decarbonisation. The only 
institution which has sent a strong signal to this effect is the World Bank (see section 4.2.3). 
The overarching signal of the PA and the SDGs is being echoed and amplified by a range of other 
institutions. For example, SE4All sends clear signals towards the required shift, aiding actual 
implementation. The role of local authorities and municipal utilities is often overlooked in stimulating 
the transformation of power systems on the ground. The Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy 
and the Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance are actively developing the signal from the UNFCCC and SDG7 
and translating it into action at the local level. And in the realm of private sector institutions Global 
100% RE, for example, explicitly demands from its members to invest accordingly.  
However, the signal to phase in renewable energy resonates much more strongly within the wider 
governance complex than the signal to phase out energy-related fossil fuel production (see chapter 
6) and consumption. The Powering Past Coal Alliance is the only institution providing a corresponding
signal directly and explicitly. However, as noted above its membership is still rather limited and
includes only countries that have limited coal generation capacity. Overall, the signal is being heard,
at least in some parts of the world: Europe’s energy utilities through their trade association
EURELECTRIC have collectively committed not to build any new coal power plants after 2020. The
only EU countries that have not committed are Poland and Greece (EurActiv, 2017).
On the other hand, global coal demand has started to decrease in recent years (IEA, 2017c), but the 
pipeline of coal power plants in the planning or already under construction is still extensive. If all 
these plants were built, the well below 2°C and limiting warming to 1.5 °C goal would be doomed 
(Edenhofer, 2015; Oil Change International, 2016; Pfeiffer et al., 2018). Therefore, what would be 
needed is a truly global Powering Past Coal Alliance. 
To conclude, an overarching signal is provided by the PA and the SDGs, supported by a wide range of 
international institutions. The signal to the power sector to ramp up renewable energy is loud and 
clear from the existing global governance landscape: low-carbon energy sources, first and foremost 
renewable energy, and the corresponding infrastructure needs to be expanded post-haste. What is 
lacking, though, is an explicit roadmap/target for decarbonisation of the power sector. Also, the 
signal is somewhat ambiguous when it comes to the role of natural gas. Finally, what is missing is a 
more explicit focus on the flipside of the renewable energy revolution, namely on the phase out of 
fossil fuel production and consumption. We therefore assess the guidance and signal function to be 
fulfilled to a medium level. 
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4.3.2. Setting Rules 
Ideally, rule setting within the power sector should be realised in form of coordinated target setting, 
for example by harmonised RE targets/quotas or cap and trade systems that cover emissions from 
the power sector, and coordinated investments in grid and generation infrastructure particularly 
where power systems are physically interconnected. The former has not been achieved at a larger 
scale. A first attempt to introduce top-down coordinated target setting with legally binding 
commitments infamously failed at the 2009 Copenhagen COP.30 As chapter 2 has elaborated, the PA 
instead has focused much more on procedural obligations (Oberthür and Bodle, 2016), but has 
consequently been criticised for its lack of legal ‘bindingness’ (Obergassel et al., 2015, 2016; 
Bodansky, 2016; Oberthür and Bodle, 2016).  
Although the PA makes no explicit reference to the power sector in general or renewable energy in 
particular, the first round of NDCs has demonstrated the important role of the sector. Still, due to the 
lack of a common standardised format of NDCs their comparability is low. In their current form they 
hence are more of a tool for target setting that is coincidental rather than effectively coordinated. 
Apart from the UNFCCC, no other international institution has the authority or mandate to serve as a 
forum for the kind of coordinated target setting at the global level that would resolve the 
competitiveness concerns outlined above. But even despite this, the world is seeing ever more 
carbon pricing initiatives (World Bank, 2017a; Métivier, Bultheel and Postic, 2018), though hardly any 
schemes covering the international realm.31 The one exception is the Western Climate Initiative 
which unites subnational entities of two countries, the United States and Canada. This proliferation 
of carbon pricing approaches already to some degrees addresses competitiveness concerns to the 
extent that the various schemes create similar levels of regulation in the concerned jurisdictions. As 
noted in chapter 3, Article 6 of the PA provides potential avenues for countries to engage in 
“cooperative approaches” which may further facilitate the proliferation of carbon pricing 
instruments as well as increased coordination/harmonisation of them. Yet, given that the detailed 
rules for Art. 6 will only be elaborated as part of the Paris Rulebook, it is still too early to make a 
definitive judgment (Luhmann and Arens, 2016). 
Beyond that, a few mostly voluntary institutions try to orchestrate target setting, whether for cities 
(Covenant of Mayors and Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance) or for businesses (RE100). 
The rule-setting could be also important with respect to a global phase-out of coal mining and use. 
To the extent that coal is an international commodity, potential spill-overs (e.g. price effects) could 
30 Of course the attempt was not exclusively focused on power sector emissions but much broader. A more 
successful Copenhagen agreement arguably would have resolved some of the power sector related 
competitiveness concerns mentioned above. 
31 The EU with its European Emission Trading Scheme has been considered as a single jurisdiction and was 
therefore excluded from the analysis. 
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be addressed by common rules. In this regard we do not see any international institutions that 
establish common rules in this regard with the possible exception of the PCPA. The PPCA has set 
itself ambitious targets, but whether these will be translated into formal rules that are implemented 
remains to be seen.  
We do observe some progress with respect to a very different yet also necessary type of rules and 
standard setting: the setting of international technical standards. This includes for example the 
efforts of regional power pools in Africa that aim to further integrate and harmonise the 
interconnected power grids of their respective member countries.  
All things considered, the global climate governance sub-complex for the power sector does not fully 
satisfy the governance demands for rule-setting we have identified. Considering the limitations of 
what global governance can reasonably be expected to deliver, we would still rate the rule-setting 
function as low-medium.  
4.3.3. Transparency and Accountability 
Generally, transparency is relatively high in the power sector. Major institutions like the IEA, IRENA, 
World Bank and REN21 to a large degree complement each other and collectively provide a high 
degree of transparency. A limitation to this is that the legitimacy of two of the most informative 
sources – IEA and REN21 – is somewhat limited. The IEA is an organisation under the OECD and 
hence has a strong focus on OECD countries. While it provides information on non-member 
countries, this data is less frequent, and potentially less accurate. Also, non-members may consider 
the IEA information insufficiently authoritative. Finally, IEA statistics and many of the more detailed 
IEA products require a hefty subscription fee that may actually inhibit the data being used by a wide 
range of actors, especially within civil society. 
The REN21 Global Status Reports ensure a high degree of rigor through a well-organised scientific 
process that brings together a large number of contributors and an even larger number of reviewers. 
Yet it lacks the kind of political processing that makes the IPCC, for example, a highly authoritative 
source of information. 
A number of more specialised institutions also contribute to transparency and accountability. These 
include the Covenant of Mayors that contributes information on power supply at municipal level and 
RE100 which provides transparent information of use of renewable energy by subscribing companies. 
The transparency and accountability function specifically focuses on information that supports rule 
setting and implementation (see Oberthür et al., 2017). This relates to two issues. On the one hand 
there is a need for a basic level of transparency in order to be able to formulate and coordinate 
collective goals and individual targets. With the information provided from the existing governance 
complex, a lack of basic transparency should not hinder more advanced rule setting in the power 
sector. On the other hand, transparency and accountability are required to track progress on the 
implementation of collectively agreed targets and built trust. As stated above, there is still a lack of 
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such collectively agreed goals that go beyond the basic overarching goals of the PA and the SDGs. 
Hence there is no need for further transparency on that matter. Those institutions that engage in 
coordinated target setting at the transnational level (e.g. the Western Climate Initiative, RE100 and 
the Covenant of Mayors) have their own, tailored, transparency arrangements. 
Consequently, we consider that the overall rating for the transparency and accountability function is 
high in the power sector.  
4.3.4. Means of Implementation 
The identified key governance demands with respect to means of implementation include 
arrangements for risk sharing for capital-intensive investments, capacity building as well as transfer 
of renewable energy and energy storage. Various institutions provide these governance functions, 
particularly financial support and capacity building. Financial means of implementation are provided 
first and foremost by the Multilateral Development Banks, especially in developing countries. 
However, their role is not unambiguous. MDBs have also been accused of impeding the process 
towards sustainable energy systems by continuing to fund fossil-fuel projects (Kim and Urpelainen, 
2013; Wright, Holmes and Barbe, 2017). The World Bank’s commitment to stop funding upstream 
fossil fuel investments highlights how this may be changing.   
Alongside the MDBs, numerous other institutions provide more targeted finance. These include the 
Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, with a regional focus, and Mission Innovation and the 
Breakthrough Energy Coalition with a focus on research and innovation. While Mission Innovation 
holds the potential to become a key institution in the area, its future is somewhat uncertain. The 
United States was a key driver of the initiative, not only contributing a major share of the budget but 
also providing staff for its secretariat (Sanchez and Sivaram, 2017). In the Trump era, it is highly 
questionable whether the US engagement in Mission Innovation will continue. Initially, Trump’s 
proposed budget would have slashed funding for clean energy research (Foehringer Merchant and 
Pyper, 2018), but after negotiations in the Congress the budget for clean energy research was 
actually significantly increased (Morello and Guglielmi, 2018). While this seems to suggest that the 
US will contribute financially to the targets Mission Innovation set out, it is still uncertain whether 
other countries will be able to compensate for the lack of US leadership. 
But are the available means of implementation sufficient to meet the enormous investment needs to 
transform global power systems? While current growth rates for renewable energy are in line with 
the required pace to embark on a 1.5°C compatible pathway (see Kuramochi et al. 2018), it is unclear 
whether this high level of growth (25-30%) can be maintained and for how long. The investment 
challenge is enormous: in order to save a chance of limiting global warming to well below 2°C 
investments, around USD 20 trillion need to be shifted from investments in fossil fuel infrastructure 
to renewables and energy efficiency in the 2015-2050 period, and investments of an additional USD 
27 trillion need to be attracted compared to current levels of investment (IRENA, 2018).  
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Overall the governance institutions in place are probably sufficient. However, the actual financial 
means may not suffice to sustain current growth in renewable energy. As chapter 3 has highlighted 
as well, this needs to be set against the continued funding of unsustainable fossil-fuel infrastructure. 
The number of institutions providing capacity building is even higher than with respect to financial 
means of implementation. These include SE4All, the International Solar Alliance, the Clean Energy 
Ministerial, IRENA with its various regional initiatives, as well as the technology-specific institutions 
such as the Global Bioenergy Partnership, Global Geothermal Alliance, Global Solar Council and 
Global Wind Energy Council. For private businesses, capacity building is provided by the Global 
Sustainable Electricity Partnership, among others. Overall, there is ample governance supply. While 
the plethora of capacity-building institutions may suggest a high degree of specialisation among the 
institutions and hence a broad range of aspects are covered, it also bears the question whether the 
resources for capacity building are spent efficiently. There is perhaps room for improvement in 
better coordinating or orchestrating the various efforts (see chapter 10). 
All in all, the governance function means of implementation for the energy sector fulfils the demands 
under 4.1 to a medium to high degree.  
4.3.5. Knowledge and Learning 
There are a plethora of inter- and transnational institutions that serve the knowledge and learning 
governance function. Among the key suppliers are the IEA (specifically through the World Energy 
Outlook, Energy Technology Perspectives reports and various TCPs). IRENA is also very important as 
an information hub.  
Further relevant initiatives are REN21, the International Solar Alliance, the Clean Energy Ministerial, 
Energy Cities, and the International Solar Alliance, to name a few. However, most of these are 
concerned with technological knowledge. Social scientific knowledge production, related inter alia to 
socio-economic and cultural implications of energy transformations seems underrepresented. 
Nevertheless, overall we conclude that the knowledge and learning governance function is being 
fulfilled to a high degree. Also, knowledge with respect to the increased temperature goal (1.5°C) is 
still somewhat limited and many models that inform analyses, such as the IEA’s periodic reports, is 
still based on 2°C scenarios. The 2018 IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C may help to close this gap. 
4.4. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The climate governance complex for the power sector is highly populated with many diverse 
institutions. There is however no central and/or coordinating institution. When compared to other 
sectoral systems, the governance complex for power is perhaps still the most ‘complete’ in terms of 
governance supply meeting the identified needs (see chapter 10). This is particularly true for 
transparency, knowledge and learning, and means of implementation (with some limitations on 
finance). Significant shortcomings remain, however: while the signal is strong and clear for the 
phase-in of renewable energy, it is somewhat vague when it comes to the phase-out of coal and 
virtually absent when it comes to oil and particularly gas. Arguably, however, the issue of phase-out 
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of fossil fuel infrastructures will become more and more central as renewable energy technologies 
approach global breakthroughs and begin to challenge the incumbent fossil-fuel based system. The 
increasing recognition of the importance of “just transition” (Obergassel et al., 2018) can be seen as 
highlighting this.  
But what is the right forum to address these issues? Goldthau (2017) suggests that the G20 is well 
placed to play a central role in mediating imminent conflicts between the winners (low carbon 
technology leaders) on the one hand and losers (fossil-fuel producers and heavy consumers) on the 
other hand. While we agree that the G20 is the right place to set the agenda for fossil fuel phase-out 
and initiate talks, it may not be the right forum to resolve consequent conflicts. It may be the right 
place because it brings together the key winners and losers of the energy sector transformation, but 
its ad-hoc nature, limited formalisation as well as its limited representativeness suggest otherwise. 
Others have proposed to engage in ‘supply side climate policy’, i.e. policies that restrict the 
production/extraction of fossil fuels, also in the context of the UNFCCC (Asselt and Kulovesi, 2017; 
Piggot et al., 2017; Verkuijl et al., 2018) (see chapter 6 on extractive industries).  
Given its strong focus on GHG emissions in general and the historically minor role that sector-specific 
perspectives played in the negotiations32, the UNFCCC is perhaps not the right place to develop and 
negotiate a global vision and/or roadmap for the power sector (or indeed any other sector). The 
NDCs and the long-term low-emission strategies that Parties are invited to prepare in accordance 
with Art. 4.19 of the PA (implicitly) enlist national governments in developing such visions, but not in 
an internationally coordinated manner. On the other hand, the UNFCCC could still take up visions 
developed at other international fora and, for example, “take note” or “endorse” them by way of a 
COP decision. This would help to raise the profile of such sectoral visions and further institutionalise 
them thus amplifying the signal and guidance provided. Article 22 of the PA would in principle even 
allow formal inclusion of such visions as amendments to the PA.33 
Finally, the IEA could also be the right institution to take on a leading and/or orchestrating role 
within towards governing the transformation of the power sector, at least in principle. The IEA has 
substantial analytical capacity and already serves as a knowledge broker. It also has strong convening 
power (Heubaum and Biermann, 2015) which it could utilise even more broadly to foster 
international coordination particularly with respect to the required decline and ultimately phase-out 
of fossil fuel consumption in the power sector.  
32 While the GHG monitoring and reporting do provide a sectoral disaggregation, these sectors (e.g. Energy 
sector) are not aligned with the sectoral systems that guide the analysis of this report. Exceptions are perhaps 
agriculture and forestry which have received somewhat more explicit attention recently (Dinesh et al., 2017). 
33 A formal amendment would of course require a steep and stony path to first adopt and than ratify the 
amendment in a context in which unanimous decision making is the norm. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
99 
But in its current form, the IEA’s capacities to do so are limited mainly by two aspects of its historic 
legacy. The first regards its affiliation with the OECD. IEA full membership (and hence full voting 
rights in the governing bodies) is restricted to OECD members. The second aspect regards the IEA’s 
historic focus on fossil fuels. Founded as a ‘buyer’s club’ to counterbalance OPEC, even today a 
membership requirement is that members need to hold oil reserves for up to 90 days. But this legacy 
is not only a problem when it comes to broadened membership; it is also a question of credibility. In 
the past, the IEA has rather promoted the production and consumption of fossil fuels while in the 
future it will be necessary to restrict their use. 
Arguably, the IEA has come a long way to leave behind this legacy with the broadening of its issue 
portfolio and the “opening the doors” strategy to welcome associated countries (Heubaum and 
Biermann, 2015; Elkind, 2017). While these efforts are laudable, they will only go so far. In order to 
become a truly leading institution, the IEA would have to leave this legacy fully behind and attract a 
much wider membership. Being part of the OECD system may discourage many developing countries 
and emerging economies from joining the IEA and providing it with a more global mandate. Former 
IEA’s Deputy Director Ambassador Jones described the situation of the IEA as an autonomous agency 
of the OECD as follows: “It’s like being 35 years old and still living with your parents” (quoted in 
Lesage, Van de Graaf and Westphal, 2010, p. 52). Maybe it is time to move out? 
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4.5. Annex: Overview of Institutions and their respective Contribution to the Governance Functions 
GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS: Guidance and Signal Setting Rules 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
GOVERNANCE NEEDS 
results based on the analysis of 
sectoral transformation 
challenges 
Signal for low-carbon 
investments in energy 
infrastructure 
- coordinated target setting 




- coordination at the regional
level (especially grid
development) 
required to support collective 
action function 
- risk sharing for capital 
intensive investments in
sustainable power systems, 
especially in developing 
countries 
- international transfer of 





sharing of good practice policies 




UNFCCC/Paris Agreement Focus 
PA’s 1.5 degree Celsius long-term 
temperature goal; goals of 
peaking emissions as soon as 
possible and net zero emissions 
in 2nd half of this century; 5-




Regular reports of countries’ 
GHG emissions and tracking 
progress made in implementing 
and achieving NDCs; 
transparency framework under 
the PA 
Focus 
Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF); Green Climate Fund (GCF); 
Climate Technology Center and 
Network (CTCN) 
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GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS: Guidance and Signal Setting Rules 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
Sustainable Development Goals 
– SDG 7 
Focus 
Targets 7.2, 7.a, 7.b 
Indirect 
Global indicator framework 
Sustainable Energy for All Focus 
ensuring universal access to 
modern energy services, 
doubling the share or RE in the 
global energy mix, doubling the 
global rate of improvement in 
energy efficiency 
Focus 
Global Tracking Framework to 
benchmark progress 
Focus 
financial or in-kind contributions; 
national strategies and 
investment plans 
Focus 
regional and thematic hubs; 
Global Energy Efficiency 
Accelerator Platform; Energising 
Finance report series 
G7 indirect 
2015 announcement to 
decarbonise global economies in 
the second half of the century 
G20 focus 
2009 commitment to phase out 
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies 
(but lacking implementation) 
World Trade Organisation Indirect 
removing trade barriers through 
Environmental Goods Agreement 
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GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS: Guidance and Signal Setting Rules 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
Energy-specific IGOs 
International Energy Agency Indirect 
authoritative energy models and 
projections 
Focus 
regular energy statistics; IEA 
Access to Energy database. 
Focus 
World Energy Outlook; IEA 
research and analysis of clean 
energy technologies; Annual 






create a collaborative platform 
for increased deployment of 
solar energy technologies to 









information, analyses and data 
on renewable energy; advise and 
support countries in their 
national and regional efforts; 
promote the economic, social 
and environmental benefits of 
renewables; develop 
collaborative stakeholder 
partnerships for energy 
transformation; annual reviews, 
statistics, Global Atlas, 
technology briefs 
REN21 – Renewable Energy 
Policy Network for the 21st 
century 
Focus 
Global Status Report Renewable 
energy: Collection of relevant 
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GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS: Guidance and Signal Setting Rules 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
information RE statistics, markets 
and policies; catalysing discussion 




World Bank Indirect contribution 
pledge to stop financing the 
upstream of oil and gas; aligning 
funding policies with well below 
2°C target underwrites 
overarching signals with “hard 
currency” 
Indirect contribution 
Working with about 70 countries 
on improving transparency and 
governance in their industries, 
focus on sustainability and 
fostering private sector 
investment 
Focus 
Support of various strategic 
global partnerships and 
programs;  Attract increased 
private sector participation and 
investment 
Focus  
Working to build global 
knowledge on energy access; 
extensive statistical database; 
global tracking framework 
(collaboration with SE4All) 
African Development Bank Indirect contribution 
aligning funding policies with well 
below 2°C target underwrites 
overarching signals with “hard 
currency” 
Focus 
(financial) support for regional 
member countries 
Indirect contribution 
Fostering knowledge transfer 




aligning funding policies with well 
below 2°C target underwrites 
overarching signals with “hard 
currency” 
Focus 
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GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS: Guidance and Signal Setting Rules 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
European Investment Bank Indirect contribution 
aligning funding policies with  
well below 2°C target 
underwrites overarching signals 
with “hard currency” 
Focus 
Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank 
Indirect contribution 
aligning funding policies with well 
below 2°C target underwrites 






aligning funding policies with well 
below 2°C target underwrites 
overarching signals with “hard 
currency” 
Indirect contribution 
Project/ Progress Monitoring 
Report and Loan Results Report 
Focus Indirect contribution 
international seminars; 
workshops; studies 
New Development Bank Indirect contribution 
aligning funding policies with well 
below 2°C target underwrites 
overarching signals with “hard 
currency” 
Focus 
Financial and technical support  
Climate Investment Funds Focus 
Clean technology Fund (CTF); 
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GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS: Guidance and Signal Setting Rules 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
Scaling Up Renewable Energy in 
Low Income Countries Program 
(SREP) 
Informal Energy Alliances 
International Solar Alliance Indirect 
goals: increasing the use of solar 
energy in meeting energy needs 
of prospective ISA member 
countries in a safe, convenient, 
affordable, equitable and 
sustainable manner 
Indirect 
guiding principles for members 
Focus 
coordinated actions to address 
the demand for financing and 
capacity building, network of 
correspondents by National Focal 
Points 
Focus  
cooperation among members 
and non-member entities; 
coordinated actions to address 
the demand for technologies, 
innovation, research and 
development 
Powering Past Coal Alliance Focus  
Commitments to phase-out coal 
production and consumption 
Focus 
Partners commit to phasing out 
existing traditional coal power in 
their jurisdictions, and to a 
moratorium on any new 
traditional coal power stations 
without CCS  
Indirect contribution 
Mutually beneficial engagement, 
sharing of information , close 
cooperation with the private 
sector 
Clean Energy Ministerial Focus 
Goal: improve energy efficiency, 
clean energy supply and access 
worldwide 
Focus 
Clean energy investments; 
Funding in research and 
development 
Focus  
Regular meeting of energy 
ministers; provision of 
information and tools 
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GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS: Guidance and Signal Setting Rules 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
REEEP – Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency Partnership 
Focus 
facilitate investment in scalable 
projects; supporting 




online knowledge hub reegle.info 
Mission Innovation Focus 
Aim: reinvigorate and accelerate 
global clean energy innovation 
with the objective to make clean 
energy widely affordable 
Focus 
Commitments by members to 
double their governments’ clean 
energy research and 
development (R&D) investments 
over five year; development of 
strategies for clean energy 
innovation funding based on 
individual national resources, 
needs, and circumstances 
Focus 
Information sharing; cooperation 
with private sector 
Breakthrough Energy Coalition Focus 
committed to building new 
technologies for a transition to 
clean energy 
Focus  
Breakthrough Energy Ventures; 
Patient and risk tolerant private 
investors and financial 
institutions 
Institutions with Regional Focus 
Africa Renewable Energy Focus Indirect contribution Focus Indirect contribution 
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GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS: Guidance and Signal Setting Rules 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
Initiative Achieve at least 10 GW of new 
and additional RE generation 
capacity by 2020; Mobilise the 
African potential to generate at 
least 300 GW by 2030 
monitoring and assessment as 
cross-cutting work area 
capacity mobilisation and 
building; mobilisation of finance 
for incentives and investments; 
and project development and 
support 
Mapping of RE policies, 
regulations, experiences and 
programmes; Socio-economic 
and environmental assessments 
of RE technologies 
Eastern Africa Power Pool  Focus 
framework for pooling energy 
resources, promoting power 
exchanges and reducing power 
supply costs 
Southern African Power Pool  Focus  
Interconnecting power grids in 
Southern Africa (see EAPP) 
West African Power Pool Focus 
Interconnecting power grids in 
Western Africa (see EAPP) 
Western Climate Initiative Indirect contribution 
collaboration among states and 
provinces to tackle climate 
change at a regional level 
Focus 
establishing a regional emission 
trading scheme 
Focus 
compliance tracking system; 
market monitoring of allowance 
auctions and allowance and 
offset certificate trading 
Focus 
administrative and technical 
services to support the 
implementation of state and 
provincial gas emissions trading 
programs 
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GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS: Guidance and Signal Setting Rules 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
Covenant of Mayors for 
Climate & Energy 
Focus 
2050 vision: accelerating the 
decarbonisation of their 
territories and allowing their 
citisens to access secure, 
sustainable and affordable 
energy 
Focus 
adoption of a joint approach to 
tackling mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change; 
submitting a Sustainable Energy 
and Climate Action Plan (SECAP) 
Focus  
networking platform; regular 
meetings 
ICLEI – Local Governments for 
Sustainability - 100% 
Renewable Energy Cities & 
Regions Network 
Indirect contribution 
by demonstrating leadership on 
the subnational level. 
Focus 
recognising and highlighting 
cities and regions that commit to 
100% Renewable Energy 
Focus 
establishment of a regional 
platform for mapping and 
monitoring its goals 
Focus 
Scenarios on technologies, 
strategies, and best practices 
Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance Indirect contribution 
striving for carbon neutrality 
Focus 
ambitious long-term carbon 
reduction goals 
Indirect 
CNCA "Innovation Fund" 
Indirect 
Share lessons and best practices; 
address necessities to reach 
goals 
Institutions geared toward the 
private sector 
RE100 Indirect Focus 
Commitments to use 100% 
renewable electricity 
Focus 
Annual disclosure of electricity 
data; reports on own progress; 
credibility and transparency 
requirements 
Focus 
Peer-to-peer learning and 
technical guidance 
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GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS: Guidance and Signal Setting Rules 
Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
Global 100% RE Focus 
Showcasing the vision: 100% 
renewable energy in power, 
heating/cooling, and transport 
sectors globally, New 
investments in energy systems 
must be 100% renewable energy 
Focus 
reports, workshops and good 
practice, peer learning among 
members 
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5. Energy-intensive Industries
Gauri Khandekar, Sebastian Oberthür and Tomas Wyns 
5.1. 5.1 Transformation Challenges and Governance Demands 
5.1.1. Current Status and Prospect 
The global energy-intensive industry sector contributes 21 per cent of total global GHG emissions 
(IPCC, 2014a). Global industrial emissions have grown from 5.4 Gt CO2eq in 1970 to 8.8 GtCO2eq in 
2010 or around 63 per cent (Kechichian et al., 2016). Emissions from the energy-intensive industry 
sector comprise mainly of direct energy-related emissions, indirect emissions from electricity and 
heat production, process emissions and a tiny percentage from waste/wastewater (IPCC, 2014a). 
Other GHG emissions from industry are mainly N2O emitted during the production of ammonium 
and adipic acid and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) from aluminium production. The sector accounted for 
around 29 per cent of the final global energy consumption in 2012 (IEA, 2014b), more than 70 per 
cent of which comes from fossil fuels (Kechichian et al., 2016). Fossil fuels account for 74 per cent, 
85 per cent and 85 per cent of the iron and steel, cement and chemical industries’ energy 
consumption respectively (Kechichian et al., 2016). Aluminium is the only energy-intensive industrial 
subsector that relies mostly on electricity as its energy supply (Kechichian et al., 2016). 
Table 5.1: GHG Emissions Overview of Energy-Intensive Industries in 2010 
Sub-Sector Total Emissions (in MtCO2) % of Industry Emissions 
Iron and Steel 2410 24.05 per cent 
Cement 
(as part of non-metallic minerals) 
1910 19.06 per cent 
Chemicals 1880 18.76 per cent 
Aluminium 
(as part of non-ferrous metals) 
690 6.89 per cent 
Source: Kechichian et al. 2016 (total emissions) and Ecofys 2013 (share of industry emissions) 
This section focuses on four key energy-intensive industry subsectors: iron and steel, cement, 
chemicals and aluminium which constitute 68.76 per cent of industrial emissions (Kechichian et al., 
2016); Table 5.1). These four subsectors have grown sharply in the past decades driven primarily by 
globalisation and dramatic growth in developing countries and countries with economies in 
transition. One of the most important raw materials used today, global crude steel production, 
stands at 1,628.5 million metric tonnes (Mt) (2015) (World Steel Association, 2017), up from just 
200mt in 1950. Cement, the second most consumed material on the planet, has seen a dramatic 
growth – from 133mt in 1950 (U.S. Geological Survey, 2015) to nearly 4.1 billion metric tonnes in 
2015 (Olivier, Janssens-Maenhout, Muntean, & Peters, 2016). The chemicals industry, the largest 
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amongst the industrial subsectors in monetary value, has also expanded significantly, from USD 171 
billion in 1970 (Perlitz, 2008) to USD 4.1 trillion in 2013 (Consultancy.uk, 2015). Aluminium is a key 
enabling metal and is the world’s third largest consumed metal after steel and copper, and 
production of new aluminium results in one per cent of total global annual GHG emissions (Tyabji & 
Nelson, 2012). 
Over the past half century, industry emissions have risen sharply amongst the low to upper middle-
income countries as compared to a gradual decline amongst high income countries. Some of the key 
exogenous trends driving developments in these subsectors have been the pursuit of growth in the 
developing world strongly supported by public policy incentives and globalisation, lower production 
costs, population rise alongside growing per capita income. Production growth of energy intensive 
materials (in particular steel and cement) in emerging economies is closely linked to large 
infrastructure construction and urbanisation.  
Few countries dominate these industrial subsectors – China, the EU, the US, Japan and India. China is 
currently overwhelmingly the largest producer and consumer in all the four subsectors and one of 
the top five importers and exporters. Asia is the most important region accounting for nearly 65 per 
cent of steel use (World Steel Association, 2016), more than 75 per cent of global cement 
consumption, and 61 per cent of total global chemical sales. Production and demand is highly 
concentrated in Asia, although it is growing in other developing regions like the Middle East, Latin 
America and Africa. For instance, the most rapid growth in the cement sector is seen in Sudan, Peru, 
Nigeria, Turkey, Colombia, and Brazil (Kechichian et al., 2016). These “fastest risers” between 2003 
and 2013 have compensated recent contraction in mature markets, such as the EU and the US. 
Industrialised nations, although innovative, face a comparative disadvantage in these subsectors 
given lower input (e.g. energy costs, labour or raw material) and larger domestic demand in the 
global south.  
Next to a geographic concentration in Asia, these industries are also dominated by a few private 
sector companies. The World Steel Association lists 94 global steel companies who produced almost 
60 per cent of the total global crude steel production of 1,628.5mt in 2015 (World Steel Association, 
2017). Fifty of these companies are based in China while fourteen others are based in India (5), 
Japan (4), South Korea (3), Taiwan (1) and Australia (1) (World Steel Association, 2016). Similarly, just 
10 companies produce almost half the world’s aluminium. More than half of the top 50 chemicals 
companies are headquartered in just eighteen countries. Twelve are in the US, eight in Japan and six 
in Germany. BASF, headquartered in Germany is the world’s largest chemical company since a 
decade, with USD 63.7 billion sales in 2015, down from USD 78.7 billion in 2014 (Tullo, 2016). The 
cement subsector is more speckled in comparison. According to the Global Cement Directory 2016, 
there were 2273 active integrated cement plants around the world in 2015 (Saunders, 2015). 
Trade in the iron and steel and chemicals subsectors is highly globalised: nearly a third of all steel 
produced is traded (US Department of Commerce, 2016). In the aluminium sector, most aluminium 
products are traded with regions or countries. For instance, China which produces nearly half of 
global aluminium is self-sufficient, while no single country accounts for more than 13 per cent of the 
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import or export market (Ludwig & Van Houwelingen, n.d.). However, the trade intensity of products 
using aluminium (e.g. cars, laptops) is of a much higher trade intensity. Finally, the cement subsector 
is predominantly regional. Cement production is significantly local: virtually every country produces 
cement and only three per cent of global production is traded internationally (The Economist, 2013). 
5.1.2. Deep Decarbonisation Potential and Drivers 
The model used by the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives (IEA, 2017a) shows that a 2°C scenario 
requires global direct CO2 emissions from industry to be reduced by 44 per cent by 2050 and halved 
by 2060 compared with its baseline scenario. However, to reach net-zero CO2 emissions at the 
system level, by 2060, which is required for a well below +2°C scenario, industry would need to 
further reduce its carbon emissions by 69 per cent by 2050 and 80 per cent by 2060 compared with 
the baseline scenario (IEA, 2017a). 
Technology solutions for decarbonisation and modernisation across industrial sectors can be 
categorised broadly in three areas (Kechichian et al., 2016); energy efficiency improvements (in 
processes), low-carbon substitutes (for materials and fuels) and innovative and alternative 
processes.  
For most existing industrial processes there still is an overall potential to improve energy and 
process efficiency (e.g. by closing old inefficient plants and investing in best available technologies) 
and best practice solutions already exist that focus largely on relatively easy retrofits which have 
quick paybacks (Kechichian et al., 2016). However, energy and process efficiency will meet the law of 
diminishing returns (i.e. more effort required to achieve lower gains), the closer these processes get 
to thermodynamic or chemical optimisation.  
Low-carbon substitutes for materials and fuel inputs are being explored on a global scale (e.g. use of 
municipal waste and biomass in cement production). The future potential of this option can be 
significant in some sectors (e.g. biomass based feedstock or use of waste gases from other industries 
in chemicals production), but will depend on the (limited) availability of these substitutes (CEFIC, 
2013, p. 112). 
The use of innovative and alternative processes will be essential for deep decarbonisation of 
industrial sectors. This includes higher levels of electrification of energy intensive processes (using 
renewable energy sources) and the use of carbon capture, utilisation and/or storage. Table 5.2 
below gives a brief overview of some major new (or improved) processes that would enable deeper 
emission reductions in industrial sectors. 
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Table 5.2: Deep Decarbonisation Options 
Sector Deep Decarbonisation Options 
Steel 
• Improving energy efficiency beyond best available technologies
• New Smelting Reduction Technologies
• Direct Reduction of iron ore using natural gas or hydrogen
• Using electricity for iron ore reduction
• Use of biomass in steel production
• Higher levels of steel recycling (while maintaining quality)
• Use of waste gases from cokes/iron/steel production as feedstock for chemicals
production
• Carbon capture and storage
Cement 
• Higher energy efficiency of processes and fuel switching (to low carbon fuels)
• Reducing clinker content in concrete
• Innovative changes to the composition of concrete
• Enhanced concrete and cement recycling
• Extend lifetime of concrete (e.g. through self-healing concrete)
• Carbon capture at process level or during concrete formation
• CO2 utilisation
Chemicals 
• Major improvements in resource/energy efficiency of processes
• Higher use of (renewable) electricity e.g. for production of H2
• Higher use of biomass (waste), waste and recycled materials including utilisation of 
waste gases from e.g. steel industry and industrial symbiosis
• Development of advanced (plastics) recycling processes 
Aluminium 
• Use of non-oxidising anodes in primary aluminium production in combination with
highly efficient processes.
• Improvement of recycling technologies to maintain different aluminium type
qualities 
• Establishment of circular value chains and leasing of metals.
Source: Based on European Commission 2017a. 
Next to the (process) technology solutions, deep emission reductions in industrial sectors will also 
require a value chain approach that covers the supply and value chains across different sectors. 
Steel, cement, chemicals and aluminium producers mostly make intermediate products and hence 
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have limited impact on the use of intermediate goods in the final consumer or other products (e.g. 
cars, aeroplanes, buildings). Therefore, reducing the basic materials’ intensity in these end products 
through smarter design, efficient consumption and enabling a circular resource model will need to 
be part of the over-all mitigation efforts related to the emissions of the basic materials sectors. A 
behavioural switch to a circular economy can make its mark on the wider market and the carbon 
footprint of the industrial sector by reducing demand, recycling and underscoring greater efficiency. 
The concept of a circular economy which is “a continuous positive development cycle that preserves 
and enhances natural capital, optimises resource yields, and minimises system risks by managing 
finite stocks and renewable flows” (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2015) can potentially have a direct 
impact on emissions reduction34. While the concept of a circular economy is pervading the regional 
level and at best the national echelon (mostly limited to certain sectors), it remains largely absent at 
the global level. A transition towards more circularity (recycling, waste to energy, and so on) would 
certainly aid decarbonisation efforts. However, circularity remains poorer in the developing 
countries than in the developed ones (see also Section 4.4 on the circular economy). 
5.1.3. Main Challenges and Barriers toward Decarbonisation 
Activating low-carbon interventions in industrial sectors depends on the presence of a combination 
of variables (Kechichian et al., 2016). These include the ability to provide quick paybacks from low-
carbon investments and a minimal operational disruption; the capital expenditure (CAPEX) of the 
intervention together with access to finance (and the cost of capital); the cost of current inputs in 
processes compared to the low-carbon substitutes; a strong and globally implemented carbon policy 
(e.g. globally agreed price on carbon, a global emissions trading system, the linkage of regional 
emissions trading systems into a global emissions trading system, or common global standards) and 
the extent to which competitors around the world are implementing GHG mitigation measures.  
The main barriers or challenges for deep decarbonisation are a combination of technological inertia, 
the high capital expenditure and risk associated with new (process) technologies, the reluctance to 
impose ambitious GHG regulations or CO2 costs due to fear of loss of international competitiveness 
or impeding development and the complexity of global value and supply chains (Bennett & Heidug, 
2014). Each is now examined in turn.  
34 Both steel and aluminium are 100 per cent recyclable without loss of quality and with a potentially endless 
lifecycle. Recycling aluminium requires around five per cent of the energy used to produce primary aluminium 
and emits as little as five per cent of the GHG emissions when compared to primary aluminium production 
(Kechichian et al., 2016). Steelmaking from scrap uses one-third of the primary energy and emits a quarter of 
the emissions as compared to steelmaking from iron ore (Cullen, 2010). However only a third of all aluminium 
produced today comes from old, traded and new scrap (International Aluminium Institute, 2009). Similarly, 
650 million tonnes of steel are recycled globally every year or only less than one-third of global production. 
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Technological Inertia and R&D Mismatch 
The basic materials industries such as the ones covered in this section almost all saw their major 
disruptive process innovations happen by 1970-1980 (Freeman & Soete, 1997). Large production 
installations mostly see incremental, but still important, improvements in energy efficiency and 
mitigation of GHG emissions. Since these sectors use large (and costly) process installations the 
investment cycles are long. This prevents an accelerated take-up of new breakthrough technologies, 
especially if these replace incumbent installations. Furthermore, the basic materials industries (with 
the exception of chemicals) have an over-all low R&D intensity (expressed as R&D expenditure over 
revenues) compared to other industrial sectors35. One can even see an R&D mismatch with smaller 
new entrants in these sectors showing more interest in R&D but having lower means to do so 
compared to larger incumbent companies. These smaller companies also lack sufficient market 
access (into e.g. consolidated cement, steel and chemicals markets) to further their innovative 
products and processes.  
High Capex and Technology Risk of New Breakthrough Process Technologies 
Beyond the relative low R&D spending and the possible R&D mismatch there exists also an 
important barrier at the latter, demonstration to commercialisation, stage of R&D into low carbon 
technologies. These large-scale pilot and demonstration plants, the final steps towards 
commercialisation, require a high level of capital expenditure. At the same time, the still 
experimental nature of these installations comes with an important technology risk.  
The innovative technologies, while promising, are therefore generally not yet deployable, financially 
less attractive, require longer paybacks and may necessitate longer operational shutdown periods to 
integrate changes in production process/existing assets. Some promising technology options may 
therefore never become mainstream solutions. 
Competitiveness and Development Concerns 
Across most countries in the world there is resistance by these industrial sectors to externalities 
being priced (fully) in or being faced with a stringent regulatory environment related to GHG 
mitigation. In industrialised nations, incumbent producers fear that a high(er) price on CO2 emissions 
and/or a full exposure to a CO2 price would, in the absence of similar measures in most other 
countries around the world, deter further investments, leading to so called investment leakage. 
Commonly accepted regulations and standards (like procurement policies, customs exemptions, 
labelling schemes) could create a global level playing field which could foster competitiveness in the 
right direction (Kechichian et al., 2016). 
In developing countries (that see high levels of growth in basic materials production), on the other 
hand, introducing a price on CO2 emissions is often seen as stunting development and the 
construction of necessary infrastructure for an increasing and more affluent population. 
35 See the JRC’s EU and global R&D scorecards 2016 http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/scoreboard16.html 
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Notwithstanding these concerns, a growing number of industrialised and developing countries are 
adopting a form of carbon pricing. While it is hard to quantify or even prove the above-mentioned 
concerns, they are clearly part of the political discourse and hence shape both domestic and 
international positioning and policies.  
Global Complex Value Chains vis à vis the National Bottom-Up Approach of the Paris Agreement (PA) 
Finally, as stated before, deep decarbonisation in industrial sectors will require addressing the whole 
value and supply chains related to these industries. Over the past decades these value chains have 
grown to become more complex but also more global in scale. This issue is connected to the 
problem of accounting for embedded emissions (i.e. the GHG emissions embedded in imported 
goods). In practice, this means that a basic materials company is not (always) able to track and 
control the end use of its products. This makes closing value chains (circularity) difficult and/or 
expensive. It therefore prevents the wide-scale introduction of new business models such as the 
transition from a sales-based model to one in which basis materials are leased and returned to the 
original producer for re- or up-cycling. Future governance for these highly globalised sectors 
operating across borders does not fully match the approach under the PA which asks each country 
to develop nationally determined commitments and long-term decarbonisation plans.  
Some of the above-mentioned barriers can be negatively reinforcing. For instance, the low R&D 
intensity of (many) energy intensive industries in combination with the large CAPEX need for 
breakthrough technologies. The high technology and financial risks related to these technologies 
can, in case of failure, hamper the competitiveness on companies and hence make them more risk 
averse.  
5.1.4. The Promise and Potential of International Cooperation 
Guidance and Signal 
A clear international ‘decarbonisation’ objective with firm timelines and differentiated (national, 
regional and global) mitigation pathways could provide important guidance to decision-makers in 
industrial sectors. This could be achieved through the construction of global roadmap(s) for 
decarbonisation of energy intensive industries, e.g. built up from national, regional and existing 
sectoral roadmaps. These roadmaps should present an integrated view of how the industries can 
transform their supply, production and value chains while maintaining competitiveness (Ahman et 
al., 2016) and not infringing economic development.  
Given the disparities highlighted between regions, each economic region may need a low carbon 
roadmap including trajectories for the industrial sectors which need to be embedded within the 
other parts of the economy that form the downstream demand for the products of the energy 
intensive sectors. Resource efficiency linked to a (global) circular economy will need to be a part of 
the development of such roadmaps. Coordinating these (sectoral) global and regional roadmaps with 
national decarbonisation plans (developed under the PA) will be a requirement.  
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Setting Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
Given the globalised nature of energy-intensive industries, there is a clear rationale for international 
regulation (to address competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns). Collective action to enable 
the decarbonisation of industrial sectors can be realised through (a combination of) different 
(regulatory) instruments. Regulation could take the form of carbon pricing (be it a (coordinated) CO2 
tax or a global emissions trading system, e.g. through linking regional trading systems) or 
(coordinated) international regulations and/or standards. These can be targeting the production 
processes (e.g. CO2 emission limits per tonne of product produced) or the consumption side (limit on 
embedded emissions in final product; see Neuhoff et al. 2014). Short of international agreement, 
national and regional frontrunners can pave the way to broader approaches. Regulating embedded 
emissions in final products could help create a level playing field between global industrial 
producers because ‘end of the value chain’ pricing would not discriminate between local and foreign 
production. 
Transparency and Accountability 
For any international regulatory approach, it is important to have common monitoring, reporting 
and verification (MRV) standards and metrics for industrial emissions, preferably even including the 
whole supply and value chain, as a basis for comparing and verifying efforts. Transparency of GHG 
impact in semi- and finished products across complex and global value chains would require 
common/global GHG accounting standards.  
Means of Implementation 
Global cooperation on innovative technology deployment (including the financing thereof) is 
urgent. According to the IEA, holding temperature increase to well below 2°C will require OECD 
countries to transfer innovative technologies for industry to non-OECD countries where new 
capacity installations increase the potential to widely deploy innovative industrial process 
technologies. This has to happen very soon to avoid carbon lock-in/stranded assets (IEA, 2017a). 
Processes and platforms enhancing bilateral and multilateral diffusion of technology and research 
cooperation – such as the Mission Innovation36 initiative – could foster such cooperation.  
Such international cooperation would also need to address the high capital cost and risk associated 
with large industrial breakthrough technologies. One option would be R&D cooperation that 
combines the knowhow and finance present in different countries and at different stages in the 
technology readiness level. Such an approach could make use of the different stages of 
industrialisation around the world to make use of available resources efficiently. While potential for 
building new large low-carbon demonstration plants particularly exists in emerging economies, more 
advanced economies could pioneer circular economy related technologies. Such international 
innovation program could be implemented through a global industrial innovation fund in 
combination with coordinated international technology projects (along the lines of the ITER nuclear 
36 http://mission-innovation.net  
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fusion project). Leveraging private capital to enable these investments will require the active 
participation of large national or regional investment banks.  
Knowledge and Learning 
To the extent the aforementioned technology cooperation involves the development of innovative 
technology, it will also support the creation of technical knowledge. Beyond that, decarbonising 
industrial sectors (at a global level) will also require a significant investment in circular economy 
policies and the realisation of domestic enabling conditions for industrial innovation (e.g. innovation 
and industrial policies). Global coordination and dissemination of knowledge and learning in 
relation to industrial decarbonisation is therefore relevant, in particular given the complexity of 
supply and value chains of industrial sectors. For instance, sharing best practices on circular 
economy, industrial and innovation policies through a global knowledge & learning 
depository/platform can accelerate the implementation of enabling conditions in a wider group of 
countries. 
For decarbonisation efforts in the energy intensive industries, all the governance functions identified 
can play a critical role. Apart from transparency and accountability which ranks medium high in 
importance, all governance functions are deemed to rank high (see Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3: Synthesis of governance demands for energy-intensive industries 
Sector Guidance and 
Signal 





































Grading High High Medium High High High 
5.2. Governance Supply 
In the energy intensive sector, not only is there a very limited number (10 altogether of which 8 are 
international institutions and 2 are sectoral platforms) of international organisations/institutions 
that address decarbonisation, but also, their work on decarbonisation is scarce. No single 
international organisation/institution can be credited with a sole focus on decarbonisation on the 
energy intensive sector alone or fulfilling all the identified governance functions satisfactorily. The 
most sectorally relevant institutions/initiatives are the UNFCCC and in particular the PA, the Cement 
Sustainability Initiative (CSI), the Group of 20 (G20), the International Energy Agency (IEA), United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO), Mission Innovation and the World Bank (WB). The table below provides a quick overview 
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of the relevant institutions and which governance functions their activities most relate to. It is 
observed that the delivery of means of implementation and knowledge and learning are the 
governance functions most performed by far. A detailed overview of the institutions is provided in 
table 5.4 (appended). 
The criteria of fairness and social acceptability to ensure a just transition entail regional strategies, 
acceleration of the deployment of breakthrough technologies, involvement of trade unions and 
employers, investment in skills and boosting local support for decarbonisation (ETUC, 2016).  For a 
just transition, forward-looking regional policy frameworks implemented locally will be crucial for 
reducing industrial emissions without losing industrial jobs. Breakthrough technologies will play a 
crucial role in assuaging competitiveness concerns and achieving decarbonisation in the energy 
intensive sectors. With the recognition that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all strategy every region 
will have to prioritise and invest in technologies including carbon capture and storage (CCS), carbon 
capture and use (CCU), and electrification of industrial processes for a low-carbon industry (IEA, 
2017a). For a just transition, engagement and social dialogue with stakeholders, especially trade 
unions and employers, will be crucial for addressing the various impacts decarbonisation. Investing 
in skills among the workforce would be crucial to ease the transition to decarbonisation (circular 
economy, renewables, new technologies, and so on). Likewise, building public support for 
decarbonisation would be equally important. Greater public preference for low carbon industrial 
products would encourage business leaders to make a step change towards decarbonisation. 
The assessment reveals that overall, performance of the governance functions performed by 
sectorally relevant international organisations/institutions is weak. There is no one single 
organisation that covers decarbonisation in the energy intensive sector as whole. Although some 
institutions like CSI do focus on one sub-sector of the energy intensive sector, similar entities for 
other energy intensive subsectors remain amiss. While UNIDO does have a dedicated industry focus, 
its emphasis is broader than just the energy intensive sector, lacks focus on the decarbonisation of 
the sector and as such, its impact is dispersed given limited capacity and financial means. 
5.2.1. International Institutions 
The UNFCCC and the PA are the most relevant given their role in three specific regards: (1) The PA 
laid down the global objective of holding temperature increase to well below 2°C/limiting warming 
to 1.5°C as well as the mitigation objective of phasing out net GHG emissions. (2) The UNFCCC has 
put in place a fundamental accounting and reporting system in the form of national GHG inventories 
that are mandated by the UNFCCC/PA. (3) The 5-yearly periodic global stocktakes of climate action is 
a mechanism that can create political moments and catalyse more ambitious climate action across 
the entire global climate regime complex and along all governance levels.  
The signal set by the PA may however prove less effective for the energy intensive industry. Given a 
lack of measures and alternatives available for the sector to take action to fully phase out GHG 
emissions, energy-intensive industries could assume that some undefined level of emissions may 
continue in the long-run and be offset by negative emissions in other sectors. 
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The system of reporting under the UNFCCC and the PA holds particular potential. Mandatory 
national GHG inventories contain separate emission data for the energy-intensive industries that can 
provide a basis for tracking progress of the sector as a whole, in individual countries and in groups of 
countries/regions. Sector relevant mechanisms for capacity building have also been undertaken inter 
alia through the CDM in a couple of sectors. The Technology Executive Committee of the UNFCCC 
has so far contributed via papers, thematic reports and dialogues (UNFCCC Technology Executive 
Committee, 2016, 2017). Yet much remains to be desired as regards knowledge diffusion and 
learning under the UNFCCC. 
The UNFCCC provides general guidance (for all sectors) but that guidance (as concerns sectoral 
decarbonisation objectives and related national, regional, global roadmaps) is not targeted enough 
for the energy-intensive sector given the critical challenges to decarbonisation which includes above 
all the strategic nature of the sector (primary industry), lack of feasible alternatives (business 
models, alternative greener energy sources at scale, process emissions), and competitiveness 
concerns (both amongst business and national governments). The lack of sector-specific emission-
reduction targets, firm timelines and differentiated mitigation pathways (including roadmaps), 
makes the signal provided by the UNFCCC for the sector low. 
The IEA is a Paris-based autonomous intergovernmental organisation established in the framework 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The IEA works closely with 
member countries and others on various aspects of the energy intensive sector (energy efficiency, 
transition to low carbon, technology transfer, sharing of knowledge and best practises, sustainability 
options and strategies and so on). The IEA promotes knowledge and learning through its various 
analysis, technology roadmaps, modelling and data on the Energy intensive sector (IEA, 2013, 2018). 
It also hosts workshops and seminars which provide a platform for energy intensive industry 
stakeholders. Its annual Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) reports (IEA, 2006-2017) and 
Technology Roadmaps (IEA, 2009-2017) in particular focus closely on the energy intensive sector. Its 
various decarbonisation focused technology roadmaps, data and statistics generate important 
knowledge. 
The IEA also plays a sectorally relevant role in capacity building through its Technology Collaboration 
Programmes (TCPs) (IEA, 2016a). IEA implementing agreements provide a framework for members 
and stakeholders to collaborate by sharing research on breakthrough technologies, fill existing 
research gaps, build pilot plants and to carry out deployment or demonstration programmes along 
any technology-related activity in the energy intensive sector that supports energy security, 
economic growth, environmental protection and engagement worldwide. The Industrial Energy-
Related Technologies and Systems (IETS) is such an Implementing Agreement established in 2005 
with the aim “to foster international co-operation among OECD and non-OECD countries for 
accelerated research and technology development of industrial energy-related technologies and 
systems”. The IETS co-operative activities include “scientific research, technology and systems 
research and development, demonstration and deployment, technology and systems foresighting, 
technology and systems assessment of policies and consequences, and dissemination of 
information” (IETS, 2012). The IEA works with governments around the world to develop effective, 
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realistic, and well-integrated low-carbon climate and energy policies and strategies in the energy 
intensive sector (IEA, 2017). 
The G20 has delved more into the financial and trade aspects of energy intensive industries and less 
on decarbonisation. Energy intensive industries were addressed overwhelmingly in terms of anti-
dumping and countervailing initiations (30-50 percent of all investigations in each six-month period). 
In December 2017, the G20 forum pledged to do its best to phase out subsidies and cut over-
capacity in the steel industry (Darabhsaw, 2017). Although curbing over-production has been 
addressed in D4.1 as a factor in controlling rising emissions in the sector, given the political weight of 
the G20 and the fact that it includes the largest producers and consumers of energy intensive 
industry products, much more could be done in terms of sustainability. The G20 has hardly 
contributed to the decarbonisation of the energy intensive sector except for soft, nonbinding 
pledges/declarations regarding anti-dumping, curbing overproduction and phasing out subsidies 
which is insufficient to address barriers to decarbonisation. G20 members moreover are accused of 
spending four times more public finance (soft loans, guarantees from governments, subsidies) on 
fossil fuels than on renewables (Doukas et al., 2017) and the forum has still not set a target date for 
phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies. The G20 which represents three-quarters of the world’s GHG 
emissions (Burck et al., 2016) has not exploited its potential (Victor et al., 2017). 
UNEP has worked closely with governments around the world, policymakers and stakeholders on 
developing laws, best practises and case studies for industrial efficiency (UNEP Handbook for 
Drafting Laws on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Best Practices and Case Studies for 
Industrial Energy Efficiency Improvement, UNEP Technical Reviews and Guidelines (UN Department 
of Public Information, 2013)). At COP23 in Bonn, UNEP unveiled its Law and Climate Change Toolkit 
aimed at government policy makers responsible for developing laws that help implement the PA. 
UNEP’s International Resource Panel set up in 2007 has a dedicated Metals Working Group purposed 
to build knowledge. UNEP also produces a significant number of reports (example its annual 
Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2017)) and funds research into low carbon strategies in the energy 
intensive sector (KLH Sustainability, 2017) which add to knowledge and learning. 
Although UNEP provides financial support for research in low carbon strategies in the energy 
intensive sector, the relative impact of its activities is low given also that it does not solely focus on 
the energy intensive sector. Nonetheless on knowledge and learning, the breadth of UNEP activities 
(including its capacity building activities), its climate change toolkit for the PA, a dedicated metals 
working group and its various reports and data is vast. 
UNIDO promotes industrial development and environmental sustainability and its work resonates 
strongly with UNSDG 9 - “Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable 
industrialisation and foster innovation”. Of all UN bodies, UNIDO focuses closest on the energy 
intensive sector. UNIDO works with countries to reduce their consumption of natural resources, 
greenhouse gas and other emissions and industrial wastes in industrial processes, builds capacity of 
industry stakeholders (albeit of current emitters), and promotes more resource-efficient and cleaner 
industrial processes (UNIDO’s projects total USD 52.2 million grant funding and an additional USD 
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574 million in co-financing but which also include technologies not promoting decarbonisation) 
(UNIDO, 2015). UNIDO fosters technology transfer, generates data and statistics and facilitates 
platforms and partnerships for collaboration. UNIDO’s programs target industrial energy efficiency 
including policy and development standards (e.g. introduction of ISO 50001 in energy intensive 
companies – currently operational in 17 countries, planned in further 10 as of May 2016 (Matteini, 
2016), capacity building, training and awareness-raising, technology demonstration and upscaling 
(Matteini, 2015). UNIDO has also set up knowledge sharing platforms for member states, such as the 
Vienna Energy Forum (VEF). 
Mission Innovation, established in 2015, is an intergovernmental platform consisting of 22 countries 
and the European Union (EU) with an aim to accelerate global clean energy innovation. Member 
countries have committed to doubling public R&D investments over five years while catalysing 
greater private sector investment in transformative clean energy technologies.  Although the forum 
is relatively new, it is worth including given the potential it represents. Mission Innovation work 
programme includes the development of technologies which could have an important impact on the 
energy intensive sector (CCS, Hydrogen, bioenergy, and so on), set up issue-specific platforms, 
laboratories and roadmaps, and currently convenes workshops and stakeholder dialogues. Given the 
platform is relatively new and thereby its activities are in the early stages of implementation, it may 
be too early to assess the impact of its functions. 
At the WTO, Article XX has permitted some exceptions to the non-discrimination principle for 
environmental motives (among others), on the condition that the measures in question are not “a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.” 
Yet, while Border Adjustment Taxes, which includes a combination of import tariffs and export 
subsidies, would have been a far more effective method of environmental control, it clashes with 
the WTO’s Article I (Most Favoured Nation provision) and Article III (National Treatment Provision). 
However, scholars like Pauwelyn (2012) believe that carefully designed carbon border adjustment 
tax could be permissible under the WTO provided that the tax or duty on imports can be construed 
as an internal measure (or border measure equivalent to an internal tax) and they avoid origin-based 
discrimination. In the absence of border adjustment taxes or equivalent measures, energy intensive 
industries could relocate from countries with emissions commitments or relevant policies (e.g. taxes) 
to countries without such commitments or policies (Frankel et al., 2008), although evidence for such 
carbon leakage has remained inconclusive to date (Naegele & Zaklan, 2017).  
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs): The potential role of MDBs like the African Development 
Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank 
Group (IDBG), and the World Bank Group (WBG) in decarbonisation of the sector is significant since 
a large amount of finance will be required for the transition. The IEA (2016b, pp. 102) estimates that 
US$ 35 Bn of annual energy efficiency investment alone in energy-intensive industry is needed by 
2020.  However, a joint report from the above mentioned MDBs published by EIB (2016) on MDB 
climate finance reveals that while the combined MDB climate finance for 2016 was US$ 6,5 Bn 
(constituted of US$ 27 Bn in climate finance and US$ 38 Bn in net climate co-finance along with MDB 
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own resources), only 1 percent of MDB adaptation finance (or US$ 60 Mn) went to industry 
(extractive, manufacturing and trade). Activities eligible for industry climate finance include: 
“industrial energy efficiency improvements though the installation of more efficient equipment, 
changes in processes, reduction of heat losses and/or increased waste heat recovery and/or 
resource efficiency” (EIB, 2016). 
The World Bank (WB) is an international financial institution that provides loans to countries of the 
world for capital programs. The WB provides various means of implementation (capacity building, 
financial support) and fosters knowledge and learning (stakeholder platforms, publically available 
data). The WB has financed numerous projects targeting the energy intensive sector in particular as 
regards energy efficiency (conservation and diversification), heat and gas recovery and waste 
reduction (World Bank). The WB too has funded fossil fuel projects around the world: the total 
portfolio across the World Bank Group institutions being worth around $280bn (Isaac, 2017). The 
WB has brought together stakeholders on similar issues, while its extensive publicly-available data 
contributes to knowledge and learning. The WB also has its own set of guidelines for emission levels 
used in making decisions regarding provision of World Bank Group assistance, including Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency guarantees. The WB also issues Environmental, Health, and Safety 
(EHS) Guidelines for the Energy intensive sector, which are technical reference documents with 
general and industry-specific examples of Good International Industry Practice (GIIP) (International 
Finance Corporation, 2007).  
5.2.2. Transnational Sectoral Platforms 
The CSI is a transnational sustainability programme (the largest ever by a single-industry sector), by 
24 major cement producers whose operations span more than 100 countries and accounts for 
around 30 percent of the world’s cement production (CSI, 2014). The CSI provides four governance 
functions: guidance and signal, transparency and accountability, means of implementation, and 
knowledge and learning. The CSI has adopted as a membership-wide goal, the reduction of CO2 
emissions by 20 to 25 percent by 2030 compared to business as usual (CSI, 2016). The CSI was set up 
with an agenda to develop a CO2 Protocol and relevant tools for the cement industry (project 
delivered to more readily assess sectoral emissions), develop a climate change mitigation strategy, 
publish targets and progress and provide transparency and accountability by ensuring its members 
make public their baseline emissions. The CSI also developed a set of guidelines for the responsible 
use of conventional and alternative fuels and raw materials in cement kilns. 
CSI has endeavoured to set up an action plan to enhance overall energy efficiency; scale-up good 
quality alternative fuels and raw materials, including relevant waste from other sectors in a circular 
economy approach; further reduce the clinker content in cement to minimise the share of the 
energy intensive part of the process; develop new cements with reduced net CO2 emissions over the 
full life cycle; engage the full value chain to identify and minimise emissions; and evaluate green 
technologies such as CCS-U. In 2009, CSI in collaboration with the IEA developed a cement industry 
technology roadmap, the first sector-specific report of its kind, which offered a pathway for the 
industry to half CO2 emissions by 2050 (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2013). 
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The International Council of Chemicals Associations (ICCA) is a platform for the global chemical 
industry, whose members account for more than 90 percent of global chemical sales and employs 
more than 20 million people worldwide. Although ICCA does not provide any decarbonisation target, 
like the CIS, ICCA has developed membership-wide guidelines for assessing and reporting avoided 
emissions (ICCA, 2013). The ICCA’s Responsible Care initiative (implemented by 58 chemical 
associations in more than 60 countries worldwide) reports that its members have reduced GHG 
emissions by 34 percent since 2006 (along with a value chain accounting approach which includes 
the buildings, transport and lighting sector, this amounts to 3 billion tons of GHG emissions per year) 
(ICCA, 2015). 
5.3. Assessing the Governance Complex 
Guidance and Signal Function 
Although the UNFCCC and the CSI (for the cement sub-sector) provide some level of guidance to the 
energy-intensive industries, neither provides a firm, definitive guidance and signal toward 
decarbonisation (i.e. a sectoral ‘decarbonisation’ target with firm timelines and regional and global 
mitigation roadmaps). The UNFCCC signal is a general one for all sectors and will have a longer 
trickledown effect in terms of low carbon strategies being developed by industry. The CSI’s 
membership-wide emissions reduction target of 20-25 percent by 2030 and relevant roadmap 
provides a signal to the cement subsector but is not sufficient for decarbonisation. The CSI’s ability 
to enact dramatic change is further circumscribed given the guidance is not binding, competitiveness 
concerns amongst industry owners and pressure on political leaders to avoid carbon leakage. 
Overall, the guidance provided to the sector can be deemed as medium-low. 
Setting Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
The absence of any international rules or regulations (international emission limits and/or carbon 
pricing) represents a fundamental gap in efforts towards decarbonisation of the sector. The G20 
provides some soft non-binding form of rule setting in terms of declaration to phase out subsidies 
and cut over-capacity in the steel industry but it remains non-obligatory process and insufficient to 
address decarbonisation of the sector. The overall provision of rules to facilitate collective action is 
assessed as low. 
Transparency and Accountability 
Transparency and accountability has been identified in section 1 as those measures required to 
monitor and verify the implementation of rules. Only the CSI and ICCA provide modest transparency 
and accountability in the cement subsector and chemicals sector respectively: the CSI through its 
CO2 protocols and tools and ensuring its members make their baseline emissions public and ICCA 
through its membership wide guidelines for assessing and reporting avoided emissions. 
Transparency and accountability in the sector is hence deemed as low. 
Means of Implementation 
A number of international organisations/institutions provide different means of implementation: 
financial support/incentives and technology transfer. These include the CSI, IEA, WB, UNEP, UNIDO 
and Mission Innovation. The Energy Breakthrough coalition which consists of private investors and 
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financial institutions also invests in breakthrough energy ventures but it remains unclear how much 
finance (and for what) is provided by the group. Although their work on providing means of 
implementation is relevant and targeted enough on the energy intensive sector, decarbonisation in 
the sector will require much more in terms of finance, technology (development, deployment, 
transfer) and capacity building. Currently, finance by MDBs, the WB, and UNIDO also is problematic 
since it serves to establish carbon lock-in (with finance provided for expansion of fossil-fuel based 
energy intensive industries). It can therefore be concluded that means of implementation provided 
to sectoral decarbonisation is low.  
Knowledge and Learning 
Global knowledge platforms, stakeholder dialogues, and R&D are key to global coordination and 
dissemination of knowledge and learning in relation to industrial decarbonisation given the 
complexity of supply and value chains of industrial sectors. The CSI, IEA, WB, UNEP, UNIDO and 
Mission Innovation all make an important contribution to knowledge and learning in the energy 
intensive sector. The provision of knowledge and learning to the sector can be assessed as low. In 
particular, greater R&D will be needed for the development of low-carbon technologies and low-
carbon alternatives. 
5.4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The analysis exposes three key facets. First, there is a palpable absence of a single overarching 
international organisation/institution which performs all relevant governance functions targeted 
towards decarbonisation in the energy intensive sector. Second, the number of institutions involved 
in supporting the climate transition of the sector remains notably limited (especially when compared 
with other sectoral systems). Third, while most governance functions are being performed to some 
extent by one organisation or the other, there is a clear undersupply of international governance in 
the sectoral system; there remains tremendous scope for international/transnational institutions to 
contribute to advancing the decarbonisation of the sector. Concrete emission reduction targets or 
credible roadmaps for the sector at large (on a global level) remain missing. International rules 
(international emission limits and/or carbon pricing) and mechanisms to ensure transparency and 
accountability remain virtually absent. While different institutions provide various means of 
implementation, finance, technology development and capacity building remain insufficient for 
effectively driving the sector toward decarbonisation.  
What is more, several international institutions like the WB, other MDBs, UNIDO and the WTO 
engage in activities that constitute impediments to the decarbonisation of the sector. The WB, other 
MDBs and UNIDO finance the expansion of energy-intensive industries and hence for the 
perpetuation of business as usual. Even if fostering the most efficient available technologies (which 
is not always the case and can hence be further strengthened), this creates carbon lock-in as the 
installations that are established will emit GHGs for years and decades to come. The WTO for its part 
impedes the design of effective measures to address carbon leakage concerns such as border tax 
adjustments (while also providing an international forum for potentially coordinating responses that 
can be compatible with trade rules).  
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The fact that even financing the most efficient available technologies creates carbon lock-in points to 
a crucial priority area of international cooperation that is fundamental for any efforts to 
decarbonise energy-intensive industries: advancing R&D efforts to find and pilot new, 
breakthrough zero-emission technologies and bring them to the market. Only once these 
technologies are available, can support for fossil-fuel based technology be realistically phased out. 
And it is with such zero-emission technology that the issue of trade disciplines becomes most 
relevant (and potentially solvable if the resulting products can be distinguished from “old”, high-
emission products).  
Several of the institutions contributing to sectoral governance could in principle be used to fill 
existing governance gaps. For example, UNIDO, the UNFCCC/PA, the G20 and the CSI could all 
engage in defining sectoral decarbonisation objectives (“guidance and signal”), agreeing on 
international emission limits, monitoring emissions (“transparency and accountability”) and 
addressing the priority issue of R&D (“means of implementation”). However, each of them has 
particular advantages and drawbacks. The UNFCCC/PA presumably has a limited potential to engage 
in sectoral initiatives given its preoccupation with the overall international governance framework 
(and given the fact that it has already “outsourced” other sectoral governance tasks – e.g. ICAO, 
IMO, Montreal Protocol. Given its established system of reporting and review, it may have a 
particular advantage when it comes to transparency and accountability (i.e. the monitoring of 
emissions). Its added value may, beyond that, also be in doubt because of its global reach whereas 
governance of most energy-intensive industries would only require cooperation of a more limited 
number of countries/players. The G20 would in this sense possibly be more suitable, but has so far 
hardly been used for the required more structural cooperation (and has proven largely ineffective in 
addressing fossil-fuel subsidies). UNIDO constitutes a potentially promising venue (although it is not 
usually considered a “strong” international institution). The CSI on its part remains limited in scope, 
membership (including lack of government participation) and authority.  
Given this institutional landscape, there is hence a case to be made for exploring the creation of 
new, subsector-specific institutions that could serve to address the identified governance gaps and 
potentials. For such subsector-specific institutions to have the potential to deliver on the needs 
identified, they would presumably require participation by key governments (for ensuring authority 
of agreed decarbonisation objectives, setting rules and coordinating R&D support) as well as 
relevant companies (that frequently constitute multinational operations). Most of the subsectors 
would require coordination and cooperation by a limited number of countries and companies to 
cover the largest part of production (and consumption). The CSI may constitute a model for sectoral 
initiatives to some extent, but it may itself also have to be further developed (e.g. including 
enhanced involvement by governments) in order to deliver on the governance needs more fully. 
Related sub-sectoral initiatives could be launched by individual players, but may also be launched 
through (“spin-offs”) existing institutions such as the G20, UNIDO or Mission Innovation. Sectoral 
involvement could for example be pursued through existing industry associations such as the world 
councils on chemicals and steel. (Sub-sectoral initiatives may also in principle be combined in a 
single dedicated international institution for the decarbonisation of energy-intensive industries, but 
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the added value of such a combination may need further assessment (e.g. different actors would 
need to be brought together for different subsectors). 
Financing needs are particularly prominent with respect to R&D for zero-emission breakthrough 
technologies. Government cooperation and existing financial institutions could be activated for such 
efforts – together with existing initiatives such as Mission Innovation and the Energy Breakthrough 
Coalition. Upon zero-emission technologies becoming more widely available, it will be important to 
ensure that existing financial institutions such as the WB and MDBs provide funding exclusively for 
such technologies (rather than for “old” technology).  
Knowledge and learning is already supported by most of the existing institutions. New subsector-
specific initiatives (see above) could also contribute their share. 
The UNFCCC and the PA could probably best assume an overarching supervisory function in the 
evolving sectoral institutional complex. While the UN climate regime would in principle possess the 
authority to also engage in sectoral initiatives, it may not be best suited for branching out in this way 
(also because of its comparatively slow movement and limited decision-making capacity due to the 
need to achieve a global consensus). The UNFCCC does already collect GHG emission data, including 
from energy-intensive industries, which provides an entry point for overall checking of progress and 
contributing to “transparency and accountability” (and contributing to capacity building as regards 
data collection and reporting). Beyond that, implementing rules could request or encourage 
countries to include sectoral objectives and measures in their “nationally determined contributions” 
and their low GHG emission development strategies, including for energy-intensive industries. 
At first sight, the decarbonisation of the energy-intensive industries seems to raise equity issues to a 
comparatively limited extent. Production facilities would still be required (but would use different 
technologies). To the extent that the response would succeed in also reducing demand for the 
relevant products (because of increased circularity), demand for energy-intensive products could 
decrease and social effects like loss of employment may result. Given an existing general trend of 
increasing demand for the relevant products, this would, however currently seem a rather remote 
prospect. Having said that, the industrial restructuring implied by decarbonisation is likely to result 
in certain winners and losers (currently uncertain) depending on the outcome of the race to climate-
friendly breakthrough technologies. Current international debates on how to address global 
overcapacity in steel production capacity may give a foretaste of the political ramifications of any 
such effects. Coordinating related R&D efforts could provide a means to carefully and timely manage 
such effects in a targeted manner.  
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Table 5.4: Supply of international governance functions for energy-intensive industries. 
Governance Functions UNFCCC/Paris 
Agreement 







objectives and related 
national, regional, global
roadmaps
1.5/2°C goal • CO2 emission
reductions by 20-25
percent by 2030 




to half CO2 emissions
by 2050
Setting Rules ·  International emission
limits and/or carbon
pricing (production or 
consumption)
















·  Required to monitor 
and verify 
implementation of rules
• CO2 Protocol and
relevant tools










·  Financial 
support/incentives and







Funds research into low 
carbon strategies in the 






COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex 
– V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
142 
technology transfer raw materials 





emissions over the full
life cycle 
Programmes  (conservation 
and 
diversification), 
heat and gas 
recovery and 
waste reduction 
in the energy 
intensive sector 
energy intensive sector awareness-raising. 
• Provides project 












·  Global knowledge and 
learning platform(s)
(policy learning) 
·  International R&D
Guidelines for the 
responsible use of 
conventional and 
alternative fuels and 













• Toolkit for developing
laws to implement the
Paris Agreement
• UNEP’s International 
Resource Panel Metals 
Working Group 
Reports, case studies, 
data 
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6. Fossil-Fuel Extractive Industries
Tim Rayner 
6.1. Introduction 
The potential role of international institutions in addressing the supply-side of climate policy, i.e. 
reducing fossil fuel extraction at source, is only just beginning to receive the scholarly attention it 
merits (van Asselt 2014). Fossil fuel production and consumption decisions, as with energy policy 
questions more broadly, are closely linked to national sovereignty and perceived national interests 
(Van Asselt and Kulovesi 2017), even in relatively well-integrated regions such as the EU. As Newell 
(2014: 414) has noted, ‘intergovernmental and public control over the actors and processes which 
extract and burn most carbon is either weak and indirect or often non-existent’ (cited in van Asselt 
2014). While this enduring feature of global governance appears unlikely to change much for the 
foreseeable future, it is important to understand its dynamics and contemplate international-level 
responses that can contribute towards critical climate goals.  
Extractive industries range from the most carbon-intensive coal sector, to oil and gas as less 
intensive forms. Analytical coverage in this chapter is not exhaustive. With limited space, most 
consideration is given to oil and especially coal, the most carbon-intensive fuel. In terms of the 
governance landscape, a series of bilateral and regional economic agreements (including investment 
treaties and trade agreements) have some relevance to energy-related decisions, but are not (yet) 
included in detail in this analysis. Moreover, it needs to be borne in mind that fossil fuel extraction is 
also potentially influenced by the success of institutions promoting renewable energy, as well as 
practices in the finance sector, covered in chapters 4 and 3 respectively. Following analysis by van 
Asselt (2014), certain relevant regional-level organizations (such as APEC) will be identified, but not 
considered in detail. Also for reasons of space, while fairness aspects related to ‘just transition’ are 
touched on, the legitimacy and ‘social acceptability’ of relevant institutions and processes is not (but 
see conclusions chapter for further reflections). 
The internal performance of fossil-fuel extractive industries’ emission reduction efforts (as opposed 
the end use it supplies) also needs to be highlighted as a component of the transformation necessary 
to be consistent with long-term temperature targets. Recent evidence has suggested the problem of 
fugitive emissions from production sites is greater than previously believed (Nature 2018). However, 
for reasons of space we do not address activities of companies at any length, although relevant 
activities are included in Table 3.1 (at the end of this chapter). 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the current status, trends and prospects for the sector are 
set out. Section 6.2 highlights what needs to change to decarbonise the sector, along with barriers to 
those changes. The potential benefits, in principle and in the abstract, of international cooperation 
are then set out according to the governance functions. Potentially relevant institutions/ initiatives 
are presented in section 6.3, followed by an assessment of their combined effects in terms of how 
far key governance functions are fulfilled (6.4 and 6.5). Finally, recommendations are offered (6.6). 
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For reasons that are explained below, the issue of fossil fuel production subsidies is treated 
separately as a distinct challenge.37 
6.2. Transformation Challenges and Governance Demands 
6.2.1. Current Status and Prospect 
Remaining within a below 2°C carbon budget (let alone 1.5°C) requires most global fossil fuel 
reserves to remain unexploited. McGlade and Ekins (2015) find that a third of oil, half of gas and 
over 80% of coal reserves should remain untouched from 2010 to 2050 (see fig. 6.1). Achieving this, 
however, is a daunting challenge. Investment in fossil fuel extraction and delivery more than tripled 
between 2000 and 2014, and remains the largest share of world energy investment (IEA 2016a). In 
2012, the IEA warned that on current trends, enough new fossil fuel-based infrastructure – mines, 
power plants, pipelines, refineries etc. – would come online by 2017 to lock-in the remainder of 
emissions allowable assuming a 2°C carbon budget (IEA 2012). Fossil fuel extraction and trade are 
widely perceived as central to energy security and economic development, especially in developing 
countries with large unmet energy needs (Manley et al. 2017, Whitley and van der Burg 2015). Both 
production and consumption of fossil fuels continue to be widely subsidised. Major economies 
continue to subsidise investment in fossil fuel exploration and extraction on the order of $18-70 
billion per year (SEI 2018). Multinational companies in the sector(s) are significant wealth generators 
and underpin the returns to many pension funds in developed counties. Given this context, climate 
policy, at domestic and international levels, has focused almost exclusively on curtailing demand for 
fossil fuel energy, neglecting supply - at least until recently. But it is increasingly recognised that 
effective climate policy requires action on both (SEI 2015, Green and Denniss 2018).  
Governments own over 50% of global production of fossil fuels through majority-stake or full 
ownership of producing companies (Whitley and van der Berg 2015). National Oil Companies (NOCs) 
control 80 - 90% of proven global oil reserves (up from <10% in the 1970s), with most engaging 
International Oil Companies (IOCs) in a variety of contractual arrangements. Because of this shifting 
ownership, IOCs have focused on hard-to-access (e.g. deepwater) and hard-to-recover (e.g. oil 
sands, shale oil) reserves that cost more than the current price of oil to develop (Holmes 2017).  
Global coal production has grown since 2000, particularly in China (see Figure 6.2). While the world’s 
biggest producer and user succeeded in reducing its consumption in 2016 for the third consecutive 
year, 2017 saw a rise, with a corresponding effect on emissions from the power sector (Financial 
Times 2018). China is also reducing its substantial subsidies to coal power, although the figure is still 
double what is received by renewables.38  
37 The author gratefully acknowledges assistance in the form of an interview with Harro van Asselt of the 
Stockholm Environment Institute. The usual disclaimers apply. 
38 The value of Chinese government subsidies to coal-fired generation was estimated as at least CNY 252 billion 
(USD 37.7 billion) in 2014 and CNY 120 billion (USD 18 billion) in 2015 (Denjean et al. 2016). 
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Figure 6.1: ‘Unburnable’ fossil fuels to remain within 2°C carbon budget.
Figure 6.2: Output of top 5 global coal producers (billion short tons). Source: US Energy Information 
Administration. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=3350
While production has increased, global consumption of coal looks set to level out (Figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.3: World energy consumption by source, 1990 – 2040. Source: US Energy Information Administration: 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26212
A particular focus in this section is the role of production subsidies to fossil-fuel extractive 
industries, and prospects for their reduction. This is because extraction (and current consumption 
levels) depend to a significant extent on subsidy. Continuing current levels of subsidy to production 
globally has been estimated to lead to the emission of over 37 Gt CO2 from 2017 to 2050 that would 
otherwise not occur - roughly equivalent to burning all proven US and Norwegian oil reserves 
(Gerasimchuk et al. 2017). Removing such subsidy therefore constitutes a significant, albeit indirect, 
policy instrument to reduce fossil fuel extraction. Public finance for exploration of new reserves 
averages $13.5 billion annually across the G20 (Doukas et al. 2017). Consumption subsidies also 
undermine mitigation efforts, potentially making other sectors of the economy (e.g. transport) more 
dependent on fossil fuels (Manley et al. 2017). Other damaging effects of production and 
consumption subsidies include undermining the attractiveness of low-carbon investments, 
discouraging private R&D on new low-carbon energy technologies, and obstructing technology 
transfer (Whitley and van der Burg 2015). Subsidies tend to lock-in patterns of activity, preventing 
dynamic responses to changing circumstances (ibid).  Although originally intended to be short-term, 
they often become embedded in planning and expectations, prices (including of capital), resource 
allocation etc., creating new vested interests.  
Though estimates vary - because precise definitions are not agreed - the IEA estimates that fossil fuel 
subsidies (FFS) amounted to US$493 billion in 2014 (up from US$300 billion in 2009) and exceed 
renewable energy subsidies by more than four to one (IEA 2015). Estimating their extent is 
complicated by substantial data gaps because of limited transparency at the national level, and a full 
accounting of global energy subsidies (for all types) has never been completed. As a result, it is likely 
that existing figures are under-estimates (Whitley and van der Burg 2015). Production is supported 
by a wide range of subsidies that include, inter alia: direct payments; preferential access rights to 
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energy deposits; credit and insurance support; caps on liabilities; tariffs; government ownership of 
power generation (Koplow and Charles 2010). Consumption subsidies may improve access to 
affordable energy, but tend to benefit higher income groups disproportionately (Whitley and van der 
Burg 2015). 
The fossil-fuel extractive industry sector has shown notable signs of destabilisation in recent years. 
After the strong growth between 2000 and 2014 noted above, more recent estimates of ‘brown’ (i.e. 
high-carbon) finance put global investments in oil, gas and coal supply in 2015 at USD 900 billion: a 
decline of 18% from the USD 1.1 trillion in the peak year 2014 (OECD/IEA 2016). It remains to be 
seen whether this is a lasting change. In the oil and gas sector, demand is falling in many regions as 
energy efficiency measures take effect. In future, substitution with other fuels, the development of 
lower cost low-carbon technologies as well as increased efficiency will further reduce demand, and 
also limit price rises in the longer term (Holmes 2017). Declining oil prices from 2014 have 
encouraged Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries to undertake economic 
diversification efforts; all regional oil exporters now have strategies in place (Tagliapietra 2017). 
Many have seen the recent drop in oil prices as a ‘once-in-a-generation opportunity’ to slash 
subsidies and introduce a carbon price. However, others warn that falling commodity prices lead to 
increased calls for production subsidies, as demonstrated by lobbying from UK North Sea oil 
producers for tax breaks (Whitley and van der Burg 2015).  
Alongside various multi-lateral institutions that are now pressing for more concerted 
decarbonisation (see below), shareholder activism and court action represent further and increasing 
challenges to ‘business as usual’. For example, a 2017 shareholder resolution requires annual 
assessments of the impact that the Paris long-term goal will have (by reducing oil and gas demand) 
on Exxon’s business (Darby 2017). Large, global asset managers BlackRock and Vanguard voted in 
favour. However, institutional investors are unlikely to divest en masse. Instead, annual assessments 
are more likely a first step towards energy companies diversifying into cleaner technology or 
returning money to shareholders (Darby 2017). 
6.2.2. What Needs to Change? 
Precise recommendations for ‘roadmaps’ towards decarbonisation of extractive industries depend 
on the scenario envisaged for wider mitigation efforts (for example, how widespread will carbon 
capture and storage technology become, how far will growth in e-mobility disrupt the oil market) 
and economic/ societal pathways.39 As noted above, McGlade and Ekins (2015) offer one possible 
breakdown, sectorally and by region, of what needs to be left ‘in the ground’. This makes clear that 
the biggest ‘contribution’, in terms of assets left unrecovered, will need to be from coal, given its 
higher carbon content. Action on coal must also be rapid: under a least-cost strategy, OECD 
countries would need a complete phase by 2030, China by 2040 and the rest of the world, including 
the majority of emerging economies, by 2050 (Climate Analytics 2016). 
39 On potential disruption to oil markets caused by changes in the transport sector, see Arbib and Seba (2017), 
and further discussion in chapter 7. 
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For oil, there is a degree of consensus that exploration does not need to stop entirely in the lowest-
income countries (Manley et al. 2017, Tagliapietra 2017), out of concern for either efficiency, or 
fairness, or potentially both. Costs of development and extraction vary significantly across different 
geology, so it may be worthwhile for certain countries to allow exploration for reserves that may be 
less expensive to extract - even after a carbon tax is factored in (Manley et al. 2017, Tagliapietra 
2017). In the IEA’s ‘450 scenario’ (consistent with a 50% chance of 2°C), demand falls sharply after 
2020. Lower production costs that allow export competitiveness to be maintained mean that Middle 
Eastern exports, however, are assumed to continue at 2020 levels until 2040 (IEA 2016b). But lower 
prices over this timescale will see oil rents decline significantly. Thus, oil exporting MENA countries’ 
entire economic, social and political models must change (at a time of significant demographic 
change), to transform them from ‘rentier states’ into more economically diverse ‘production states’ 
(Tagliapietra 2017).  
Extractive fossil fuel companies also need to take greater responsibility for the emissions associated 
with extraction processes. The IEA estimates that oil and gas extraction processes emit roughly 76 
million tonnes of methane per year globally, and that three-quarters could be eliminated with 
current technologies if companies fixed or replaced leaky equipment. Implementing measures that 
pay for themselves would be equivalent to reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 160 billion tonnes 
by 2100 — nearly 47 times the current annual emissions of the EU (Nature 2018). 
6.2.3. Main Challenges and Barriers toward Decarbonisation 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, decisions about fossil fuel production and consumption are 
closely linked to national sovereignty and perceived interests, and energy policy questions more 
broadly remain largely the prerogative of national decision-makers (Van Asselt and Kulovesi 2017). A 
combination of social, political, institutional, and economic factors lie behind the apparent ‘lock-in’ 
of ongoing investment in fossil fuel extraction and delivery (SEI 2018).  
The likelihood of ‘stranded’ (i.e. unexpectedly devalued) assets (Schlösser et al. 2017) raises public 
policy concerns about financial instability and a growing pension deficit, particularly in developed 
countries (Holmes and Orozco 2017). Unlike the large coal-based energy companies, their oil and gas 
counterparts – both international and national – can be regarded as ‘too big to fail’.40 Countries are 
more vulnerable than private companies. Diversification by IOCs could potentially address developed 
country governments’ concerns around loss of oil revenue and the need to shore up of companies in 
the short term through tax credits. On the other hand, pension funds and insurers would need to 
develop other sources of reliable returns as dividends paid by the oil companies dwindle (ibid). The 
situation for countries is more challenging: not only is it more difficult to shift capital and 
capabilities, they are also tied, geographically and constitutionally, to ownership of reserves which 
40 For example RWE’s market capitalisation is around US $8.4bn compared to Exxon Mobil’s US $314.5bn 
(Holmes 2017). 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
149 
cannot be sold outright but only licensed to companies for development. By contrast, companies 
could, if they wanted, run down their existing reserves in less than 15 years (Manley et al. 2017). 
A further obvious challenge relates to equity considerations and the importance of securing a ‘just 
transition’ (Hermwille 2017). But ‘while there is growing interest … in supply-side climate policy 
options, the attendant equity questions have received relatively little attention’ (Kartha 2016: 1). 
Trillions of dollars in ‘foregone rents’ may be at stake, constituting a substantial share of GDP in 
many cases (ibid). Control over fossil resources is unevenly distributed among countries, and often 
also among regions and individual economic entities within them. So too are the benefits of 
exploiting them. That some stand to lose much more than others from any future constraints on 
extraction (McGlade and Ekins 2015) constitutes a huge challenge to multi-lateral efforts.41  
Phasing out of coal, oil, and gas ‘would have to be planned and executed in a proactive, long-term 
way and systematic new economic perspectives would have to be developed for the affected 
regions’ (Hermwille 2017: 38). As noted above, coal would need the most rapid action. But to date, a 
lack of incentives encouraging economic diversification is evident (Tagliapietra 2017). For MENA oil 
exporters, this problem is exacerbated by private investors’ unwillingness to invest in non-oil, 
potentially import-substituting sectors, for fear that when oil prices rise, so will value of the currency 
of foreign exchanges, making exports less competitive.  
On the specific issue of FFS, though widely recognised as desirable from efficiency and climate 
protection perspectives, their removal also raises serious equity issues. Benefits of subsidy reform – 
particularly in the short term – will be unevenly distributed and strongly dependent on the approach 
and complementary (compensatory) measures adopted (Whitley and van der Burg 2015). 
Complementary measures should aim to improve the competitiveness or viability of those who stay 
in the sector(s), support those who want to leave the industries or to diversify into other activities, 
and take into consideration the potential of the private sector to create new opportunities (ibid: 37-
8). FFS are particularly high in the MENA region, where they are estimated at 13% of GDP and 35% of 
government revenues (ibid). 
Researchers have identified several reasons for the persistence of production subsidies (Whitley and 
van der Burg 2015), together creating a dangerous inertia. A principal reason for lack of progress 
regarding both producer and consumer subsidies is lack of information. A 2015 inventory of fossil 
fuel subsidies uncovered about 800 types of subsidy, mainly in national budgets, but even that did 
not cover all factors causing artificially lower prices (OECD 2015). Most are not clearly identified in 
standard government budget documents (Whitley and van der Burg 2015). In order for governments 
41 Edenhofer et al. (2013) estimate the value of the GHG emission endowments that are created by 
establishing a cap-and-trade system (‘climate rents’) at around US$1 trillion per year. They argue that ‘a major 
and so far perhaps underappreciated challenge of climate policy negotiations is to deal with what may be 
largest distributional negotiations the global community has ever engaged in’. As Kartha (2016) notes, this 
applies even more to fossil fuel extraction rents. 
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to be fully accountable for their commitments, there is an urgent need for more transparent and 
comparable information. The important role of special interests also needs mention. Because the 
benefits of subsidies are often concentrated, while the costs are spread across the general 
population (i.e. consumers and taxpayers), political leaders face asymmetric incentives. The lack of 
countervailing a lobby strengthens vested interests’ chance of blocking subsidy reforms (Asmelash 
2017). The economic and political power of the fossil fuel sector has enabled them to strongly 
influence domestic (and indeed international) climate and energy policies, and to be successful 
shapers of public opinion (Kartha 2016). A further implicit reason lies in the weakness of institutions: 
governments sometimes subsidise fossil fuels because they lack other effective means and 
institutional capacity to implement more targeted policies (Whitley and van der Burg 2015). 
The main challenges to multilateral action will be to define what constitutes FFSs, achieve 
transparency about their application, bridge the developed-developing country gap, and to set out 
enforceable obligations with implementation timelines (Asmelash 2017). The cross-cutting nature of 
the issue means that the global effort to phase out FFSs lacks an obvious, single institutional home at 
the international level (ibid).  
6.2.4. Promise and Potential of International Cooperation 
It is increasingly recognised that climate policy needs to work on the ‘supply side’ of fossil fuel 
extraction, as well as demand side for the products themselves (and tackling associated emissions 
once combusted). If not, free riders in terms of mitigation effort will benefit from cheaper fossil 
fuels, as market price adjusts to a lowering of overall demand. Green and Denniss (2018) put 
forward a range of further arguments why working on supply and demand together helps ‘cut with 
both arms of the scissors’. This section attempts to describe the role and importance of each 
international governance function, first for extractive industries in general, then specifically 
concerning FFS reform, summarising the results in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. Given its relative novelty 
in climate policy communities, we start with the importance of improving knowledge and learning 
on fossil-fuel supply-side questions. 
Knowledge and Learning 
To help overcome the current inertia over the ‘supply-side’ of climate policy, Kartha (2016) suggests 
improving knowledge and understanding around particular questions, the current absence of which 
prevents strong recommendations on improved international cooperation being made in this 
chapter. Such improved knowledge could begin to shift engrained perceptions of the ‘national 
interest’ in fossil-fuel production-reliant countries. Relevant questions include, inter alia: 
i) How far does fossil fuel extraction really contribute to development, given side-effects of
environmental and human rights impacts, concentration of wealth and power, Dutch 
disease42 and geopolitical instability? 
42 A situation where growth in national income from natural resource extraction damages other sectors of a 
country's economy, by raising the value of the currency. 
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ii) What are the distributional impacts of policies constraining extraction? When are
domestic steps sufficient, and when might international support be appropriate to
help alleviate regressive impacts?
iii) What ‘just transition’ lessons can be learned from other sectors? What obligations
may some nations bear to support just transitions in other nations?
iv) Which countries’ resources should stay in the ground, and which should be exploited,
and how to decide this given a particular overall carbon budget: based on economic
efficiency, ethical principles, a combination, mediated by tradeable “extraction
rights”? Is there a role for command-and-control approaches, e.g. a ‘coal non-
proliferation treaty’?43
Guidance and Signal Function 
In principle there is a clear need to signal the resolve of governments and others, indicating likely 
policy trajectories to business, investors and other actors at all levels. Consensual and deliberate 
transition away from extraction of fossil fuels requires a common understanding of its necessity and 
urgency. Strong international signals can help to achieve this, based on the learning and knowledge 
described under the previous heading. Pension funds and insurers, for example, would need to 
develop other sources of reliable returns as dividends paid by the large oil companies dwindle. 
Strong signals from global institutions would facilitate this.  
Setting Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
Ideally targets would be set and implemented through a global instrument, or instruments, 
recognised as equitable. As elaborated in the previous work package deliverable (Oberthür et al. 
2017), ‘agreement on collective action requires agreement on the contribution of each individual 
party and hence on a burden-sharing’. To date, international climate negotiations have focussed on 
determining who can emit how much from fossil fuels. Theoretically, they could go on to ask who 
can extract how much in terms of fossil fuels, establishing a form of ‘burden sharing agreement’. For 
example, the Kyoto 2 concept (Tickell 2008) suggests a global system whereby the bulk of GHG 
production rights are allocated by regular global auction open to all bidders, as close as practical to 
the point of fossil-fuel production. Producers of fossil fuels and industrial greenhouse gases would 
need to hold sufficient rights to match their production. Auctioning of permits could credibly raise a 
sum of about €1 trillion per year for a multi-purpose Climate Change Fund. Such a bold re-
orientation of current international efforts, requiring cooperation from fossil fuel companies whose 
businesses it would compromise, would clearly be a great challenge to negotiate. 
43 See e.g. https://thinkprogress.org/a-simple-proposal-a-coal-power-non-proliferation-treaty-a7132622a7dd 
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Transparency and Accountability 
Global regulation would require monitoring and verification of implementation. It makes most sense 
to discuss this predominantly in terms of FFS (see dedicated discussion below). 
Capacity Building, Technology and Finance (Means of Implementation) 
It has been suggested that the problem of lack of investment in boosting the private sectors of 
MENA countries, which perpetuates their status as ‘rentier’ rather than ‘production’ states could be 
remedied by strategic investment by sovereign wealth funds (Tagliapietra 2017). This would require 
‘strong governance and forward-looking visions on the part of governments’ (ibid), and would 
benefit from international-level coordination. The same can be said of countries currently heavily 
dependent on other domestic fossil fuel resources. 
6.2.5. International Cooperation on Fossil Fuel Subsidy (FFS) Reform 
In the more specific field of FFS reform, the following governance functions can be highlighted as 
requiring attention if the kind of barriers we have identified are to be addressed seriously, and as 
areas where feasible, international-level policy actions are conceivable.  
Knowledge and Learning, and Transparency and Accountability 
As noted above, one of the main challenges is to define what actually constitutes FFSs, to pre-empt 
denials that they even exist.44 Then, international institutions will be in a position to help address 
them. As Whitley and van der Burg (2015) observe, while domestic reforms can proceed without 
internationally comparable data, this information can facilitate valuable lesson learning and 
evaluation of progress, creating peer pressure and enabling cross-country comparisons of the 
effectiveness of different interventions on FFS. Whitley and van der Burg set out a range of possible 
initiatives, from mandatory to voluntary. Mandatory reporting on fossil fuel subsidies (following the 
model for agriculture) is conceivable. Country commitments to transparency can also be widened 
and strengthened when governments already committed to reform insist on subsidy reform in 
bilateral or multilateral trade agreements (ibid). 
Guidance and Signal Function 
44 Saudi Arabia, for example, has reported that it had no inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and therefore ‘phasing 
out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies does not apply to Saudi Arabia’ (G20 2010, quoted in Smith and Urpaleinen 
2017). 
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Language on phasing down “high-carbon investments and fossil fuel subsidies” could be included in 
the key negotiated outputs from international processes. 
Setting rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
Some suggest that stronger international regulatory steps beyond voluntarism will be necessary to 
turn apparent commitments into genuine action, which is maintained even in the face of e.g. oil 
price shocks, public protest, and changes of political regime. ‘Without any mechanism that ties their 
hands, reluctant governments often find it easier to renege on their voluntary commitments’ 
(Asmelash 2017: 347; cf. Tagliapietra 2017). Others (Smith and Urpeleinen 2017) regard peer 
pressure through international organisations, rather than binding commitments, as more feasible.  
Capacity Building, Technology and Finance (Means of Implementation) 
There is a strong need for this function to be fulfilled in terms of FFS reform. Whitley and van der 
Burg (2015) suggest the need to increase technical and financial support for national efforts, and to 
ensure climate finance is not used to support fossil fuels. Resources and finance for ‘complementary 
measures’ in developing countries, such as support for health services, education, social protection, 
energy-sector development and economic diversification, need to be linked to subsidy reform 
processes, either in terms of institutional arrangements or careful timing. It will be important to not 
only increase these resources, but also foster linkages between existing support mechanisms and 
the processes of FFS reform.  
International institutions can put in place financial and other economic incentives, particularly for 
developing countries: for example, by indicating clearly that fossil fuel subsidy reform is part of a 
country’s mitigation portfolio, the likelihood increases that such actions can be eligible for support. 
Even though national–level subsidy reform is more likely to be triggered by economic and fiscal 
motivations, the climate regime could strengthen the case for reform by offering these incentives 
(van Asselt and Kuvolesi 2017). 
Overall, the primary channels for greater international ambition and action on FFS reform may be 
summarised as: ‘bodies for reporting, tracking and accountability; financial and technical support, 
which must be diverted from providing subsidies and towards reform; multilateral and bilateral 
agreements (including on trade); and a greater understanding of the processes being undertaken by 
regions and countries that are already leading by example in reforming subsidies to fossil fuels’ 
(Whitely and van der Burg 2015: 3). 
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Table 6.1: International sectoral governance requirements by function and strength of need (Unless otherwise 
stated, the need for the functions is the same for the broader issue of phasing down extracting industries and 
for FFS reform). 
6.3. Governance Supply 
6.3.1. Existing Governance Institutions/ Initiatives of Relevance 
While national policies play a key part in governing fossil fuels and any transition away from them, 
international institutions can also influence behaviour, constrain activity, and shape expectations in 
relevant ways (van Asselt 2014). A wide array of international institutions influence the behaviour of 
state and non-state actors regarding extraction, and of states in terms of production subsidies, but a 
single, dominant institution is lacking. We cover extraction in general terms first, then consider the 
related issue of subsidy separately (see section 6.3.2). The results are summarised at the end of this 
chapter in tables 6.2 and 6.3, respectively. 
Guidance and 
Signal 
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Intergovernmental/ International Organisations (IOs) 
UNFCCC/Paris Agreement (PA): The mandates of the UNFCCC and PA can be interpreted as 
encompassing fossil fuel supply. Even with favourable assumptions about prospects for carbon 
capture and storage technology, the need for a steep reduction in supply is implied by the PA’s goal 
to hold temperature increase ‘well below’ 2°C and achieve net zero emissions by the second half of 
the century (Piggot et al. 2017). Explicit reference to fossil fuels is, however, conspicuous by its 
absence in the PA. Despite their combustion contributing the large majority of GHG emissions, the 
text does not describe how production or combustion may be phased down, either globally or by 
individual countries. Instead, in keeping with past UNFCCC approaches, states are left to develop 
specific climate policies and measures in accordance with their own national circumstances (Piggot 
et al. 2017). 
In principle, the UNFCCC/ PA does offer the architecture within which governments could act on 
fossil-fuel extraction. For example, a country that already plans to reduce GHG emissions by a 
certain percentage could also plan to reduce its production of fossil fuels by a specific percentage, 
expressing this through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) or Long-Term Low-Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Development Strategies (LTS) (due to be submitted by 2020), with ambition depending 
on national circumstances. Financing or capacity building components could also be communicated 
in this way. Beyond headline goals, countries can identify specific policy options, e.g. removing 
production subsidies, production and export taxes, restricting exploration, or limiting finance 
(Lazarus et al. 2015).45  
Also worthy of mention are the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Goal 7 of which 
highlights access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy, Goal 12 responsible 
production and consumption, and Goal 13 tackling climate change (though without mentioning fossil 
fuel production explicitly).  
Along with other development banks and export credit agencies, the World Bank can play an 
important direct role by either financing fossil fuel (extraction) projects or choosing not to. As noted 
in chapter 3, citing the PA temperature goals, at the 2017 One Planet Summit the World Bank Group 
(WBG) made a series of announcements46, including an end to finance for upstream oil and gas 
projects after 2019. This built on previous commitments to restrict public finance for coal projects 
(which itself helped generate additional commitments in other forums and growing global 
momentum towards a phase-out). WBG also announced greater ambition in its Climate Change 
Action Plan, to increase transparency regarding portfolio GHG emissions, and a new partnership with 
45 Some countries have already taken steps to limit fossil fuel supply. India’s ‘cess’ on coal production, for 
example, taxes locally produced and imported coal. 
46 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/12/12/world-bank-group-announcements-at-one-
planet-summit 
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Canada and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) to provide analysis and support for 
a just transition away from coal in developing countries. 
The G20 and G7 groupings are of obvious relevance. The G7 - the seven major advanced economies 
as reported by the International Monetary Fund (including the EU) - has pledged to end all fossil fuel 
use by the end of the century (G7 2015). G20 and G7 commitments on FFS reform will be noted in 
section 6.3.2. 
Other IOs include groups of energy producers and consumers, such as the International Energy 
Agency (IEA), the International Energy Forum, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, and the Gas Exporting Countries Forum and the Energy Charter Treaty (Van Asselt 2014). 
The Energy Charter Treaty brings together around 50 energy exporters and importers from the 
Eurasian continent, with a view to facilitating investments in, and trade of, energy and energy 
products (irrespective of carbon content of energy source). Its investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions, whereby corporations can sue governments where national policies entail ‘loss of future 
profits’, are particularly relevant. This diversity of bodies makes for a fragmented governance 
picture, with organisations working towards sometimes-conflicting goals (see section 6.4). 
Transnational/ Hybrid Initiatives 
A variety of private, company-led transnational initiatives exist, notably the Oil and Gas Climate 
Initiative (OGCI), as well as hybrid public-private efforts, such as the Climate and Clean Air 
Coalition’s Oil and Gas Methane Partnership. These generally focus on emissions arising from 
companies’ internal operations. While potentially significant in terms of dealing with short-lived 
climate forcers (methane etc.), and acting in the short-term to contribute to a Paris-compatible 
pathway, their neglect of the issue of end-use effectively renders them negligible in relation to the 
overall scale of the greenhouse problem (Collier and Venables 2014).  
Among an emerging field of NGO/civil society initatives, the Unfriend Coal Network, is a notable 
global coalition of NGOs and social movements that is pressuring insurance companies to divest 
from coal and support the transition to clean energy. Elsewhere, 340 NGOs signed the Lofoten 
Declaration demanding an organised withdrawal from fossil fuel production under the leadership of, 
and with dedicated support from, high-income producing countries (Lofoten Declaration 2017). 
Also worthy of mention is the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), launched in November 2017, and 
already noted in chapter 3. Although focused on electricity production and not strictly targeting 
extraction per se, this commitment to abandon coal-related investments that has attracted both 
state and non-state signatories (placing it in the ‘hybrid’ category) has generated great interest as a 
signal that coal is increasingly out of favour, with clear implications for its extraction. 
6.3.2. International Governance Activity on Fossil-Fuel Subsidy 
Energy subsidies are usually established by national or sub-national governments, but raise 
important questions for international trade, climate change, energy security and economic 
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development. As such, they fall under the remit of several IOs, which can be said to constitute an 
energy subsidy regime complex (van der Graaf and Van Asselt 2017 – see their table 1), taking in, 
inter alia, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), UNFCCC, G20, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank, OECD, IEA, OPEC, Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) and Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy 
Reform (FFFSR). For space reasons, the discussion below focuses on some of the principal actors 
from different categories in the work package’s database. 
The WTO remains the only multilateral organisation to administer a legally binding agreement on 
subsidies. Under the WTO, energy can be governed as both a good or as a service. Fossil fuels count 
as goods under WTO law, falling under the GATT. Energy-related services such as the transportation 
and distribution of energy fall under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In addition, 
WTO disciplines on subsidies, and in particular the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM), are relevant. Even within the WTO, therefore, energy governance is notably 
fragmented. Nevertheless, the WTO could potentially play a role in addressing fossil fuel 
development. However, subsidies for fossil fuel consumption and production have barely been 
raised in the WTO (unlike other IOs discussed below). Existing rules of the SCM Agreement appear to 
be inadequate to discipline FFSs (van Asselt 2014). No fossil fuel subsidy has been challenged by a 
Member, and notification rates of subsidies have generally been low, due to a lack of commitment 
(possibly due to fear of starting a trade dispute), a lack of clarity about which subsidies need to be 
reported, or inherent difficulties of estimating them (Casier et al. 2013; van Asselt 2014). 
Under the UNFCCC, one of the first intergovernmental responses to calls for FFS reform came when 
the Kyoto Protocol included it, albeit implicitly, in the non-exhaustive list of climate policies and 
measures. Article 2.1(a) (v) of the Protocol refers to: ‘Progressive reduction or phasing out of market 
imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse-gas 
emitting sectors that run counter to the objective of the Convention and application of market 
instruments’ (UN 1998).  
The G20 (G20 2009) committed to phasing out ‘inefficient FFS,’ and encouraged national strategies 
to do so, while protecting the most vulnerable. The G7 pledged (G7 2016) to phase out their support 
for fossil fuels by 2025. Along with the G20, the OECD and IEA have been IOs most concerned to 
reduce FFS. Collaboration between the OECD and the IEA, which have in the past largely assessed 
different countries, has enhanced transparency and learning on the issue.47 A new report (OECD 
2018) which for the first time combines figures from these key IOs, suggests that FFS totalled at least 
$373bn globally in 2015, and that reductions in more developed countries have stalled in recent 
years, with most reform instead occurring in developing nations such as Indonesia and India. The 
Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform is an informal group of non-G20 countries working to build 
political consensus on the importance of reform, notably in the context of the WTO (see section 6.5). 
47 The IMF also weighs in on the subject of energy subsidies, reaching a much higher estimate than other IOs 
(US$5.3 trillion) by including the value of external costs (IMF 2015). 
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Also relevant are the UN SDGs, where FFS reform is suggested as a means of implementing Goal 12, 
to ‘ensure sustainable production and consumption patterns (Merrill and Chung 2014). Indicator 
12.c.1 requires tracking of the ‘Amount of fossil fuel subsidies per unit of GDP (production and
consumption) and as a proportion of total national expenditure on fossil fuels’. Reform here is
highlighted as a measure that could generate large savings through which the achievement of
various SDGs could be financed.
Among a range of NGOs, the Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) is a significant player, working with 
countries to implement subsidy reform, and tracking G20 and APEC countries’ commitments in 
phasing out inefficient FFS. 
6.4. Assessing the Governance Complex 
The fragmented global energy governance architecture may lead to conflicting objectives and 
policies. Goals of the IEA, for example, may favour lower oil prices, impeding decarbonisation. 
Conversely, mitigation policies might undermine the objectives of energy-specific institutions for 
whom continued production and use of fossil fuels remains a priority. Recent research has raised 
concerns about the effect of the Energy Charter Treaty in deterring ambitious climate policy, and 
lack of transparency even about how many disputes it may be considering (Eberhardt et al. 2018). 
Where inconsistencies and trade-offs between different institutions’ objectives occur, no 
international arbiter exists to manage them (Dubash and Florini 2011; Van Asselt 2014). 
Conflicting objectives may occur within single institutions, as well as between them, particularly 
those such as the IEA whose remit encompasses the energy ‘trilemma’. The G20 has been criticised 
for double standards. In 2017, financing from G20 governments for overseas coal projects reached a 
five-year high, totalling at least $13 bn in loans, credits, and guarantees. Of course, this was not a 
collective decision by G20, but the sum of individual country decisions, and in particular those made 
by the financial institutions of China, Japan, India, and Korea (Chen 2018). Japan has even claimed 
that its support for several coal projects in Asia counted as climate finance (Chen et al. 2016).  
Fragmentation in global energy governance is understandable given, inter alia, the diverse objectives 
of energy policy. And although several international institutions are of (potential) relevance in 
governing fossil fuel development, their influence on energy policy decision-making is rarely direct. 
Instead, incentives to spur or limit fossil fuel extraction tend to operate through market price signals 
(e.g. OPEC export quotas influencing oil prices, which may influence extraction). The influence of the 
climate change regime to date is also indirect: at best, it could be argued that in seeking to increase 
the social cost of carbon, it has limited fossil fuel development (van Asselt 2014). 
Guidance and Signal 
While anti-fossil fuel norms are strengthening (and expressed in significant forums such as the 
G7/G20), failure to mention them explicitly in the PA is a significant weakness, undermining this 
critically important governance function. Fossil fuel supply is not an explicit part of guidance 
documents on NDC development; neither are fossil fuel supply strategies a separate category in 
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synthesis reports of multiple NDCs. ‘As long as fossil fuel supply is not explicitly tied to climate 
change, some producers can be “strategically ignorant” about the impact of extracted fuels on GHG 
emissions, or the pace of change necessary …’ (Piggot et al. 2017: 9). The territorial approach 
followed by UNFCCC and IPCC in its guidance on inventories is also problematic in this regard, in that 
it rewards actions that reduce emissions domestically, but not those (such as restricting fossil fuel 
exports) that might have an effect beyond a country’s jurisdiction.48  
Although recent announcements from the World Bank and PPCA highlight a degree of strengthening 
in anti-fossil fuel norms, the signal offered by the governance complex as a whole remains relatively 
weak regarding the need to reduce extraction to levels consistent to respect the PA’s long-term 
temperature goal. More broadly, a lack of incentives encouraging economic diversification is evident 
(Tagliapietra, 2017).49 Where the need for guidance and signal was assessed as high, the overall 
delivery must be assessed as low.  
Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
As explained above, agreement on rules facilitating collective action requires agreement on the 
contribution of each individual party and hence on burden-sharing. It not only requires an 
understanding that collective action is required or beneficial but also what each individual actor’s 
fair contribution should be. For reasons elaborated above, this is severely lacking.  
At the level of extractive industry companies themselves, rules to control emissions from production 
processes tend to be voluntary. The OGCI, for example, is essentially aimed at technical dialogue and 
knowledge exchange, not rule setting or enforcement.  
Thus, where the need for this governance function was assessed as high, the overall delivery by the 
existing governance complex must be reported as low.  
Transparency and Accountability 
Given the relative absence of specific rules relating to fossil fuel extraction, there is a corresponding 
absence of mechanisms to ensure transparent implementation of those rules. However, 
international institutions have served to publish estimates of the scale of extraction (and also of 
fossil fuel subsidisation - see below), and as the profile of the issue grows, attempts are being made 
to include it in the forthcoming Global Stocktake.  
48  NB. there is an overlap to reconcile on this aspect in future work with other governance functions: ‘rules’ and 
transparency/accountability. 
49 For MENA oil exporters, this problem is exacerbated by private investors’ unwillingness to invest in non-oil, 
potentially import-substituting sectors, for fear of making exports less competitive when the value of the 
currency rises on foreign exchanges in response to higher oil prices. 
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Where the need for the governance function was assessed as high, the overall delivery by the 
existing governance complex must be scored as low.  
Means of Implementation 
The extent to which institutions, including multi-lateral development banks and Sovereign Wealth 
Funds are willing to finance transitions by fossil-fuel extracting and exporting countries, beyond the 
rhetoric, is not easy to determine. While the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green 
Climate Fund (GCF) operate to a general remit of supporting decarbonisation, no international fund 
dedicated specifically for the purpose of phasing out fossil-fuel extractive industries exists. It also 
needs to be borne in mind that many fossil-fuel extracting countries in principle have significant 
capacity to engineer their own transformations, were social/political conditions to allow. What is 
easier to identify is ‘brown finance’ that continues to support extraction of fossil fuels (see chapter 
3), which arguably must also be weighed in scoring this function. Evidence suggests that most MDBs 
spend almost as much on fossil fuel-related investment as they do on energy-related climate 
projects. Funding for fossil fuels from the main MDBs exceeded $5bn in 2016 (Wright et al. 2018). 
Apart from the WBG, already mentioned, only the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) specify strict conditions on coal mining in their policies; 
others have no exclusions (Wright et al. 2018).  
The OGCI’s billion-dollar investment fund, investing in promising technologies and business models 
that have the potential to significantly reduce GHGs from extraction processes, must also be 
weighed in the assessment.50 Overall, however, where the need for the governance function was 
assessed as medium-high, the overall delivery by the existing governance complex can probably 
most accurately be scored as low.  
Knowledge and Learning 
Institutions including OECD, IEA, IMF, UNEP and the WBG have published estimates of the scale of 
extraction and also of fossil fuel subsidisation (see section 6.5). Such institutions have also 
developed and sought to share alternative development pathways that fossil-fuel dependent 
economies could consider. 
In their closing statement at COP 23, the world’s 47 least developed countries requested that the 
Talanoa Dialogue include ‘managing a phase out of fossil fuels’. Such discussion could have the effect 
of further advancing understanding of the importance of the supply-side of climate policy, and 
increased spread of anti-fossil fuel norms (Green 2018). Submissions to the process from research 
institutes such as the Stockholm Environmentl Institute (SEI) and International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD) have raised the profile of the issue. Further research is required to 
establish how far the process was able to engage with fossil fuel supply-side issues.  
50 See http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Oil_and_Gas_Climate_Initiative 
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Where the need for the governance function was assessed as medium, the overall delivery by the 
existing governance complex can be scored as low-medium.  
6.5. Assessment of Governance Functions in Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform 
The various institutions involved in phasing out ‘inefficient’ fossil fuel subsidies (G20, IEA, OECD) can 
be considered to (indirectly) target fossil fuel development; however, most of their initiatives are still 
at the stage of enhancing transparency about the level of such subsidies, rather than developing 
concrete measures to phase them out. Moreover, most attention has been paid to consumer rather 
than producer subsidies (van Asselt 2014). 
Guidance and Signal 
Guidance and signal is present in the aggregate of institutions and initiatives in this case, but is 
undermined by a continuing inability to agree on a common definition of fossil fuel subsidy. The 
result, manifest in the G20’s compromise of a commitment to phase out ‘inefficient’ FFSs, allows 
countries to define the term as narrowly as they wish. Eight out of the G20 countries claim to have 
no such inefficient FFSs (Asmelash 2017).  
Outside the G20, pressure from the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform via a Communiqué (FFFSR 
2015) calling for the elimination of FFSs in the context of PA, offers some degree of signal. In 
December 2017, a Ministerial Statement by 12 WTO Members (coordinated by the FFFSR) at the 
Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference, called on the WTO to ‘achieve ambitious and effective 
disciplines on inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption including through 
enhanced WTO transparency and reporting that will enable the evaluation of the trade and resource 
effects of fossil fuel subsidies programmes’.51 (The Ministerial Statement also notes that any efforts 
to phase out fossil fuels must take into account the needs of the poor). The 12 endorsing WTO 
members, supported by the FFSR, also encouraged the rest of the international community to follow 
their lead.52 This is the first time the WTO has accepted a Ministerial Statement specifically targeting 
fossil fuel subsidy reform. 
Where the need for the governance function was assessed as high, the overall delivery by the 
existing governance complex can reasonably be scored as low-medium.  
Rules for Collective Action 
A shortcoming of intergovernmental agreements to eliminate FFSs has been the lack of clear-cut 
commitments. As well as being non-binding, commitments have been vague and indefinite. 
According to Asmelash (2017: 359), it is ‘desirable to clearly and explicitly set out each and every 
51 https://www.norway.no/en/missions/wto-un/our-priorities/trade/wto-world-trade-organization/mc11-
ministerial-declaration-on-fossil-fuel-subsidy-reform/ 
52 Currently no EU countries are signatories. 
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country’s commitment to phase out FFSs. Perhaps the most effective way to do so is to ban certain 
FFSs and/or impose a quantitative limit on the overall level of subsidies a country may provide’. It 
should also be highlighted how certain WTO rules on FFS that could in principle be applied have not 
been invoked. Where the need for the governance function was assessed as high, the overall 
delivery by the existing governance complex can be scored as low-medium.  
Transparency and Accountability 
Voluntary country peer reviews of inefficient FFS are conducted under auspices of G20 and APEC as 
a solution to the failure to agree on a common definition. The US, China, Germany and Mexico have 
already undergone this process, which is chaired by the OECD. In themselves, however, such 
mechanisms are unlikely to be sufficient to improve transparency (Casier et al. 2014). The G7’s FFS 
phase-out pledge included no systems to ensure accountability. Analysis by the OECD (2018) has 
improved transparency, and allowed the extent of subsidies in countries which deny applying them 
to be better identified by the likes of Carbon Brief (see Timperley 2018). Gaps in this OECD analysis 
remain, however, e.g. on credit support – whereby governments offer support to investment in the 
production of fossil fuels, thus increasing access to credit or lowering the cost of borrowing. (Nor 
does it include any estimates for the cost of externalities, which the IMF has included to produce far 
higher estimates of the value of FFS).  
Adoption of indicator 12.c.1 within the SDGs, covering “Amount of fossil fuel subsidies per unit of 
GDP (production and consumption) and as a proportion of total national expenditure on fossil fuels” 
bodes well for the future, but for the time being, overall, the overall of this function can reasonably 
be scored as low-medium.  
Means of Implementation 
World Bank works with countries to implement subsidy reform; IMF may include reform as condition 
for lending. Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) works with countries to implement subsidy reform. 
Where the need for the governance function was assessed as medium-high, the overall delivery by 
the existing governance complex can be scored as low-medium.  
Knowledge and Learning 
Institutions including OECD, IEA, IMF, UNEP, WBG, have served to publish estimates of the scale of 
extraction and also of fossil fuel subsidisation. In addition to the voluntary country peer reviews 
noted in the transparency/accountability discussion above, the Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) 
operates a dedicated website for tracking the progress of the G20 and APEC countries in phasing out 
inefficient FFS over the medium term, and has established a worldwide network of Civil Society 
Organisations working on subsidy reform. In addition, a group of the organisations listed above, 
along with UNEP, has established the Green Growth Knowledge Platform and the Green Fiscal Policy 
Network, which facilitate online-based knowledge sharing, bilateral study visits and international 
meetings. The World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP) is also 
developing a website to facilitate knowledge sharing through public and confidential channels 
among governments. ‘The sharing of positive experiences of reform through these means could 
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prove a powerful way to communicate the benefits of reform, and raise the ambition of reform 
processes’ (Whitley and van der Burg 2015: 42). The Bank’s Climate Action Peer Exchange brings 
together finance ministers to discuss FFS reform. 
Where the need for the governance function was assessed as medium, the overall delivery by the 
existing governance complex can be scored as medium.  
6.6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Gaps are particularly evident in terms of guidance and signal and rules to facilitate collective action 
(including the burden-sharing element of the latter), but also transparency and accountability and 
means of implementation. The discussion focuses on these aspects, once again separating general 
points from those more specifically related to subsidy reform. Conclusions related to the (potential) 
role of the EU, and further reflections on the importance of equity and just transition can be found in 
chapter 10. 
6.6.1. Institutional Implications of a Phase Out of Fossil-Fuel Extraction 
Despite decision-making responsibility ultimately resting with sovereign states, urgent consideration 
needs to be given to how the development benefits of fossil fuel resources can be optimised within 
the shrinking carbon budget that the PA’s 1.5C goal necessitates. Some fossil-fuel-dependent states 
may in effect have to become stranded (Manley et al. 2017), and the process by which they 
transition from this, diversifying their economies, requires careful analysis and ‘complex 
international negotiation and coordination’ (Schlösser et al. 2017). Both the G20 (Goldthau 2017; 
Schlösser et al. 2017) and the UNFCCC (with UNEP) are strong candidates to oversee these 
processes. However, both would need to gear themselves up significantly to be credible and 
legitimate leaders of this global transition (SEI 2018). These processes, by which these complex 
transitions can be negotiated and coordinated, cannot be confined to official climate-policy related 
channels, but must also extend to development cooperation and governance of finance where, as 
chapter 3 noted, improved information about climate-related risks is needed to guide investment. 
The G20’s regular meetings of finance ministers would need to become the steering committee for 
the low-energy transition (Goldthau 2017). 
Beyond the regular climate regime, development cooperation channels have potential to foster an 
inclusive debate to inform and encourage decisions based on a sound assessment of opportunities 
and threats of various options and on comprehensive consultation of actor groups (Schlösser et al. 
2017). In the immediate-term, a report from GIZ has suggested that stranded asset risks should be 
considered in development policy processes at UN level, including SDGs, UNEP Green Economy & 
Finance Initiatives etc, and in ODA donor forums, such as OECD, multilateral development banks, 
Sustainable Energy for All, G7 (Schlösser et al. 2017). Bilateral and regional initiatives such as North-
South or South-South partnerships should also take up the issue (ibid). To begin more serious 
discussion within the fossil-fuel sector, a project task force in the OECD Policy Dialogue on Natural 
Resource-based Development could offer a suitable forum for evidence-based deliberations and 
formulating recommendations (Schlösser et al. 2017). A corresponding subject group in the 
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Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development could also 
identify appropriate ways to involve stakeholders from the oil and gas sector (ibid). 
The UNFCCC 
As the central international forum for addressing climate change, the UNFCCC is well-placed in 
principle to articulate the rationale and logistics for phasing down fossil fuels. While not the only 
possible venue, an obvious benefit of governing through the UNFCCC (compared with other 
international energy or trade organisations) is its near-universal participation by states, including 
countries that both produce and consume fossil fuels (van Asselt 2014). As noted above, the 
UNFCCC’s mandate can also be interpreted as encompassing fossil fuel supply, as the need to phase 
out fossil fuels is implied by the agreed goal to pursue efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C, as 
well as achieve net zero emissions. 
Improving the provision of guidance and signal and rules facilitating collective action are closely 
inter-related endeavours in the UNFCCC. Articulating fossil-fuel phase-down pathways and actions 
can have broader effects on how the problem of climate change is framed and understood, which 
ultimately could help ratchet mitigation ambition. The PA offers a framework through which, in 
principle, countries could move in this direction. Piggott et al (2017: 7) point to ‘processes through 
which the articulation of a pathway away from fossil fuels could enhance ambition’, such as the 
process of Long-term Strategy (LTS) development. Alongside the NDC process, LTS development 
provides an ideal opportunity for countries to plot a managed decline in fossil fuels (including 
production), incorporating trajectories for production and investment that are consistent with a 
1.5°C goal. This could form the basis for a “climate test”, where proposed fossil-fuel infrastructure is 
assessed against national commitments and development trajectories (ibid).  
As noted above, the established territorial approach to accounting for emissions does not recognise 
or reward actions such as restricting fossil fuel exports. An alternative accounting framework based 
on extraction-based emissions would be needed to monitor the alignment of fossil fuel supply with 
climate goals and help send a more appropriate signal. Given that the development of a 
standardised methodology and capacity for territorial emissions accounting has been hard-won, an 
extraction-based accounting system should arguably be established in parallel (Piggott et al. 2017). 
A range of elements where the PA offers further, future possibilities are identifiable. In terms of the 
transparency and accountability function, the global stocktake, for example, could include an 
assessment of fossil fuel supply against the 1.5-2°C goals. In terms of means of implementation, the 
Paris Committee on Capacity-Building could expand its current technical and capacity-building 
efforts to include tools and support for more supply-focused actions. The PA acknowledges that 
some mitigation measures (or ‘response measures’) may have negative social and economic impacts. 
It therefore calls on Parties to ‘take into consideration in the implementation of this Agreement the 
concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly 
developing country Parties’ (UNFCCC 2015b; Article 4.15). Historically, it has been oil-producing 
countries that have expressed most concern about such impacts, and used them to argue for less 
ambition (Chan 2016). More recently, labour unions have become more vocal, calling for 
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consideration of the impacts on workers in extractive industries, and the need to plan a transition 
towards cleaner jobs (ILO 2015; ITUC 2015). The UNFCCC’s forum on the “impact of the 
implementation of response measures” offers a platform with obvious potential to discuss 
challenges involved in the transition away from fossil fuel production, and how to proceed in an 
equitable fashion. The forum has developed a work programme focusing on ‘economic 
diversification and transformation’ and ‘just transition of the workforce, and the creation of decent 
work and quality jobs’ (UNFCCC 2015a).  
Eventually, the GCF and GEF could become more active in channelling the funds to enable transition 
away from reliance on fossil-fuel extraction, as part of their wider role financing low-carbon 
development (see chapter 3). Rules to restrict levels of fossil-fuel subsidy, potentially set in other 
venues (see below), could free up large funds to finance such transitions: annual FFS levels represent 
more than six times the ‘financing gap’ between national pledges and the $100 bn goal (Merrill et al. 
2017). Redirecting such subsidies would allow for a win-win, reducing GHG impacts and freeing up 
funds for low-carbon development. 
The UNFCCC could also do more to recognise and encourage efforts by non-state/ non-Party actors, 
for example by adding supply-side aspects to the NAZCA portal, which currently neglects them. The 
Just Transition Fund, set up by several philanthropic foundations, shows how non-Party stakeholders 
can also provide support for the transition (SEI 2018), with potential to be scaled-up. 
More broadly, and in summary, UNFCCC should continue to: 
• Recognise countries’ supply-side actions, to ensure a public signal of countries’ climate
commitments, enabling debate and discussion about whether such commitments are fair
and ambitious, and reducing the chances of policy reversal.
• Foster norms and intensify moral pressure. ‘UNFCCC can help normalise the idea that
transitioning away from fossil fuel extraction and production is a necessary part of climate
policy, by highlighting the actions nations are already taking, and providing opportunities for
social learning about policies to limit fossil fuel development. Intensifying moral pressure …
can be a key tool for ratcheting ambition to help meet Paris goals’ (Piggott et al. 2017: 8; cf.
Green 2018).
• Clarify and strengthen signals to financial markets. By providing a venue for more clearly
articulating fossil fuel phase-down trajectories, the UNFCCC could aid in producing a stable,
predictable, investment pathway.
• Support planning for a just transition, as a space for nations to explore the tensions
associated with a planned, or managed, decline in fossil fuels (Piggott et al. 2017).
Despite these possibilities, given the tendency of the UNFCCC to gridlock, it may be that smaller 
coalitions of the willing will first need to form on a mini-lateral basis, implementing their own sets 
of rules. For example, a moderate coal export tax levied in coordination by the four largest (steam) 
coal exporters, Indonesia, Australia, South Africa and Colombia, could bring net benefits to the 
exporters, as well as reductions in emissions (Richter et al. 2015). The resultant rise in traded coal 
prices would reduce coal consumption, while exporters raise potentially tens of billions of dollars per 
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year in revenue. This could be used to support the structural transition in coal mining regions and/or 
low-carbon R&D. The larger the coalition, the less leakage to non-participating countries. Who would 
initiate/ coordinate such a grouping remains an open question. Tying it to Paris goals, though not 
essential, would make more explicit the need for other countries to address fossil fuel supply 
(Piggott et al. 2017).  
As a final point, action through initiatives by oil and gas corporations themselves must remain a 
component of transformation of the sector. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)53 
could potentially be expanded to improve monitoring of company initiatives. But apart from being 
inadequate in itself, such ‘in-house’ action is arguably itself dependent on broader transformation, 
without which the necessary technological and economic innovations within companies will not be 
achieved (Schlosser et al. 2017: 38).  
6.6.2. Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform 
Here, it is possible to contemplate a range of possible reforms to existing institutions or new 
initiatives, covering the gaps in governance functions identified. Whitley and Van der Burg (2015: 
pp.43-49), for example, offer a range of options depending on the preferred degree of ambition and 
compulsion. The main challenges to multilateral action will be to define what constitutes FFSs, 
achieve transparency about their application (thereby exposing vested interests to greater public 
scrutiny/ awareness), address the concerns of developing countries and oil exporters, before setting 
out enforceable rules with implementation timelines (Asmelash 2017). It is important to note 
however that consensus on the most appropriate formulator and enforcer of any new rules, or 
whether they can feasibly be the subject of a dedicated multilateral agreement, has not necessarily 
yet emerged. Given how entrenched they can be in national political economy, a commitment to 
progressively eliminate FFSs is certainly more feasible than an outright ban. The cross-cutting nature 
of the issue means that the global effort lacks an obvious, single institutional home at the 
international level. Arguably, a single international organisation is needed to coordinate otherwise 
fragmented efforts, provide a forum for negotiations towards an international agreement, and 
oversee its implementation (Asmelash, 2017). On the other hand, the consensus in the literature 
appears to be sceptical regarding the likelihood of binding multilateral agreements being reached 
(see e.g. Smith and Urpaleinen 2017), but more favourable towards regionally-based initiatives like 
APEC (cf. Droege et al. 2018), or other progressive ‘clubs’. 
Regarding transparency, recent OECD analysis has reinforced the message that ‘[w]hile several 
international organisations and NGOs develop their own data repositories of support measures for 
fossil fuels, … greater coordination is necessary in order to deliver a strong message to policy 
makers’ (OECD 2018). Further coordination is needed and can be improved, especially as 
inconsistencies in definitions and data are sometimes used as an excuse to postpone action. Greater 
53 Currently excluded from our database as insufficiently oriented to climate-related issues. 
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coordination efforts could also help move towards a consensus on key concepts, such as the 
conditions under which support to fossil fuel is not considered as ‘inefficient’. 
The UNFCCC 
One way to widen and strengthen country commitments could be to include language on phasing 
down fossil fuel subsidies in the negotiated outputs of the UNFCCC (Whitley and Van der Burg 2015). 
By indicating clearly that fossil fuel subsidy reform is part of a country’s mitigation portfolio, the 
likelihood increases that such actions can be eligible for support. Even though national–level subsidy 
reform is more likely to be triggered by economic and fiscal motivations, such incentives from the 
climate regime could strengthen the case for reform (Van Asselt and Kuvolesi 2017). Although it may 
be unrealistic to expect UNFCCC to set standards to phase out or reform FFS (owing to the historic 
inability to specify policies and measures Parties should take), it could in theory begin to address 
them in at least six ways (van Asselt and Kulovesi 2017):  
i) voluntary reporting of subsidies and their reform by Parties;
ii) including FFS reform as a nationally appropriate mitigation action (NAMA);
iii) including FFS reform in NDCs;
iv) discussing FFS reform as a measure with high mitigation potential in future technical expert
meetings (TEMs) (as part of ‘workstream 2’—focusing on scaling up climate action before
2020);
v) reviving the idea, removed from COP21 negotiating texts, of reducing support for high-
emissions investments in the context of future climate finance discussions;
vi) reiterating the G7 commitment to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025.
The WTO 
Several commentators see an important opportunity for the WTO, the only body with a definition of 
subsidies that has been tried and tested through a vigorous negotiation process. When the E15 Task 
Force on Subsidies (see Whitley and Van der Burg Section 8.1.3) examined the extent to which the 
WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) agreement could address fossil fuel (and 
renewable energy) subsidies, it noted shortcomings in terms of tackling dual energy pricing and 
production subsidies, and concluded that the adoption of a new multilateral agreement on 
subsidies or trade remedies within the WTO framework would be the best response (Espa and 
Rolland 2015). Several suggestions have been made that could help the WTO enhance transparency 
without requiring changes in its legal framework (van Asselt 2014; Casier et al. 2013), including: 
• a new subsidiary body under the SCM Committee to examine whether notifications are in
line with the actual support provided;
• a new notification template providing further details on subsidies in a standardised fashion;
and
• allowing NGOs to report on the level of non-actionable subsidies.
The WTO could do more to incentivise subsidy reform. Incentives could arise if a subsidy clearly 
qualified as either “prohibited” or “actionable”, allowing other WTO Members to take action under 
Article 4 or 7 of the SCM Agreement, respectively (van Asselt 2014). According to Gerasimchuk and 
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Bacchus (2017), it is also only a matter of time before the first lawsuit over FFSs is put before the 
WTO’s dispute settlement body, with the proposed Adani coalmine in Australia one potential case.  
While it seems quite unlikely that WTO Members will be able to renegotiate the subsidies regime to 
take into account the climate impacts of FFSs, the issue could be worked on by a smaller group of 
WTO Members, potentially involving several Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform. However, unless 
this group engages the countries responsible for the largest subsidies, the effectiveness of such a 
plurilateral agreement would be limited (Van Asselt 2014). Ultimately, commitment needs to be 
‘complemented by clear and explicit country-specific benchmarks and timelines for implementation’, 
which in turn requires an effective enforcement mechanism (Asmelash 2017: 359). 
6.7. References 
Arbib, J. and T. Seba (2017). RethinkX: Disruption, Implications and Choices – Rethinking 
Transportation 2020-2030. RethinkX. https://www.rethinkx.com/transportation. 
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) (2009). APEC Leaders’ Declaration: Sustaining Growth, 
Connecting the Region. 14–15 November, Singapore. 
Asmelash, H. B. (2017). Falling oil prices and sustainable energy transition towards a multilateral 
agreement on fossil-fuel subsidies. In Arent et al. (eds). Political Economy of Clean Energy 
Transitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Casier, L., R. Fraseer, M. Halle, and R. Wolfe (2014). Shining a light on fossil-fuel subsidies at the 
WTO: How NGOs can contribute to WTO notification and surveillance. World Trade Review 13(4): 
603-32.
Chen, H., Doukas, A., Godinot, S., Schmidt, J. and Vollmer, S. L. (2016). Swept under the Rug: How G7 
Nations Conceal Public Financing for Coal Around the World. New York, NY: Natural Resources 
Defense Council, https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/swept-under-rug-coal-
financingreport.pdf 
Chen, H. (2018). G20 Countries' Public Coal Financing Reaches Five-Year High 
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/han-chen/g20-countries-public-coal-financing-reaches-five-year-
high 
Climate Analytics (2016). Implications of the Paris Agreement for Coal Use in the Power Sector. Bonn. 
http://climateanalytics.org/files/climateanalytics-coalreport_nov2016_1.pdf 
Coady, D., Parry, I., Sears, L. & Shang, B. (2015). How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies? IMF 
Working Paper No. WP/15/105. Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15105.pdf 
Collier, P. and A. Venables (2014). Closing coal: economic and moral incentives. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 30 (3): 492–512. 
Darby, M. (2017). Exxon shareholders win ‘historic’ climate vote against board’s advice. Climate 
Home News 31 May, Retrieved from http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/05/31/exxon-
shareholders-win-historic-vote-climate-transparency/ 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
169 
Denjean, B. et al. (2016). Subsidies to Coal Power Generation in China. GSI Report. International 
Institute for Sustainable Development. 
Doukas, A., DeAngelis, K., & Ghio, N. (2017). Talk is Cheap: How G20 Governments are Financing 
Climate Disaster. Oil Change International, Friends of the Earth U.S., the Sierra Club and WWF 
European Policy Office. Retrieved from 
http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2017/07/talk_is_cheap_G20_report_July2017.pdf 
Droege, S. and Rattani, V. (2018). International Climate Policy Leadership after COP23: The EU must 
resume its leading role, but cannot do so alone. SWP Comment 1. Berlin: SWP. 
Dubash, N. K. and Florini, A. (2011). Mapping global energy governance. Global Policy, 2: 6–18. 
Eberhardt, P., C. Olivet & L. Steinfort (2018). One Treaty to Rule them All. The ever-expanding Energy 
Charter Treaty and the power it gives corporations to halt the energy transition. Brussels/ 
Amsterdam: Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and the Transnational Institute (TNI. 
Edenhofer, O., Flachsland, C., Jakob, M. and Lessmann, K. (2013). The Atmosphere as a Global 
Commons – Challenges for International Cooperation and Governance. The Harvard Project on 
Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 13-58. Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons 
and Climate Change and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.  
Espa, I. and Rolland, S.E. (2015). Subsidies, Clean Energy, and Climate Change.  E15 Initiative. 
Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World 
Economic Forum. 
FFFSR (2015). Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform Communiqué. Friends of Fossil-fuel Subsidy Reform. 
Retrieved from http://fffsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/friends-fossil-fuel-subsidy-
communique_final.pdf
Financial Times (2018). China’s annual coal consumption rises for first time in 3 years. February 28. 
https://www.ft.com/content/5d351276-1c48-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6 
G7 (2015). Leadersʼ Declaration. G7 Summit 7-8 June 2015. 
G7 (2016). Leadersʼ Declaration. G7 Summit. 
G20 (2009). Leaders’ statement: Pittsburgh summit, 24–25 September 2009. 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Pittsburgh_Declaration.pdf 
Gençsü, I. et al. (2017). Phase-out 2020. Monitoring Europe’s fossil fuel subsidies. ODI and CAN. 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11762.pdf 
Gerasimchuk, I., Bassi, A., Ordonez, C., Doukas, A., Merrill, L., & Whitley, S. (2017). Zombie Energy: 
Climate Benefits of Ending Subsidies to Fossil Fuel Production. Winnipeg: IISD. 
Gerasimchuk, I. and Bacchus, J. (2017). To phase out coal, world leaders should learn from tobacco 
action. Climate Home, 10 December. Retrieved from: 
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/12/10/phase-coal-world-leaders-learn-tobacco-
action/ 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
170 
Goldthau, A. (2017). The G20 must govern the shift to low-carbon energy. Nature, 546 (7657): 203–
205. 
Government of Canada (2017). Powering Past Coal Alliance Declaration. 
https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/canada-international-
action/coal-phase-out/alliancedeclaration.html 
Green, F. (2018). Anti-fossil fuel norms. Climatic Change. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6
Green, F. and Denniss, R. (2018). Cutting with both arms of the scissors: the economic and political 
case for restrictive supply-side climate policies. Climatic Change (forthcoming; accepted for 
publication on 16 February 2018). DOI: 10.1007/s10584-018-2162-x 
Hermwille, L. (2017). En Route to a Just Global Energy Transformation? – The Formative Power of the 
SDGs and the Paris Agreement. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/13453.pdf 
Holmes, I. (2017). Pathways to 1.5/2°C-Compatible Oil: Is Managed Decline the Only Way? Briefing 
Paper February 2017, London: E3G. 
Holmes, I. and D. Orozco (2017). What Happened to the International Oil Companies? Simulating the 
1.5/2°C Transition. London: E3G. 
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2012). World Energy Outlook 2012. Paris: International Energy 
Agency. 
IEA (2015). World Energy Outlook 2015. Paris: International Energy Agency. 
IEA (2016a). World Energy Investment 2016. Paris: International Energy Agency, OECD. Retrieved 
from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/book/9789264262836-en 
IEA (2016b). World Energy Outlook 2016. Paris: International Energy Agency. 
ILO (2015). Guidelines for a Just Transition towards Environmentally Sustainable Economies and 
Societies for All. International Labour Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. 
ITUC (2015). Climate Justice: There Are No Jobs on a Dead Planet. Brussels: International Trade Union 
Federation. Retrieved from http://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc_frontlines_climate_change_report_en.pdf
Kartha, S. (2016). Fossil fuel production in a 2°C world: The equity implications of a diminishing 
carbon budget. Somerville: Stockholm Environment Institute. Retrieved from 
https://www.seiinternational.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate/SEI-DB-2016-
Equity-fossilfuel-production-rents.pdf
Kartha, S. (2017). [forthcoming] 
Koplow, D. and Charles, C., eds. (2010). Untold Billions: Fossil fuel Subsidies, Their Impacts and the 
Path to Reform. Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) of IISD. Geneva. Available at: 
http://earthtrack.net/files/uploaded_files/mapping_ffs.pdf
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
171 
Lazarus, M., Erickson, P. and Tempest, K. (2015). Supply-Side Climate Policy: The Road Less Taken. SEI 
Working Paper. Stockholm Environment Institute. Retrieved from http://www.sei-
international.org/publications?pid=2835 
Lofoten Declaration (2017). The Lofoten Declaration. Climate Leadership Requires a Managed 
Decline of Fossil Fuel Production. Retrieved from http://www.lofotendeclaration.org/ 
Manley, D., J. Cust, G. Cecchinato (2017). Stranded Nations? The Climate Policy Implications for Fossil 
Fuel-Rich Developing Countries. OxCarre Policy Paper 34. Oxford: Oxcarre. 
McGlade, C., & Ekins, P. (2015). The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting 
global warming to 2 degrees C. Nature 517 (7533): 187-U143. 
Merrill, L. and Chung, V. (2014). Financing the Sustainable Development Goals through Fossil-Fuel 
Subsidy Reform: Opportunities in Southeast Asia, India and China. Winnipeg: IISD. Available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/financing-sdgs-fossil-fuel-subsidy-reform-southeast-
asian-india-china(6).pdf 
Nature (2018). Oil and gas emissions could far exceed current estimates. Nature. February 28th. 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-02581-2 
Newell, P. (2014). The international political economy of governing carbon. In Handbook of the 
International Political Economy of Governance. In A. Payne and N. Phillips (eds.). Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK, pp. 414–32.  
Oberthür, S. et al. (2017) Key concepts, core challenges and governance functions of international 
climate governance. Deliverable 4.1. Paris: COP21 RIPPLES Project (Horizon2020). Available at: 
https://www.cop21ripples.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Deliverable-4.1-Ripples-Final2.pdf 
OECD (2015). OECD Companion to the Inventory of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels 2015. Available 
at http://www.oecd.org/site/ tadffss/ 
OECD/IEA (2016). World Energy Investment 2016. Retrieved from: https://webstore.iea.org/world-
energy-investment-2016 
OECD (2018). Companion to the Inventory of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels 2018. Paris: OECD. 
http://www.oecd.org/environment/oecd-companion-to-the-inventory-of-support-measures-for-
fossil-fuels-2018-9789264286061-en.htm 
Piggot, G., P. Erickson, M. Lazarus, and H. van Asselt (2017). Addressing Fossil Fuel Production under 
the UNFCCC: Paris and Beyond. Working Paper No. 2017-09. Stockholm Environment Institute. 
Richter, P. et al. (2015). Market power rents and climate change mitigation: a rationale for coal 
taxes? AJRC Working Papers. https://ccep.crawford.anu.edu.au/publication/ccep-working-
paper/6057/market-power-rents-and-climate-change-mitigation-rationale-coal
Schlösser, T., K. R. Schultze, D. Ivleva, S. Wolters, C. Scholl (2017). From Riches to Rags? Stranded 
Assets and the Governance Implications for the Fossil Fuel Sector. Bonn: Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. 
SEI (2015). The SEI Initiative on Fossil Fuels and Climate Change. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment 
Institute. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
172 
SEI (2018). Aligning Fossil Fuel Production with the Paris Agreement: Insights for the UNFCCC Talanoa 
Dialogue. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute. 
Smith, J., and J. Urpaleinen. (2017). Removing Fuel Subsidies: How Can International Organizations 
Support National Policy Reforms? International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law, and 
Economics, 17 (3), 327–340. 
Tagliapietra, S. (2017). The Political Economy of Middle East and North Africa Oil Exporters in Times 
of Global Decarbonisation. Brussels: Breugel. 
Tickell, O. (2008). Kyoto 2. London and New York: Zed Books. 
Timperley, J. (2018). OECD: Fossil fuel subsidies added up to at least $373bn in 2015. Carbon Brief. 
Feb 28th. https://www.carbonbrief.org/oecd-fossil-fuel-subsidies-373-billion-2015 
Van der Graaf, T. and van Asselt, H. (2017). Introduction to the special issue: energy subsidies at the 
intersection of climate, energy, and trade governance. Int Environ Agreements. 17(3): 313-326. 
Van Asselt, H. (2014). Governing the Transition Away From Fossil Fuels: The Role of International 
Institutions. SEI Working Paper No. 2014-07. Stockholm Environment Institute, Oxford, UK. 
http://www.sei-international.org/publications?pid=2583 
Van Asselt, H. & Kulovesi, K. (2017). Seizing the Opportunity: Tackling Fossil Fuel Subsidies under the 
UNFCCC. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 17(3), 357–370. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-017-9357-x 
UNFCCC (2015a). Decision 11/CP.21: Forum and Work Programme on the Impact of the 
Implementation of Response Measures. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Bonn, Germany. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a02.pdf#page=25 




UNFCCC (2016). Just Transition of the Workforce, and the Creation of Decent Work and Quality Jobs. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, Germany. 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/tp/07.pdf  
Whitley, S. and van der Burg, L. (2015). Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform: From Rhetoric to Reality. New 
Climate Economy, London and Washington, DC. Available at 
http://newclimateeconomy.report/misc/working-papers 
Wright, H. et al. (2018). Banking on Reform: Aligning the development banks with the Paris Climate 
Agreement. London: E3G. 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex 
– V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
173 
Table 6.2: Supply of international governance functions regarding extractive industries (key global-level institutions/ initiatives – not including subsidies) 54 
54 NB. Some individual organisations/ initiatives, currently clustered into columns, will be considered individually in further work to be undertaken 
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Table 6.3: Fossil fuel (production) subsidy reform (key institutions/ initiatives, FFS-related) 55 
55 NB. Some individual organisations/ initiatives, currently clustered into columns, will be considered individually in further work to be undertaken. 
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7. Land Transport
Wolfgang Obergassel, Friederike Asche, Lukas Hermwille, Frederic Rudolph, Oliver Lah, Santhosh 
Kodukala 
7.1. Transformation Challenges and Governance Demands 
7.1.1. Current Status and Prospect 
The land transport sector includes domestic as well as transboundary road, rail and pipeline 
transport. International aviation and maritime transport are addressed in a separate chapter. 
Domestic aviation and waterways transport are also not covered by this chapter as challenges and 
strategies differ substantially from land-based transport. 
The sector is one of the largest and fastest-growing emission sources worldwide. In 2015, transport 
accounted for nearly a quarter of energy-related global CO2 emissions (8 Gt) (International Energy 
Agency, 2017). Emissions from transport have more than doubled since 1970, growing faster than 
emissions from any other energy-end-use sector. Passenger transport accounts for about 60 per 
cent, and freight transport for about 40 per cent of global transport energy demand. Without 
changes to current trends, global GHG emissions from transport are set to again double by 2050. 
Nearly all growth in the transport sector, both passenger and freight, is expected to occur in 
developing countries and emerging economies due to growth in incomes, populations and freight 
transport. Emissions in developed countries are projected to hardly decrease from 2011 levels if 
current trends persist (IPCC, 2014). Even scenarios assuming substantial improvements in vehicle 
efficiency and some modal shifts project global transport emissions in 2050 that are still at 2015 
levels (Lah, 2017).  
Conventional transport is under pressure not only for climate policy reasons. Transport also is a 
strong contributor to local noise and air pollution, oil imports are a heavy burden on many 
economies and congestion is a problem in many cities. Therefore, multiple economic, social and 
environmental benefits can be achieved by moving to more sustainable transport systems 
(Eckermann et al., 2015). At the same time, conventional vehicle technology based on the internal 
combustion engine is increasingly exposed to competition from battery electric vehicle technology, 
which is advancing rapidly in terms of cost effectiveness, battery recharging times and the driving 
range. China, France, India, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK have decided to phase out or even 
outright ban sales of new diesel or gasoline vehicles starting from 2025 to 2040 (Chrisafis & Vaughan, 
2017; Stumpf, 2017). Some manufacturers have realised their future target market is in electric 
mobility. Volvo, for example, announced that from 2019 onwards, all of its new vehicles will be 
electric or hybrid (Ewing, 2017). 
Current strategies in the sector to foster more sustainable forms of transport focus on providing 
mobility services and managing transport demand, rather than providing only infrastructure. Such 
strategies often rely on the Avoid-Shift-Improve framework towards infrastructure and service 
(Bakker, Zuidgeest, de Coninck, & Huizenga, 2014; Sims et al., 2014; SRU, 2005): 
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Avoid travel or reduce travel-length: Ideally, settlement patterns and transport infrastructure should 
be designed in a way that minimises the need to travel, and minimises the length of travel in case of 
unavoidable travels. This can be achieved by compact and integrated city planning with mixed land 
use. For freight, this also means avoiding empty trips through improved logistics as well as 
infrastructural planning and decisions if (parts of) raw materials or pre-products can be sourced 
nearer to the areas of production or refinement. 
Shift travel to more climate-friendly modes: If travel cannot be avoided, policies should encourage 
or regulate that low-emission transport options are favoured over high emission ones. For passenger 
transport, this means to encourage walking and bicycling for shorter travels, and public transport 
use for longer travels. The policy toolbox encouraging shifting includes incentives for shifting to 
other modes (pull measures) and disincentives, including fiscal, for using motorised personal 
automobiles (push measures). For freight, this can mean incentivising shifting long distance freight 
to rail and water transport, and short distance freight delivery can be optimised through efficient 
supply chain management and using non-motorised transport for deliveries within the destination.  
Improve vehicle and fuels technology and efficiency: Technologically, both fuels and vehicles have 
not yet reached their limits of energy efficiency. In the medium term, land transport should entirely 
shift to zero-emission vehicles. In the short term, policies incentivising lighter and small vehicles, 
high fuel efficiency and fuel economy can yield higher uptake of efficient vehicles.  
A key rationale for this three-fold approach is seeking a balance between meeting mobility demand 
and managing energy intensity. The objective is provision of access and mobility, not just the 
provision of transport infrastructure. Isolated technology shifts of the propulsion systems of the 
vehicles would fall short on delivering wider socio-economic benefits and would be less cost-
effective (ITF, 2009). A comprehensive strategy can also address other key policy issues such as 
congestion and the excessive amount of urban space currently occupied by automobiles (Rudolph, 
Koska, & Schneider, 2017). 
Policy measures should be designed in packages in order to avoid trade-offs. For example, increasing 
fuel taxes without providing modal alternatives and measures to ensure a supply of efficient vehicles 
can negatively affect mobility and transport affordability and thereby engender strong political 
resistance. Combinations of measures, such as taxation, vehicle efficiency standards, provision of 
modal choices, and compact city design, have the potential to address multiple political objectives 
and avoid opposition from relevant veto players (Lah, 2017). 
The potential direct and indirect savings to society from decarbonisation of the land transport sector 
is estimated at around USD 50 trillion to 100 trillion by 2050. These savings result from lower fuel 
consumption and reduced need for vehicle purchases and infrastructure. Further benefits to the 
society namely health, safety and quality of life, are not a part of the above savings (IEA, 2012; Lah, 
2017). 
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The combination of electrification, automation and sharing options may yield the potential for 
substantial disruptive change. Mobility-as-a-service models that already change mobility behaviour 
include ride-sharing and e-hailing, bike-sharing and car-sharing and on-demand bus services. Further 
impetus would be provided by the emergence of self-driving cars, which could enable electric 
robotic taxis. A key message of recent analyses on the potential impact of mobility scenarios that 
rely on automation, electrification and sharing options is that the integration of all three elements is 
vital to make a positive contribution to CO2 mitigation targets and wider sustainable development 
objectives (ITF 2017). The main contribution to travel demand management and CO2 emission 
reductions is based on the sharing element (Fulton, Mason, & Meroux, 2017).   
7.1.2. Main Challenges and Barriers toward Decarbonisation 
Despite the substantial sustainable development benefits that may be achieved, a variety of 
challenges and barriers need to be overcome. A fundamental challenge is the longevity of human 
settlement patterns and transport infrastructure. Once put in place, physical infrastructure 
determines transport demand profiles for decades. Human settlement patterns and transport 
infrastructure designs in many industrialised country cities currently lock in high transport demand 
levels (Driscoll, 2014; Figueroa, Lah, Fulton, McKinnon, & Tiwari, 2014). At the same time, the rapid 
urbanisation that is ongoing in the global South poses a great risk of further emissions lock-in. Based 
on projections for declining population densities, and economic and population growth, world-wide 
urban land cover is expected to expand by 56–310 % between 2000 and 2030 (Seto et al., 2014). 
Business as usual – incremental approaches and less structured, quasi-automatic urbanisation – 
would lead to growth of highly unsustainable cities. What is required is transformative strategies 
departing from conventional infrastructure patterns (WBGU, 2016). For example, in many cities 
worldwide ‘segregated land-use’ is enshrined in their urban planning practices. In these cities 
different types of land use (residential, commercial, manufacturing, service, recreational) have been 
purposefully kept separate. The result is a higher need to travel for various needs. Another practice 
in many cities is the provision of urban areas for automobile friendly infrastructure, such as parking 
spaces, wide motorways and extending existing road capacities (United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme, 2013). A related problem is the use of cost-benefit analyses as basis for transport 
investment projects as currently often practiced. Currently, these analyses often focus on economic 
and transport objectives that can be expressed in monetary values and tend to neglect long-term 
environmental and social impacts of motorisation (Næss, 2006; Rudolph et al., 2015).  
The ability of urban areas to steer their development onto a low-emission course depends on their 
governance, technical, financial, and institutional capacities. While the most accessible mitigation 
opportunities are in rapidly urbanising areas where urban form and infrastructure are not locked in, 
their capacities are often already overstretched by tasks such as providing decent habitation for 
their rapidly growing populations (Seto et al., 2014; WBCSD, 2010). 
Furthermore, the car manufacturing and oil industries will need to substantially change their 
business models, as these currently strongly rely on fuels and technologies that will have a 
diminishing role in a decarbonising sector. Many traditional European car makers made substantial 
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investment in internal combustion engines,, which create technological lock-in effects to a certain 
extent (Skeete, 2017). In countries with a strong historical background as car producers, industry 
policy objectives inhibit the radical transformation of the sector that would be needed to move away 
from individual car ownership towards multimodal mobility services  (Alam, Hyde, Duffy, & 
McNabola, 2017; Ross Morrow, Gallagher, Collantes, & Lee, 2010).  
Two other barriers are "techno-political" in nature: Customers are currently faced with 
standardisation problems in zero-emission vehicle systems, as there are currently no real standards 
set for charging, e.g. currents, connectors etc., which vary widely across manufacturers, countries, 
and even models (Pereirinha & Trovão, 2016). The other one concerns the change in infrastructure 
that is needed - current infrastructures are strongly geared towards servicing combustion engines 
(fuel stations etc.). In order to foster a change e.g. towards electrical propulsion, the infrastructure 
needs to be changed almost completely. Another "socio-technical" barrier to change can be the 
absence of viable alternatives - as much depends on infrastructures, especially rural or remote areas 
may face difficulties of access (no public transport, no railway lines for freight transport etc.). 
At a cultural level, vehicle ownership is often connected with a sense of personal freedom, and an 
attachment to the vehicle. Moreover, in many countries cars are seen as a status symbol. However, 
there are signs of change. In some countries such as Germany, young adults take their driving license 
later, own less cars and behave more multimodal than young fellow countrymen and countrywomen 
10-20 years ago (ifmo, 2011; infas & DLR, 2008). The challenge here is to consolidate and reinforce
these trends.
7.1.3. The Promise and Potential of International Cooperation 
Guidance and Signal 
Transport is currently not sufficiently addressed in national climate action. 87% of current NDCs 
identify transport as an important source of GHG emissions and area for action (Löhr, Perera, Hill, 
Bongardt, & Eichhorst, 2017). In practice, however, the envisaged contributions as they relate to the 
transport sector often fall short of what would be required to achieve the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement (PA) (for the G20 countries, see Vieweg et al., 2017). Even countries that have achieved 
strong reductions in their overall emissions such as the UK or Germany have hardly seen a dent in 
transport emissions (Evans, 2016; Umweltbundesamt, 2017). Given the long-term path 
dependencies in the transport sector, this situation needs to change quickly. International 
governance should therefore endeavour to send signals that action in the sector is crucial and 
beneficial. 
As evident from national discussions about ending the use of combustion engine vehicles, targets 
and timetables can be a strong lever to redirect sectoral developments. International agreement on 
a target to phase out the use of fossil fuels in the transport sector would make the overall global 
climate policy targets more palpable for actors in the sector. A sectoral decarbonisation target would 
support the shift to zero-emission vehicles but also support avoid and shift strategies as these 
minimise the need for energy inputs in the first place while ensuring access. International 
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cooperation could set a common roadmap for the sector, with differentiated decarbonisation target 
years for different countries with different levels of development.  
Agreement on a new paradigm centred on transit-oriented development and prioritising public, 
shared and non-motorised transport over individual motorised transport could be even more 
effective as it would tackle some of the underlying drivers of transport emissions. 
Setting Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
Governance challenges in the transport sector are mostly not of a ‘collective action’ nature. 
Nonetheless, international governance could establish a number of obligations of conduct to 
promote emission reductions. 
International governance could help to focus attention on the so far neglected transport sector by 
requiring countries to have sectorally differentiated short- and long-term climate strategies, with 
specific targets and measures for transport. The transport sector should be further broken down to 
passenger and freight transport to fine-tune targets and measures. In addition to sectoral targets, 
these climate strategies should ideally also describe current and envisaged measures to facilitate the 
tracking of action. 
To be compatible with the PA’s 1.5°C limit, countries’ long-term strategies should aim to fully 
decarbonise transport by 2050 at the latest (Sterl et al., 2016). In line with the UNFCCC’s principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities, countries with high economic capability and high historic 
responsibility for contributing to climate change should aim for earlier decarbonisation dates. 
Fleet emission standards and fuel economy standards are a commonly used policy instrument. They 
set future target values well in advance and thereby allow manufacturers to develop and deploy the 
technologies needed to meet the respective target level, a prerequisite to ensure compliance with 
climate change mitigation strategies (Damert & Rudolph, 2018). International governance could help 
to have all countries introduce such standards, and to have them converge globally over time. As 
many original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have production sites and significant market shares 
all over the world, ambitious regional emission standards may globally foster the production and 
sale of energy and carbon efficient vehicles. 
Furthermore, in line with the PA’s goal to make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development (Article 2.1(c)), it would be very helpful 
if countries started a process on reforming priorities and criteria for funding transport infrastructure. 
In a first step, countries could commit to provide transparency on transport spending, identifying 
how much spending goes into unsustainable transport and how much into sustainable transport. In 
the next step, countries could commit to shift funding from unsustainable to sustainable transport 
infrastructure. More domestic funding for sustainable transport could also be mobilised by charging 
the real social and environmental cost of transport, e.g. through carbon pricing, congestion charging, 
road and parking pricing. 
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Transparency and Accountability 
Transparency requirements in the transport sector would likely vary with the scope of international 
cooperation, and consequently the rules set. Agreement to require sectorally differentiated short- 
and long-term climate strategies should be accompanied by requirements to provide sectorally 
differentiated accounts of national emissions, measures taken and their impacts. In the medium 
term, these requirements will need to be differentiated according to the capacity of countries. 
Countries with little capacity should first prioritise producing robust emission inventories; ex-post 
evaluation capacities can then be gradually built up. 
A focus on the need to bend the curve in transport emissions could be re-enforced by including a 
sectoral breakdown in in global reviews of current climate efforts. Looking not only at aggregate 
emissions but also at the sectoral level would put developments in the transport sector on the global 
agenda in regular five-year intervals. 
Means of Implementation 
Commitments to reform national transport infrastructure funding as discussed above should extend 
to the international provision of means of implementation. All provision of support should be made 
compatible with the PA, prioritising non-motorised, public and shared transport. A reform could also 
be made a condition for the provision of support. Countries could be required to first redirect their 
domestic resource from unsustainable to sustainable transport in order to qualify for the provision 
of support. 
Many urban areas in the world are committed to do more on climate change but lack resources and 
institutional capacities to deliver low-carbon mobility systems. Increased provision of means of 
implementation could therefore unlock substantial potential for more action. Resources should in 
particular be used for strengthening administrative and planning capacity.  
Knowledge and Learning 
Current studies indicate that many developing/emerging countries mimic infrastructure 
developments of industrialised countries, albeit at often a much grander scale (Arndt et al., 2014). 
International cooperation on best practices through partnerships such as city networks, research 
institutions and NGOs, can help support the implementation of low-carbon transport measures. This 
can include common technical knowledge, but could also extend to exchanges on policies that have 
shown high effectiveness. While policies will always need to be shaped according to national 
circumstance, policy dialogues will provide useful starting points for transport decarbonisation. 
The findings are summarised in Table 7.1 below. 
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Table 7.1: Synthesis of Governance Demands 
Sectors Guidance and 
Signal 






Transport • Signal that action 
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beneficial, moving 





















down to passenger 
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• Long-term
strategies to aim to 
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latest 
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• Make all finance, 
technology and
capacity building
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PA 
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of domestic
resources to qualify 
for support 
• Provide resources 












Grading • High • Medium-High • Medium-High • High • Medium-High 
7.2. Governance Supply 
This section provides a structured overview of existing/active international institutions relevant to 
the transport sector. The below table provides an overview of the relevant institutions and which 
governance functions their activities most relate to. A detailed overview of the institutions is 
provided in Table 7.2 in the annex to this paper. 
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Table 7.2: Overview of institutions 
nmain activity | p secondary activity
7.2.1. International Institutions 
United Nations System 
The PA in Article 2.1(a) has set the objective for the international community to hold the increase in 
the average global temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to make best efforts 
to stay below 1.5°C. In addition, to achieve this objective, Article 4.1 sets out the aim to achieve a 
global peaking of GHG emissions as soon as possible, to undertake rapid reductions thereafter, in 
order to achieve a balance of emissions and removals by sinks in the second half of the century. 
Given that current emission trends are widely out of step with these objectives, the PA thereby 
signals that strong mitigation action is needed. Furthermore, the 5-yearly cycle of global stocktakes, 
which are to be followed by enhanced NDCs, also operates to send a signal that more ambitious 






C40 C40 ! !   !
Clean Energy Ministerial CEM ! !  
Electric Vehicles Initiative EVI   !
EV100 EV100 ! !  
EV30@30 EV30@30 ! ! ! !
Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy GCM  ! ! 
Global Fuel Economy Inititaive GFEI !  ! !
ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability ICLEI  !  !
International Association of Public Transport UITP !    !
International Energy Agency IEA !
International Renewable Energy Agency IRENA  !
International Transport Forum ITF ! !
Low Carbon Technology Partnership initiative LCTPi ! !
MobiliseYourCity MobiliseYourCity   ! !
Paris Process on Mobility and Climate PPMC !  !
Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport SLoCaT ! !
Sustainable Mobility for All Sum4All !  ! !
Transformative Urban Mobility Initiative TUMI   ! 
Transport Decarbonisation Alliance TDA ! ! 
United Nations Development Programme UNDP ! !
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe UNECE   
United Nations Environment Programme UN Environment/ UNEP !
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC ! ! ! ! !
United Nations Human Settlements Programme UN–Habitat ! ! ! 
United Nations Secretary-General Advisory Group on Sustainable Transport ! !
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals process SDG process ! ! 
Urban Electric Mobility Initiative UEMI ! !   !
World Bank Group WBG ! ! ! !
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD !
Other Multilateral Development Banks MDBs  ! !
Zero-Emission Vehicle Alliance ZEV Alliance ! !
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action is needed. However, the Paris objectives and the ‘ambition cycle’ do not contain a sectoral 
breakdown and thereby do not provide sector-specific orientation. 
Under the UNFCCC, transport sector activities may receive financial support through the financial 
mechanism (which is operated by the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund). The 
UNFCCC system also provides capacity building through its Climate Technology Centre and Network 
(CTNC). Donor countries also provide direct bilateral support to fulfil their commitments to provide 
means of implementation to developing countries. In terms of knowledge diffusion, the Technical 
Examination Process (TEP) is of particular importance. Under this process, a series of expert 
meetings have been held to collate and synthesise good practice policies for a variety of sectors 
including transport. (secretariat UNFCCC, 2018). 
Most recently, the UNFCCC has sought to play an orchestrating role. Under the so-called Lima-Paris 
Action Agenda, which was subsequently further developed and rebranded into the “Marrakech 
Partnership for Global Climate Action” (MPGCA), the UNFCCC organised a series of high-level events 
to showcase particularly successful initiatives by non-state and subnational actors. At each of the 
two most recent COPs, a full day was devoted to low-carbon transport. These events were 
repeatedly used to announce new initiatives by other institutions also considered in this report 
(Global Climate Action, 2018; Marrakech Partnership, 2018). 
The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are the result of a process launched by 
the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro (Rio+20), to “end 
poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all”. In relation to the transport sector SDG 9 
and SDG 11 are especially important. Both speak to the transformation challenges discussed above. 
SDG 9.1 sets a target to “[d]evelop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including 
regional and trans-border infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, 
with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all.” SDG 11.2 aims to “[b]y 2030, provide access 
to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, 
notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable 
situations (…)”. To be able to evaluate and observe the progress on the SDGs, a global indicator 
framework was established (Agenda for Sustainable Development, 2018). 
The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat) has the goal to promote and 
implement socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements. The adoption of the New 
Urban Agenda (NUA) in 2016 sets a focus on providing better public transport, tackle urban 
challenges and increase public spaces and therefore contributes to the implementation of the Avoid-
Shift-Improve approach. This is also the guiding principle for the Urban Electric Mobility Initiative 
(UEMI), which is led by UN-Habitat. To track developments in the field of urbanisation and to 
monitor the NUA and the SDGs, the Global Urban Observatory (GUO) unit was established (UN 
Habitat website, 2018). Additionally, UN HABITAT provides capacity building and technical assistance 
to support the development and implementation of sustainable urban mobility plans and investment 
strategies, aims at including financing partners therein, and also offers stakeholder consultation 
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processes, international expertise, best practises and a global database of policies, laws, decisions 
and practices relating to the urban environment (Global Urban Law Database, UrbanLex).  
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) is also worth mentioning especially 
because of its permanent working party, the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle 
Regulations (WP 29). It provides a global framework for harmonising regulations for vehicles in the 
context of road safety, environmental protection and trade (UNECE website, 2018c). In addition, the 
Transport, Health and Environment Pan-Europe Programme (THE PEP) aims at empowering national 
and local governments to implement and take into consideration policies on sustainable mobility 
(UNECE website, 2018b). Furthermore, UNECE established the ForFITS Model, which is a tool that 
facilitates comparisons of scenarios with and without implementation of transport policies (UNECE 
website, 2018a). 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) contributes to climate governance in the 
transport sector by means of four particularly relevant initiatives: The E-mobility Programme, the 
Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI) - in partnership with the IEA -, the Partnership for clean fuels 
and vehicles (PCFV) and the Share the Road Programme.  
• The E-mobility Programme aims at implementing electric mobility strategies and roadmaps
(UNEP website, 2018b).
• The GFEI aims at stabilising GHG emission from the global light and heavy duty vehicle fleet
by 2050 (UNEP website, 2018c).
• The PCFV aims at at an decrease in vehicle emissions by supporting both cleaner fuels
(through the lead campaign and the sulphur campaign) and cleaner vehicles (through the
vehicle campaign) (UNEP website, 2018a).
• The Share the Road Programme aims to promote policies that encourage investments in
walking and cycling infrastructure. (UNEP website, 2018d)
All four predominantly provide knowledge and learning concerning their respective thematic focus. 
In addition, the E-mobility Programme and the Share the Road Programme also provide targeted 
capacity building and technical assistance.  
Multilateral Development Banks 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) provide, as part of their portfolios, financial assistance to 
large transport and infrastructure projects in developing countries. For example, the African 
Development Bank’s (AfDB) objective is to support inclusive and green growth within Africa and 
identified the provision of sustainable transport infrastructure as one area of priority. Another 
example is the Asian Development Bank (ADB) that aims at implementing transport projects in Asia 
that fulfil the requirements of the Avoid-Shift-Improve approach. (ADB website, 2018) Especially 
noteworthy is the World Bank Group as an active player in the area of sustainable transport. At the 
end of the fiscal year 2016, there were 493 active World Bank transport projects with total net 
commitments of $57.7 billion, representing close to 20% of the total lending portfolio. Furthermore, 
it launched the Leaders in Urban Transport Planning Program (LUTP) which provides participants 
with knowledge and learning to explicitly tackle the complexity of urban transport, as well as the 
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initiative Sustainable Mobility for All (Sum4All) to support implementation of transport-related SDGs, 
which includes knowledge provision as well as a global tracking framework to measure progress 
(World Bank website, 2018b). 
At the Rio+20 conference in 2012, eight MDBs (African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
CAF–Development Bank of Latin America, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
European Investment Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, and the 
World Bank) pledged to provide $175 billion of loans and grants for more sustainable transport in 
developing countries by 2022. They also developed common arrangements for measuring and 
monitoring their transport projects (World Bank website, 2018a). 
Other International Organisations 
The International Transport Forum (ITF) is an international organisation that is administratively 
hosted by the OECD but is politically independent. Its membership of 59 countries extends beyond 
OECD countries and includes a number of emerging economies. It essentially is a think tank for 
transport policy and operates through global dialogues and providing a platform for discussion and 
pre-negotiation of policy issues. Its annual summit in Leipzig is the largest global meeting of 
transport ministers. The ITF launched the Decarbonising Transport project to establish a commonly 
acceptable pathway to achieve zero transport emissions by around 2050 (ITF website, 2018). 
Currently, it is in the phase of establishing a modelling framework with relevant data and a catalogue 
of measures and of assessing the effectiveness of these measures, which are supposed to be 
finalised by October 2018 and May 2019 respectively.  
The International Energy Agency (IEA) was established under the OECD but acts as an autonomous 
body for policy advice. It comprises 30 member countries. Its scenarios on energy provision/use and 
related GHG emissions and other analysis are widely seen as authoritative. The IEA’s Mobility Model 
Partnership (MoMo) provides historical data and quantitative analyses. Also relevant are the IEA’s 
Technology Collaboration Programmes (TCPs): Advanced Fuel Cells TCP, Advanced Motor Fuels TCP, 
Clean and Efficient Combustion TCP and the Hybrid and Electric Vehicle TCP. Their main activities 
focus on research, studies, information exchange, policy recommendations and establishing pilot 
projects. 
Furthermore, the IEA closely cooperates with the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM), a global forum 
consisting of 24 countries and the European Commission, and the IEA hosts its Secretariat. The CEM 
mainly focuses on the transition to clean energy. Nevertheless, there are two initiatives that are also 
relevant for the transport sector: The Electric Vehicle Initiative (EVI) and EV30@30, the latter of 
which builds on and extends the scope of the former. EV30@30 has set the goal of reaching a 30% 
sales share of electric vehicles by 2030 and collects pledges to contribute to this goal from 
governments, local authorities, the private sector and civil society (CEM website, 2018). The CEM 
also provides technical assistance and capacity building as well as policy research and global 
networking to exchange information, experiences and best practices.  
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The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) similarly provides relevant analysis, showing 
that the transport sector has the potential to quadruple its current 3% share of renewable energy by 
2030. IRENA’s analyses focus on the topics Electric Vehicles and Liquid Biofuels (IRENA website, 
2018). 
7.2.2. Transnational Institutions and Initiatives 
There is a host of different transnational initiatives that bring together a wide range of actors both 
public – different level governments – as well as private – corporate and civil society. We have 
divided the various initiatives into institutions formed under the Marrakech Partnership for Global 
Climate Action and others.56 
Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action (MPGCA) Transport Initiatives 
As mentioned above, the MPGCA gathers a range of initiatives relevant for transport. In the 
following we will describe the ones that are most formalised in terms of membership and follow-up 
on actions. 
C40 Cities consists of over 90 megacities from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin and North America. Its 
overarching aim is to tackle climate change, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and climate risks by 
implementing urban actions. Transport relevant initiatives include the Clean Bus Declaration (C 40 
Cities, n.d.), which commits the 22 signatory cities to introduce over 40 000 clean technology buses 
by 2020. In addition, it organises three networks that set rules for their respective thematic focus: 
The Bus Rapid Transit (TRT) Network, the Low Emission Vehicle (LEV) Network and the Mobility 
Management Network. 
MobiliseYourCity is a partnership created by the governments of France and Germany and 
supported by the European Commission to support local governments in developing countries to 
plan sustainable urban mobility in order to develop more inclusive, liveable and economically 
efficient cities and reduce GHG emissions. 100 cities and 20 national governments are to be engaged 
in deep transformational actions through the implementation of Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans 
(SUMP) supported by National Sustainable Urban Mobility Policies and Programmes (NUMP). 
MobiliseYourCity aims to assist cities in their efforts to cut at least 50% of their urban transport 
related emissions by 2050 compared to business as usual (Mobilise Your City Website, 2018). 
The Transformative Urban Mobility Initiative (TUMI) was started by the German government and 
unites institutions on sustainable mobility, city networks and think tanks including the ADB, UN-
Habitat, SLoCaT, C40 Cities and GIZ. It aims at modifications in policy making and investment 
56 It is difficult to cluster the wealth and diversity of institutions relevant for the transport sector into meaningful 
categories. The proposed categorisation is by no means exclusive nor exhaustive. What is more some of the listed 
institutions may have a scope that exceeds the narrow focus of one of the proposed categories. Nevertheless, we deem 
the categorisation helpful and adequate for the analysis.  
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
190 
decisions to reach sustainable urban mobility. Its main activities are offering capacity building for 
leaders in developing countries and providing technical and financial assistance for innovations. 
Under the initiative, the German KfW committed to provide USD 1 billion to sustainable transport 
projects (TUMI website, 2018).   
The Declaration on Climate Leadership by members of the International Association of Public 
Transport (UITP) includes public transport authorities and operators, policy decision-makers, 
research institutes and service industries. They pledge “to demonstrate ‘climate leadership’ and 
make a voluntary commitment to reduce emissions/strengthen climate resilience within their 
city/region in support of UITP’s goal to achieve a doubling in the market share of public transport 
worldwide by 2025.” They declared to assist governments by offering technical knowledge and by 
monitoring and reporting the implementation of SDGs. Activities include capacity building, 
knowledge development, development of policy-recommendations, monitoring and reporting 
(SloCaT website, 2018b). 
The Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI) was founded to assist governments and transport 
stakeholders to promote greater fuel economy. Using the skills and expertise of the GFEI partners 
(the IEA, UNEP, the ITF, the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), the Institute for 
Transportation Studies at UC Davis, and the FIA Foundation), the GFEI Toolkit team work to establish 
a baseline in each country; present policy options and case studies; and enable all stakeholders to 
engage in the policy process. The GFEI is actively engaged in processes such as the UNFCCC, G20 and 
Post 2015 framework – to promote fuel economy as part of energy efficiency, whilst backing-up this 
advocacy and capacity building with research. 
The Urban Electric Mobility Vehicles Initiative (UEMI) by UN-Habitat and the EU-funded SOLUTIONS 
project aims to help phasing out conventionally fuelled vehicles and increase the share of electric 
vehicles in the total volume of individual motorised transport in cities to at least 30% by 2030. The 
UEMI is to be implemented in the overall context of better urban planning and a balanced Avoid-
Shift-Improve approach in the context of the New Urban Agenda with a particular focus on 
improving access and mobility.  The UEMI is an active partnership that aims to track international 
action in the area of electric mobility and aims to initiate local action through the provision of tools 
and guidelines. The current 23 cities engaged in the programme have a combined population of over 
46 million people covering key emerging economies. 
Other Programmes and Initiatives 
There are a large number programmes and initiatives that deal with certain aspects of the 
decarbonisation of the land transport sector. This section provides a short summary of selected 
initiatives. 
Decarbonising Transport was officially launched at the ITF's 2016 Summit on "Green and Inclusive 
Transport" in the presence of 47 partners and supporting organisations, on 19 May 2016. The 
International Transport Forum and the Wuppertal Institute are implementing a project as part of this 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 –  25/06/2018 
191 
partnership to support emerging economies in the development of decarbonisation pathways and 
policy actions at the local and national level. 
The Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport (SLoCaT) is a partnership of UN organisations, 
multilateral and bilateral development organisations, NGOs, foundations and partners from the 
academic and business sectors. Its general goal is to integrate aspects of sustainable transport into 
global policies. It focuses mainly on the transport sector in developing countries. For the years 2017 
and 2018, SLoCaT’s workplan concentrates on the processes of the SDGS, the PA and the New Urban 
Agenda and the areas rural transport, urban transport, transport and climate change and equity 
(SloCaT website, 2018a). SLoCaT is also currently developing a Global Status Report, the first version 
of which is to be published in early 2019.  
SLoCaT is also one of the initiators of the Paris Process on Mobility and Climate (PPMC), and the 
Transport Decarbonisation Alliance (TDA), which aim to bring together actors and countries active 
in the area of low-carbon transport. Both of these initiatives aim at achieving net-zero emission 
transport by 2050. While the PPMC focuses on transparency, knowledge and learning, the TDA 
requires its members to formulate ambitious short (2020), medium (2030-2040) and long term 
(2050) action plans. 
The Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance is a collaboration of 20 large international cities that want to 
achieve long-term carbon reduction goals, inter alia by establishing sustainable modes of 
transportation as a new standard. Therefore, they defined a number of commitments in the 
“Framework for Long-Term Deep Carbon Reduction Planning”, like providing financial incentives to 
use carbon-free vehicles and to avoid driving in certain places or investing in alternative 
transportation modes (Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance, 2018, pp. 92–93).  
The Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy represents over 6 800 cities in 57 countries 
with the common goal to work towards decarbonisation, increased capacity for adaptation and 
secure, sustainable and affordable energy for the citizens by 2050 (Global Covenant of Mayors 
website, 2018b). In order to participate, cities have to commit themselves to reduce CO2 emissions 
by at least 40% by 2030. (Global Covenant of Mayors website, 2018a) Since transport is one of the 
key sources of emissions in cities, the Covenant also pledged to support initiatives in the transport 
and mobility sector. Members also commit to implement strategic action plans. These plans are 
registered and publicly available and actions are reported regularly in a standardised format (Global 
Covenant of Mayors website, 2018c).  
7.3. Assessing the Governance Complex 
This section will discuss to what extent the governance demands are collectively being satisfied by 
the governance complex as described above.  
Generally, the governance complex that is relevant for the decarbonisation of the transport sector is 
characterised by a large number of institutions which host an even larger number of governance 
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initiatives. There are however, hardly any institutions that emerge saliently as hubs or core 
institutions in what appears to be otherwise a relatively fragmented governance landscape.  
Another key insight is that the climate governance sub-complex on transport is highly dynamic. A 
number of in part very promising institutions have only been created very recently and yet have to 
demonstrate their efficacy in delivering what they have promised in terms of providing the required 
governance functions. 
Guidance and Signal 
The transport sector is in high need of increased attention, with limited efforts so far to bend the 
sector’s emissions curve. As evident from national discussions about ending the use of combustion 
engine vehicles, targets and timetables can be a strong lever to redirect sectoral developments. 
International agreement on a target to completely end the use of fossil fuels in the transport sector 
could send a signal to all car manufacturers to focus their production on new technologies. 
Moreover, as discussed in section [0], a sectoral decarbonisation target can probably only be 
achieved if road transport volumes are reduced to minimise the need for energy inputs in the first 
place.  
There currently is no multilaterally agreed target to decarbonise the transport sector. While the PA 
aims at globally peaking GHG emissions as soon as possible and achieving net zero emissions by the 
second half of the century, this target is not broken down to the individual sectors. The only formal 
intergovernmental forum of transport ministers is the International Transport Forum (ITF). It aims to 
establish a commonly acceptable pathway to achieve zero transport emissions by around 2050. The 
ITF has no global authority as it covers only 59 countries, but these include all the major emitting 
countries. However, the ITF is mainly a think tank and has no mandate to take binding decisions. 
Nonetheless, the message that the sector needs to decarbonise seems to be taking hold, as 
evidenced by the high number of related initiatives. Two of them explicitly aim at contributing to 
achieve a net zero transport sector by 2050: the Paris Process on Mobility and Climate, and the 
Transport Decarbonisation Alliance. In addition, as one piece of decarbonisation, a number of 
institutions aim at making zero-emission vehicles the new standard, including EV30@30, EV100, the 
Urban Electric Mobility Initiative (UEMI), and the Zero-Emission Vehicle Alliance. 
The SDGs and the New Urban Agenda can be seen as enshrining a new mobility paradigm prioritising 
public and non-motorised transport. Both have been adopted under the aegis of the UN and thus 
enjoy global authority. It remains to be seen to what extent the new paradigm will be reflected in 
actual implementation. What can be said is that a number of institutions work explicitly on 
promoting implementation of these two Agendas, including the International Association of Public 
Transport, MobiliseYourCity, Sustainable Mobility for All and TUMI. Again, these initiatives cannot 
replace, but complement governmental action.  
Governance supply with respect to the guidance and signal can therefore be rated as medium. 
International governance has adopted a new urban mobility paradigm, and while there is no globally 
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accepted decarbonisation target for the transport sector, a number of institutions are working 
towards establishing one. 
Setting Rules 
Governance challenges in the transport sector are mostly not of a ‘collective action’ nature. 
Exemptions are technical standards and possibly regulations such as carbon pricing. The World 
Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations under the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE) is working on a system of vehicle regulations that deal with technical aspects that 
affect international trade of vehicles and in that sense also relate to factors such as vehicle efficiency 
and emissions.  
While the PA requires Parties to submit NDCs and invites them to develop long-term climate 
strategies, there are currently no requirements for Parties to have a sectoral breakdown in their 
NDCs or long-term climate strategies. Nor are there international commitments towards reforms of 
national transport infrastructure spending, fuel and vehicle taxation or introduction/harmonisation 
of fleet emission standards. 
There is quite some coordination happening on other policies and regulation, largely driven by 
individual programmes and initiatives covering specific areas of low-carbon transport, such as 
promotion of electric vehicles. There is a high number of institutions that collect various forms of 
commitments from their members. For example, several initiatives aimed at promoting zero-
emission vehicles, such as ,EV30@30 or EV100, require their members to aim for certain market 
shares and/or to put in place enabling measures. Several city networks, such as C40 and the Global 
Covenant of Mayors, similarly require their members to aim for certain emission reductions, develop 
climate strategies and/or implement specific measures. However, it is not always easy to judge what 
is a rule that is actually codified and potentially enforceable by the respective institution, and what 
remains a vague expression of intent.  
In summary, the governance supply in the area of setting rules can therefore be rated as low. 
Transparency and Accountability 
The need for transparency on national emissions, measures taken, and their impacts is currently 
largely covered by the UNFCCC’s rules on national emission inventories, national communications 
and international expert reviews. It can be expected that the implementation rules currently being 
negotiated for the PA will further strengthen transparency. Agreement under the PA to require 
sectorally differentiated NDCs from Parties would similarly have transparency in-built through the 
PA’s transparency framework.  
By contrast, Article 13 of the Agreement does not provide for reporting on or review of long-term 
strategies communicated by Parties. Such a review system therefore still needs to be established. 
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The Global Stocktake under the PA may play a critical role in ensuring that the latest science and 
progress in climate action are globally considered every 5 years in order re-emphasise the need for 
enhanced action. The modalities of the Global Stocktake have yet to be agreed. A focus on the need 
to bend the curve in transport emissions could be re-enforced by including a sectoral breakdown in 
the Stocktake. Looking not only at aggregate emissions but also at the sectoral level would put 
developments in the transport sector on the global agenda in regular five-year intervals. 
Outside the UNFCCC, there is a surprisingly strong focus on measuring and reporting developments 
in the sector. Key institutions include the Sum4All initiative that is developing a global tracking 
framework, the UN HABITAT Global Urban Observatory (GUO) as well as the global tracking 
framework that is planned under the PPMC. Due to its relatively recent launch, however, the actual 
reporting mechanism of the latter has yet to be established. These initiatives may become key 
contributors to transparency. The SDG process should be mentioned as well, because it includes 
indicators for targets 9.1 and 11.2 (see above).  
There so far are no initiatives to require countries to provide transparency on their transport 
spending. 
In summary, the governance supply in the area of transparency and accountability can therefore be 
rated as medium. 
Means of Implementation 
With respect to financial resources, the sub-complex for governance in transport is on the one hand 
well developed. The MDBs and national institutions are directing substantial resources towards the 
sector. Moreover, all MDBs have criteria and/or principles with respect to sustainable transport.  
However, it is worth mentioning that these principles are not always consistent and some doubt 
remains whether the principles are followed in the lending practice by all actors at all times. The 
MDBs also still provide substantial support to the utilisation of fossil fuels. According to Oil Change 
International, the AfDB, the ADB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank Group 
provided more than USD 7 billion in 2015 to fossil fuel projects, accounting for 22% of the MDBs’ 
energy financing, and more than USD 83 billion in the period between 2008 and 2015, accounting for 
30% of MDBs’ energy financing. (Oil Change International, 2017a) In 2016, the volume was USD 9 
billion, 2 billion more than the year before (Oil Change International, 2017b). International funding 
for alternative transport modes may also indirectly be an incentive for national governments to 
focus their national budget on road transport extension. 
Positively, in 2017 the World Bank announced to stop financing upstream oil and gas projects and 
also the AfDB reports a trend towards decreasing their fossil fuel financing – according to Oil Change 
International it decreased from 47% to 12% of energy financing between 2008 and 2015. (World 
Bank website, 2018c). 
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Capacity building to establish emission inventories and to plan and executive sustainable transport 
measures is the subject of many activities but still a challenge. The duration of many projects is too 
short to build capacity sustainably. Also, in many cases international consultants are employed 
instead of building local capacity (interview response).  
In summary, the governance supply in the area of means of implementation can therefore be rated 
as medium. 
Knowledge and Learning 
The field of knowledge creation and diffusion is probably the most active of the governance 
functions among institutions involved in the transport sector. Almost all institutions contribute in 
one way or another. This includes the UNFCCC with its Technical Examination Processes that 
regularly focuses on transport, spans to the PPMC that engages in a social media campaign to spread 
knowledge about “20 quick win actions” and includes the IEA that engages in coordinated research 
and development activities under its various Technology Collaboration Programmes. Some 
institutions promote peer learning (e.g. the Transport Decarbonisation Alliance) which can also be 
considered a form of capacity building. However, as with capacity building, the geographical 
coverage and sustainability of initiatives has room for improvement (interview response). 
In summary, the governance supply in the area of knowledge and learning can therefore be rated as 
medium-high. 
7.4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The analysis reveals that while some governance demands identified in section 7.1 are already being 
delivered by the international system, others are not. While guidance and signals to move towards 
more sustainable transport are being provided, the rule-setting, transparency and means of 
implementation functions are not being provided to the extent that would be desirable and 
necessary for the decarbonisation of transport and mobility. Also, while a high number of knowledge 
sharing, capacity building and implementation support initiatives have been established, the 
sustainability of many initiatives depends on project-based funding. 
The EU, its member states and other progressive countries may therefore wish to consider to take 
targeted initiatives to close the governance supply gaps that currently exist in those areas. Given 
that there is no transport-specific international institution with a mandate to establish legally 
binding rules, the UNFCCC is probably the best avenue to strengthen the international rule-setting 
and transparency/accountability functions. The EU could work to establish requirements to have a 
sectoral breakdown in NDCs and long-term strategies, with transport further broken down into 
passenger and freight categories. The EU could also work to have a sectoral breakdown included in 
the Global Stocktake and to strengthen national reporting and international review on national 
transport emissions as well as on measures taken and their impacts. Furthermore, the EU could 
make its own provision of means of implementation compatible with the PA and work towards 
analogous policies within the multilateral financial institutions. 
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One area where the EU could promote the need for more ambitious action in the transport sector by 
itself is fleet emission standards. The EU already has established such standards and is currently in 
the process of revising them. Due to the importance of the EU market, establishment of ambitious 
standards would help shift global car manufacturing and all producers wanting to sell into the EU 
would need to comply with these standards. As manufacturers have production sites and significant 
market shares all over the world, an ambitious EU emission standard could thereby globally foster 
the production and sale of energy and carbon efficient vehicles. 
Currently, however, EU standards are too weak to play this role. In Germany, the national 
government aims at reducing transport emissions by 44.7 Mt CO2-eq. by 2030. The new standards 
proposed by the European Commission in 2017 would contribute only a reduction of about 3.5 Mt 
CO2-eq. in Germany, while more ambitious standards would have the potential to contribute up to 
20 Mt CO2-eq. (Agora Verkehrswende, 2018). Given the EU’s role as a lead market, it would be highly 
beneficial not only from an EU perspective but also from an international perspective if the on-going 
negotiations led to a substantial strengthening of the Commission’s proposal. 
The difficulty of agreeing on ambitious EU standards suggests that the EU’s potential to lead by 
example and push for strong policies internationally may be limited. Ambitious countries may 
therefore have to come together independently of the EU. The Transport Decarbonisation Alliance 
already constitutes such a come-together, and it provides some of the governance demands that 
have been identified, as do many of the other transport sector initiatives. Most of them provide 
clear emission targets for the transport sector, and provide knowledge and policy support.  
However, the size of each of the initiatives is limited and a more coordinated approach would help 
boosting the impact across the sector.   
The areas that would need strengthened support by all initiatives are transparency and means of 
implementation. In line with Article 2.1(c) of the PA, countries could commit to provide transparency 
on their transport spending and to shift resources from unsustainable to sustainable transport 
investments, nationally and internationally.  
Furthermore, countries could push for the adoption of analogues policies in the multilateral financial 
institutions. In addition, initiatives could add the provision of means of implementation to the scope 
of their commitments. That is, developed country members could pledge to provide specified 
amounts of funding to sustainable transport projects in developing country members. As noted 
above, recipient countries should be required to in parallel shift their own resources from funding 
unsustainable to sustainable transport infrastructure. 
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7.6. Annex: Overview of Governance Demands and Supply (Land Transport sector) 
GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS 










High significance Medium-high 
significance 
- Signal that action in
the sector is crucial 
and beneficial,
moving away from













- Require sectoral 








strategies to aim to 
reduce transport 
emissions to zero by





- Commitment to 
environmental fiscal 
reform 
- Harmonisation of 
technical vehicle
standards 




of measures taken 
and their impacts 






- Make all finance, 
technology and
capacity building 
compatible with the 
PA 




- Provide resources 
directly to urban
level 
Learning partnerships  
on technologies and 
policy design (including 
policy integration with 
other sectors such as 
power and urban 
settlements) 
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International treaties to 
address climate change.  
Focus 
The PA:  
- aims to hold global 
temperature
increase to well 




increase to 1.5oC 
- aims to reach global 
peaking of GHG
emsisions as soon




sources and sinks of
GHGs by 2nd half of 
century 
Focus 
Parties to the PA are 
required to prepare, 
communicate and 
maintain successive and 
ever-more ambitious 
NDCs every five years, 
and pursue domestic 
mitigation measures 
with the aim of 
achieving the objectives 
of such NDCs 
Focus 
Parties to the UNFCCC 
and the PA are required 
to provide regular 
reports on their actions 




Parties are required to 
provide means of 
implementation 
These are partly 
provided through the 
UNFCCC’s Green Climate 
Fund; other funds are 
subject to UNFCCC 
guidance but managed 




(TEP): series of expert 
meetings to collate and 
synthesise good practice 
policies, including for the 
transport sector 
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The UN agency for human 
settlements and sustainable 
urban development. Cities 
and Climate Change 
Initiative (CCCI) seeks to 
enhance the preparedness 
and mitigation activities of 
cities in developing 
countries.  
Habitat conferences taking 
place every 20 years, with 
the most recent one in 2016 
adopting the New Urban 
Agenda 
Focus 
Goal: promote and 




adequate shelter for all  
New Urban Agenda aims 
to set a shared vision 
and new global standard 






unit for global 
monitoring of the 







network consisting of 
national and city-level 
institutions that function 
as National and Local 
Urban Observatories to 
support the 
implementation of the 
New Urban Agenda; 
knowledge, advocacy 
and technical assistance 




mobility plans and 
investment strategies; 
strengthen technical 
capacity of local and 
national governments 
Some contribution 
package of knowledge, 
advocacy, and technical 
assistance to support 
national governments 
and local authorities; 
consultation processes 
of stakeholders; provide 
international expertise 
and best practices; 
UrbanLex: global 
database of policies, 
laws, decisions and 






Mandate to address issues 
around poverty, inequalities 









solutions supporting the 
uptake of sustainable 
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combining renewable 
energy and energy 
efficiency measures with 
aspects of urban design like 











UNEP provides four 
transport relevant 
initiatives: the E-mobility 
Programme, the Global Fuel 
Economy Initiative (GFEI), 
the Partnership for Clean 
Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV), 
and the Share the Road 
Programme.  
Focus 
network and country 
contacts to promote 
electric mobility 
PCFV unites resources 




the fuel and vehicle 
industries, civil society, 
and experts on cleaner 
fuels and vehicles; 
supporting the 
development of electric 
mobility strategies;  
Share the Road 
programme: 
development of tools, 
provision of in-country 
support, advocacy for 
non-motorised transport 
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Regional Commission of the 
United Nations to support 
economic integration 
throughout Europe. It offers 
"policy dialogue, 
negotiation of international 
legal instruments, 
development of regulation 
and norms, exchange and 
application of best practices 
as well as economic and 
technical expertise, 
technical cooperation for 




includes four priority 
goals on environment- 
and health-friendly 
transport, sustainable 
mobility, reducing GHG 
emissions 
Some contribution 
World Forum for 
Harmonization of 
Vehicle Regulations (WP 
29) provides framework 
for globally harmonised 
regulations on vehicles  
Some contribution 
The Transport, Health 
and Environment Pan-
European Programme 
encourages national and 
local governments to 





Advisory Group on 
sustainable 
transport 
Mandate to provide 
recommendations on 
sustainable transport 
actionable at global, 






Provision of concrete 
policy recommendations 






17 goals adopted by the UN 
member states at the UN 
Sustainable Development 
Summit to address poverty, 
inequalities and climate 
change until 2030.  
Focus 
especially Goal 9 and 
Goal 11 are consistent 
with governance 
demands for transport 
sector 
Focus 
UN- Habitat Guide to 
assist national and local 
governments to monitor 








High Level Advisory 
Group on Sustainable 
Transport (HLAG-ST); 
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indicator framework Global sustainable 
transport outlook report 




on sustainable transport 





High-level global forum of 
ministers from 24 countries 
and the European 
Commission that aim to 
improve energy efficiency, 
provide clean energy supply 
and clean energy access. 
The CEM supports policies 
and programs that are 
relevant in the context of 
the transition to a global 
clean energy economy.  
Focus 
Aim to signal importance 
of clean energy and 
efficiency; for transport 
with particular emphasis 
on electric vehicles 
Focus 
Efforts of EV30@30 
Some contribution 
Efforts of EVI and 
EV30@30 
Some contribution 
Annual CEMs provide 
possibility for 
networking, to share 
lessons and best 
practices.  




Initiative under the CEM 
with 14 member 
governments and 
coordinated by the IEA to 
accelerate the deployment 
of electric vehicles.  
Some contribution 
Aim: facilitate the global 
deployment of 20 million 
electric vehicles by 2020 
Some contribution 
Support the 
development of national 
deployment goals 
Focus 
Share experiences, best 
practices and policies; 
information sharing on 
public investment in 
research, development 
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and demonstration 
programs; data update 




EV30@30 Builds on and extends the 
EVI. Its redefined goal is to 
achieve collectively at least 
30% new electric vehicle 
sales by 2030.  
Focus 
Goal: implement electric 
mobility, meet the global 
climate goals for 2050; 
campaign should expand 




from governments; 30% 
sales share of EVs by 
2030 
Focus 
Policy and technical 
assistance; training and 
capacity building 
Focus 
Facilitate the exchange 
of experiences and best 








under the framework of the 
OECD. Its ambition is to 
provide reliable, affordable 
and clean energy also 
beyond the scope of its 
member countries.  
Focus 
Provision of highly 
influential energy system 
scenarios 
The Mobility Model 
Partnership (MoMo) 
provides data on 
transport modes, fuels 
and regions and 
develops projections to 
2050 for the transport 
and energy sector 
Technology 
Collaboration 
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Programmes (TCPs): 
Advanced Fuel Cells TCP, 
Advanced Motor Fuels 
TCP, Clean and Efficient 
Combustion TCP, Hybrid 
and Electric Vehicle TCP 






organisation focusing on the 
implementation of 
renewable energy.  
Some contribution 
Aim to signal the need to 
shift to renewable 
energy, including for 
transport 
Focus 
Provision of knowledge 





The ITF is a politically 
autonomous OECD 
organisation with 59 
member countries. It serves 
as a think tank for transport 
policy and a platform for 
global dialogues in the 
context of transport and 
organises the Annual 




initiative to establish a 
commonly acceptable 
pathway to achieve zero 




provision of scenarios 
(Transport Outlook 
Project); integrated and 
sustainable urban 
transport roundtable to 





with the mission to promote 
policies to improve the 
Focus 
Studies to identify 
instruments and other 
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economic and social well-





policies; OECD Working 
Group on Transport; 
OECD database on 
environmental policy 
instruments  
World Bank Group Largest multilateral 
development bank to 
reduce poverty and support 
growth and development in 
developing countries. The 
World Bank initiated the 
Leaders in Urban Transport 
Planning Programe (LUTP) 
and the Sustainable Mobility 
for All initiative (Sum4All). 
Focus 
two overarching goals: 
end extreme poverty 
and promote shared 
prosperity by 2030; 
extend mobility to 
improve access to 
economic and social 
opportunities; act on 
climate change 
according to the PA; 
after 2019 no financing 




493 active World Bank 
projects with total net 
commitments of 
USD57.7 billion, 
representing nearly 20% 
of the total lending 
portfolio (end of the 
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GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS 








- - - - -
C40 Network of megacities 
taking action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
It is committed to 
implementing meaningful 
and sustainable climate-
related actions locally that 
will help address climate 
change globally. Their 
global field staff works with 
city governments, 
supported by technical 
experts across a range of 
program areas, facilitating 
active exchange and 
collaboration across cities. 
Focus 
Aim to signal that city-




Declaration to have over
40, 000 buses with clean 
technologies by 2020; 
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
Network to introduce, 
improve and transform 
BRT systems; Low 
Emission Vehicle (LEV)
Network to increase 
incentives for LEV 
Some contribution 
The Bus Rapid Transit 





The Bus Rapid Transit 
(BRT) Network with the 
focus area “Financing 
mechanisms and 
business models”  
Focus 
The BRT Network with 
the focus area 
“Communications”;  The 
LEV Network with the 
focus area “Citywide LEV 
strategy”; sharing of best 
practices and policies 
relating to the focus 
areas 
EV100 Initiative by the Climate 
Group gathering 16 
companies from around the 
world to work to establish 
Focus 
Goal: make electric 
transport the new 
Focus 
Member companies 
need to make a public 
Some contribution 
Annual reporting cycle 
to monitor members’ 
Indirect contribution 
Sharing of best practices; 
engagement and 
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electric vehicles as a 
standard by 2030. 
standard by 2030 commitment to at least 
one of three defined 
2030 targets: Integrate 
electric vehicles into 
directly owned or leased 
corporate fleets; 
Establish requirements 
in service contracts for 
electric vehicle usage; 
Support staff and 
customers to use 
electric vehicles by 
installing charging 
infrastructure at all 
premises 
progress dialogue between 
governments and other 
stakeholders 
Global Covenant of 
Mayors for Climate 
and Energy 
The Covenant of Mayors 
represents 6,800 cities in 57 
countries committing to 
climate action 
Some contribution 




for adaptation, provision 
of secure, sustainable 
and affordable energy 
for citizens; transport/ 
mobility as one initiative 
Focus  
reduce CO2 emission by 
at least 40% by 2030; 
adopt an integrated 
approach to tackling 
mitigation and 
adaptation to climate 
change; implementation 
of strategic action plans 
Focus 
action plans are 
registered and publicly 
available; actions are 
reported regularly and 
standardised relating to 
NDCs, the PA and 
current and future 
impacts 
Some Contribution: 





Partnership of the 
International Energy Agency 
(IEA), the United Nations 
Environment Programme 
Some contribution 
goal: stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas 
Some contribution 
Collection of data on 




data and research 
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(UNEP), the International 
Transport Forum (ITF), the 
International Council on 
Clean Transportation (ICCT), 
the Institute for 
Transportation Studies at 
the University of California-
Davis, and the FIA 
Foundation. It aims at 
improvements in fuel 
economy and the maximum 
deployment of vehicle 
efficiency technologies. 
GFEI provides analysis, 
advocacy, policy support 
and tools.  
emissions from the 
global light duty vehicle 
fleet through a 50% 
(from today’s level) 
improvement of vehicle 
fuel efficiency 
worldwide by 2050 (30% 
improvement of new car 
fuel economy by 2020 
and 50% by 2030) 
measure progress; track 
and report on efficiency 
trends and the uptake of 
technologies 
building analysis 
ICLEI - Local 
Governments for 
Sustainability 
Network of over 1,500 
cities, towns and 
metropolises in 86 
countries committed to 





Mobility) Agenda as one 
of ten Urban Agendas, 
establishing principles to 
achieve reductions in 
greenhouse gas 




cities to implement 
urban mobility strategies 
Some contribution 
support local and 
subnational 
governments to access 





provision of newsletters, 
regional updates on 
activities, case studies, 




Worldwide network of 
public transport 
stakeholders  Especially its 
Focus 
Aim: global  promotion 
of public transport, 
Some contribution 
Commitment by 
members to support 
Some contribution 
tools and material to 




global centre of 
knowledge and know-
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Public Transport Declaration on Climate 
Leadership contributes to 
global climate governance. 
doubling market share 
of public transport 
worldwide by 2025 
governments at all levels 
by providing them with 
technical knowledge and 
delivering action on the 
ground; support 
monitoring and 
reporting of SDG 
implementation 
to report on SDG11.2 
implementation at the 
company, national and 
sector level 
how on public transport 
solutions 





The Low Carbon Technology 
Partnerships initiative 
(LCTPi) is comprised of over 
160 companies and 70 
partners who are 
committed to accelerating 
the transition to a low-
carbon economy. Led by 
the World Business Council 
for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) and 
supported by We Mean 
Business partners, LCTPi 
offers a collaborative 
platform for businesses and 
policymakers to scale up 
deployment of business 
solutions to a level and 
speed that are consistent 
with limiting global 
warming to below 2°C. 
Focus 
Aim to highlight need for 
low-carbon technologies 
Focus 
Low Carbon Freight: 
principles and 
demonstration projects, 
identifying new solutions 
Low Carbon Transport 
Fuels: demonstration 
projects of companies 
across the technology 
spectrum and value 
chains 
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MobiliseYourCity Partnership created by the 
governments of France and 
Germany and supported by 
the European Commission 
to support 20 developing 
country governments and 
100 cities in addressing 
transport related 
challenges. Its goal is to 
decrease transport related 
GHG emissions in member 
cities by at least 50% by 
2050. MobiliseYourCity acts 
on the New Urban Agenda 
and UN's 2030 Agenda 
(especially SDG 11). 
Some contribution 
Goal: reduce global 
urban passenger 
transport CO2 emissions 








at least 100 cities should 
commit to implement a 
Sustainable Urban 
Mobility Plan by 2020; 
reduce transport related 
GHG emissions by at 
least 50% by 2050 
within these cities; at 
least 20 developing or 
emerging countries 
should commit to 
implement a National 
Urban Mobility Policy 
(NUMP); 
implementation of low 
carbon transport 
policies to: reduce the 
amount of urban trips 
with conventionally 
fuelled transport, 
promote a modal shift 
and structural change in 
vehicle use, improve 
vehicle energy 
efficiency; members 
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Paris Process on 
Mobility and 
Climate (PPMC) 
Platform with currently 150 
members, including multi- 
and bilateral development 
organisations, financing 
institutions, civil society and 
foundations, academia and 
the business sector) that 
aims to unite all 
organisations and initiatives 
acting on transport and 
climate change.  
Focus 
Aim to emphasise the 
importance of 
sustainable transport in 
the context of the 
UNFCCC.  
Aim to contribute to 
systematic 
transformation of world 
transport over the next 
40 years to achieve a 
net-zero-emission 
economy 
Proposed Global Macro 






plans to introduce a 
global tracking 
framework with country-




and air quality 
Focus 
social media campaign: 
WeAreTransport with 
key messages; 20 







partnership of over 80 
organisations (including UN 
organizations, Multilateral 
and Bilateral development 
organisations, NGOs and 
Foundations, Academia and 
the Business Sector).  
Focus 
Goal: integration of 
sustainable transport in 
global policies 
2030 vision of the 
Sustainable Transport 
Community proposes 
targets on access, air 
Focus 
improves the knowledge 
on sustainable low 
carbon transport, helps 
develop better policies 
and catalyse their 
implementation 
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pollution and GHGs 
(peak by 2020, then 
decline of 2% p.a.) 
Sustainable 
Mobility for All 
(Sum4All) 
Global initiative by the 
World Bank and 40 partners 
(multilateral developments 
banks; UN Agencies, 
Programs, and Regional 
Commissions; bilateral 
donor organisations; NGOs; 
global civil society 
organisations; academic 
institutions) to implement 
transport-related SDGs and 
foster innovation.  
Focus 
Goal: transform the 
transport sector by 
making mobility 
equitable, efficient, safe 
and clean; roadmap of 
actions for the 
international 
community; closely 






Framework to monitor 
global progress towards 
the goals of SuM4All and 
to track process on 
transport-related SDGs 
Focus 
development of a global 
roadmap of actions; 





Initiative started by German 
government including ADB, 
CAF, UN-Habitat, SLoCaT, 
ICLEI, C40 and others.  
Some contribution 
Goal: transition towards 
sustainable urban 
mobility and therefore a 





impact will be 
monitored and reported 
regularly 
Focus 
Aim to enable 1 000 
urban change makers to 
plan and implement 
modern mobility 
concepts, support 
innovative pilot activities 
in cities across the 
globe; measures to fulfil 
the Avoid-Shift-Improve 
approach 
KfW commitment to 
mobilise one billion USD 
to build and modernise 
Some contribution 
Webinars, e-Learning 
courses, workshops and 
conferences 
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of countries, cities, regions, 
and private sector 
companies initiated by the 
PPMC, the Netherlands, 
Costa Rica, Portugal, 
France, Michelin, Alstom 
and Itaipu Binacional. Its 
overarching goal is the 
achievement of a net-zero 
emission transport sector 
by 2050+. 
Focus 
Goal: transition to a net-
zero emission sector by 
2050+ 
Focus 
members have to 
formulate ambitious 
short (2020), medium 
(2030-2040) and long 
term (2050) action plans 
or be in the process or 
committing to do so 
Focus 
support countries, cities 





forum to exchange good 





UEMI has more than 20 
partners including UN-
Habitat, the IEA, ICLEI, 
development agencies, 
research institutes and 
NGOs 
Focus 
Goal: Contribute to 
phase out of 
conventional vehicles, to 
be replaced by at least 
30% electric vehicles by 
2030; to widen the 
concept of urban 
sustainability; and a 30% 
GHG emissions 




from local and national 
governments as well as 
businesses on e-mobility 
targets; Commitments 
to strive towards 30% 
GHG reduction in urban 
areas by 2030 and 
towards the 
implementation of at 
least 30% electric 
vehicles by 2030 
Some contribution 
aims to track 
international action 
Some contribution 
provision of tools and 
guidelines to implement 
local action 
Focus 
open forum for 
knowledge transfer and 
support; initiate a 
process of dialogue  
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Collaboration of Germany, 
the Netherlands, the UK 
and 11 US states and 
Canadian province that aim 
at the introduction of zero-
emissions vehicles to reach 
their climate change 
commitments 
Focus 
Goal to achieve 100% 
ZEV passenger vehicle 
sales in their 
jurisdictions by 2050 
Focus 
commitments to provide 
purchase incentives, 




implement policies that 
require the deployment 
of ZEVs, lead by example 
through, perform and 
commission research 
and development 
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8.1. Transformation Challenges and Governance Demands 
8.1.1. Current Status and Prospect 
Global aviation (domestic and international combined) currently produces around 2% of global CO2 
emissions; global shipping about 3% (Gençsü and Hino 2015).58 In combination, however, the 
international shipping and aviation sectors constitute a significantly growing share of global 
emissions;  growing by around 80% in terms o8.f carbon emitted between 1990 and 2010, while 
growth of other sectors in the world economy was approximately 40% (CDIAC 2013a; 2013b; 
UNFCCC 2013, cited in Bows-Larkin 2015). In part this was driven by rapid growth in emerging 
economies, but also arose as a consequence of the lack of coverage of these sectors in the national 
mitigation policies of UNFCCC Annex I nations (Bows-Larkin 2015). High growth is likely to continue. 
Shipping’s CO2 emissions have been forecast to rise by 50-250% by 2050 without additional policies 
(IMO 2014). For aviation, a range of scenarios is possible in which CO2 emissions rise by up to 515% 
between 2000 and 2050 (Gudmundsson and Anger 2012), although more typical figures are around 
220% (Bows-Larkin 2015). Strong growth of air travel in Latin America and Asia in particular means 
that emissions from developing countries are likely to account for more than half of global aviation 
emissions by 2020. 
The implications for the global temperature targets are serious: a 50% chance of avoiding 2℃ entails 
a reduction of 71–76% by 2050 for aviation, calculates Bows-Larkin (2015). Using the principles of 
fair share and taking into account efforts of comparable sectors, Paris temperature goal compliance 
by international shipping arguably requires 70-100% absolute emissions reduction by 2050, or 90-
100% carbon intensity per tonne-km, both compared to 2008 levels (T&E 2018). For international 
shipping, this must be complemented with a peaking of absolute annual emissions at or below 2008 
levels in the immediate future (ibid).59 Under current policy and projections, assuming that total 
57 The author gratefully acknowledges the time given through interviews by Tristan Smith (UCL), Faig Abbasov 
(T&E) and Alejandro Piera. Any factual errors are the author’s own responsibility. 
58 However, aviation’s non-CO2 emissions at high altitudes intensify the impact of aviation emissions on global 
warming, making them much greater than that of CO2 alone. Black carbon emissions, inter alia, from ships 
are also rising (Azarra et al. 2015). 
59 Working out the details of a fair contribution from the sectors is complex. Further work is needed to clarify 
an appropriate contribution from the sectors based on their unique, comparative circumstances, the 
likelihood and timing of technological breakthroughs, etc. However, debates over what would constitute fair 
contribution need not delay action, as the basic message from the Paris Agreement is that all sectors must 
decarbonise as rapidly as possible, and make all reasonable efforts to achieve full decarbonisation. 
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emissions fall sufficiently to hold warming at 2℃, the international transport sectors combined could 
contribute nearly 40% of total CO2 output by 2050 (Cames et al. 2015). Governance efforts to 
contain or reverse these trends face the difficulty of allocating responsibility for international 
emissions, which make up the majority of emissions, but which are not covered by domestic policies.  
The structure of the aviation industry – featuring two dominant manufacturers and a few key airlines 
– is somewhat conducive to decarbonisation efforts (Bows-Larkin 2015). In the case of shipping, a
complicated industry structure - many ship builders, owners, operators, shippers, charterers and
end-users – makes steps to encourage decarbonisation more problematic (ibid). Trade flows and
globalisation represent important exogenous trends driving sectoral developments. Total
international seaborne cargo, for example, has risen from 2.6bn. tonnes in 1970 to 9.5bn. tonnes in
2013 (Gençsü and Hino 2015). Many stakeholders suggest that because the maritime industry serves
demands originating in other sectors, management of the demand for shipping should not be
attempted directly. Following Bows-Larkin (2015), in the discussion below we distinguish
technological aspects from practice/operational and demand-side aspects.
In aviation, concern over energy costs has driven development and relatively widespread 
deployment of better technology in the form of efficient gas turbine engines. Opportunities for 
ongoing improvements are, however, in decline. The industry’s own targets (see below) suggest that 
technological developments overall offer a 1–2% annual improvement in fuel efficiency. In terms of 
practices/ operations’, unlike shipping aviation continues to be largely oriented towards leisure 
passengers. Industry pressure to expand airport capacity has met with success. While increases in 
airport capacity (and improved air traffic control) can reduce fuel consumed per passenger-km, they 
carry the risk of rebound effects, maintaining or raising growth rates, increasing absolute energy 
consumption (Bows-Larkin 2015). 
Relatively high engine efficiency makes shipping a relatively low-carbon freight mover. Nevertheless, 
a wide range of incremental technologies, many of which could be retrofitted, are yet to be widely 
exploited (IRENA 2015). Efficiency can be disaggregated into technical design and operational 
aspects; even ships with similar design efficiencies can have vastly different operational efficiencies 
(Gençsü and Hino 2015). Speed is a critical factor: a 10% reduction corresponds to a 27% drop in fuel 
use per unit of time (ibid).60  
60 ‘Slow steaming’ practices, widely adopted during the 2007–2012 recession, reduced daily fuel use by an 
average of 27%, but by over 70% in some ship size categories (IMO 2014).  
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8.1.2. What Needs to Change to Phase-Out Greenhouse Gas Emissions? 
For both aviation and shipping, a balance needs to be struck between ‘in-sector’ action, by which 
decarbonisation is treated as an exclusive responsibility for the sectors in question, and ‘out-of-
sector’ collaboration with others towards a global GHG reduction goal (Chircop et al. 2018), e.g. 
through off-setting schemes. This may be justifiable where short-term reduction opportunities are 
scarce.  
Overall, progress in both sectors has been slow. The International Energy Agency’s assessment of 
progress towards interim 2°C scenario targets in 2025 warns that international shipping is ‘off-track’ 
while aviation shows some improvement but more effort is needed (IEA 2017). Although lower 
carbon alternatives certainly exist, phasing out GHG emissions entirely in these sectors is a distant 
prospect. Mitigation potentials vary significantly: while shipping has many technological and 
operational options that could be effective in the short to medium term, aviation does not. In this 
section, we again distinguish technological measures from those based on operations and demand 
management. We begin with shipping. 
Meeting the IEA’s 2℃ scenario requires, initially, that the global shipping fleet improve fuel 
efficiency per vehicle-km at an annual rate of 2.3% between 2015 and 2025 (IEA 2017). 
Improvements to efficiency in existing and new ships are possible through a wide range of 
incremental technologies. It is estimated that ships’ energy consumption and CO2  emissions could 
be reduced by up to 75% by implementing existing technologies and applying available operational 
measures, almost completely decarbonising maritime shipping by 2035 (International Transport 
Forum 2018). Currently available efficiency technologies could roughly halve the average fuel 
consumption per vehicle kilometre of new ships (IEA estimate based on Smith et al., 2016). This will 
need to be complemented by the use of advanced biofuels (IEA 2017). In addition, pioneering wind 
power technologies - include Flettner rotors, kites, and rigid sails - could offer fuel savings of up to 
50% (IRENA 2015).  
In terms of alternative fuels, liquefied natural gas (LNG) cuts the emissions intensity of operations in 
the short term, and is favoured by the sector as a transitional fuel; a suitable bunkering network is 
rapidly evolving on established routes. However, a fleet-wide switch to LNG would not deliver 
sufficient decarbonisation, and risk further carbon lock-in. Biofuels are currently the most viable 
alternative for replacing, or blending with, fossil fuels. Although experience with their use and the 
scale of their application in the shipping sector is still minimal, recent technology learning regarding 
second and third generation biofuels give them the highest long-term penetration potential (IRENA 
2015).  
Various concepts and prototypes exist for electric and hydrogen fuel cell-powered vessels. However, 
emission savings depend on the primary source of energy being used. Potential for solar-power has 
also been noted (IRENA 2015), as well as for alternative fuels such as hydrogen and ammonia. 
Development of hydrogen fuel cell technology has made significant advances, although sustainability 
of production is critical (IRENA 2015). At least in principle (real world feasibility being another 
matter!), nuclear power could have a significant decarbonisating effect (Walsh et al 2017; 
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International Transport Forum 2018), benefiting from development of modular reactors in the 
power sector.  
Successful marine mitigation, requires consideration of the interdependencies between ship speed, 
level and pattern of demand for services, and the extent and rate of innovation in propulsion 
technology. Given relatively slow rates of technological innovation. ‘it is difficult to foresee how 
deep decarbonisation can be achieved without an immediate, fleet-wide speed reduction; and a 
land-based energy-system transition strongly influences shipping demand, which in turn, influences 
the extent of required low-carbon propulsion technology change’ (Walsh et al. 2017: 32). Reducing 
power requirements improves the proportion that could be provided by renewable technologies 
(IMO 2014, Psaraftis & Kontovas 2013).  
The scale of the technological challenge for aviation is much greater. Here, emission cuts cannot be 
made by reducing speed or introducing renewable energy sources, but require a fundamental shift 
in design, e.g. open-rotor engines or prop-fans, which could cut fuel intensity by up to a 50% 
(Akerman 2005), but which are currently held back by high noise and vibration levels. New 
construction materials can also deliver better fuel efficiency, but real benefits only materialise as the 
fleet renews. Although biofuels are regularly touted, and initiatives and research partnerships are 
under way to scale up renewable jet fuel and reduce costs (Gençsü and Hino 2015) they fail to 
address the impact of contrails on cloud formation and aerosol deposition (Smith 2015), and 
provoke aforementioned sustainability concerns. Less controversially, wider efficiency 
improvements are possible and cost-effective.61  Recent initiatives have raised the prospect of 
hybrid-electric flight, at least over short distances.62 
Arguably, the sector repeatedly succumbs to technology ‘myths’, which ‘must be recognised, 
confronted and overcome as a critical step … to sustainable aviation climate policy’ (Peeters et al 
2015: 40). Bows-Larkin (2015) suggests that for aviation to contribute fairly to delivering a 2℃ 
target, annual demand growth must reach zero by 2025 at the latest, and decrease by 4-6% p.a. 
thereafter. Given its controversial nature, demand reduction is regularly overlooked as a policy 
option. Although investments in high-speed rail may serve to reduce demand for air travel, its role is 
limited in that around 80% of all aviation emissions are from flights over 1,500 km (ATAG 2014). 
Technological innovations, such as video-conferencing, can also serve to manage demand in some 
circumstances, saving time and money for businesses and individuals. 
To summarise, ‘[o]nly electrical propulsion, demand reduction … or offsetting remaining emissions 
will enable full decarbonisation of the aviation sector’ (Cates et al. 2015: 41). Biofuels could also 
contribute, if sensitively handled. 
61 The fuel efficiency of the least and most efficient US airlines differed by 27% in 2013 (Gençsü and Hino 2015). 
62 Airbus, Siemens and Rolls Royce are partnering to develop a prototype hybrid electric plane, where at least 
one of the aircraft's four gas turbine engines is replaced with a two megawatt electric motor. The aim is to 
have a demonstration model running by 2020 (Cuff 2017). 
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8.1.3. Main Challenges and Barriers toward Decarbonisation 
With shipping, a complex set of barriers to the adoption of lower carbon energy (including improved 
efficiency measures) can be categorised in terms of organisational/structural, behavioural, market 
and non-market factors (IRENA 2015). This complexity, in part, reflects the unique and international 
nature of the shipping industry, with underlying constraints and factors beyond the ability of 
individual states to modify (ibid). Historically, most ship building has occurred in jurisdictions 
without climate targets, with many diverse manufacturers, as well as charterers, owners, operators, 
and other global stakeholders (Bows-Larkin 2015).  
With regard to organisational, structural and behavioural barriers, limited R&D financing, particularly 
for initial proof-of-concept technologies, is a major factor, together with ship owners’ concerns over 
the risk of hidden and additional costs, as well as opportunity costs of renewable energy solutions. 
Historically, a lack of reliable information on costs and potential savings of specific operational 
measures or renewable energy solutions has been noted (Gençsü and Hino 2015; IRENA 2015). The 
fundamental market failure is one of split (‘landlord-tenant’) incentives between ship owners and 
hirers, limiting the motivation of owners to invest in solutions since benefits may not accrue to the 
investing party. Investors tend to be risk averse. Significant levels of fleet turnover/ retrofitting must 
be achieved, the maintenance of which across extended periods has historically proved difficult 
(Walsh et al. 2017). The capital-intensive nature of maritime retrofit technologies poses a significant 
barrier. Ship financing is a concentrated industry, with the top 40 banks holding more than 90% of 
the world’s $500 billion in shipping debt. Many of these are reducing their shipping commitments, 
leaving shipping companies with restricted access to capital and credit (Stulgis et al. 2014). 
Sufficiently rapid fleet-wide retrofit arguably also requires adequate global dry-docking services and 
opportunities for demonstrating new technologies (Walsh et al. 2017: 39). Moreover, widespread 
uptake requires extensive knowledge exchange to ensure correct operation. North-South technical 
co-operation and transfer of technology may be necessary. Early-adopters would need to be strongly 
incentivised (ibid). Furthermore, the shipping sector’s low public profile results in less societal 
pressure to change. 
In terms of specific technologies, the high potential of advanced biofuels to transform the shipping 
sector ultimately depends on a number of factors, including the global availability of sustainable 
feedstock. Lack of cost-effective and reliable low-pressure storage options for hydrogen fuel cells 
remain critical issues (IRENA 2015). In terms of slow steaming, compensation in the form of 
increased ship size or numbers to maintain freight flows might be required to ensure acceptability to 
the industry. Global supply chains must be capable of accommodating speed reductions over all 
journey legs (Walsh et al. 2017), which might require restructuring of some industries.  
The simpler industry structure of aviation, compared to shipping, means that other things being 
equal, incentivising change should be relatively practical (Bows-Larkin 2015). However, significant 
commercial, technological and cultural barriers exist here too. For example, current prices of 
biofuels are around three times higher than conventional jet fuel. Although the industry favours off-
setting measures, uncertainty exists over long-term availability and cost of credits (Gençsü and Hino 
2015). Flying is higher in public consciousness than the shipping of goods - making demand 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
225 
management a sensitive issue. A perceived ‘right to fly’ apparently extends even to those with 
otherwise pro-environmental behaviours (Alcock et al. 2017).  
For both international shipping and aviation, the power of incumbent actors in the political 
institutions involved in sectoral governance (see below, and chapter 10) is a further important 
challenge to decarbonisation. Shipping industry groups have embraced the ‘fair share’ concept for 
emissions reduction (Darby 2016), but insist that any outcome must not inhibit development. 
Refusal of large developing countries to accept reduction targets (at least until 2014), in particular 
China, Brazil and India, has also impeded progress. Overall, the aviation industry may be regarded as 
trying to drive some relatively limited kinds of change – such as off-setting - in order to head-off 
more fundamental change that would be more detrimental to its interests (Gonçalves 2017).  
Another barrier affecting decarbonisation efforts in both sectors is the major perverse subsidy at the 
international level constituted by the absence of taxation of aviation and shipping fuels (the reasons 
for which are explored below), lowering the incentive for reducing fuel use. In the shipping sector, 
although marine fuel represents 50% or more of a ship’s operating cost, the fact that it is untaxed is 
one factor behind the lack of progress in shipping efficiency, particularly design efficiency (Gençsü 
and Hino 2015). In discussions of measures to internalise carbon externalities for both aviation and 
shipping, such as carbon taxation, compensating developing countries for the economic harm they 
might suffer - ensuring that they bear ‘no net incidence‘ - is widely recognised as critical to their 
acceptability (IMF 2011). 
8.1.4. The Promise and Potential of International Cooperation 
Since the vast majority of aviation and shipping activity takes place across national borders, 
international harmonisation of policy responses is essential to effective governance. Imposition of 
stricter requirements, for example, on ships registered in one jurisdiction may simply prompt 
owners to re-register elsewhere, harming one state’s competitive position to little environmental 
benefit. Meanwhile, the transaction costs of national regulatory variation can be high for shipping 
companies. Given its complexity, directly influencing change in the international shipping sector is 
arguably most effectively encouraged by combining global-led policies with measures implemented 
at the port-state level (Bows-Larkin 2015; cf. IEA 2017).63 Strong global competition also makes 
international cooperation essential for raising mitigation ambition in the aviation case (Gençsü and 
Hino 2015: 3). In the following, the importance of each of the governance functions identified in the 
previous work package deliverable (Oberthür et al. 2017) is identified (the results summarised in 
Table 8.1 below). 
63 Port State is the country where a vessel enters, with whose laws it must comply when in Port. 
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Guidance and Signal 
Given the projections for emissions growth, and the trends towards international aviation and 
shipping taking up more and more of the available carbon budget, there is a significant need to 
signal more strongly what level of emissions constitutes the sectoral ‘fair share(s)’.  
Setting Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
There is also significant need for regulation (standards, rules) at international level to incentivise and 
facilitate global-scale action. In both shipping and aviation, emission limits could be implemented 
globally by market-based instruments such as taxation and emissions trading, or more direct 
technological regulation – or some combination. International agreement to tax aviation and 
shipping fuel (with revenues potentially recycled into low-carbon R&D) could facilitate collective 
action. In principle it is also possible for states to remove tax exemption from bilateral air service 
agreements. The emergence of new technologies will likely require adequate standards (agreed 
upon by global institutions and ship classification companies). In shipping, requiring verified vessel 
efficiency ratings, taking into account the effect of new technologies, may incentivise the installation 
of such technologies through enhancing the resale value of a vessel. In both aviation and shipping, 
ensuring that offset schemes and/or the production of alternative fuels adhere to high quality and 
sustainability standards is critical to avoid side-effects. 
Addressing distributional equity (esp. North-South) is also necessary to ensure meaningful 
international agreements can be reached, and may be promoted by phasing in measures over time 
for certain actors, or by finance and technology transfer (see also ‘means of implementation’ below). 
Rules related to operational measures e.g. slow steaming may also need compensatory measures of 
some kind. 
Rules relating to demand management in the aviation sector, though highly controversial, could in 
principle include moratoriums on airport expansion, additional price mechanisms to curb growth, 
even the implementation of an individual carbon quota scheme that includes flights. However, 
states would probably also need to accept responsibility for a portion of international aviation 
emissions for such policies to be enacted (Bows-Larkin 2015). 
Transparency and Accountability 
To the extent that international regulation is introduced, implementation would require appropriate 
transparency (monitoring and verification) and accountability (enforcement). International, industry-
wide efforts are needed to improve transparency and strengthen incentives, including on use of 
alternative fuels and to account for changes in life-cycle GHG emissions, in order to assess progress 
toward achieving global goals. A degree of transparency is also required before rules can be set, in 
order to be able to set meaningful policy targets. 
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Means of Implementation (Capacity Building, Technology and Finance) 
As noted above, in the shipping sector a mixture of action at global and port-state level has been 
recommended to implement change. Ports should provide, inter-alia, shore-based power facilities, 
electric charging systems and bunkering facilities for alternative fuels. Decarbonisation through 
either retrofitting or new construction requires capital that ship-owners often will not invest. While 
increased uptake of new technologies can bring capital costs down, the technical risk perceived with 
currently immature technologies can further drive up the capital cost. Both state and private sector 
actions can be effective in addressing these significant barriers, incentivising innovative solutions 
and combating the ‘landlord-tenant’ problem. The ‘savings as a service’ model in which technology is 
rented and paid for entirely out of fuel savings, avoiding up-front costs, offers particular potential 
(International Transport Forum 2018: 37). In addition, the needs of developing countries (especially 
SIDS and LDCs) for access to financial resources and technology have been acknowledged in debates 
at the International Maritime Organisation (Chircop et al. 2018). A global carbon pricing mechanism 
could raise a substantial amount, part of which could be earmarked to stimulate further 
decarbonisation of the sector, including via research and development (International Transport 
Forum 2018 – see also ‘knowledge and learning’, below). 
Concerning aviation, the policy, technological, and supply-chain support for bio-jet fuel development 
effort has been compared to what was required in the U.S. and Brazil to establish conventional 
biofuels such as bioethanol and biodiesel for road transportation (IRENA 2017). Industry has called 
for global subsidies as well existing state biofuel subsidies to be extended to aviation. There is also a 
significant need to support developing countries (where aviation growth is highest) in implementing 
initiatives to reduce emissions from the sector, potentially enabling more effective participation, for 
example, in market-based mechanisms.   
Knowledge and Learning 
In the shipping case, governance needs are in large part related to highlighting the current 
availability of already effective technology, and financing its deployment. Given the market failures 
noted above, particularly in shipping, significant international level measures are needed to 
overcome lack of reliable information on costs, correct operation and potential savings of specific 
operational measures or renewable energy solutions. The IEA has highlighted how for shipping, 
demonstrating zero emission technologies and use of low carbon fuels are key RD&D challenges, the 
latter of particularly critical importance to delivery of 2℃ scenarios (IEA 2017: 91). A short-term 
priority is to ‘transform the experience with the use of low carbon fuels, develop technical 
specifications of low carbon fuels’ (ibid).  
(Joint) R&D for low-carbon aviation technologies, involving airlines, governments and other 
stakeholders has been recommended, particularly for new aircraft design and sustainable biofuels. 
Internationally coordinated public sector involvement is necessary due to industry concerns over 
commercial confidentiality (Piera, interview). The IEA (2017) suggests that for aviation, developing 
energy efficient technologies and demonstrating commercial feasibility of innovative aircraft 
configurations are critical. In shipping, neither firms nor national governments (for the most part) 
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have a track record of financing R&D (Smith, interview), suggesting the need for international 
governance to prompt this. For both shipping and aviation, increased production of advanced 
biofuels from sustainable waste and residue feedstocks is a key RD&D challenge identified by the 
IEA.
A further element of knowledge and learning that should not be neglected is the need to sensitise 
developing/ emerging economies to the significance of climate change and potential co-benefits 
from developing mitigation policies. Global institutions, including those involving NGOs, have an 
important role here (Piera, interview). 
8.1.5. Interlinkages with Other Sectoral Systems 
Decarbonisation of international shipping can be greatly facilitated by wider decarbonisation efforts. 
For a country such as the UK (in 2010), up to 50% of tonnage imported may be fossil fuels. 
Reductions of fossil fuel consumption and the growth in biomass/biofuels could therefore have a 
significant impact on overall shipping demand (Mander et al. 2012, Bows-Larkin 2015). Wider 
decarbonisation of the electricity sector is also necessary if alternative fuels are to be manufactured 
in a sustainable way.   
Inter-linkages are also evident in terms of the potential effects of slow steaming. While 
compensation in the form of increased ship size or numbers to maintain freight flows might help 
ensure acceptability to the industry, the effects on global supply chains might require restructuring 
of some industries. ‘By 2050, an adequately decarbonised shipping sector will look very different to 
the present system and if achieved, it will be within the context of wider energy system 
decarbonisation across the globe’ (Walsh et al. 2017). 
Regarding aviation, long-term availability and cost of offset credits depends on linkages with carbon 
markets associated with other economic sectors. Scarcity issues also arise for both aviation and 
shipping in terms of the need to compete for supplies of biofuel with alternative uses (Gençsü and 
Hino 2015).  
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex 
– V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
229 
Table 8.1: Type and strength of international sectoral governance demands and potential contribution of international institutions 
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8.2. Governance Supply 
While all governance functions are of at least medium importance, guidance and signal, rules to 
facilitate collective action, and transparency and accountability may be regarded as of particularly 
high importance to both shipping and aviation. So too, for the shipping sector, is ensuring adequate 
means of implementation. The following discussion therefore focuses on these aspects.  
The international aviation and shipping sectors began to experience pressure to decarbonise from 
1997, when the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 2.2) first assigned responsibility for their emissions to the 
International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
respectively. Emissions from these sectors continue to be handled primarily by these UN bodies; 
explicit references to both aviation and shipping were included in the draft of the Paris Agreement 
(PA) but dropped at a late stage, presumably to smooth adoption of the text (Reuters 2015). While 
the ICAO and IMO do not have climate protection as their primary function (Gonçalves 2017), 
contacts with other international organisations that do can be significant. The ICAO’s Committee on 
International Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP) (est. 1983), for example, has an ICAO Council 
mandate to work closely with the UNFCCC Secretariat and IPCC. Likewise, the IMO regularly makes 
submissions to UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) meetings. 
Also worth noting is the inclusion in the UN resolution adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (UNSDG) of a commitment to policies promoting sustainable transport systems (UNGA 
2015). In the following text, the governance landscapes pertaining to international shipping and 
aviation are examined in turn. The findings are summarised in Table 8.2. 
8.2.1. Intergovernmental/ International Organisations (IOs) in the Case of Shipping 
As noted above, there is a degree of interaction between international shipping and the UNFCCC. 
While its emissions are not (yet) included in any NDCs under the PA, Parties may choose to include 
them, and such emissions are captured under the collective goals and the Global Stocktake. The 
expectation at time of writing is that the IMO will facilitate the determination of shipping’s fair 
contribution, within the spirit of the PA (Chircop et al 2018).64 
In addition to the mandate from Kyoto, the Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 
and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) arguably also provide the IMO with 
competence to regulate GHG emissions (Shi 2014).65 The IMO has invoked these competences to 
regulate such emissions within its Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), where three 
categories of policy instrument have been discussed: technical, operational and market-based 
measures (MBMs) (Shi 2016: 134).  
64 Detailed rules for the Global Stocktake are currently being negotiated. It is unclear at this stage whether the 
rules will include any obligation to report on emissions from the sector beyond the current guidelines for 
preparing national inventories. 
65 In Part XII of the Convention, Article 192 establishes a generic duty for all States to protect and preserve the 
marine environment. (As an integral part of the corpus of international environmental law, the Paris 
Agreement serves to inform the content of Article 192).
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The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by and 
incorporated in the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL), is the most important international convention for 
prevention of vessel-source pollution. Technical regulation occurs in annexes and ancillary codes 
(which may be mandatory or voluntary) and guidelines. Implementation and enforcement is a 
responsibility of all State Parties. Annex VI covers GHG emissions and, although optional, includes 88 
states representing 96.16% of global tonnage. 
In terms of rules facilitating collective action, IMO design efficiency standards were introduced in 
2011 for ships built from 2013 onwards (IMO 2015). The Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) is the 
first mandatory GHG emissions reduction regime for an entire industry. It is non-prescriptive and 
performance-based; as long as the required energy-efficiency level is attained, ship designers and 
builders are free to use the most cost-efficient solutions. To incentivise the development and take-
up of mitigation technologies, the regulation has set 3 targets, known as phases, each requiring that 
ships progressively emit less CO2 per unit of transport work. The most stringent - Phase 3 - requires 
new ships built after 2025 to be 30% more efficient. Currently, the EEDI mandates a 1% annual 
improvement in global fleet efficiency from 2015 to 2025 (IEA 2017). The IMO also requires all ships 
to use a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) to identify what energy-saving measures 
have already been undertaken and what further steps are possible, and to have procedures to 
monitor and evaluate efficiency.  
As steps towards greater transparency and accountability, data collection on fuel consumption of 
ships is being increased in a ‘three-step approach’ (IMO 2015), moving from data collection, to 
analysis, then potentially to further regulations. From 2019, ships over 5,000 tonnes will have to 
collect and report data on fuel oil consumed through their flag state to the IMO. Data e.g. on 
distance and time travelled will also be collected. It is projected that the introduction of a global 
data collection system for CO2 emissions from shipping will lead to emissions reduction and to 
energy savings (ref),66 although it is yet to be decided whether this system should be voluntary or 
mandatory. 
In contrast to the format of other sectoral analysis chapters in this report, it makes sense here to 
include specific reference to the regulatory framework developed by the European Union. This is 
because of its (potential or actual) extra-territorial reach. the Commission has proposed a systematic 
and gradual three-step approach for integrating maritime GHG emissions into the EU’s existing 
commitments. After the creation of an emissions monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) 
system for ships using EU ports (step one), and the creation of reduction targets in the maritime 
sector (step 2), a third step contemplated the eventual introduction of some form of market-based 
measure. The EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) can in principle include maritime emissions of 
66 Development of a Global Data Collection System for Maritime Transport, submitted by Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria et al., MEPC 68th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 68/4/1, 3 March 2015, para 12. 
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vessels not just trading between EU ports, but also those beyond. Moreover, the EU has developed 
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) provisions that are further advanced than the IMO’s 
(ENDS Europe Daily 2017a), enabling large ships calling at EU ports to report their CO2 emissions and 
fulfil their obligations under the EU's wider MRV Regulation.67 An EU-wide port charging scheme 
currently under consideration 68  could offer incentives for greener ships. The EU also funds 
development of LNG technology and infrastructure (Smith, interview). 
8.2.2. Shipping-Related Transnational Initiatives 
Various transnational private governance ‘green shipping’ initiatives have emerged as the result of 
growing consumer concerns, increasing retail shipper demands (for cleaner fuels, lower emissions, 
etc); and increased regulation. The industry-led Clean Cargo Working Group (CCWG) and the 
environmental NGO-led Sustainable Shipping Initiative (SSI) are increasing business knowledge and 
transparency and aiming to change behaviour. The CCWG works with over 40 ocean freight carriers 
and cargo owners to analyse/compare their shipping efficiency (Gençsü and Hino 2015). Several 
independent initiatives currently address the lack of information/ transparency in the industry 
(market failures). For example, the organisations RightShip and Carbon War Room provide a rating 
system for over 70,000 vessels that grades each ship on design efficiency from A to G. The Clean 
Shipping Index provides a similar service, rating carriers on all pollutants.  
8.2.3.  Intergovernmental/ International Organisations (IOs) in the Case of Aviation 
As noted above, following its designation as such by the Kyoto Protocol, the ICAO is the key actor. 
Through the adoption of its standards and recommended practices (SARPs), it has been instrumental 
in laying down the foundations allowing international civil aviation to evolve. 
At the 37th ICAO Assembly in 2010, following increased signs of industry commitment (see 
discussion of transnational initatives below), governments acted to set two aspirational goals: to 
improve fuel efficiency by 2% per year, maintaining the goal from 2020 to 2050, and to deliver 
‘carbon-neutral growth’ (CNG) from 2020 onward, principally by ‘offsetting’. A system of State 
action plans, essentially seeking to induce States to monitor their aviation emissions and identify 
reduction measures, was adopted to aid achievement of the aspirational goals (Piera 2016). The CO2 
standard, as agreed in 2017, will apply to new aircraft designs from 2020, and to those already in-
production as of 2023; those which by 2028 do not meet the standard will no longer be able to be 
produced unless sufficiently modified. The ICAO’s adoption of a framework for market-based 
mechanisms (MBMs) has led to the much higher profile, 3-stage global scheme known as CORSIA 
(‘Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation’). This aims to stabilise CO2 
emissions by 2020, and offset emissions exceeding a sectoral baseline - the average of total CO2 
67 This law requires large ships to monitor their CO2 emissions and fuel consumption from 1 January 2018; a 
year later, they will have to submit annual emissions reports to the Commission (European Parliament 2015). 
68 Based on Regulation (EU) 2017/352) establishing a framework on market access to port services and 
financial transparency of ports. 
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emissions between 2019 and 2020 - thereafter (ICAO 2016a). Biofuel can be used instead of offsets 
to meet CORSIA obligations. CORSIA’s phased approach recognises the differing capabilities of 
Member States and seeks to minimise market distortion. The Pilot Phase (2021 to 2023) is 
completely voluntary. The First Phase (2024 - 2026), is also voluntary, but automatically includes 
Pilot Phase participants. Participation in the Second Phase (20272035) will be mandatory for all 
States whose 2018 revenue tonne-kilometres (RTKs) exceed 0.5% of the industry total.69 CORSIA’s 
route-based approach should ensure that all operators are treated equally on the same route. 
As with shipping, the EU is also an international actor worthy of note. The EU’s ETS scheme can (and 
does) incorporate aviation, not just within the EU, something which has significantly shifted the 
regulatory landscape at global level.70  
8.2.4. Aviation-Related Transnational Initiatives 
Ever since the EU announced its intention to incorporate aviation into its ETS, the airline industry, 
led by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), has been active in addressing climate 
change issues (Piera 2015). The Air Transport Action Group (ATAG) was founded by the Airport 
Council International (ACI) Europe (representative of European airports), setting industry-wide goals 
through collaborative action across the aviation sector. Airports, airlines, air traffic management 
organisations, the manufacturers of aircraft and engines and partners across the supply chain are 
involved. Through this body, the industry has committed to carbon neutrality and fuel efficiency 
targets. In 2009, it agreed to: further improve fleet fuel efficiency by 1.5% per year (2008 - 2020); 
cap net sectoral emissions at 2020 levels; and halve net emissions from 2005 levels by 2050 (ATAG 
2014).  
An initiative listed as Collaborative Climate Action Across the Air Transport World appears in the 
NAZCA database71, in effect summarising the joint activities of ICAO and ATAG. Launched via ICAO, 
this hybrid initiative is said to support short-, medium- and long-term goals to cut emissions from 
aviation. Apart from the introduction of a global market-based mechanism (CORSIA), it supports 
developing new, more efficient aircraft technology and sustainable alternative fuels while promoting 
and deploying operational improvements to reduce CO2 emissions from aircraft already in service. It 
calls for better use of infrastructure, especially in air traffic management. 
69 Further, any State whose cumulative share of RTKs falls into the top 90% in the industry should be included. 
The participation of LDCs, SIDS and LLDCs will be entirely voluntary. ICAO plans to review CORSIA every three 
years from 2022 onwards, thus allowing room for adjustments. 
70 Directive 2008/101/EC indicated the EU’s intention to include all European and foreign aircraft operators 
flying to and from airports situated in the EU within the EU ETS with effect from 1 January 2012. 
71 The NAZCA database was introduced in chapter 1. 
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8.2.5. Potential Conflicts among International Institutions 
Emission reduction opportunities in both shipping and aviation cases must be pursued in an 
institutional context that isn’t always conducive to mitigation efforts. In the international shipping 
sector, two important international law principles, Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) 
and No More Favourable Treatment’ (NMFT), can at times appear at cross-purposes, and constitute 
an obstacle to consensual rule setting. The debate on applying them to GHG emissions has been a 
constant undercurrent in IMO-level negotiations. The CBDR principle, underlying the UNFCCC, 
requires developed States to bear greater responsibility, while NMFT requires port states to enforce 
applicable standards uniformly. The latter principle has been consistently applied to all IMO treaty 
instruments (Shi 2016). While developing states have for the most part insisted that CBDR should be 
applied to regulating shipping emissions, many developed country counterparts favour NMFT 
(Chircop et al. 2018). Consequently, the IMO’s energy efficiency measures were adopted by a 
majority vote in 2011 rather than by consensus, with developing countries complaining that the 
CBDR principle had not been respected fully and objectively (Shi 2016: 125). According to Chircop et 
al (2018: 50), however: ‘The reality is that international shipping emissions cannot easily be 
attributed to any particular territory and if ships registered under the flags of developing States were 
to be excluded or given preference, the whole purpose of reducing emissions from international 
shipping would be undermined’.  
In overcoming this conflict, the potential for certain kinds of MBM to offer a compromise is regularly 
highlighted. Here, however, some IMO Member States have flagged a potential conflict between 
such measures and WTO rules. Somewhat reassuringly, however, WTO representatives have 
remarked to the effect that the trade body could not challenge a global agreement facilitated by the 
IMO, and that trade rules should not be invoked to stall progress tackling climate change.72 
In the aviation case, according to a 2012 Assembly resolution (A38-18), in developing a ‘global 
scheme’ (which became CORSIA), ICAO must take into account the (seemingly potentially 
contradictory) principles of CBDR, special circumstances and respective capabilities (SCRC), non-
discrimination, and equal and fair opportunities (Piera 2015). Although 50 (developed) States filed 
reservations against including CBDR in the resolution, the principle now forms an integral part of 
ICAO’s guiding principles on MBMs. SCRC evolved from the premise that CBDR leads to market 
distortions and, as such, conflicts with the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 
72 The GATT permits notable exceptions, which could serve to justify an MBM that might otherwise be found in 
violation of the MFN and national treatment principles. These include measures ‘necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health’ and measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’. If 
a measure is captured under either of those specific exceptions, it can be justified provided that it is not 
‘applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’ (Chircop et al. 
2018).  
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Convention) that founded ICAO. It ‘represents a laudable attempt to incorporate a workable 
principle into the ICAO domain that would recognise the different circumstances and level of 
development of States while minimising market distortions’ (Piera 2015: 74). 
The Chicago Convention (effective since 1947), whose primary objective is to facilitate the expansion 
of global civil aviation, does not mention environment. Despite environmental protection being 
recognised in new strategic objectives for 2013-16, this remains problematic. In cases of conflict, 
development would most likely trump environment (Piera 2016). Fuel taxes are one of the principal 
market-based options for reducing energy consumption and thus GHGs. However, the Chicago 
Convention prohibits the taxing on arrival of fuel already on board an aircraft. This prohibition, taken 
to avoid the dangers of double taxation, was subsequently widely extended by governments to 
become a general tax exemption for fuel on international flights. The prohibition was further 
enshrined in a very large number of bilateral aviation agreements. In 1996, the ICAO Council 
adopted a Resolution strongly recommending that any environmental levies States may introduce 
take the form of charges rather than taxes. Taxes were viewed as levies to raise general government 
revenues to be applied for non-aviation purposes, whereas charges were seen as levies to defray the 
costs of providing facilities and services for civil aviation. The ICAO Assembly’s endorsement of this 
position in 2001 effectively rules out any further work on the use of kerosene taxation at 
international level (although a few countries maintain taxes on domestic aviation fuel) (Piera 2016).  
8.3. Assessing the Governance Complex 
8.3.1. Shipping 
Guidance and Signal 
While the Paris Agreement (PA) does not refer to international shipping emissions (not even 
renewing the mandate to the IMO), the IMO is (finally) responding to long-standing pressure on it to 
act. Most recently, this pressure was expressed through the Paris ‘One Planet’ summit (2017), which 
saw 35 countries adopt the Tony de Brum Declaration73, reiterating the PA’s global temperature 
commitments (Timperley 2017b). A set of seven strategic directions for the 2018-2023 period have 
been adopted by the IMO Assembly, including one dedicated to ‘developing appropriate, ambitious 
and realistic solutions to minimise shipping's … impact on climate change’ (IMO 2017). At the 72nd 
session of the MEPC (April 2018), a target was agreed as part of an Initial Strategy (due to be revised 
in 2023) to reduce sectoral emissions by at least 50% on 2008 levels by 2050. This falls short of calls 
from e.g. the Marshall Islands for complete decarbonisation by 2035, or from EU member states for 
70–100% by 2050, but could still help achieve the ‘below 2℃’ temperature goal if other sectors and 
countries are able to reduce emissions faster to compensate. Moreover, the ‘at least’ wording 
signals that ambition could be further ratcheted in future. The agreement also calls for emissions 
ultimately to be phased out completely, though without any timeline. 
73 A total of 44 had signed by April 2018. 
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Where the need for the governance function was assessed as high, recent positive developments 
suggest that the overall delivery by the existing governance complex can be scored as medium.  
Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
Although the IMO initial strategy proposes a host of measures which could be developed and 
implemented in future, including MBMs and enhanced energy efficiency measures, it is thin on 
specifics for the time being. The revised GHG strategy due in 2023 is set to include short-, mid- and 
long-term “further measures” for reducing emissions, along with an implementation schedule. 
The most significant achievement of the IMO’s MEPC to date has been the adoption of technical and 
operational measures in the form of amendments to Annex VI of MARPOL in 2011 and 2014. 
However, initiatives promoting decarbonisation noted above have often been limited in scope 
(Gençsü and Hino 2015). The effectiveness of the apparently significant EEDI requirements is 
weakened by their application solely to new vessels under construction, meaning that by 2020 15% 
of the global fleet at best will be regulated. Furthermore, the long standing ‘flags of convenience’ 
system of open registry (whereby ship owners can choose the nation with the lowest standards to 
register their vessels) facilitates a continuing implementation gap as states ‘competitively postpone 
adopting standards’ (Lister 2015: 125). For its part, the SEEMP does not require actual 
implementation of any of the identified efficiency measures; nor that a goal be set or met (Gençsü 
and Hino 2015). Given that the EEDI and SEEMP only entered into force in 2013, their precise 
mitigation effectiveness will take time to establish. Even with full implementation, however, 
shipping emissions have been projected to increase fourfold compared with 1990 (Shi 2016). As with 
aviation, the failure to levy any tax on international marine fuels represents a major weakness in the 
policy instrument portfolio to tackle emissions. Nor is there any regulation of speed at present. 
Transnational initiatives, while showing promise, are disappointing in relation to the overall scale of 
the challenge, suffering from relatively low levels of ambition, transparency issues and concerns 
about data reliability (Scott et al. 2017).  
Where the need for the governance function was assessed as high, the overall delivery by the 
existing governance complex can therefore be scored as low.  
Transparency and Accountability 
Under the UNFCCC system, emissions from international transport are reported under the category 
of international bunker fuels, associated to the country in which a plane or e.g. cargo vessel was 
fuelled. This form of accounting has obscured responsibility for emissions, be it operators of the 
planes/vessels, the country of origin or the country of destination of the transported goods. 
Transparency aspects are gradually improving, however, notably being addressed by the IMO’s on-
going three-step data collection process and related action by the EU, where the Commission has 
used its legislation as an attempt to spur the IMO to agree a global solution. The advent of improved 
satellite monitoring has potential to facilitate much greater transparency in the near future (Amos 
2018). IMO rules are not as stringent as the EU’s, using metrics that are too limited to allow the real 
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operational efficiency of individual ships to be established (Abbasov, interview). Moreover, there is a 
risk that the EU’s system may be diluted in any integration of the two systems.  
Where the need for the governance function was assessed as high, the overall delivery by the 
existing governance complex can, for the time being, be scored as low-medium. (See also discussion 
of knowledge and learning, below). 
Means of Implementation 
The IMO’s Initial Strategy refers to encouraging technical cooperation, research and development 
and capacity-building activities, in a list of candidate measures. At the time of writing it is too early 
to judge what this will amount to. The IMO currently operates programmes geared at building 
technical cooperation (GLOMEEP) and capacity building (Capacity Building for Climate Mitigation in 
the Maritime Shipping Industry, or GMN). GloMEEP is a joint Global Environment Facility (GEF)-
UNDP-IMO Project, launched Oct. 2015, with a USD 2 million budget. GMN is a joint IMO-EU EUR10 
million project (running from 2015 to 2019) to promote energy efficient technologies in the sector 
by establishing 5 Maritime Technology Cooperation Centres (MTCCs) in 5 regions worldwide. The 
performance of these programmes is uncertain, but the sums involved appear low.  
International development banks (including the European Investment Bank, which operates the EUR 
750 million Green Shipping Financing (pilot) programme with financial institutions in France, the 
Netherlands and Nordics), have yet to gear up the the scale of the challenge. As well as committing 
greater resources to alternative fuels, an important aspect of the challenge will be to reduce 
(currently generous) support to short-term - but ultimately counter-productive - solutions, namely 
LNG (Smith, interview).  
Other finance for refitting ships is available from transnational initiatives. Innovative self-financing 
models – such as the Sustainable Shipping Initiative’s ‘Save As You Sail’ (SAYS) and the Self-Financing 
Fuel Saving Mechanism (SFFSM) driven by Carbon War Room and University College London (Stulgis 
et al. 2014) - have potential to enable the adoption of retrofit technologies, thereby reducing fuel 
payers’ operating costs, while requiring zero capital expenditure. While useful in addressing 
potential financing obstacles, lack of industry demand for these retrofits has hampered their 
diffusion (Smith, interview).  
MARPOL’s Annex VI Chapter 4 includes provision for promotion of technical cooperation and 
transfer of technology relating to the improvement of energy efficiency of ships, based on State 
request. The IMO enacts this through its Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on Facilitation of Transfer of 
Technology for Ships. However, this provision arguably faces the challenge of intellectual property 
rights, which are not readily transferred by commercial actors seeking to maintain market 
competitiveness. These issues have arisen in relation to efforts to address the role of technology and 
technology transfer under the UNFCCC. The technology mechanism first announced under the 
Copenhagen Accord, is continuing with development and dissemination of climate related 
technologies under the PA. 
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Where the need for the governance function was assessed as high, the overall delivery by the 
existing governance complex should probably, for the time being, be scored as low (particularly since 
resources are arguably being mis-allocated to LNG infrastructure development). 
Knowledge and Learning 
Work within the IMO (supported by the OECD) analysing potential impacts of different policy 
instruments has been relatively well advanced. The challenges lie more in RD&D and, equally if not 
more important, clear demonstration of the benefits of currently available technologies (IEA 2017: 
91; Walsh et al 2017: 39). Research and development of advanced low-carbon fuels continues to be 
significantly under-funded (Smith, interview). This arguably reflects lower visibility and lobbying 
weight of their (would-be) manufacturers, compared to oil and gas majors promoting use of LNG.   
The IMO’s on-going three-step approach, gathering and analysing data on fuel consumption/ 
emissions, is addressing the deficit of information. The EU’s MRV legislation is dramatically 
improving the quality of information within the industry. As noted above, several independent 
initiatives also currently address the lack of information/ transparency in the industry, helping to 
foster an environment in which efficiency is monitored, prioritised and rewarded. For example, 
RightShip and Carbon War Room provide a public rating system, grading over 70,000 vessels on 
design efficiency (from A to G). Charterers representing almost a quarter of global non-containerised 
shipments have begun factoring efficiency into their vetting process as they decide which ships to 
charter. Currently, however, these voluntary initiatives lack industry-wide influence, and a single, 
standardised methodology (Gençsü and Hino 2015; Scott et al. 2017). 
Where the need for the governance function was assessed as medium-high, the overall delivery by 
the existing governance complex can be scored at best as low-medium.  
8.3.2. Aviation 
Guidance and Signal 
Relative to the challenge of ‘Paris-compliance’, the signal sent by international governance 
institutions is falling well short. This is even without factoring in the almost complete neglect of 
aviation’s non-CO2 emissions (Timperley 2017a) including NOx, contrails and water vapour, 
where the science has matured significantly. In 1999, the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) estimated the total historic climate impact of aviation to have been two to four times higher 
than for CO2 alone (IPCC 1999). The significance of the signal being sent to the industry by its own 
body, ATAG, including its goal of halving net emissions from 2005 levels by 2050 is debatable, 
particularly given the high apparent willingness to rely on offset schemes.  
Overall, therefore, where the need for this governance function was assessed as high, overall 
delivery by the existing governance complex must be scored as low.  
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Rules to facilitate Collective Action 
This assessment takes into consideration the CO2 standard, State action plans and the CORSIA 
‘global scheme’. Although there are others, along with the aspirational goals, these topics 
‘adequately illustrate the challenges faced and the political implications involved’ (Piera 2016: 2). 
1. The CO2 standard (2017) may be criticised for its applicability only to wholly new
aircraft types, at least at first. It perpetuates the incrementalism of the initial
commitment to 2% annual improvement in fuel efficiency, which critics equated to
‘business as usual’. Even that, however, was not implemented; efficiency has
improved at approximately half the targeted annual rate, due in part to low fuel prices
(Kharina and Rutherford 2015). However, the new standard could in principle be
tightened.
2. Arguably, ICAO’s requirement for State action plans represents a success story (see
also transparency/ accountability). These plans are in the process of changing states’
attitudes; many are beginning to address aviation’s climate impact for the first time
(Piera 2016).
3. CORSIA: During the initial pilot phase and the first implementation phase (2024 –
2026), the scheme will only apply to airlines from states voluntarily opting in. Several
large States, including Brazil, India, Russia and Saudi Arabia have opted out (for
various reasons). Starting with the second phase (2027 to 2035), exceptions will apply
only for least developed countries, land-locked and small island developing states, and
those with low levels of activity.
ICAO’s goals are non-binding, and not assigned or ‘attributed’ to particular states or aircraft 
operators. Instead, all states are encouraged to strive collectively to achieve them (Piera 2016: 20).74 
CORSIA’s early focus on tackling sectoral rather than individual airline emissions growth carries risks. 
Until operators begin to be assessed by their own emissions, incentives to make individual 
reductions via technological or operational means will be lower than they could be (Chircop et al. 
2018: 76). Offsetting also risks ‘free-riding’ on other sectors’ efforts, allowing technological and 
operational stagnation while emissions continue to rise (ibid). 
Annual aviation CO2 emissions are set to rise approximately 1 bn tonnes by 2030, of which CORSIA 
could offset between zero and 0.3 billion depending on the way the offsetting rules are set (UNEP 
2017). The risk of the effectiveness of the offsetting regime being compromised by implementation 
issues is real, and reliance on forestry projects provokes opposition. Similarly, reliance on biofuels 
could be counterproductive; standards designed to ensure sustainability are currently under 
development and remain controversial. Critics, including IEA (2017), have called for a more stringent 
74 This was done to delink ICAO’s goals from the notion of binding emissions reduction commitments 
applicable at the time under the UNFCCC/Kyoto regime (Piera 2016: 20). 
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CORSIA to be complemented with fuel carbon taxes (which, as with shipping, are conspicuously 
absent).  
Meaningful demand management, required if aviation is to become Paris-compliant, is nowhere to 
be found. Nevertheless, international aviation is given a Low-medium on this function because of 
ICAO’s significant progress that, in principle, can allow further steps (Piera 2016).75 
Transparency and Accountability 
State action plans were designed in part to improve monitoring and thereby transparency. Concerns 
about accuracy of data, over-emphasis on technological and operational measures, or in some cases, 
lack of evidence that concrete measures have been put in place (Piera 2016: 19) mean that it is not 
yet possible to determine actual GHG emission reductions as a result of the actions plans. These 
concerns notwithstanding, Piera (2016) considered that development of the plans constitute one of 
ICAO’s major achievements. 
In the case of CORSIA, ICAO still needs to finish detailed design work on monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV), emission units criteria (EUC) and registries. Thereafter, IT systems will be needed 
to enable airlines to track how many credits they need, and to enable governments to check 
whether or not they have bought them (WWF 2017). Beginning in 2022, the CORSIA scheme will be 
reviewed every three years, in what might be considered a counterpart to the PA’s Global Stocktake, 
though the details are still to be elaborated.  
Enforcement issues are also of significant concern, with responsibility being placed on states with 
varying levels of capacity and commitment (Piera, interview). A further concern centres on credit 
criteria, vital for ensuring offsets really reduce emissions without side-effects, and accounting rules, 
to ensure these credits aren’t being double or triple counted. Rules are still under development. In 
theory, ICAO could screen out offset project types with low environmental integrity and risks to 
sustainable development and still meet its goal. Many countries and airlines, however, want 
maximum possible supply of offset credits at lowest possible cost. 
Once new developments have become public (June 2018?), a score for delivery of this function can 
be offered. 
Means of Implementation 
In terms of institutional capacity building, ICAO runs a comparatively large technical cooperation 
programme, primarily designed to assist developing countries “in remedying their deficiencies”, 
including non-compliance with technical standards and recommended practices (SARPs), lack of 
75 NB. This scoring will need to be reviewed once decisions on detailed rules for the implementation of CORSIA 
have been announced (June 2018). 
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appropriate aeronautical infrastructure, and insufficient regulatory oversight (Piera 2015). As part of 
the efforts to provide further assistance to States and facilitate access to financing for States’ action 
plans, ICAO established partnerships with the EU, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the Global Environment Facility (ICAO 2016b). 
For aviation biofuels, supply chain development and measures to reduce cost premiums are still 
somewhat lacking. 
Where the need for the governance function was assessed as medium, due to lack of transparency 
about levels of investment and support being offered (and the project’s capacity to research it), the 
overall delivery by the existing governance complex cannot currently be scored.  
Knowledge and Learning 
(Joint) R&D for low-carbon technologies/fuels, involving airlines, governments and other 
stakeholders is reported to be happening to some extent through Air Transport Action Group, 
(Collaborative Climate Action across the Air Transport World). Precise details, however, are hard to 
obtain. ICAO also operates a Global Framework for Aviation Alternative Fuels (GFAAF) which offers a 
Database for relevant activities and supports Initiatives and Projects. However, the IEA warns that 
the development of CORSIA, though in many ways welcome, ‘could come at the expense of reduced 
pressure for R&D solutions that could be achieved within the aviation industry itself’ (IEA 2017). 
Where the need for the governance function was assessed as medium, due to lack of transparency 
about levels of investment and support being offered (and the project’s capacity to research it), the 
overall delivery by the existing governance complex cannot currently be scored.  
8.4.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Despite some notable improvements in recent years, the most critical international governance 
functions for decarbonisation are a long way from being adequately fulfilled for both shipping and 
aviation sectoral systems. EU institutions have pressed for greater policy ambition on both 
international aviation and shipping, with some effect, and look set to continue to do so (see chapter 
10 for further discussion). This section sets out some options for addressing some of the key gaps 
identified in the governance landscape, which the EU may be able to endorse, taking shipping and 
aviation in turn. 
8.4.1. Shipping 
Although guidance and signal is now significantly stronger following the agreement at MEPC 72, the 
maritime sector may eventually need to confront the issue of whether to maintain an ‘in-sector’ 
decarbonisation focus (Chircop et al. 2018), or work collaboratively with other sectors to integrate 
its efforts into the PA’s global net zero emissions goal, requiring closer coordination with the 
UNFCCC. The rate of reduction from peak emissions to full decarbonisation or emission neutrality 
may also need to be further specified. These elements could all be based on IPCC analysis, including 
in particular the 1.5˚C scenario analysis due later in 2018. Adjustments to the sector’s long-term goal 
could be made over time, based on clearly established factors such as changes to the way parties 
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approach and define the long-term goal, changes to the IPCC’s understanding of the potential 
contribution of negative emissions, and actual global progress toward decarbonisation (Chircop et 
al. 2018: 87). The credibility and visibility of the signal towards decarbonisation will be critical to 
avoid ‘lock-in’ to sub-optimal solutions like LNG, which would ultimately fail to deliver sufficient 
emission reductions and risk an eventual ‘stranding’ of shipping assets. 
With the adoption of an initial climate strategy, the IMO’s role as the primary venue for developing 
appropriate response measures is secure for the foreseeable future. To fill the evident governance 
gap on rules facilitating collective action in shipping, the IMO needs to develop and adopt new, 
concrete measures, with the ability to review and update them. To be politically acceptable, 
developing countries (especially SIDS and LDCs) will need to have access to financial resources and 
technology and effects on international trade should be handled sensitively. The actions needed cut 
across diverse economic sectors at national and regional as well as global levels, and requiring 
involvement of regulatory bodies at all levels; at times they may also require action from regulators 
in other sectors. The IMO will need to define appropriate roles for its Member States and for private 
industry actors (Chircop et al. 2018). Although challenging, there are reasons to believe the IMO has 
potential to develop its role in this direction (see discussion of ‘IMO as orchestrator’, below). 
Among others, the IEA (2017) and OECD (International Shipping Forum 2018) have suggested 
modification of existing rules, in particular increasing the ambition of the EEDI, including expanding 
it to include operational efficiency standards for existing ships. This would require swift action to 
ensure the adequate collection of data along trading patterns of individual vessels (highlighting how 
improved transparency is a pre-condition for stronger rules). Upgrading the EEDI framework could 
also serve to incentivise alternative fuel and hybrid machinery designs in the medium term, with the 
ultimate goal of transitioning to full decarbonisation of vessels (T&E 2018). Low-carbon fuel 
standards could be developed for the shipping sector, similar to the fuel standards that have been 
developed for road transport (International Transport Forum 2018). 
Some low-carbon alternative measures are currently more expensive than oil-based marine 
propulsion because external costs, including climate change, remain unpriced. This market failure 
could be addressed by a carbon levy on bunker fuels, currently under consideration as a potential 
new global rule.76 Industry bodies prefer an IMO initiative to a potential regional patchwork of 
regulations that might otherwise emerge (Darby 2016). An MBM adopted on the basis of consensus 
within the framework of an international maritime convention is also less likely to generate conflict 
with the WTO regime. IMF analysis of the global economic implications of the Paris agreement 
suggested that international shipping and aviation fuels should have a levy applied for both revenue-
raising and emission-reducing reasons, proposing US$30 per tonne CO2 (IMF 2016). In improve 
political acceptability, around half of the revenue is proposed to be set aside for developing 
countries as compensation for trade losses; the remainder would support the Green Climate Fund 
(see chapter 3). However, such a figure is likely to be too low to deliver the scale of absolute 
emission reductions required (Smith 2016). 
76 The need for carbon pricing would be less pressing if strong standards were to be developed. 
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With the exception of a few large developing countries such as China and India, most national 
industries have welcomed the adoption of MBMs, although they have different preferences on the 
precise form (Shi 2016: 125). Large developing States may not be intransigent, however, with 
evidence that China would accept a compromise position provided that the CBDR principle could be 
incorporated (Shi 2016: 125). Certain MBM types submitted as proposals to the IMO (including the 
rebate mechanism for a market-based instrument for international shipping and the port-state levy) 
have potential to incorporate elements of both the CBDR and NMFT principles (Shi 2016). 
National or regional incentive schemes, with potential to be internationally coordinated, could 
complement carbon pricing at a global level. Co-ordinated port-level charging schemes with 
incentives for greener ships, for example, have very promising potential to reduce shipping 
emissions. An EU-level scheme under consideration would rate ships based on CO2 data gathered as 
part of mandatory EU monitoring. Research suggests that offering energy/ CO2-efficient vessels fee 
rebates of 20% at all ports could reduce GHG from sea trips within the EU by close to 4% a year by 
2030 (COGEA et al. 2017).  
Recalling that it is difficult to conceive of deep decarbonisation without an immediate, fleet-wide 
speed reduction’ (Walsh et al. 2017), rules on slow steaming will require global-level agreement. To 
accommodate concerns of countries at the end of long supply chains, however, differentiations for 
various classes and potentially specific routes may also be necessary. Satellite tracking of ship 
movements can facilitiate recording of speeds and ensure that compliance is straightforward. The 
advent of blockchain makes verifying and recording this easy and trustworthy (Abbasov 2017).  
Regarding transparency and accountability, whatever the (currently uncertain) fate of the EU MRV 
provisions in the context of IMO action, ultimately regular reporting, review, and enhancement of 
the approach ‘in sync’ with reporting and review under the PA will be critical for the effective 
implementation of the IMO strategy’ (Chircop et al. 2018). To address the significant governance 
gaps affecting means of implementation, development banks (including the EIB) have a big role in 
developing infrastructure and technology transition in an equitable manner. Governments might 
collaborate with financial institutions or encourage domestic development banks to develop 
targeted financial instruments for green shipping (International Shipping Forum 2018). Given that 
sufficiently rapid fleet-wide retrofit arguably requires adequate dry-docking services around the 
world (Walsh et al. 2017), consideration may need to be given the enhancing this capacity on the 
part of port-states.  
Prospects for agreeing on the measures necessary for decarbonisation would be enhanced if the 
IMO could agree on greater transparency and integrity in its own policy-making processes, as well to 
reform its voting systems to less heavily favour certain flag states (all elements long subject to 
criticism from NGOs). Questions related to the importance of legitimacy and social acceptability of 
policy making institutions are considered further in chapter 10.  
IMO as an Orchestrator 
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As noted above, there is a clear need for coordination across multiple levels and actors to deliver 
sectoral climate goals. The IMO’s significant potential to orchestrate the range of green shipping 
private initiatives noted above, alongside international efforts to spur policy innovation, 
coordination and state regulatory cooperation, has been highlighted by Lister (2015). She suggests 
that the IMO would ‘appear to possess the main success factors: a focal institution in the issue area 
of global maritime sustainability; in theory, convening power; the ability to delegate legitimacy; the 
resources to enable; and an organisational culture that although heavily bureaucratic, has 
recognised the need for reform through greater consultation and engagement of new actors (Lister 
2015: 126). Although undoubtedly a focal international institution with the authority to govern, to 
date the IMO has lacked both the creativity and coercive power to get states to ratify, legislate and 
enforce compliance. Therefore, leveraging the efforts of organisations such as the CCWG or SSI to 
serve in an entrepreneurial role may help to produce governance benefits such as ‘demonstration 
effects’ through pilot projects and information dissemination to encourage learning and policy 
innovation, and pave the way for greater regulatory cooperation between states. Lending support to 
the SSI could provide the group with additional capacity for more focused advocacy and targeted 
pressure on national governments to regulate. Lister suggests that the IMO might also consider 
endorsing one or more transnational green rating schemes to help scale up their efforts. 
8.4.2. Aviation 
While the ICAO was somewhat faster than the IMO in developing elaborate decarbonisation 
measures, such as CORSIA, its headline decarbonisation targets now appear much less credible, and 
the measures to implement them less robust than those that the maritime sector is now 
contemplating.  
The guidance and signal function requires significant additional effort, in particular to ensure that 
individual operators are incentivised, rather than – as occurs with CORSIA – the sector as a whole. 
Given improved science, climate change targets should take account of non-CO2 impacts that have 
not previously been accounted for or regulated due to uncertainty over their exact effects. WWF 
(2017) propose a simple multiplier (e.g. x2). 
In terms of the prospects for strengthening rules facilitating collective action, options are limited by 
the current international legal framework, which ‘de facto immunises fuel used in international 
aviation from taxation’ (Piera 2016: 28). In theory, this and other deficiencies in the governance 
framework could be addressed through substantial amendments to the Chicago Convention, the 
framing of which explicitly prioritises continuing growth of the sector above the environmental costs 
that this entails. This, however, is extremely unlikely. Short of this, more frequent Assembly 
meetings of ICAO could be considered, to provide more of a counter-weight to the Council (which 
adopts SARPs), whose membership is more limited and less progressive on environmental questions. 
Increased participation by ICAO member states is arguably a sine qua non for more ambitious 
climate action (Piera 2016: 8).  
The IEA (2017), among others, has called for better alignment of the CO2 standard with the sectoral 
mitigation targets (carbon neutral growth by 2020, 2% annual efficiency improvement to 2050, and 
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halving of emissions by 2050), as well as clarifying the magnitude of the savings expected from 
CORSIA. From 2022, CORSIA’s three-yearly review cycle, comparable to the PA’s global stocktake, 
could in principle be used to ratchet up the scheme’s ambition in light of new scientific evidence on 
progress towards achieving the long-term temperature goal. It will be important to maintain US 
participation, without which CORSIA’s coverage of emissions (above 2020 levels) between 2020 and 
2035 would drop from 77% to 56%. (WWF 2017).77  
Although demand management would appear to be unavoidable if aviation is to do its ‘fair share’ of 
decarbonisation, it is hard to imagine how this could be pursued at international level. Personal 
carbon quota schemes or frequent flier levies78, which could in principle include international flights, 
would, as noted by Bows-Larkin (2015), require national-level action. A degree of demand 
management is conceivable by removing the exemption passenger flight tickets enjoy from VAT, 
something that could also bring fiscal benefits (see suggested recommendations to the EU in section 
10.6). NGOs advocating that individuals restrict their flying are emerging, but any social movement 
in that direction has yet to gain significant momentum.  
Concerning transparency and accountability, it is essential that ICAO develops registries and 
accounting mechanisms that can guarantee that any emissions reductions claimed by airlines under 
CORSIA are not also claimed by the host country towards their NDCs. This will require close 
collaboration across the two parallel sets of technical negotiations on the CORSIA in ICAO and Article 
6 of the PA (WWF 2017). Controversial issues related to integrity of offsets must also be addressed, 
as well as sustainability standards for biofuels (discussed briefly below in a cross-sectoral context). 
The latest available draft at time of writing proposes that forest offsets and carbon credits sourced 
from the CDM should be eligible, despite major controversies with both these sources. Arguably, 
CORSIA should only accept credits from projects where the investment decision was made after the 
decision to proceed with CORSIA, an approach favoured by the EU (ENDS Europe Daily 2018). Long-
term availability and cost of offset credits depends on linkages with carbon markets associated with 
other economic sectors. Some have also mooted the idea of making State action plans mandatory 
(Piera 2016). 
To address the shortfall in terms of the knowledge and learning function, coordinated efforts by 
airlines, governments, manufacturers and other stakeholders should be made to increase R&D on 
low-carbon aircraft design. Similarly, governments and airlines should work together to advance 
renewable jet fuel technology to reach a commercial scale, while ensuring the delivery of real 
emission reductions compared with alternatives (Gencsu and Hino 2015).  
77 At time of writing, continuing US participation is still under review.  
78 http://afreeride.org/ 
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8.4.3. A cross-sectoral consideration: biofuel sustainability 
In both aviation and shipping cases, ensuring that the production of alternative, low-carbon fuels 
adheres to high quality and sustainability standards is critical to avoid side-effects, including those 
that erode supposed carbon emission reductions. Standard-setting bodies can have a role here: the 
ISO 8217 marine fuel standard (sixth edition), for example, currently makes a clear distinction 
between superior and inferior biofuel grades. Through blending mandates and fuel standards, 
governments have the leverage to create demand stability that could assist biofuel availability and 
uptake (International Transport Forum 2018). Stringent sustainability criteria for biofuels need to 
include direct and indirect effects on land use. Recent decisions in the context of CORSIA give 
significant cause for concern here (ENDS Europe Daily 2017, 2018). Scarcity issues also arise for both 
aviation and shipping in terms of the need to compete for supplies of biofuel with alternative uses. 
These issues are highlighted again in chapter 10.  
8.4.4. Interactions with the UNFCCC 
To enhance transparency and accountability, and potentially also knowledge and learning as a 
consequence, consideration could be given to the IMO, (and ICAO) or State Parties as part of their 
NDC submissions, reporting on sectoral emissions as part of the Global Stocktake. Alternatively, 
individual Parties could be asked to report on emissions from these sectors in their Article 13 
inventories. Either way, as Chircop et al. (2018: 21) have noted, ‘it will be critical that accurate and 
consistent information about emission trajectories in the international shipping sector is available 
every five years starting in 2018. Ideally, this would lead to an assessment of what approaches have 
been implemented, which have been effective and which have not’. The same need to harmonise 
transparency and accountability functions across ICAO and UNFCCC has already been raised above.  
Opportunities should also be explored for consistency and cooperation between ICAO and IMO 
sectoral initiatives, and institutions and instruments under the PA covering market mechanisms, 
finance and technology implementation, to assist in effective implementation of measures agreed 
under sector-related process. Chircop et al. (2018) suggest that traditional maritime regulation alone 
will likely not be sufficient for the required mitigation effort, and that novel measures and possible 
linkages with other global and regional regimes, for example to develop effective MBMs, may be 
needed. If IMO parties decide to explore an MBM that includes access to ‘out-of-sector’ reductions 
or offsets, it would be helpful to seek consistency with the emerging new Sustainable Development 
Mechanism under Article 6.4 of the PA. The technology mechanism affirmed in Article 10 of the Paris 
Agreement is dealing with climate technology transfer in a broad sense, and may offer valuable 
possibilities for cooperation and coordination. 
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Table 8.2: Summary of activity under key governance functions for international transport. 
Note: the table is under review in light of developments in sectoral governance in 2018. 
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9. Buildings
Gauri Khandekar and Sebastian Oberthür 
9.1. Transformation Challenges and Governance Demands 
9.1.1. Current Status and Prospect 
The global buildings and construction sector accounts for more than half of global wealth (Global 
Alliance for Buildings and Construction, 2016). In 2010, the buildings sector accounted for 32 per 
cent of total global final energy consumption (51 per cent of global electricity consumption) and 
produced 19 per cent of global GHG emissions (including electricity-related, while direct emissions 
stood at 6.4 per cent of the global total) (Lucon et al. 2014, p. 687). GHG emissions from the building 
sector have more than doubled since 1970 (Lucon et al. 2014, p. 678). Most of the GHG emissions in 
the buildings sector are indirect CO2 emissions that emanate from electricity use in buildings and are 
projected to grow 1.8 per cent a year through 2030 (Knox, 2015). 
Population growth, urbanisation, rising per capita incomes, and climate change are key factors that 
will dramatically impact this sector and drive an increase of energy use. The United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) estimates global population to grow to 9.7 
billion by 2050 of which approximately 2.5 billion will be new urban inhabitants, mainly in Africa and 
Asia (UNDESA, 2015). Urban areas will comprise 85 per cent of growth in building energy use until 
2050, 70 per cent of them in developing countries (Diana Urge-Vorsatz, Cabeza, Serrano, Barreneche, 
& Petrichenko, 2015). As global temperature rises, the demand for space cooling amongst warmer 
countries is expected to triple between 2010 and 2050 (IEA, 2013). Moreover, urbanisation is 
typically associated with a shift from traditional biomass fuels (such as wood and waste) to more 
modern fuels (such as natural gas or electricity), but also with greater potential for energy efficiency 
measures. Overall, the IPCC has warned that, in the absence of action, the use of energy in buildings 
could double or in worse case, triple by 2050 (Lucon et al., 2014). In order to meet the 2/1.5°C goal 
set out by the Paris Agreement (PA), the buildings sector would have to reduce energy and process-
based CO2 emissions by 60 per cent in 2050 compared to 2012 (Dean et al. 2016). 
Spatial heating and cooling, cooking and water heating in the buildings sector account for the lion’s 
share of the buildings sector’s final energy consumption. In 2012, the respective shares in residential 
and commercial buildings were: 32 and 33 per cent for space heating, 24 and 12 per cent for water 
heating, two and 32 per cent for cooling and 29 per cent for cooking (residential buildings only) (IEA 
2013 in Lucon et al. 2014, p.681). The relatively large share of cooking ensues as a result of the use 
of traditional biomass (in combination for water heating) by approximately 3 billion people with low 
conversion efficiencies in developing countries (IEA, 2013).  
The buildings sector varies both regionally and within regions, depending on climate, economy, 
energy access, availability of energy sources, and energy-related policies (Knox, 2015). Per capita 
final energy use in buildings in countries like the US and Canada can be as much as five to ten fold 
higher than in Africa or Latin America per se (D. Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2012). Space heating continues 
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to dominate building energy use in OECD countries, while cooking and water heating account for 
nearly 60 per cent of building energy demand in non-OECD countries. In the non-OECD nations, 
consumption of delivered energy in buildings is estimated to grow by 2.1 per cent per year from 
2012 to 2040, nearly three times the growth rate for the OECD nations (Knox, 2015). Three quarters 
of the final energy consumption for heating and cooling is fossil fuel based including the generation 
mixes for electricity used for heating and cooling, and for commercial heat. Renewables constitute 
the remaining portion, of which almost 90 per cent is traditional biomass (IEA, 2015). 
Achieving the goals of the PA will require an ambitious mix of mainstreaming highly energy-efficient 
near-zero or net-zero energy and energy-plus buildings in new construction, a massive retrofit of the 
existing building stock and a switch to greener sources of energy in particular electricity from 
renewables (Dean et al., 2016). According to the CAT (2016), if all new buildings were to be zero-
energy (by 2020 in OECD countries and by 2025 in non-OECD countries) alongside deep renovation 
rates (5 percent in OECD countries and 3 percent in non-OECD countries per year), the buildings 
sector would be compatible with the 1.5°C pathway. Although the buildings sector is currently one 
of the largest GHG emitting sectors, it offers large low-cost potential for reducing energy demand 
and associated emissions in all world regions by 2030 (Lucon et al., 2014). Although definitions vary, 
net-zero energy buildings (NZEBs) are buildings with on-site renewable energy systems (such as PV, 
wind turbines, or solar thermal) that generate an equivalent amount of energy as is consumed by 
the building (Lucon et al., 2014). In the case of energy-plus buildings, such renewable energy 
generation exceeds consumption. 
Enormous potential for reducing energy consumption and GHG emissions can be realised through 
retrofitting existing buildings as well as, even more so, in constructing new buildings. Buildings 
envelopes are key. According to the IEA, a high-performance building envelope for existing and new 
buildings in OECD countries can reduce energy required for heating to 20-30 per cent of current 
consumption while it can boost energy savings potential for cooling between 10-40 per cent in hot 
countries (IEA, 2013). Holistic retrofits can result in 50–90 per cent final energy savings in thermal 
energy use in existing buildings, with the cost savings usually surpassing investments (D. Urge-
Vorsatz et al., 2012). As regards new buildings, cost-effective technology and materials now make it 
possible to construct buildings that use 10–40 per cent of the final heating and cooling energy of 
conventional new buildings in all world regions and climate zones (D. Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2012).  
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design certification is the most widely used third-party 
verification for green buildings and ensures that buildings use one third less electricity (Knox, 2015). 
The World Green Building Trends 2016 study finds that globally, green building construction is 
steadily rising, most of the growth coming from emerging economies in Asia. Smart building 
technology spending is also expected to rise from USD 6.3 billion in 2014 to USD 17.4 billion in 2019 
(Feblowitz & Levine, 2015). 
As regards cookstoves, biomass used in open fire or basic cook stoves, still represents two-thirds of 
energy consumption for cooking globally. More efficient biomass stoves can deliver fuel savings of 
30–60 per cent and chimney-included models can reduce indoor air pollution levels by 80–90 per 
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cent (D. Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2012). and transition from traditional biomass to modern fuels could 
save 3.5 EJ of energy, (or around or 34 per cent of total buildings energy consumption in 2010 (IEA, 
2013). 
9.1.2. Main Challenges and Barriers toward Decarbonisation 
 There is a palpable paucity of strong regulatory measures or incentives across all regions and 
countries, even though a number of affordable technologies and efficiency improvements that can 
help decarbonise the sector exist. Even in most developed countries, policies that mandate energy-
efficient retrofits typically result in savings of only 20–40 per cent of the building energy use 
(Guneralp et al., 2017). Low efficiency targets risk resulting in a decades long lock in for energy use 
and corresponding GHG emissions (D. Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2012). Moreover, even in most developed 
regions like the EU where policies exist, implementation is poor (Boasson & Dupont, 2015). The rate 
of retrofitting in the EU is currently a mere one per cent annually, which would require a century to 
decarbonise the sector. Many OECD members have indeed pursued NZEBs for the past 10-12 years, 
but progress remains low including inside the EU (Boasson & Dupont, 2015; IEA, 2015). Introducing 
policies that mandate state-of-the-art deep retrofits could save 70-90 per cent of building energy 
use (Guneralp et al., 2017). At the policy level, ambition is low in non-OECD nations too, where the 
emphasis will be on new constructions rather than on retrofits. 
The lack of training, awareness of existing technology costs and capacity building measures 
constitute an important non-financial barrier (IEA, 2013). The sector involves a large number of 
stakeholders (constructors, building product producers, building managers, architects, engineers, 
owners, occupants, investors, trades people, equipment manufacturers, suppliers, architects, 
lenders, insurers, codes and standards setters, zoning officials, realtors and others) (Boasson & 
Dupont, 2015; IEA, 2013) and is deeply fragmented (between the national or local level). Consumer-
awareness programmes, standards and labelling while effective tools to encourage purchase of the 
most efficient available technologies, are not prevalent across the globe, in particular in developing 
countries. In the absence of awareness, easy access to knowledge and technology, and organised 
training, the large number of private construction companies may either entirely perceive otherwise 
affordable decarbonisation measures to harm their competitiveness in a highly competitive real 
estate market or overlook them entirely. 
Transitioning to NZEBs globally will be difficult even though it may be the most efficient solution. 
NZEBs remain largely unaffordable, especially in the developing world. Moreover, there is a distinct 
lack of designers or builders with the necessary skills or experience to construct NZEBs. Technical 
challenges also inhibit the widespread construction of true NZEBs and NZEB communities given their 
suitability for only certain building types and settlement patterns, primarily low-rise buildings and 
less densely populated residential areas. Moreover, their economics are presently typically 
unfavourable, as opposed to high-efficiency buildings (D. Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2012). In a 2010 study 
cited by the IPCC only about 300 both commercial and residential net zero or almost NZEBs existed 
worldwide at the time (Lucon et al., 2014). 
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The continued widespread use of solid fuels — including wood, charcoal, coal, animal dung, and crop 
waste — for cooking and heating energy supply remains an important source of buildings sector 
GHG emissions. Globally, there remains a lack of adequate support for the sustainable production of 
clean biomass fuels and renewable fuel alternatives alongside the current focus on stove efficiency 
and emissions given that demand-side solutions alone are not enough (Putti, Venkata, Tsan, Mehta, 
& Kammila, 2015). The drive to increase the focus on clean cooking solutions remains arbitrary 
across the world. Globally, more than 3 billion people, particularly in rural areas in the developing 
world, still use solid fuels as their primary cooking and heating energy supply. And only about 200 
million have access to improved or clean cookstoves (Putti et al., 2015). Access to finance, consumer 
education, quality standards, policy reform, and market intelligence will be needed for a transition 
to more efficient cooking and heating energy supply (Putti et al., 2015). 
Although improving building efficiency is often profitable, investments are hindered by various 
barriers: “market barriers (like high initial costs and low priority of energy efficiency in decision-
making – and market failures e.g. principal-agent problems, transaction costs, search costs, 
regulatory compliance issues) (IEA, 2013), split incentives, distorted energy price/tax regimes, 
limited access to financing, lack of information and awareness of benefits, regulatory failures, and so 
on (Lucon et al., 2014). Regulatory failures can include policies that have inhibited the deployment of 
technologies. For instance, in some countries, building codes prohibit the installation of solar 
thermal collectors on roofs or local regulations exist that may not foster innovative building 
solutions (IEA, 2013). Decision makers themselves at times do not have accurate or adequate 
information on varied aspects.  
The principal-agent problem is also important especially in OECD countries where either building 
developers seek to minimise costs without the long-term interests of owners or occupiers in mind or 
where landlords make purchase heating and cooling equipment for tenants without regard to life-
cycle costs (Murtishaw & Sathaye, 2006). Strong and diverse market oriented policies that can 
overcome these hurdles will help in catalysing potentially cost-effective investments (Lucon et al., 
2014). The lack of robust data and large-scale demonstration projects that evaluates the 
performance of energy-efficient and low/zero-carbon technologies in each market segment also 
compose a barrier (IEA, 2011). Financial challenges also remain. According to the IEA (IEA, 2013), 
decarbonisation in the sector would require an estimated USD 31 trillion by 2050. 
9.1.3. The Promise and Potential of International Cooperation 
Guidance and Signal Function 
A common international goal of full decarbonisation of the sector (e.g. early in the second half of the 
century) with targets differentiated by region could help to align the diversity of actors in the sector. 
This could be an important signal “to consumers and manufacturers, both to maximise efficiency and 
to limit the cost of future changes” (IEA, 2011). A well-defined global strategy for carbon neutrality 
of the buildings sector with differentiated targets can provide a roadmap for sustainable buildings 
subsectors (like heating and cooling, cooking, heating water, where challenges are indeed shared 
across a number of countries and/or regions) (Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction, 2016). 
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Setting Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
International regulation (technical standards and agreement on far-reaching decarbonisation 
objectives) can play a complementary role by addressing competitiveness concerns. Such concerns 
exist to the extent that decarbonising buildings cause significant net costs. This is under current 
market conditions (without full accounting of external costs of energy use and GHG emissions) 
especially the case for the more advanced transition to NZEBs. Having said that, many of the options 
for significantly reducing emissions in the sector do not involve significant net costs, but even 
generate net benefits. One challenge in developing any international rules will be to take into 
account the widely varying conditions in different countries and regions. An additional potential may 
exist with respect to the international harmonisation of certain building materials. 
Transparency and Accountability 
International agreement on differentiated targets/rules would require a transparency framework for 
performance assessment. Collection of data will be essential for regular tracking of progress.  
Means of Implementation 
The provision of adequate means of implementation like training, capacity building, awareness 
raising finance and investment can help address some of the key barriers to the decarbonisation of 
the buildings sector at the global level. International training, capacity building and awareness 
programmes for the large number of stakeholders involved in the buildings sector can help raise 
awareness and enhance skills and expertise. Such capacity building can help inform stakeholders in 
particular in low-mid income countries about otherwise overlooked affordable decarbonisation 
measures. International finance has a key role to play in delivering the enormous finance and 
investment required to bring about the transition in the buildings sector, in particular amongst low-
mid income countries. International banks can help promote decarbonisation by prioritising green 
buildings through soft loans, better interest rates or green bonds (WEF 2011). Multilateral 
development banks can help ensure that investments are available in all countries/regions. A 
particular potential exists regarding the distribution of clean cookstoves that can help reduce 
emissions in the sector at a large scale in many developing countries. 
Knowledge and Learning 
Policy and technical knowledge platforms can help increase information and awareness, allow the 
sharing of best practices, enable diffusion of technical know-how, develop solutions to common 
concerns like the principal-agent problem and empower policy makers to develop effective policies 
and low-carbon technology priorities (IEA, 2013). These platforms can also help promote awareness 
and knowledge of available financial incentives for high-performing products and systems (IEA, 
2015). A global database can help build and maintain reliable information, sectoral mapping, existing 
financial opportunities, climate compatible innovations, and a progress measurement system (Global 
Alliance for Buildings and Construction, 2016). The IEA also recommends an array of standardised 
information packages that can allow decision makers to compare the potential of technology 
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alternatives, identify performance targets and energy and CO2 savings at the time of design or 
purchase (IEA, 2013). 
There is a particularly high need for international governance institutions to provide a consistent 
guidance and signal towards decarbonisation of the buildings sector. The need for international 
institutions to provide the other identified governance functions is medium to medium-high (see 
Table 3.1) – while for example the need for regulation may be higher at other levels of governance. 
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Table 9.1: Synthesis of Demands for International Governance of the Buildings Sector 
9.2. Governance Supply 
This section provides a structured overview of existing/active international institutions relevant to 
the buildings sector and the governance functions they perform. We have identified 13 
existing/active international institutions which provide some governance to the buildings sector of 
which 5 are international institutions, 2 are regional and 2 are city networks. The table below 
provides a quick overview of the relevant institutions and which governance functions their activities 
most relate to. It is observed that the delivery of knowledge and learning is the governance function 
most performed by far. A detailed overview of the institutions is provided in the annex to this paper. 
9.2.1. International Institutions 
The G20. The IPEEC Secretariat oversees and coordinates the G20’s energy efficiency work under 
the 2014 G20 Energy Efficiency Action Plan and 2016 G20 Energy Efficiency Leading Programme. 
Buildings feature as one of six priority areas outlined in the Action Plan and has a dedicated task 
group: the Buildings Energy Efficiency Task Group (BEET) which works under the G20 Energy 
Efficiency Leading Programme (G20, 2016). Through BEET, which is a collaborative platform for 
countries to research, inform and support the development and implementation of effective 
building energy efficiency polices, focusing closely on building rating systems and building codes, the 
G20 provides knowledge and learning. BEET has also developed a web portal to facilitate 
collaboration among participating countries on building performance metrics and building codes and 
further generates knowledge through various reports. In 2014, the Energy Management Working 
Group (EMWG) of IPEEC launched in July 2010 launched a consensus-based, international 
Sector Guidance and 
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certification scheme for ISO 5000179  (IPEEC, 2018) ‘Lead Auditor’ which provides rules, while 
oversight by the EMWG provides transparency and accountability. ‘Lead Auditor’ also builds capacity 
among accreditation and certification bodies in participating countries to establish new personnel 
certification programs that are nationally relevant and internationally equivalent (IPEEC, 2016). 
Through the EMWG, energy ministries also share best practices, stakeholder (private industry, non-
government organisations (NGOs), standards and accreditation bodies) are engaged, and national 
and regional energy and climate strategies are supported. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) launched in 1974, is a Paris-based autonomous 
intergovernmental organisation established in the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The vast majority of the IEA’s work on decarbonisation in the 
buildings sector is based on knowledge and learning, and foster sharing of best practices through 
reports and stakeholder interaction. The IEA also conducts trainings (IEA, 2013a; 2015; 2018a), 
experts dialogues (IEA, 2018b) and workshops (IEA, 2011a; 2012; 2014) on various relevant issues. 
The IEA produces important knowledge on subjects like modernising buildings energy codes (IEA, 
2013b), energy performance certification (IEA, 2010), energy efficiency policies (IEA, 2011b) and so 
on. It regularly produces technology roadmaps (IEA, 2013c; IEA, 2011c; IEA, 2013d; IEA, 2011d) 
which fill an important knowledge gap especially amongst stakeholders in developing countries and 
produces detailed pathways to Transition to Sustainable Buildings by 2050 (IEA, 2013e; IEA, 2018c). 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is an agency of United Nations and 
coordinates its environmental activities, assisting developing countries in implementing 
environmentally sound policies and practices. Supported by UNEP, a 'Common Carbon Metric' aims 
to allow emissions from buildings around the world to be consistently assessed and compared, and 
improvements measured thereby providing rules (UN Environment Programme, 2018c). It 
contributes means of implementation through numerous projects which target capacity building, 
training, raising awareness, finance and investment. The Sustainable Buildings and Construction 
Programme (SBC) was launched in 2015 to promote resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation 
efforts, and the shift to SCP patterns in the buildings and construction sector (UN Environment 
Programme, No Year a). Its Sustainable Buildings and Climate Initiative (SBCI) launched in 2006 UNEP 
promotes and supports sustainable building practices on a global scale with a focus on energy 
efficiency and GHG emission reduction while its Sustainable Social Housing Initiative (SUSHI) and the 
Sustainable Buildings Policies in Developing Countries (SPOD) promotes sustainability in social 
housing programmes and helps governments at national and local levels to develop policy tools for 
mainstreaming sustainable construction and buildings approaches respectively. 
79 The ISO 50001 is applied by nearly 12 000 organisations at the end of 2015. According to the Clean Energy 
Ministerial (CEM), the implementation of ISO 50001 could potentially drive cumulative energy savings of 
approximately 62 exajoules by 2030 (in 2010, total global primary energy consumption was 550 exajoules), 
save USD 600 billion in energy costs and avoid 6500 million metric tons of CO2 emissions. 
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The Sustainable Energy for All programme launched in 2011 is a global initiative to provide universal 
access to modern energy service, and double both the global rate of improvement in energy 
efficiency and the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. The Energy Efficiency 
Accelerator Platform was established to help accelerate energy efficiency action in specific sectors, 
such as district energy, lighting, appliances, vehicle efficiency, buildings and industry (UN 
Environment Programme, 2016a). The District Energy in Cities Initiative, a partnership coordinated 
by UN Environment, supports market transformation efforts to shift the heating and cooling sector 
to energy efficient and renewable energy solutions. These are only a few examples of UNEP’s work 
on means of implementation. 
UNEP also helps building knowledge through reports, tracking progress, designing roadmaps in 
concert with government focal points and stakeholders (UN Environment Programme, 2018a) and 
financing projects.  Its various programmes bring together sector stakeholders by providing a 
platform for dialogue and collective action, develops tools and strategies to better evaluate and 
implement sustainable building practices, and pilot projects. The NAMA for Buildings project started 
in October 2013 and has delivered stakeholder engagement to share experiences on assessment of 
existing building policies and identify priority opportunities for potential buildings sector NAMAs (UN 
Environment Programme, 2018d). A Global Status Report 2016 aims to track each year the progress 
made in the transition towards low-emission and resilient real estate, building knowledge (UN 
Environment Programme, 2016b), while the Handbook on Climate finance for cities and buildings 
helps raise awareness among local stakeholders regarding climate finance and its potential in the 
built environment, help local governments use climate finance mechanisms to increase the energy 
performance of their district while creating additional revenue, improve resource efficiency and 
support their wider climate strategies (UN Environment Programme, No Year b). 
“A 'Quick Scan Tool' to assess policies in the building sector and scenarios to improve the current 
situation are being tested in two pilot cities, Nairobi (Kenya) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso)” (UN 
Environment Programme, 2018b). A Regional Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP) 
Roadmap aims to promote resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation efforts, and the shift to 
SCP patterns in the buildings and construction sector. The roadmap focuses on regional level support 
through national technical assistance packages at the sectoral/thematic level, regional and sub-
regional policy dialogue, training and networking activities, building public private partnerships, and 
offering national training activities (UN Environment Programme, No Year). UNEP, with support of 
the Cities Alliance, is also developing a practical methodology for better integrating environmental 
concerns in strategic planning at the city level (UN Environment Programme, No Year c). UNEP is also 
working closely with UN-Habitat on sustainable urban planning and management through a 2007 
joint Partnership Framework. 
The United Nations agency for human settlements and sustainable urban development (UN-
Habitat) seeks to promote socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements 
development and adequate shelter for all. UN-Habitat delivers mainly means of implementation and 
knowledge and learning through sharing of best practices and providing a platform for stakeholders. 
It channels finance from other sources to enhance the transition to low emission urban development 
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(Ministry of the Environment, Finland and UNEP, 2015). Through Its 10YFP Programme on 
Sustainable Buildings and Construction (one of the five initial 10YFP programmes adopted in Rio+20) 
it seeks to build and add to existing knowledge (UN Habitat, 2015). 
UN-Habitat helps capacity development programmes in partnership with local government training 
institutes and universities. Its Habitat UNI initiative (UN Habitat, 2012) links it to universities 
worldwide and in addition to thematic hubs, its Global Urban Lecture series builds knowledge on 
decarbonisation of buildings sector. Its Habitat Professionals Forum (HPF) was established in 1999 as 
an inter-disciplinary partnership of Human Settlement Professionals and UN-Habitat to promote the 
delivery of sustainable urbanisation and equitable human settlements development. It provides a 
platform for Human Settlements NGOs and works amongst other targets, to deliver sustainable 
urbanisation, especially at the “grassroots”, in particular by building up capacity in countries without 
it (Habitat Professionals Forum, 2018). 
Its initiatives seek to raise awareness and build knowledge. For instance, it’s Cities and Climate 
Change Initiative (CCCI), active in 40 cities, supports city leaders and practitioners in addressing the 
impact of climate change (adaptation) and to help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation) 
through vulnerability assessments, climate change action plans, and in some countries support 
towards policy processes that address climate change. Its World Urban Campaign (WUC) is an 
advocacy and partnership platform to raise awareness about positive urban change in order to 
achieve green, productive, safe, healthy, inclusive, and well-planned cities, driven by 180 partners 
and networks globally. 
9.2.2. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) 
Funding from MDBs like the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDBG), and the World Bank Group (WBG) are 
key to decarbonisation of the sector. A significant amount of finance will be required for the 
transition. The IEA (2013) estimates that decarbonisation in the sector would require USD 31 trillion 
by 2050).  However, a joint report from the above mentioned MDBs published by EIB (2016) on MDB 
climate finance reveals that while the combined MDB climate finance for 2016 was US$ 65 Bn 
(constituted of US$ 27 Bn in climate finance and US$ 38 Bn in net climate co-finance alongwith MDB 
own resources), less than a fifth of the total adaptation finance (18 percent or around US$ 1 Bn) of 
US$ 6.2 Bn went to the “energy, transport and other built environment and infrastructure” (it is 
unclear how much was transferred to the buildings sector in isolation). Activities eligible for building 
sector climate finance include: energy efficiency improvements and audits (EIB, 2016). However, 
while they all have relevant finance programmes, the exact figure going to the buildings sector is 
unavailable. 
The World Bank Group (WBG) is an international financial institution that provides loans to 
countries of the world for capital programs. Between FY2011 and FY2016, the WBG committed $63 
billion dollars, an average of more than $10 billion a year, to more than 1,000 climate-related 
projects that help countries adapt to a changing climate and mitigate the impacts of climate change. 
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In the past decade, WBG has almost doubled its financial commitments for cities to an annual 
average of $4.11 billion (FY2009–FY2013). WBG performs four governance functions: (issue specific) 
guidance and signal, rules setting, means of implementation and knowledge and learning. WBG 
provides a very focused guidance of transitioning to clean stoves and fuels. It provides rules through 
the development of green building codes and certification systems. A member of the World Bank 
Group, International Finance Corporation (IFC) is the largest global development institution that 
focuses exclusively on developing countries. It has also developed green building codes for 
numerous cities and countries. Although insufficient in aspiration, IFC’s EDGE (Excellence in Design 
for Greater Efficiencies) is a green building certification system which offers certification for new 
housing, offices, retail, hospitals and hotels that achieve at least 20 percent reductions in energy, 
water and the energy used in making the building materials compared to conventional construction. 
The EDGE certification is currently used by more than 130 countries. 
The WBG provides finance, investment, training, and capacity building and raises awareness. Since 
2005, the IFC has invested about $15.3 billion in long-term financing for energy efficiency, renewable 
power, and green buildings (the green building portfolio of commercial and residential buildings 
totals more than $1.5 billion) (World Bank, 2018). In India, the IFC is planning to invest over US $1 
billion in next five years in creating green buildings, out of a total planned investment of around US 
$5-6 billion to be injected into the country's climate change programs. IFC is also one of the earliest 
issuers of green bonds. Since 2014, the IFC supported 93 green bond eligible projects worldwide 
worth USD 3 billion. The IFC plays a leading role in developing principles, procedures, and guidelines 
for the global green bond market, providing the issuers and investors practical guidance in launching 
a credible green bond for sustainable construction projects (Shan et at., 2017). Since 2008, the 
World Bank has issued over USD 10 billion equivalent in green bonds supporting around 70 
sustainable development projects around the developing world. To accelerating the transition to 
clean stoves and fuels, the World Bank has committed $130 million across 13 countries benefitting 
11 million people to date. Moreover, “through results-based financing (RBF), the World Bank has 
helped private companies to enter the clean cookstoves market in China, Mongolia, Lao 
PDR, Bangladesh, Uganda, and Kenya. In Indonesia, a pilot project provided incentives to 10 private 
suppliers to distribute 10,000 clean cookstoves” (World Bank, 2017). 
Under its urban strategy, several resilient cities initiatives have been established which raise 
awareness of sustainable buildings and engage in capacity building (World Bank Group, 2016). By 
2020, the WBG seeks to, through its Global Platform for Sustainable Cities, further integrate climate 
into urban planning and launch tools and knowledge products available for 30 cities by 2020 (World 
Bank Group, 2016b). From FY2011 to FY2015, WBG portfolio for climate funding in Africa was 
around $1.7 billion per year, most of which focused on mitigation, mainly on energy and green 
buildings (World Bank Group, 2016b). Through its Global Platform for Sustainable Cities, the WB 
aims by 2020 to develop pilot programs in 15 cities that integrate low-carbon and climate resilient 
approaches to various elements of urban planning The WBG performs knowledge and learning by 
reports, conferences, new technologies for training like the Open Learning Campus, “open data” 
approach, which help develop evidence-based policies. Open data are particularly important for 
DRM and climate change adaptation, considering the need to include risk information and data in 
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planning and design decisions (Shan et at., 2017). The WBG’s Collaboration for Development (C4D) 
platform’s ECCH Community of Practice (CoP) is a collaboration tool, aims to facilitate knowledge 
sharing, and stakeholder engagement on clean cooking and heating (Collaboration for Development, 
2018). ESMAP is a partnership between the World Bank Group and 17 partners to help low and 
middle-income countries on sustainable energy solutions which emphasises knowledge and sharing 
and training. ESMAP’s Tool for Rapid Assessment of City Energy (TRACE) which helps more than 80 
cities globally use energy efficiently (ESMAP, 2018). 
9.2.3. Other International/Global Institutions/Initiatives 
The Global Buildings Performance Network (GBPN), launched by the Climate Works Foundation in 
2010, is a “globally organised and regionally focused organization” that advances building energy 
performance and works towards sustainable buildings. The GBPN is headquartered in Paris and has 
regional representation offices (in Beijing) and partner organisations (in Delhi, Brussels, Washington 
D.C. – partner organisation include mainly NGOs or foundations) which aims to provide policy
expertise and technical assistance to stakeholders (international organisations, governments,
industries, research institutes and NGOs). GBPN has project partners also in South East Asia, while
their experts network includes Latin American and African expertise. GBPN pursues a “Deep
abatement Path” with a sector specific target of 2.2 Gigatonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) abatement globally
by 2030 and 3.2 Gt CO2 by 2050 compared to today’s carbon emissions and 80 percent energy
demand mitigation from buildings globally by 2050 compared to 2005 levels. It has also developed
locally adapted (country and region specific) implementation roadmaps (Global Buildings
Performance Network, 2012) and guidelines to help develop sector-specific strategies (Global
Buildings Performance Network, 2013a).
GBPN activities include policy analysis, capacity building, awareness raising and sharing of 
knowledge, data and best practices between regions. The GBPN fosters research and knowledge 
amongst diverse key stakeholders and helps them identify, adapt and implement policy best 
practices for low-energy, affordable and healthy buildings. It has created numerous on-line tools and 
engages in capacity building by providing venues for sharing and implementation of best practises 
and policies (Global Buildings Performance Network, 2013g), training (Global Buildings Performance 
Network, 2017a; Global Buildings Performance Network, 2017b; 2013h), building market intelligence 
(Global Buildings Performance Network, 2017c), workshops (Global Buildings Performance Network , 
2013i) and widely accessible webinars (Global Buildings Performance Network, 2013j; Global 
Buildings Performance Network, 2014d) which explain technical details to a large number of 
stakeholders. Its web portal (Global Buildings Performance Network, 2015) supports more efficient 
international collaboration on building energy code implementation and is part of GBPN’s 
‘Laboratory’ (Global Buildings Performance Network, 2013k) - a knowledge platform on building 
energy performance policies globally – which also includes knowledge on buildings renovation and 
positive energy buildings. 
The Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction (GABC) was set up at COP21, as part of the Lima 
Paris Action Agenda and includes 24 key countries (ministries) (mainly in the Americas, Europe, 
Russia and parts of Asia – state members in India, China and Australia) and 72 non-state 
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organisations (sub-national, non-governmental organisations and private sector) from all over the 
world (The Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction, 2018). The GABC guidance to the sector to 
remain by 2050 on a below 2 °C path or 84 GtCO2 (from energy efficiency, fuel switching and 
renewable measures in buildings) reaching even up to cumulative saving of 250 GtCO2 (when paired 
with increased investments in low-carbon power generation) (The Global Alliance for Buildings and 
Construction, 2016) (targeting 50 percent or more energy savings potential in 2050) via a low-carbon 
and energy transition through policies for sustainable, energy efficient buildings. The GABC has 
developed a global roadmap to this extent in collaboration with UNEP (The Global Alliance for 
Buildings and Construction, 2016). 
The global roadmap seeks to set relevant targets for a low-carbon, energy efficient buildings and the 
construction sector, increase awareness, train building professionals, engage on workforce 
development and skills and training, support technology transfer, convene and facilitate events 
(round tables, workshops, and deal-flow events) in partnership with the G20 and UNEP. It also 
streamlines access to the large number of existing support programs, create a deal-flow database 
that includes project-ready assistance for policy action planning activities, identify funding to 
conduct market engagement and coordinate community engagement. The GABC has also set up 
various support programs, platforms, and tools. GABC does not provide finance but helps to identify 
investment barriers and existing solutions, promoting collaboration between public and financial 
sectors and drive harmonisation (in building codes, housing policies, property standards, and 
evaluations of performance) in order to enable and accelerate investments. 
The World Green Building Council (WorldGBC), founded in 1999, is a non-profit organisation and a 
coalition of national Green Building Councils (GBCs) (independent, non-profit organisations made up 
of businesses and organisations working in the building and construction industry) from 73 countries 
(spread across all continents) and representing over 49,000 property and construction companies 
(World Green Building Council, 2017). The WorldGBC has office in five regions Africa, Americas, Asia 
Pacific, Europe and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and endeavours to tailor its 
approaches according to regional capacities and needs. It is the largest international organisation 
focusing closely on green buildings. WorldGBC provides a 2050 sectoral decarbonisation target of 
limiting global temperature rise to 2 °C, reducing the building and construction sector’s 
CO2 emissions by 84 Gigatonnes and warranting all buildings be net zero emissions. WorldGBC 
promotes green building across the globe, engages in awareness raising and communication, builds 
capacity and knowledge, engages stakeholders through events and programmes, and generates new 
ideas and solutions that accelerate green buildings often through regional-specific projects.  
It launched 5 new net zero building certifications under which 1.24 billion m2 (an area roughly the 
size of the city of London) of green building space around the world have been certified by 2017 
(World Green Buildings Council, 2017). It has various focused working groups (example an Asia 
Pacific one on achieving net zero carbon buildings by 2050) which works with key players in the 
region. Via its Building Efficiency Accelerator programme - a partnership of businesses, NGOs and 
multilateral organisations and led by the World Resources Institute - GBCs provide support and 
expertise to 25 cities across Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas to reduce their buildings’ energy 
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consumption and CO2 emissions. Its net zero buildings awareness campaign recorded more than 250 
events and activities around the world. It has also launched 8 national renovation strategies to 
renovate existing buildings to high standards of energy efficiency in Europe.  
Low Carbon Technology Partnership initiative (LCTPi) is a climate leadership program of the WBCSD 
(a global, CEO-led organisation of over 200 leading businesses working together to accelerate the 
transition to a sustainable world) launched at COP21 in Paris that brings companies together to 
accelerate low-carbon technology solutions to stay well below the 2°C limit as outlined in the PA. 
Although it has a broad focus, in the buildings sector, LCTPi targets 65% of emissions reductions or 3-
3.5 GtCO2e/year for remaining well below the 2°C ceiling and reduce projected energy use in 
buildings by 50% by 2030 through energy efficiency in buildings (Low Carbon Technology Partnership 
Initiative, 2015). It engages in training and capacity building and finance through various initiatives 
and has developed platforms for stakeholder engagement. LCTPi has a dedicated Energy Efficiency in 
Buildings (EEB) Working Group which not only targets low carbon technology deployment, but also 
brings together buildings value chain stakeholders in 50 local markets. Between 2014 to 2016, 10 
cities engaged through this process resulting in six new EEB platforms in Houston, Warsaw, Jaipur, 
Jakarta, Shanghai and Rio de Janeiro. The success of the 10 EEB pilot cities, will be expanded to 50 
cities by 2020. LCTPi has also created a business-led approach Handbook on Energy Efficient 
Buildings. LCTPi also launched enabler projects on awareness. LCTPi fosters sharing of best practice 
on building efficiency to achieve national energy and climate goals. 
9.2.4. City Networks 
Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) is the world’s leading network of over 1,000 cities, 
towns and metropolises committed to building a sustainable future, impacting over 20% of the 
world's urban population. ICLEI provides means of implementation, helps build knowledge, fosters 
stakeholder engagement and the sharing of best practises and has tools which help diffuse 
knowledge. Its dedicated Buildings Efficiency Accelerator (BEA) programme is a public-private 
collaboration present in 33 cities across the Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa, that helps accelerate 
local government implementation of building efficiency policies and programs. Actions include 
implementing buildings codes, retrofits (including improvements in insulation and heating systems 
and installation of renewable energy systems), application of best practices in energy efficiency and 
so on (BEA, no date). 
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40), launched in 2005, is a network of more than 90 of the 
world’s megacities (representing over 650 million people and one quarter of the global economy) 
committed to addressing climate change. C40 supports cities to collaborate effectively, share 
knowledge and drive meaningful, measurable and sustainable action on climate change. It is the 
world’s largest cooperative effort among mayors and city officials to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate risks in cities. C40 cities are required to commit themselves to a target of 
limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 °C. Although the target is broad, it is assumed to cover also 
the buildings sector. More specifically in the buildings sector, C40 focuses intently on training and 
capacity building, awareness, sharing of best practises, facilitation of peer-to-peer exchanges, 
collaborating on data management, policy and technical knowledge platforms which underscore 
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stakeholder engagement and has an open, interactive data source. It has a few dedicated networks 
which focus on energy efficiency of existing commercial and residential buildings, efficiency of 
municipal buildings, low-carbon district heating, cooling and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 
systems, and sustainable infrastructure finance (C40, 2016). All these networks provide platforms for 
sharing best practices, collaborating on data management, promoting technologies, building 
awareness, and finding new solutions. It also produces numerous open access reports related to 
buildings sector decarbonisation and conducts events/workshops. 
9.2.5. Regional Institutions/Initiatives 
The Renovate Europe campaign (Renovate Europe, 2018) was initiated by EuroACE (The European 
Alliance of Companies for Energy Efficiency in Buildings) and is an industry-led political 
communications campaign calling for the reduction of energy demand of the EU building stock 
by 80% by 2050 compared to 2005 levels through legislation and ambitious renovation programmes 
which would bring the energy performance of the entire building stock in the EU to an NZEB 
performance level. Renovate Europe envisions achieving the target by tripling the EUs average 
renovation rate from the current 1% to 3% per year before 2020, ensuring that all renovations are 
deep or staged deep renovations and driving the formulation and implementation of an effective 
policy and legal framework. Beyond its campaign for a region-specific sectoral target, Renovate 
Europe produces reports and holds events which adds to sectoral knowledge and learning. 
The Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) is a forum for 21 Pacific Rim member economies that 
promotes free trade throughout the Asia-Pacific region. APEC program Nearly (Net) Zero Energy 
Building aspires to reduce APEC's aggregate energy intensity by 45 percent by 2035 compared to 
2005 providing a very specific sectoral target. APEC’s benchmarking system for data on energy use in 
commercial and industrial buildings (Feinberg, R. E. & Zhao, Y., 2001) provide rules for the region 
while its “Green Building Project” advances use of international standards. Its dedicated 
projects contribute by building awareness and promoting participation in developing technical 
requirements that facilitate trade in the sustainable construction of commercial buildings (ASTM 
International, 2011). APEC’s “Green Building Project” advances green building and building energy 
efficiency provides means of implementation and fosters public-private collaboration.80 APEC also 
builds knowledge and learning through its platforms. For instance, APEC program on NZEB involves 
20 APEC members and covers a series of meetings, task group (since 2013), exchange of NZEB best 
practices, energy reduction results comparative studies, an APEC Nearly (Net) Zero Energy Building 
Roadmap Study, and progress reports and energy efficiency goals which vary by region, climate, 
energy sources and environmental goals (resilience, etc.) (Stinson, S., 2017). Another APEC Energy 
80 In addition to finance, the Project supports a variety of actions within individual economies like exchange of 
knowledge on green building codes and building information modeling (BIM), various guides (such as the APEC 
Green Building Code Infrastructure Guide, Start-Up Guide on  Building Information Modeling, APEC Guide to 
Performance Metrics and BIM to support Green Building Objectives) and Building Codes and Standards which 
exchanges best practices on individual APEC member economies building codes that increase building 
performance. 
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Working Group is helping member economies optimise local building codes with the aim of making 
commercial buildings more energy efficient. APEC also provides a platform for energy officials from 
member economies who meet regularly to enhance commercial building energy performance and 
discuss nearly zero energy building development (Focus Taiwan, 2017). 
9.3. Assessing the Governance Complex 
This section discusses to what extent the governance demands are collectively being satisfied by the 
institutional complex as described above (and as summarised in table 9.2 below). The institutional 
landscape that is relevant for the decarbonisation of the buildings sector is characterised by a little 
more than a dozen or so institutions with insufficient reach and authority to decarbonise the sector. 
The greatest need identified in section 9.1.3 for decarbonisation of the sector was for international 
governance to provide guidance and signal in the form of a sector-specific decarbonisation target 
and sub-targets for subsectors (like heating, cooling, cooking and heating water) as well as regional 
specialisations. However, very few of the institutions identified define targets for the buildings 
sector, and where they do, the reach and authority of the targets remains unclear. Moreover, hardly 
any institution emerges saliently as a core institution for the building sector. 
Guidance and Signal Function 
Guidance to decarbonisation of the buildings sector has been identified as a sector-specific 
decarbonisation target and sub-targets for subsectors (like heating, cooling, cooking and heating 
water). These are variously provided by GBPN, GABC, WorldGBC, LCTPi globally, and APEC and 
RenovateEurope regionally. Moreover, the WBG provides a sub-sector specific targets calling for a 
transition to clean stoves and fuels while Renovate Europe calls for tripling the EU’s average 
renovation rate before 2020. Overall, the global targets vary in emissions reductions quantities and 
energy consumption reductions, which leads to the lack of a firm, definitive guidance and signal 
(sectoral ‘decarbonisation’ target, sub-targets for subsectors). Most of the institutions/organisations’ 
targets are compatible a 2°C target, but it is unclear whom their targets mainly seek to inform or 
whether they are authoritative enough to commit stakeholders and those outside of their 
engagement to sectoral decarbonisation. Overall, the provision of guidance to the sector remains 
low. 
Setting Rules to Facilitate Collective Action 
Section 1.3 has identified the need for international technical standards and agreement on far-
reaching decarbonisation objectives in order to fulfil the function of rules setting. In the buildings 
sector, while a number of international institutions/organisations may provide variations of technical 
standards (WorldGBC’ Green Buildings Certification Scheme, the G20’s consensus-based, 
international certification scheme for ISO 50001, WBG’s Green Buildings codes and Green Buildings 
certification system, APEC’s benchmarking system for data on energy use in commercial and 
industrial buildings and its “Green Building Project” advances use of international standards), there 
is no global treaty/agreement on the decarbonisation of the building sector (which may be rather 
difficult to achieve). Little harmonisation exists, and the several certification schemes make up for 
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hardly any rules. For instance, according to the IEA (2016), “two-thirds of energy consumption from 
buildings being built today has no codes or standards applied to it”. Rules facilitating collective 
action can be assessed as low. 
Transparency and Accountability 
Transparency and accountability have been identified to be delivered through the monitoring of 
implementation of rules. The function is vaguely fulfilled by only two international 
institutions/organisations in the buildings sector. UNEP has developed a 'Common Carbon Metric' 
which aims to allow emissions from buildings around the world to be consistently assessed and 
compared, and improvements measured. The G20 through its Energy Management Working Group 
(EMWG) encourages the implementation of energy management systems. There remains limited 
knowledge and related means as to the progress actors are making towards decarbonisation of the 
buildings sector. In addition, the data is not easily accessible, and one can question whether the 
measure to ensure transparency and accountability is authoritative. Transparency and accountability 
as concerns sectoral decarbonisation remains low. 
Means of Implementation 
All the international organisations/institutions active in the buildings sector provide some measure 
of means of implementation, which has been identified in section 1.3 as training, capacity building, 
awareness raising, finance and investment. A number of online tools are available to train 
stakeholders, other international organisations/institutions build awareness and disseminate 
information, some conduct trainings, a number of them provide platforms for stakeholder 
engagement and a limited number provide finance. APEC, UNEP and the WBG are the only ones 
which provide the most significant finance and investments to the sector for decarbonisation. 
Finance however remains the most potent means of implementation. The IEA (IEA, 2013) estimates 
that decarbonisation in the sector would require USD 31 trillion by 2050. While exact figures of 
financing by MDBs for the buildings sector and its decarbonisation are not available, they may only 
provide a limited share of the overall requirements in light of the size of the global buildings stock 
and future growth. City networks in particular help foster awareness of the need for decarbonisation 
of the sector. Overall, the means of implementation available for sectoral decarbonisation can be 
assessed as medium. 
Knowledge and Learning 
Every single international institution/organisation in the buildings sector provides some means of 
adding to knowledge and learning.  A number of them offer policy and technical knowledge 
platforms for sharing and curating global best practices. Some have created interactive online 
learning online tools, web portals and webinars which supports more efficient international 
collaboration. Likewise, almost all international institutions/organisations produce reports, 
roadmaps and host events which gather sector stakeholders.  GABC has developed a global deal-flow 
database while UN-Habitat has set up a knowledge programme directly with universities worldwide. 
The amalgamated effort of all international institutions/organisations makes an important 
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contribution to knowledge and learning in the buildings sector. The provision of knowledge and 
learning towards decarbonisation of the sector can be deemed as medium. 
9.4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
International governance for the decarbonisation of the buildings sector remains highly piecemeal 
and fragmented. There is no central international institution guiding the sector toward carbon 
neutrality. Instead, the need for the various governance functions is met to varying degrees by about 
a dozen or so intergovernmental and transnational institutions (a relatively limited number 
compared with some other sectors analysed in this report). A clear and authoritative translation of 
the PA’s decarbonisation goal for the buildings sector globally (e.g. NZEB as a general standard, 
including fast deep renovations of existing building stock) and regionally is clearly missing. There is 
also a dearth of efforts to define and agree on related technical standards and objectives (including 
for subsectors, such as heating, cooling, etc.). And capacity building and finance are in need of more 
encompassing strategy, including a clear positioning of international finance in efforts to 
comprehensively shift investments towards a decarbonisation of buildings.  
As a matter of fact, the lack of appropriate international governance reinforces the continuing 
carbon lock-in of the sector. Without determined efforts at making new buildings (that will normally 
be in use for decades to come) climate-neutral and increasing the rate of climate-deep renovations 
of existing buildings, reaching decarbonisation of the buildings sector early in the second half of the 
century gets ever more difficult and possibly unfeasible (CAT, 2016). 
Several of the institutions identified as contributing to the international governance of the sector 
could in principle help step up related international governance. As regards enhanced guidance and 
signal as well as international standards, the UNFCCC/PA, the G20, GABC, UNEP and UN-Habitat 
could in principle contribute to filling the existing gaps. Each of them has particular advantages and 
limitations. The UNFCCC/PA has global reach, but limited involvement of sectoral stakeholders and is 
generally focused on more overarching international governance (i.e. has limited capacity to address 
specific sectors). The G20 has a more limited membership that may prove problematic for a sector 
that has global reach. UNEP has limited reach towards the buildings sector. The GABC has the 
advantage of bringing governments and sectoral stakeholders together, but participation has so far 
remained limited and would have to be upgraded. UN-Habitat also has an appropriate sectoral focus, 
but has so far not proven capacity to address global standards for the buildings sector. It might also 
be possible to initiate a cooperative effort amongst several of the aforementioned institutions, 
thereby combining their strengths, to develop a common vision and certain technical standards 
guiding the decarbonisation of the sector. 
The finance sector has particular importance for the decarbonisation of the buildings sector. After all, 
the decarbonisation of the buildings sector has been estimated to require total investments of more 
than USD 30 trillion by 2050 (IEA 2013). International financial institutions cannot be expected to 
bring about this financing (to which national and bilateral sources will also have to contribute), but 
they can play an important and catalytic part in the overall investment shift required. This would 
entail ensuring that their finance is clearly and exclusively directed at supporting building and 
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renovation programmes and projects that are climate-proof and Paris-compatible and hence result 
in NZEBs, and that they focus their financing on those regions and countries where need of 
international finance is most pronounced (especially in regions of the Global South). In this way, 
international financial institutions could become important pacemakers for the climate transition of 
the sector. This would be part of the broader agenda of reforming international financial institutions 
and “shifting the trillions” for an effective and accelerated climate transition (see separate chapter 
on the financial sector). 
Transparency and accountability as well as knowledge and learning can also be further enhanced. 
In particular, UNEP’s efforts at developing and spreading a common carbon metric for buildings 
could be further developed and spread internationally; there is also further scope for developing 
standards for building certifications and codes (e.g. by ISO?); and the various initiatives to advance 
knowledge and learning (by virtually all the identified institutions) could be further networked and 
coordinated so as to ensure this crucial area maximises its contribution. To this end, it may be useful 
to consider the establishment of an overarching platform (“platform of platforms”) that provides 
information on relevant initiatives, including channels available for related capacity-building. This 
could be of use for several of the networks involved in concrete implementation on the ground, 
prominently including city networks. Several of the more overarching existing institutions could 
coordinate and operate such an overarching platform (UNEP, UN-Habitat, IES, GABC, GBPN), that 
could be carried by several of them in cooperation. 
The UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement could, as with respect to other sectors, probably best assume 
an overarching supervisory function. While the UN climate regime could in principle engage in more 
targeted sectoral governance of the building sector, it may not be best suited for doing so (e.g., 
given its already heavy agenda and the limited potential to engage sectoral stakeholders). It may 
best discuss and provide input to related efforts undertaken by other, sectorally more specialised 
institutions. Data reporting may hold some promise to tracking progress in the sector. In particular, 
however, the UNFCCC could usefully request or encourage countries to include sectoral objectives 
and measures in their “nationally determined contributions” and their low GHG emission 
development strategies, including for the buildings sector (and to potentially take into account 
international standards (to be) developed by other sector-specific institutions – see above). 
The decarbonisation of the buildings sector raises few direct equity and fairness issues. It is not 
prone to lead to the demise of particular regions or economic sectors. Rather, building sector 
decarbonisation is expected to help create additional employment and value in the construction 
sector. Having said that, equity issues lurk more indirectly. For example, strengthened buildings 
standards could raise upfront investment costs, which could constitute a burden on financially 
weaker building owners/house builders (especially in developing countries). This might require 
appropriate attention in the design of finance and other support schemes, including by international 
financial institutions/governance.  
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Table 9.2: Summary of activity under key international governance functions for buildings 
Functions 
Guidance and Signal Setting Rules Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
List of Institutions 
Sector-specific decarbonisation 
target and sub-targets for 
subsectors (like heating, cooling, 
cooking and heating water) 
International technical 




implementation of rules 
• Training, capacity building 
and awareness raising
• Finance and investment







• Reduce 2.2 Gigatonnes of CO2 
(GtCO2) globally by 2030 and 3.2 
Gt CO2 by 2050 compared to 
today’s emissions. 
• 80 percent energy demand
mitigation globally by 2050 
compared to 2005 levels.
• • • Capacity building,
awareness raising and
sharing of knowledge, data
and best practices between
regions, 
• Numerous on-line tools
• Training
• Knowledge platforms 
• Global online resource as well as
a tool on buildings energy
performance scenarios 
• Venues for sharing and
implementation of best practises 
• Workshops 
• Widely accessible webinars which
explain technical details to a
large number of stakeholders. 
• Web portal on building energy
code implementation
Global Alliance for 
Buildings and 
Construction  
• 84 GtCO2 by 2050 
• cumulative saving of 250 GtCO2
• 50 percent or more energy
• • • Increase awareness, 
• Skills and training
• Support technology 
• Convene and facilitate events 
• Deal-flow database
• Promoting collaboration between 
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Functions 
Guidance and Signal Setting Rules Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
(GABC) savings potential in 2050 transfer 
• Streamline access to the
large number of existing
support programs
public and financial sectors 
• Various support programs, 
platforms, and tools 
Renovate Europe • reduction of energy demand of 
the EU building stock 
by 80% by 2050 compared 
to 2005 levels 
• tripling the EUs average
renovation rate from the
current 1% to 3% per year
before 2020 
• 5 new net zero building
certifications 
• • • Produces reports and holds events 
World Green Building 
Council  
(WorldGBC) 
• 84 GtCO2 by 2050
• All buildings be net zero
emissions by when?
• Green building certification 
scheme
• 
• Net zero buildings 
awareness campaign 
• Capacity building
• Support and expertise to
25 cities 
• Working group in Asia Pacific to
advance net zero carbon buildings
by 2050.
• knowledge diffusion
• Europe wide ‘energy efficient
mortgage’ system EeMAP which
brings together stakeholders.
Local Governments 
for Sustainability  
• • • • Fosters stakeholder 
engagement 
• Sharing of best practises 
• Tools which help diffuse
knowledge
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Functions 
Guidance and Signal Setting Rules Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 





• 65% of emissions reductions or
3-3.5 GtCO2e/year by 2030 
• 50 percent energy savings 
potential by 2030 
• • • Training and capacity
building and finance
• Projects on awareness 
• Low carbon technology
deployment
• Brings together buildings
value chain stakeholders in
50 local markets 
• 6 new eeb platforms (to be
expanded to 50 cities by
2020)
• Energy Efficiency in Buildings
(EEB) Working Group
• Handbook on Energy Efficient 
Buildings 
• sharing of best practice on
building efficiency to achieve
national energy and climate goals.
• city-business collaboration model
C40 Cities Climate 
Leadership Group 
(C40) 
• Limiting global temperature rise 
to 1.5 °C (Broad goal) 
•  •  • Training and capacity 
building
• Building awareness 
• Sharing of best practises
• Facilitation of peer-to-peer 
exchanges 
• Collaborating on data 
management
• Policy and technical knowledge
platforms
• Open, interactive data source
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Functions 
Guidance and Signal Setting Rules Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
• Dedicated networks 
• Reports 
• Events, workshops 
Asia Pacific Economic 
Forum  
(APEC) 
• APEC program Nearly (Net) Zero
Energy Building aspires to 
reduce APEC's aggregate energy 
intensity by 45 percent by 2035 
compared to 2005. 
• Benchmarking system for data
on energy use in commercial 
and industrial buildings 
• The “Green Building Project” 
advances use of international
standards 
• Progress reports • Finance
• Capacity building
• Build awareness 
• “Green Building Project”
• Funding to Building Codes 
Assistance Project.
• Exchange of NZEB best practices,
energy reduction results
comparative studies 
• APEC Energy Working Group
• Stakeholder processes 
• Public-private collaboration and 
facilitate technical solutions in
addition to adopting best
practices 
• APEC Nearly (Net) Zero Energy
Building Roadmap Study
Group of 20 
(G20) 
• • • In 2014, the EMWG 
launched a consensus-
based, international 
certification scheme for 
ISO 50001. 
• Lead Auditor prohramme
builds capacity among 
accreditation and 
certification bodies in 
participating countries 
• Buildings Energy Efficiency Task
Group (BEET) 
• Web portal on building
performance metrics and building 
codes 
• Reports 
• Energy Management Working
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Functions 
Guidance and Signal Setting Rules Transparency and 
Accountability 





• • • • • Foster sharing of best practices 
through reports and stakeholder
interaction. 
• Conducts trainings, expert 
dialogues and workshops 
• Technology roadmaps 
• Detailed pathways to transition to





• • 'Common Carbon Metric' aims 
to allow emissions from 
buildings around the world to 
be consistently assessed and 
compared, and improvements 
measured. 




• Pilots projects in 
developing countries
• Projects targeting energy
efficiency improvements
energy service, and energy
efficiency action. 
• A handbook on climate
finance for cities and
• Tracking progress 
• Designing roadmaps  in concert
with government and 
stakeholders 
• Platforms for dialogue and 
collective action
• Tools and strategies to evaluate
and implement sustainable
building practices 
• Quick scan tool' to assess policies 
in the building sector and
scenarios to improve the current
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex 
– V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
286 
Functions 
Guidance and Signal Setting Rules Transparency and 
Accountability 
Means of Implementation Knowledge and Learning 
buildings helps raise 





World Bank Group 
(WBG) 
• Transition to clean stoves and 
fuels 
• Green building codes 
• Green building certification 
system 
•  • Provides finance 
• Green Bonds 
• Technologies for training
like the Open Learning
Campus 
• Training
• Pilot programs in 15 cities on 
urban planning.
• Reports, conferences, “open data” 
approach
• Collaboration tool to facilitate 
knowledge sharing, and
stakeholder engagement. 
• Knowledge and sharing
The United Nations 





• • • • Capacity building • Sharing of best practices 
• Platform for stakeholders 
• Links to universities worldwide
• Thematic hubs 
• Toolbox
• Advocacy and partnership 
platform 
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10. Synthesis, Conclusions, Next Steps
10.1. Introduction 
This chapter offers a summary of the sectoral findings of preceding chapters, begins to draw out 
common themes, identify implications for key international governance actors, including the EU, and 
suggests promising pathways for future research. It is structured as follows. First, the findings 
regarding the adequacy of fulfilment of governance functions by the activity mapped in the sectoral 
system analyses are summarised and compared. Implications from each of the sectoral chapters for 
the work of the UNFCCC/ Paris Agreement (PA) are drawn out. Further cross-sectorally relevant 
findings are then offered, including some related to carbon pricing, and others to interplay between 
the climate and trade regimes. Then, in view of the conceptualisation of ‘adequacy’ presented in 
Deliverable 4.1, consideration is given to the importance of equity and ‘just transition’ in policy 
responses, and the social acceptability of policy-making institutions more broadly. Following this, 
some implications for the role of the EU are drawn out, particularly with a view to enhancing the 
prospects for upward ‘ratcheting’ of ambition in the ‘post-Paris’ climate regime.  
As noted in Chapter 1, this deliverable should be regarded as a staging post on the way to a planned 
journal special issue or book project by the authors. Its findings will continue to be updated in the 
light of both emerging developments (such as imminent decisions related to international aviation) 
and reviewer comments (that time constraints have prevented from being acted upon fully). Several 
chapters are due be presented at the forthcoming Earth System Governance (ESG) conference, 
Utrecht (5th - 8th November 2018), where the authors successfully proposed a dedicated panel 
session on Assessing the Adequacy of the Global Climate Governance Complex après Paris.  
10.2. Comparative Findings on Sectoral Governance 
The findings of this analysis highlight wide variation across the sectoral systems examined, in terms 
of how far important governance functions are addressed by the existing governance complex, 
summarised in Table 10.1below.  
Given the large number of relevant institutions and initiatives, in many cases the breadth of their 
contributions, and at times a lack of transparency over the detail of relevant actions, it has not 
always been feasible to arrive at an overall ranking (low, medium, high) of the ‘supply’ of each of the 
five governance functions. This applies to finance in particular, where, as the authors of chapter 3 
note, a more detailed methodology would need to be developed before overall rankings can be 
offered in a non-arbitrary way. It also particularly affects international transport. In interpreting the 
scoring, it should also be stressed that some sectoral system analyses took more account of regional-
level detail than did others (compare the detail on regional initiatives in the assessment of the 
power sector, for example, with relative lack of coverage in the extractive industries analysis).81 
81 We hope to extend the analysis of extractive industries accordingly in future work. 
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Table 10.1: Summary of fulfilment of governance functions, by sectoral system 
Note: FFS gives specific ranking of progress regarding fossil-fuel subsidy reform, under the extractives heading. 
International transport (S = shipping; A = aviation) has not been fully scored due to the need for more detail, or 













Finance N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Power Med Low-Med High Med-High High 
Energy-
intensives 











Transport Med Low Med Med Med-high 










Buildings Low Low Low Medium Medium 
Much governance activity is evident in some sectoral systems, and regarding particular governance 
functions, as reflected in the great length of some chapter summary tables. However, there is a 
tendency for this activity to relate to the easiest functions to address, such as learning and 
knowledge building, or to take place in somewhat limited ‘niches’ carved out, for example, in the 
finance and transport sectoral systems. Across all sectoral systems examined, the assessments find 
the gap between governance demand and what is supplied is most serious in terms of the critically 
needed function of setting rules to facilitate collective action. Guidance and signal can also be seen 
as lacking, particularly in finance, extractive industries, energy-intensive industries, and buildings. 
The least contentious function, that of providing opportunities for knowledge dissemination and 
learning, is the one closest to being adequately fulfilled.  
Of the sectoral systems we examined, the power sector appears the most advanced in covering the 
main international governance functions required of it – particularly regarding transparency and 
accountability, means of implementation (with some caveats on finance), and knowledge and 
learning. Its relatively advanced position can arguably be explained by considering that policy 
makers (both international and domestic) have been paying attention to it for longer, its public 
profile has been higher, it has been easier to deal with through national-level action (e.g. it is less 
prone to leakage), and that is has fit the dominant paradigm that demand for (rather than supply of) 
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fossil fuels needs to be targeted. Moreover, compared to some of the other sectors, it is easier to 
decouple from economic growth. Nevertheless, it still falls short in achieving critical governance 
functions to the extent necessary for sufficient decarbonisation. Significantly, while the signal is 
strong and clear for the phase-in of renewable energy, it is somewhat vague when it comes to the 
phase-out of coal-powered electricity generation and virtually absent when it comes to generation 
powered by oil and particularly gas. 
Though it has proved difficult to measure it satisfactorily, the finance sector has made important 
progress in recent years, influenced by key policy entrepreneurs occupying senior positions in global 
institutions, who are well attuned to the dangers that climate change increasingly poses to the 
sector. Yet the crucial guidance and signal function is fulfilled in a mostly indirect or partial way, and 
financial means of implementation, though increasing, remain insufficient compared to global 
investment needs. As with the power sector, we find that phasing out support for ‘brown’ 
investments constitutes a tougher challenge than raising funds for investments in low-carbon 
alternatives. This clearly tallies with the findings on fossil-fuel extractive industries (chapter 6), as 
well as the transport related sectoral systems (chapters 7 and 8 respectively). 
It is useful to ask why sectors other than electricity are lagging behind. As a non-exhaustive set of 
possible reasons, which can be elaborated in future work, this may be because they: 
• are less easy to deal with through national-level action, due to difficulty of accounting for
emissions (e.g. international transport) or globally complex value chains (energy-intensive
industries);
• don’t fit the dominant paradigm that demand for (not supply of) fossil fuels is the issue
(fossil-fuel extractive industries);
• are particularly difficult to decouple from economic growth/ patterns of development (all
kinds of transport);
• are overseen by highly complex, often non-transparent sectoral governance institutions, into
which attempts to mainstream climate concerns have only belatedly begun (finance).
Although much governance activity is evident for several sectoral systems, overall we are not 
convinced that this is of the most effective kind. In this, we echo recent findings on the extent and 
effectiveness of ‘polycentricity’ offered by Jordan et al. (2018).82 Often, as in the energy-intensives 
(chapter 5), transport (chapter 7) and buildings (chapter 9) cases, there is no central and/or 
coordinating institution. More effective mitigation will need greater co-ordination or orchestration 
effort, sometimes from the UNFCCC/ PA, but also from the likes of the G20. The recent agreement of 
an initial climate strategy by the IMO demonstrates that, faced with enough pressure (including from 
82 While is it often assumed that the groundswell of new initiatives is cumulative, we would caution against 
this. Further research could usefully focus on how many initiatives have in fact ended, or essentially exist only 
‘on paper’.  
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the EU’s credible commitment to act unilaterally in the absence of multi-lateral action), sectors that 
do not fall under UNFCCC auspices can deliver meaningful action. In theory there could be lessons 
here for other sectors, such as energy-intensive industries. The findings of chapter 5 suggests that 
there may be a case for new, subsector-specific institutions that could serve to address the 
identified governance gaps and potentials. 
10.3. Implications for the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement 
Each of the sector-oriented chapters, as well as the dedicated assessment (chapter 2), draw some 
more specific conclusions with respect to the role of the UNFCCC/ PA, and offer some 
recommendations. Although the PA provides a strong overarching signal towards decarbonisation, 
to avoid ambiguity this arguably needs to be translated into more sectorally-specific targets and 
trajectories. Whether the role of formulating such targets and trajectories should fall to the UNFCCC, 
however, remains a moot point. Given its strong focus on GHG emissions in general and the 
historically relatively minor role that sector-specific perspectives have played in negotiations, 
chapter 4 suggested the UNFCCC is perhaps not the right place. Currently, the system of NDCs and 
LTSs that Parties are invited to prepare (implicitly) enlist national governments in developing such 
visions, but not in an internationally coordinated manner. On the other hand, the UNFCCC could still 
‘take note’ or ‘endorse’ visions developed at other international forums in a COP decision, thereby 
raising the profile of such sectoral visions and further institutionalising them.  
Chapters 2, 3, 6 in particular highlight the importance of a clearer and stronger signal about divesting 
from carbon-intensive investments and aligning all financial flows with climate goals, as set out in 
Article 2.1(c) of the PA. Potential opportunities to integrate the alignment of financial flows in the 
design of Paris ‘rule book’ can be identified, such as requiring NDCs to include finance-related 
commitments and policies, including reductions of fossil-fuel subsidies, introduction of carbon 
pricing instruments, and national legislation for mandatory climate-related financial disclosure. One 
of the main foci of the Global Stocktake could be assessing progress towards the long-term goal set 
out in Article 2.1(c), with information on financial flows relevant for this goal identified as relevant 
inputs, and recommendations and guidance to both Parties and non-Party actors in relation to 
achieving the goal becoming one of its main outputs (see chapter 3). 
Its established system of reporting and review may give the UNFCCC/ PA particular advantage when 
it comes to further improvements in transparency and accountability in a range of sectors. One 
qualification to this point, however, emerges from the examination of fossil-fuel extractive industries 
chapter. The established territorial approach to accounting for emissions does not recognise or 
reward actions which might cause reductions ‘offshore’ (such as restricting fossil fuel exports). An 
alternative accounting framework based on extraction-based emissions would help ensure that such 
efforts are reflected in national accounts (Piggot et al. 2017). As chapter 6 suggests, an extraction-
based accounting system could be established in parallel to monitor the alignment of fossil fuel 
supply with climate goals. 
In terms of securing adequate means of implementation, while the amount of finance and the lack 
of ‘bindingness’ of the commitment constitute a major weak spot of the PA, the UNFCCC’s financial 
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mechanism with the Green Climate Fund (see chapter 3) still constitute a potentially powerful lever. 
To fully employ it, the UNFCCC must collaborate with other international institutions. The World 
Bank and other MDBs are accredited entities to the Green Climate Fund and help to disburse the 
available funding; another candidate for closer coordination could be the Mission Innovation 
initiative to increase funding on research and innovation for clean energy (see chapter 2). 
While it may be ideal for a single dedicated international organisation/institution to perform the 
most important governance functions, the need/suitability for the UNFCCC to become more active in 
specific sectoral arrangements varies depending on the characteristics of the system in question. The 
governance of most energy-intensive industries, for example, requiring cooperation of a relatively 
limited number of countries/players, may not require the global reach of the UNFCCC, making an 
institution such as the G20 a more suitable candidate. Smaller scale alternatives - institutions like the 
CSI for each energy intensive industry subsector - may also prove effective. Further research is 
needed on the question of where the absence of a single overarching international organisation/ 
institution is really a critical impediment to progress. 
Given the tendency of the UNFCCC to gridlock, it may also be the case that smaller coalitions of the 
willing will first need to form on a mini-lateral basis, implementing their own sets of rules, as 
suggested in chapter 6 on extractive industries. In the case of international transport, the prospect 
of continuing deadlock led to UNFCCC ‘outsourcing’ governance responsibility to the ICAO and IMO. 
Though progress in both has been slow, the 2018 agreement on an interim climate strategy for 
shipping arguably provides some vindication of that ‘division of labour’, at least in the case of the 
IMO.	 The UNFCCC need not be completely excluded, but, as noted above, can take note of or 
endorse visions developed at other international forums. In such cases of ‘outsourcing’, the findings 
of this analysis highlight the importance of coordination when it comes to accounting for emission 
reductions, in order to avoid double counting. 
As noted in Chapter 3, UNFCCC-related events such as the One Planet Summit of 2017 can build 
political momentum, particularly for mobilising finance, to implement the PA (It also offered a 
platform for a growing coalition of actors in favour of acting on international shipping). A One Planet 
platform with annual summits is under discussion, and could provide a regular venue for making 
new pledges, setting targets, and tracking progress. 
Issues relating to the UNFCCC’s role in terms of ‘just transition’ are dealt with in section 10.5.1 
below. 
10.4. Further Cross-Sectoral Aspects 
The research into different sectoral systems has revealed interesting linkages and dependencies 
between them, influencing the prospects for overall decarbonisation. As noted in chapter 5, for 
example, deep emission reductions from energy-intensive industries will require an approach that 
covers the supply and value chains across different sectors. Steel, cement, chemicals and aluminium 
producers mostly make intermediate products and hence have limited impact on the use of 
intermediate goods in the final consumer or other products. Therefore, reducing basic materials’ 
COP 21 RIPPLES – D4.2 – Evaluating the Adequacy of the Outcome of COP21 in the Context of 
the Development of the Broader International Climate Regime Complex – V1.2 – 25/06/2018 
292 
intensity in these end products through smarter design, efficient consumption and enabling a 
circular resource model will need to be part of an integrated mitigation effort related to the 
emissions of the basic materials sectors. 
In the case of international transport, the pace of land-based energy-system transition will strongly 
influence demand for shipping, which in turn influences the extent to which low-carbon propulsion 
technology will need to be deployed (Walsh et al. 2017: 32). Wider decarbonisation of the electricity 
sector is also necessary if alternative fuels such as biofuel and hydrogen are to be manufactured in a 
sustainable way. Cross-sectoral interaction issues also arise for both aviation and shipping in terms 
of the need to compete for scarce supplies of biofuel with alternative uses, for example in the power 
sector. Given such competition, and the desire to minimise costs, continuing pressure to lower 
sustainability standards will likely be felt from some industrial interests. Regarding aviation, long-
term availability and cost of offset credits depends on linkages with carbon markets associated with 
other economic sectors; chapter 8 noted pressures here too in terms of agreeing standards for the 
quality and integrity of credits. We return to these issues when highlighting implications for the EU, 
below.  
As noted in the chapter on finance, investors and companies regularly call for more credible carbon 
pricing to correct policy and market failures. In this sense, it can be described as a governance 
demand actually emanating from actors making up many economic/ societal sectors (rather than the 
abstract sense in which our analysis has used the term). While the PA did not set an explicit, 
worldwide price, there is continued momentum for carbon pricing through existing and emerging 
initiatives beyond the UNFCCC. Chapter 3 noted how China’s national ‘cap and trade’ carbon market 
is due to replace the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) as the largest carbon market in 
the world, and highlighted the Carbon Pricing in the Americas (CPA) platform. However, coverage of 
the global total of emissions under these schemes remains limited. The Carbon Pricing Leadership 
Coalition (CPLC), bringing together national and sub-national governments, businesses, and civil 
society organisations, has adopted and is working towards the long-term objective of a carbon price 
applied throughout the global economy that is in line with PA objectives, complemented by a high-
level political Carbon Pricing Panel calling for raising carbon pricing coverage to 25 percent of global 
emissions by 2020 and 50 percent coverage by 2030, as well as a High Level Economic Commission 
that aims to identify Paris-compatible corridors of carbon prices (High-level Commission on Carbon 
Pricing 2017). The Commission’s report joins others in highlighting the importance of reduction of 
fossil fuel subsidies as an essential element of carbon pricing. Currently, subsidies in effect constitute 
a negative price on carbon, offering a negative signal, hindering the achievement of climate targets.  
10.4.1. Managing Climate-Trade Interactions 
This section allows chance to reflect on what sectoral chapters have found in terms of possible 
conflicts or synergies between the climate regime as centred on the UNFCCC, and the trade regime 
centred on the WTO. Regulation of the response to climate change and world trade have proceeded 
predominantly in silos, thus with little consideration of issues of consistency between the two 
regimes (Bacchus 2017). In the case of inconsistencies between the two regimes, such as where a 
trade dispute arises, WTO rules and dispute settlement procedure are binding on WTO Member 
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States, in contrast to the voluntary nature of the NDCs and the absence of a dispute settlement 
system under the PA. To avoid potential conflicts, and in the absence of a carbon adjustment 
measure, Bacchus suggests that the WTO should consider adopting a ‘climate waiver’ to the regime’s 
rules. 
The chapter on fossil-fuel extractive industries highlighted how existing rules expressed in the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) appear to be inadequate to discipline 
FFSs. No fossil fuel subsidy has yet been challenged by a WTO Member, and notification rates of 
subsidies have generally been low, due to a lack of commitment (possibly due to fear of starting a 
trade dispute), a lack of clarity about which subsidies need to be reported, or inherent difficulties of 
estimating them (Casier et al. 2014; van Asselt 2014). The WTO could do more to incentivise subsidy 
reform, for example by clarifying precisely when a subsidy qualifies as either “prohibited” or 
“actionable”, allowing other WTO Members to take action under the SCM Agreement.  
WTO rules also have potentially significant implications for action on international transport (Chircop 
et al. 2018). As noted in chapter 8, in overcoming possible conflict between CBDR and NMFT 
principles in the international shipping sector, the potential for market-based measures (MBMs) to 
offer a compromise is regularly discussed. However, some have flagged a potential relationship 
between such measures and WTO rules. Somewhat reassuringly, however, WTO representatives 
have remarked to the effect that the trade body could not challenge a global agreement facilitated 
by the IMO, and that its rules should not be invoked to stall progress tackling climate change. 
GATT’s Article XX has permitted some environmentally-motivated exceptions to the non-
discrimination principle where the measures in question are not “a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on international trade”. Nevertheless, as 
chapter 5 noted, Border Adjustment Taxes that could ease the risk of energy-intensive industries 
relocating from countries with more ambitious mitigation policies to those with less stringent 
policies (carbon leakage) clash with the WTO’s Article I (Most Favoured Nation provision) and Article 
III (National Treatment Provision). While it may be the case that carefully designed carbon border 
adjustment tax could be permissible under the WTO, evidence for carbon leakage has remained 
inconclusive to date (Naegele & Zaklan, 2017).  
As chapter 4 noted, the WTO is also relevant with respect to the trade of renewable energy and 
other low carbon technologies. Preferential trade agreements could play a strong facilitative role in 
promoting their deployment, but their potential is currently not being exploited according to some 
analysts (Lewis, 2014; Morin and Jinnah, 2018). In 2014 a group of 14 countries, including the US, 
EU, China and Japan started to negotiate a so-called Environmental Goods Agreement to reduce 
tariffs and trade barriers on low-carbon technologies (Van de Graaf and Colgan, 2016). In the 
meantime, the number of parties has increased yet the negotiations are slow and seem to have lost 
some of the initial momentum (Meyer, 2016; WTO, 2017). 
Seen in this light, we suggest that the relationship between the climate and trade regimes is 
ambivalent, displaying potential for synergy as well as tensions. On the one side, WTO trade 
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disciplines hamper efforts at effective GHG emission mitigation, if only in the political discussion 
(Border Adjustment Taxes). On the other side, the WTO also provides a means to address FFS and a 
forum to develop a synergistic agenda for climate protection and international trade (Environmental 
Goods Agreement). 
10.5. Fairness, Equity and Legitimacy Concerns in Policy and Institutions 
Following the framework for ‘adequacy’ set out in D4.1, consideration also needs to be given to 
fairness and social acceptability of policy and policymaking in overall assessments of sectoral-system 
governance, particularly in terms of their implications for ultimate mitigation effectiveness. In the 
following, some reflections on how the ‘just transition’ agenda relates to the decarbonisation of the 
sectoral systems that this report has examined are first offered. Then, the question of legitimacy of 
the institutions implicated in decarbonisation responses is discussed.  
10.5.1. Just Transition 
As chapter 6 has noted, deeply significant, but as yet unanswered questions regarding an equitable 
decline in fossil fuel use include how to allocate the right to extract them in view of the remaining 
carbon budget, and how to support nations transitioning away from extractive economies. The 
question of fairness is notoriously fraught, and possible to frame in multiple ways when it comes to 
extraction/ supply side policies, e.g. based on historical extraction or per capita rights - if not on cost 
optimisation. What is clear is that mitigation in line with a 1.5˚C temperature target would require 
the large-scale stranding of coal production and consumption assets, in particular, even with 
favourable developments in CCS technology (Spencer et al. 2018). Given existing economic 
structures, this will entail ‘stranded regions’ some states may in effect have to become ‘stranded 
nations’ (Manley et al. 2017). The process by which states (or regions within them) diversify their 
economies to make a transition away from fossil-fuel dependence, requires careful analysis and 
‘complex international negotiation and coordination’ (Schlösser et al. 2017). Without this, the 
political viability of transition for such states and regions becomes, to say the least, problematic.  
In terms of whether those who have most responsibility for present and past emissions, and/or most 
capacity to act, are currently shouldering responsibility, given the (announced) withdrawal of the US 
from the PA, and attempt to maintain coal production and consumption (and increase oil 
exploration), the answer is emphatically no. This may act as a deterrent to other large-scale fossil-
fuel extracting states from acting more ambitiously. In terms of the reform of domestic fossil-fuel 
subsidies, there is evidence (OECD 2018) that reductions in more developed countries have stalled in 
recent years, with most reform instead occurring in developing nations, such as Indonesia and India. 
This may be regarded as problematic. At the global level, the contributions of major emitters to 
mitigation in the transport sector are not in line with their responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. Recent sales figures revealing an increase in the average emissions from new cars, 
despite regulation to bring the average down (particularly from the EU), reveal this in stark terms. 
Complexities entailed in ‘just transition’ are both spatial and temporal: geographical disconnection 
between areas where jobs will be lost and areas where new jobs will be created, and temporal 
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disconnection for workers before new opportunities are presented. In the power sector, the main 
equity-related issue concerns the fate of those currently employed in coal-fired power stations. At 
first sight, the decarbonisation of the energy-intensive industries seems to raise equity issues to a 
comparatively limited extent: production facilities would still be required. To the extent that the 
response would succeed in also reducing demand for the relevant products (because of increased 
circularity), demand for energy-intensive products could decrease, causing employment. Chapter 5 
suggests that the industrial restructuring implied by decarbonisation in energy-intensive industries is 
likely to result in winners and losers whose precise identities depend on the outcome of the race to 
climate-friendly breakthrough technologies. Coordinating R&D efforts could provide a means to 
facilitate careful and timely management of potentially negative social effects in a targeted manner. 
The analysis of land transport suggests that the necessary shift to zero emission vehicles will entail 
major economic dislocation. Demand for oil would decrease massively, not only putting oil workers 
out of work, but also potentially destabilising entire oil-exporting countries. In addition, the value 
chains of EVs will be very different from those based on the internal combustion engine (ICE), 
potentially jeopardising employment in current value chains. Potentially this may affect not only 
producers of auto parts but also the entire steel industry, as EVs use much less steel than their ICE-
based counterparts. A more optimistic reading of possible futures at the intersection of these 
sectoral systems would suggest that replacing the entire ICE-based fleet would have the net effect of 
raising overall demand for steel (at least during the transition). Moreover, new business and 
business models would be created through the circular economy, in which steel from scrapped 
vehicles would be recycled. Decarbonisation of the transport sector has the potential to enhance 
equity within societies, in particular the ‘avoid’ and ‘shift’ parts of the Avoid-Shift-Improve concept. 
Prioritising walkability and public transport will enhance the mobility of economically or physically 
disadvantaged people, as will the development of transport as a service. 
Controversy continues in both aviation and shipping sectors over the question of fairness, and in 
particular whether those actors who have most responsibility for present and past emissions, and 
most capacity to act, are taking an adequate lead. In aviation, controversy has accompanied 
attempts to operationalise the aspirational goals for greater efficiency and carbon-neutral growth 
(CNG). These non-binding goals are neither assigned nor “attributed” to specific States or aircraft 
operators. Instead, all States are encouraged to collectively strive to achieve them. For some 
developing States that filed reservations, the fact that these goals did not set differentiated 
obligations made them unacceptable. Fairness concerns also arise over the CORSIA instrument’s 
requirement that developing countries offset the same percentage of emissions as developed 
countries until 2030, and potentially a higher percentage after 2030 (WWF 2017). As chapter 9 
noted, several States declined to join the CORSIA pilot phase. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela objected to CORSIA for various reasons, including a potentially 
disproportionately burden on developing countries (some of these have taken similar positions at 
the IMO). By giving a justification for opting out, it is arguable that failure to treat equity seriously in 
this case threatens effectiveness of the measures being put in place. 
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The needs of developing countries (especially SIDS and LDCs) for access to low-carbon technology 
have been acknowledged in debates at the International Maritime Organisation (Chircop et al. 
2018). Without this, IMO efforts to introduce more ambitious regulation will run into political 
trouble. A further concern is voiced by exporters of certain perishable foodstuffs about loss of 
competitiveness resulting from imposition of slow steaming or other kinds of cost-raising 
regulations. Research suggests such concerns may be exaggerated (CE Delft 2017), and where 
genuine could be addressed through exemptions. In discussions of measures to internalise carbon 
externalities for both aviation and shipping, such as carbon taxation, compensating developing 
countries for the economic harm they might suffer - ensuring that they bear ‘no net incidence‘ - is 
widely recognised as critical to their acceptability (IMF 2011). It also bears repeating that low-carbon 
innovation will creates business opportunities, which can be a source of green growth and green 
jobs, not least in emerging economies. 
The decarbonisation of the buildings sector raises few direct equity and fairness issues. It is not 
prone to lead to the demise of particular regions or economic sectors. Rather, building sector 
decarbonisation is expected to help create additional employment and value in the construction 
sector. Having said that, equity issues lurk more indirectly. For example, strengthened buildings 
standards could raise upfront investment costs, which could constitute a burden on financially 
weaker building owners/house builders (especially in developing countries). This might require 
appropriate attention in the design of finance and other support schemes, including by international 
financial institutions/governance.  
As chapter 6 has noted, the UNFCCC negotiations include a Forum on the ‘Impact of the 
Implementation of Response Measures’, which in turn has developed a work programme focusing 
on ‘economic diversification and transformation’ and ‘just transition of the workforce, and the 
creation of decent work and quality jobs’ (UNFCCC 2015a). The preamble to the PA also recognises 
‘the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality 
jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities’ (UNFCCC 2015b)’. The ‘response 
measures track’ provides an obvious space for planning the transition away from fossil fuels. Indeed, 
the first UNFCCC technical report on ‘just transitions’ already acknowledges that the necessary 
fundamental change in the global energy mix will result in ‘further job losses in the fossil fuel sector 
 in coal mining, in exploration and production of oil and gas, and at fossil fuel-powered power 
plants’ (UNFCCC 2016a, p.31) (Piggot et al. 2017). 
In addition to the UNFCCC, the G20 is also a strong candidate to oversee processes of transition at 
the global level, and handling the problem of ‘stranded nations’ (Goldthau 2017; Schlösser et al. 
2017). However, both institutions would need to gear themselves up significantly to be credible and 
legitimate leaders of this global transition (SEI 2018). Processes by which these complex transitions 
can be negotiated and coordinated cannot be confined to official climate-policy related channels, 
but must also extend to development cooperation, and governance of finance where, as chapter 2 
noted, improved information about climate-related risks is needed to guide investment. 
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10.5.2.  Legitimacy 
Means of implementation, in particular finance, are to a large extent channelled through the World 
Bank and other MDBs, who have long been criticised as donor-driven and for the social impacts of 
their projects. The World Bank-administered Global Environment Fund and Climate Investment 
Funds that channel resources largely through MDBs (see chapter 3) are likewise not fully accepted 
by developing countries and civil society, and accused of lack of responsiveness to developing 
country concerns over ‘ownership’. These concerns have implications for a range of sectoral systems 
covered in this report. 
Chapter 4 suggests that in terms of the legitimacy of key sectoral governance institutions, the IEA 
may also be regarded as potentially problematic. While its assessments carry weight, the IEA’s legacy 
as an ‘oil buyers club’ arguably extends to a present day bias towards fossil fuels, expressed in 
apparent under-estimates of the potential of renewable energy. Along with this trust-related 
concern, the limited OECD membership list may also be highlighted as problematic. That said, the 
IEA is a prime candidate to take on a stronger role in sectoral decarbonisation efforts, as described in 
chapter 4, and could be separated from the OECD to attract a wider membership.  
Beyond the IEA issue, criticism that the transnational governance landscape is dominated by 
northern initiatives/actors within those initiatives (Chan et al. 2018), holds true for the sub- and 
transnational initiatives considered in chapter 4, especially those focussing on local actors.83 There is 
perhaps a need (and a potential role for the EU) to engage and support cities and regional 
governments in the global south, perhaps diffusing the Covenant of Mayors approach. But this will 
most likely require financial assistance as well as capacity building to enable local governments to 
meaningfully engage in such networks. Despite this possible criticism, there are quite a few 
initiatives that transcend the old north-south relationship, for example the variety of regional, 
African institutions, and particularly the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI). 
In terms of legitimacy/ social acceptability of the institutions through which policy and governance 
occurs, both the IMO and ICAO are commonly subject to criticism. Over-representation in the ICAO 
Council of some regions, such as the Northern European States, (and Central and Latin America), and 
on the ICAO’s Committee on Aviation and Environmental Protection (CAEP) which makes key climate 
policy-related decisions, has attracted criticism (Piera 2016) and could be considered a priority for 
reform. Apart from representation, lack of transparency is a key legitimacy-related concern in this 
case. Submissions and inputs to the process of agreeing policy measures from ICAO members, 
including EU member states, won't be made public until after the body adopts rules in June 2018.  
In the case of shipping, the majority of the world’s commercial fleet is registered in only five states 
(Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Malta and the Bahamas), many of which are known as tax 
havens for ships. Together, these five contribute 43.5 per cent of the IMO’s total funding from 170 
83 We have not been able to explore this aspect for other sectoral systems. 
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member states. This gives potentially exaggerated weight in decision making, particularly when no 
checks and balances exist. National delegations to the IMO include industry representatives, who 
also take part in technical working groups. This inclusion explains the vocal opposition to sectoral 
emissions reduction targets from states, such as the Cook Islands, which might otherwise (given 
their vulnerability to climate impacts) be expected to take a progressive stance (Darby 2016). 31% of 
member states were represented in part by direct business interests at the most recent MEPC 
meeting, a degree of corporate representation in the policy making process that is exceptional 
among UN bodies (InfluenceMap 2017). Moreover, the IMO is also notoriously secretive in its 
meetings, with journalists and NGOs with consultative status unable to report freely. More 
positively, transparency about the IMO’s administration is high, and information about the remit, 
powers and rules of procedure of its assembly, council and committees is easily accessible 
(Transparency International 2018). 
The increasing importance of private green shipping programmes in shaping global business practice 
may also be highlighted. Among their limitations, a lack legitimacy and potential for undue corporate 
influence has been highlighted, in contrast for example to private transnational certification rule-
making bodies in the natural resource and agriculture sectors (Lister 2015).  
10.6. Core Issues for EU Leadership, Après Paris 
The success of the PA in addressing climate change is contingent on how it now evolves over time 
(Kemp 2017). Most importantly, the concept of upward ‘ratcheting’ of emission reduction pledges is 
central to the eventual success of the agreement (as perceived not least by the EU). Several ‘tools’ 
by which this might be achieved have been noted in the literature. It is possible to adopt a broad 
definition of ratcheting, such that developments outside the UNFCCC regime also become relevant. 
Hale (2015), for example, usefully notes the following five potential ‘ratcheting tools’: 
1) Agreeing to raise national contributions in regular, five-year cycles.
2) Agreeing to practical international review of country pledges that mixes accountability with
support for implementation, tailored to countries’ circumstances.
3) Supporting the groundswell of action from cities, companies, and other actors.
4) Continuing diplomatic efforts at the bilateral, mini-lateral, and sectoral levels.
5) Establishing a long-term goal and other policy signals that reinforce broader shifts in finance
and technology.
The first and fifth of these tools are now embodied in the PA, while the details of the second remain 
to be agreed under the framework of the Paris ‘rule book’. In terms of (4), following some important 
progress by the G7 and G20, the Montreal Protocol’s widening to include HFCs, the Climate and 
Clean Air Coalition measures against short-lived climate pollutants, and the international shipping 
sector’s agreement on an initial climate strategy (see chapter 8), attention may turn to international 
aviation, and energy-intensive sectors. Such “mini-lateral” and sector-specific deals provide concrete 
building blocks for countries to reach and exceed their national pledges, making it more likely that 
they will ratchet up action in the future. ‘They are additive and complementary to the UNFCCC 
process, not an alternative to it’ (Hale 2015: 4). Ideally, there is therefore a strong element of 
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interaction between the ‘tools’ outlined above: the ‘post-Paris regime may benefit from an upward 
spiral of climate actions in which domestic and transnational governance of climate change mutually 
reinforce one another. Building productive linkages across these spheres is, therefore, of central 
importance’ (Roger, Hale and Andonova 2016).84 
Adopting a broader conceptualisation of the ratchet mechanism allows for consideration of ways in 
which the EU could work to enhance the potential of a range of ‘tools’. Regarding tools 3 and 4 
above, the literature (Hale and Roger 2014) is beginning to highlight interesting potential for new 
actors to engage in ‘orchestration’ activity, whereby states or international organisations multiply 
their influence by initiating, guiding, broadening, and strengthening transnational governance by 
non-state and/or sub-state actors (Abbott 2018). The World Bank, UNEP and the UK government 
have been noted as examples of orchestrators, but the concept remains ‘under-explored in the 
academic literature and underused by policymakers’ (Hale and Roger 2014: 61). Abbott and Snidal 
(2010) argue that orchestrators are likely to need cognitive, normative and executive influence. Hale 
and Roger (2014: 80) note how: 
‘potential orchestrators will be relatively few—by definition, not everyone can be a focal 
institution—[but] many more states and IOs possess the capacity to orchestrate than do so. 
The European Union, for example, has not employed this strategy effectively, even though it 
would seem to be a logical way to advance EU goals in the face of multilateral gridlock’ 
(emphasis added). 
Interestingly, in rejecting President Trump’s apparent offer to ‘renegotiate’ the PA, the EU pledged 
instead to bypass Washington to work with US business leaders and state governors to implement 
emission reduction commitments (Boffey et al. 2017). The feasibility of actors like the EU (and its 
individual member states) engaging more in orchestration activity, and the form it could take, should 
be explored further. Policy makers could strengthen new and existing international climate 
initiatives through technical and financial support; hosting of regular events to discuss and possibly 
launch new actions and initiatives in collaboration with non-state and subnational actors could fill 
current gaps in climate governance (Böβner and van Asselt 2017). Initiatives that help to strengthen 
insights into the ex-post performance of national climate policies could help improve 
implementation and the prospects of delivering NDC pledges. Supporting existing and new initiatives 
involving non-state and subnational actors in the Global South could further strengthen the EU’s 
credibility as a global climate leader (Böβner and van Asselt 2017: 12-13). 
84 Involvement of non-Party stakeholders in the global stocktake (and the 2018 Talanoa dialogue) is not only 
important for achieving greater transparency of their own actions. As Van Asselt and Böβner (2017) argue, 
non-Party stakeholders can also ‘offer insights into the mitigation potential in countries, identify untapped 
sources of financial, technological and capacity-building support, and consequently help identify ways to 
strengthen the ambition of Parties’ future NDCs’. Parties should therefore not just consider the role of non-
Party stakeholders in the ‘input’ stage of the global stocktake, but also identify possible roles in the ‘output’ 
and ‘outcome’ stages.  
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This is not to under-estimate the importance of the EU’s role in the inter-governmental climate 
regime as conventionally conceived. The literature has identified four main modes of (EU) 
leadership: structural, idea-based, directional, and instrumental (Parker and Karlsson 2014). 
Structural leadership ‘relies on the capacity to take actions or deploy power-resources that create 
incentives, costs and benefits that may sway other actors to change their behaviour’. Idea-based 
leadership ‘is characterised by problem naming and framing, agenda setting efforts and the 
discovering and proposing of joint solutions to collective problems’. Directional leadership means 
‘leading by example and demonstrating the feasibility, value, and supremacy of specific policy 
prescriptions’. Instrumental leadership refers to ‘an actor’s ability to promote the forming of 
coalitions, solve negotiation problems, and build bridges necessary to broker deals’ (ibid). In the 
literature to date, this tends to refer to inter-governmental coalition building, but the concept could 
be widened. 
A recent review of the impact of EU climate leadership has identified mixed and varied record of 
success associated with various leadership strategies. It suggests that the EU should practice 
multiple leadership modes, ‘mainly because … different leadership functions are important and are 
performed in different stages of the negotiation process’ (Parker et al. 2017: 249). While Parker et 
al. had in mind inter-governmental negotiation processes, the idea that the lesson could apply more 
widely in a more polycentric setting is worth exploring further. We suggest a need to question why 
the Commission prioritises the initiatives it chooses to support, especially under Global Climate 
Action Agenda (GCCA)?85 Is support for these initiatives the most effective way for the EU to adopt a 
leadership role beyond the UNFCCC. We suggest that a new research agenda should begin to 
examine how the EU’s leadership style could respond to an increasingly polycentric climate 
governance landscape, where the UNFCCC is only one, albeit very important, venue for action, but 
where not all Member States may be members of other important venues for action (e.g. Friends of 
Fossil-fuel Subsidy Reform). In addition, where might the threat of EU unilateral action provide an 
effective option (as it has in international shipping and aviation cases). 
10.6.1. Potential EU Role in Specific Sectoral Systems 
Finance Sector 
Given European ‘weight’ on global financial markets, the EU should use its Sustainable Finance 
Action Plan to promote the implementation of Article 2.1(c) in the UNFCCC and within its member 
states, while also seeking to influence the broader shift towards climate-aligned financial flows 
globally. This should include the setting of dynamic standards and metrics that are able to evolve 
over time and adapt to feedbacks from the physical world, such as in updating decarbonisation 
needs in terms of investments towards the 1.5˚C goal. 
85 Through GCCA, the Commission supports: the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI); the Global Covenant 
of Mayors for Climate and Energy; Mission Innovation; the Climate and Clean Air Coalition; the G7 Climate Risk 
Insurance Initiative; the NDC Partnership: Working Together to Achieve Ambitious Climate Action While 
Enhancing Sustainable Development. 
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As carbon pricing initiatives expand around the world, the EU could explore collaboration and 
possible integration opportunities with its own ETS, while bearing in mind the importance of a wider 
portfolio of instruments. All of these can signal to investors, facilitating the adjustment of climate-
related financial risks. 
EU Member States could lead the way by building on the Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations and creating mandatory regulations regarding carbon content 
and carbon risks disclosure within their jurisdictions. 
Power Sector 
Some EU member states (including France, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and 
Austria), have already committed themselves to the phase-out of coal-powered electricity, and 
joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance. Germany, however, has not. The European Commission 
could consider becoming more pro-active here by initiating a post-2020, long-term plan for phasing 
out coal internally, as well as a move to support the new alliance as part of its external action 
(Droege and Rattani 2018). In order to help close identified governance gaps, the EU should 
consider: 
• Placing decarbonisation of the power sector, including the phase-out of all fossil fuels, on
the agenda of all appropriate international fora, in particular the G20, and looking for
opportunities to link efforts to those of other sectors and/or issues such as security, trade.
• Seeking ways in which sectoral roadmaps and transformation visions can be taken up,
endorsed, and meaningfully institutionalised within the UNFCCC and PA. This could include
encouraging development of global or regional decarbonisation roadmaps by other
institutions, such as the IEA.
• Exploring whether and how the IEA could become independent from the OECD and whether
that independence would help to build trust and engage developing countries and emerging
economies to broaden IEA’s membership to become a truly global institution.
Energy-Intensive Industries 
The EU is a key actor in the area of energy-intensive industries. It holds a significant share of relevant 
production (capacity) and is a key market for energy-intensive products. It also has important 
instruments to support and advance R&D for industrial low-carbon innovation (Horizon 2020, 
Innovation Fund, EUETS). Moreover, the EU and its member states (and their industries) are 
prominent and influential members of all existing relevant institutions. As such, the EU is well placed 
to play an active role in developing the sectoral climate governance landscape along the lines 
explored in chapter 5. It can in particular itself launch related public and public-private initiatives and 
coordinate with other key players to advance the development of international governance 
structures for decarbonisation in these sectors. It may also usefully support the building of broader 
international and transnational governance structures for this sectoral system by advancing bilateral 
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or plurilateral cooperation with key partners, for example in targeted R&D and the development and 
linkage/coordination of certain related policy instruments such as emissions trading systems. 
Fossil-Fuel Extractive Industries 
Regarding fossil-fuel extractive industries, and the subsidies they benefit from, the EU has made its 
own commitments which it could work harder to achieve, in keeping with its oft-professed climate 
leadership-by-example. Officially, Members States must phase out environmentally harmful 
subsidies (including those dedicated to fossil fuels) by 2020 (Gençsü et al. 2017), and end subsidies 
to uncompetitive hard coal mining by 2018 (EU Council Decision 2010). European governments have 
made parallel pledges to end fossil fuel subsidies under the G7 and the G20; Germany and Italy 
volunteered to be assessed under the G20 peer-review process (described in chapter 6). However, 
from 2014 to 2016, EU financial instruments and public banks are reported to have subsidised gas 
and oil production (within Europe and beyond) by over €3 billion per year on average (Gençsü et al. 
2017). 
In terms of its work through international organisations, as an important first step, the EU could 
promote enhanced transparency of FFS in the WTO, for instance by adopting a new notification 
template that provides further details on subsidies in a standardised fashion and allows NGOs to 
report on the level of non-actionable subsidies (Droege and Rattani 2018). 
Working through bilateral/ regional trade agreements may also increasingly offer opportunities in 
the future governance of energy subsidies that the EU could promote. For instance, negotiations for 
an EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement have included a notable provision on fossil fuel subsidies. 
This example shows that in the absence of progress at the multilateral level—or as a parallel effort—
energy subsidy reform may well be driven by regional efforts (van der Graaf and Van Asselt 2017). 
Transport 
The EU, its member states and other progressive countries may wish to consider targeted initiatives 
to close governance supply gaps that currently exist particularly in rule-setting, transparency and 
means of implementation functions. The EU could work to establish requirements for a sectoral 
breakdown in NDCs and long-term strategies, with transport further broken down into passenger 
and freight categories. It could also advocate a sectoral breakdown to be included in the Global 
Stocktake, and a strengthening of national reporting and international review on national transport 
emissions, policy responses and their impacts. Furthermore, the EU could make its own provision of 
means of implementation compatible with the PA and work towards analogous policies within the 
multilateral financial institutions. 
As chapter 7 noted, one obvious means to show leadership is through the EU’s own fleet emission 
standards, currently in the process of revision. Due to the importance of the EU market, 
establishment of more ambitious standards would provide a kind of ‘structural’ leadership, 
incentivising a shift by all producers wanting to sell into the EU, fostering the production and sale of 
energy and carbon efficient vehicles globally. Currently, EU standards are too weak to play this role. 
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International Transport 
EU institutions have pressed for greater policy ambition on both international aviation and shipping, 
with some effect, and look set to continue to do so.86 At time of writing there are concerns that 
emerging CORSIA rules will contradict both the EU's 2007 ban on forest offsets being used in the EU 
ETS, and the European Parliament's vote to exclude palm oil from 2021 through the recast of the 
renewable energy directive. Campaigners have blamed the EU Commission for failing to push for 
greater transparency during ICAO negotiations. While the Parliament has no direct input to the 
ICAO’s offset decision-making process, EU Aviation ETS legislation includes a timetable and review 
process that will allow it significant influence. If the offset process is not considered environmentally 
robust, the EU can bring the full EU ETS legislation back into force (ENDS Europe Daily 15/2/18). A 
further step that the EU could take unilaterally that would manage growing demand and also reduce 
a perverse subsidy would be to end passenger transport services’ eligibility for reduced or zero VAT 
rates. Subjecting domestic, intra and extra-EU flight tickets to VAT at 15% would generate revenues 
in the order of €17 billion per year, presenting a major opportunity to easing the EU’s ongoing 
budget issues, as well as beginning to internalise aviation’s significant external costs (T&E 2018). 
In shipping, the Commission has proposed a systematic and gradual three-step approach for 
integrating maritime GHG emissions into the EU’s existing commitments. However, EU institutions 
have indicated a preference for the IMO to set targets and to adopt measures, and given progress 
apparent in that venue, it may be reasonable to give the global-level institution the benefit of the 
doubt for the time being. As an ‘insurance policy’, MEPs have proposed including shipping in the EU 
emissions trading system from 2023, if the IMO fails to agree a global measure. Ship operators 
would either have to buy ETS emissions allowances or contribute a corresponding amount to a new 
maritime climate fund. This would reinvest part of the revenue to make ports and ships cleaner and 
more fuel efficient. This prospect receded in November 201787 - but in principle could reappear. As 
noted in chapter 8, an EU-wide port charging scheme with incentives for greener ships has very 
promising potential to reduce shipping emissions. A further strong message emerging concerned the 
importance and urgency of switching funds away from the promotion of LNG infrastructures, and 
towards the small-scale developers of genuinely low-carbon alternative fuels that don’t carry the 
same risks of ‘lock-in’.  
Buildings 
The EU and its member states (and European sectoral stakeholders) are prominent and influential 
members of all relevant existing institutions. The EU is hence well placed to play an active role in 
developing the sectoral governance landscape along the lines explored [in chapter 9], including 
86 Many agree that it was ultimately bold action by the EU – temporarily including international flights from 
outside the EEA in the EU emissions trading scheme – that forced the ICAO to reiterate its commitment to 
action in 2013 (Gonçalves 2017).  
87 http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/europe/threat-of-shipping-s-inclusion-in-eu-emissions-trading-
scheme-recedes.html 
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through pursuing targeted alliances to this end. Secondly, the EU is a key player in the construction 
sector and leading the development of the related regulatory framework, including the Energy 
Efficiency Directive, the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, etc. as well as a plethora of 
national and local measures taken on this basis. The EU can play an active part in further developing 
these regulatory frameworks, and lead by example by accelerating the decarbonisation of the 
building sector (including by increasing the rate of retrofitting). It can also give a good example by 
including buildings in its low-GHG emission development strategy. In general, it can enhance its 
efforts to diffuse the lessons learned internationally in terms of best practice and capacity building, 
one key channel for advancing the decarbonisation of the building sector.  
10.7. Future Research 
Work remains to be done to refine the methodology by which rankings of the extent of attainment 
of governance functions can be offered in a more convincing way in some cases, and to update the 
database and ‘scores’ accordingly, in light of ongoing policy developments. Beyond this, several 
tasks for future research emerge from our analysis of the selected sectoral governance systems. To 
start with, the sectoral approach to understanding international climate governance can be further 
developed, including by considering in further detail multi-level interactions across various levels 
(local, national, regional and international), and what expectations it is necessary and reasonable to 
have regarding the international (including transnational) contribution to the whole. This might 
include investigation of the role different types of international initiatives, including “climate clubs” 
(i.e. governance efforts of smaller groups of countries/actors) might play in bringing about overall 
governance advances. A further task could be to pick up from the point made above regarding the 
need to question the assumption that the groundswell of new initiatives is cumulative. This should 
be treated as an empirical question, with future research usefully focusing on how many initiatives 
have in fact ended, or essentially exist only ‘on paper’. 
Closely related, future research could further systematise the investigation of the factors and driving 
forces that determine or affect the performance and effectiveness of sectoral governance systems in 
making meaningful progress toward decarbonisation. What endogenous/design and exogenous 
factors help advance the effectiveness of sectoral governance, and how might these factors be 
shaped and furthered? The design of particular governance initiatives in terms of participating actors 
(including intergovernmental, transnational and hybrid arrangements) and exact focus of activity 
may be part of the set of factors to be further explored, as is the broader institutional landscape in 
which such an initiative would be embedded (along with other factors such as the barriers to be 
overcome and the international constellation of power and interests). 
Such a further deepened and systematised analysis would also provide a firmer basis for identifying 
policy options for the EU and other actors interested in advancing effective climate governance. This 
step of the analysis can further systematise the assessment of the political feasibility of different 
policy options (such as engaging in further efforts to advance orchestration of different governance 
arrangements, enhance certain particularly promising elements of the international governance 
landscape, or progress regional/national and bilateral efforts, possibly as a stepping stone to broader 
international change). In doing so, it would assist the EU (and other actors) in prioritising the 
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different options (that may not necessarily be incompatible, but may not all be pursued concurrently 
given resource constraints). 
Several of the aforementioned tasks for pushing the research agenda of sectoral (international) 
governance forward will be further addressed in Task 4.3 of Work Package 4. This task is due to 
delve further into the sectoral governance of finance and investment as well as technology and 
innovation (in specific priority sectors), and will specifically investigate the potential for creating and 
advancing ‘climate clubs’ in a sectoral perspective.  
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